JISMOR

Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study
of Monotheistic Religions

Doshisha University
Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions

2020 16

Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions

16th Issue (No.16)

CONTENTS

Islamic Revivalism among Muslim Minorities in Asia

Introduction

Junya Shinohe

This issue of *JISMOR,* featuring "Islamic Revivalism among Muslim Minorities in Asia" includes the following two papers: (1) Masako Nakaya, "Islamic Revival under Socialist Regime of China：A Case Study of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region" and (2) Naomi Nishi, "Aspects of Islamic Revivalism in Thailand." These two papers are based on lectures of the same title in the CISMOR Research Fellow Workshop; Memorial Workshop for Professor Dr. Samir Abdel Hamid I. Nouh, "Islamic Revivalism among Muslim Minorites in Asia" held on Saturday, January 11, 2020 at the Conference Room, Shikokan 1st floor, Karasuma Campus, Doshisha University. There is a great deal of interest in the current situation of Muslim minorities in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and the Workshop meeting of that day was attended by too many people to enter the room, and the question-and-answer session was lively.

Then I made comments on the presentation of the two speakers Dr. Masako Nakaya and Dr. Naomi Nishi, but after reading the two papers again, I will here introduce them with some supplementary corrections.

Regarding the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism among Muslim minorities in Asia, Nakaya's paper examines it in the socialist Chinese Communist Party's religious policy, while Nishi's paper places it in the history of Thailand.

The former reminds us of the relationship between the ideology of Marxist-Leninist Chinese Communist and religion, while the latter encourages us to consider the oppressed history of the Muslim region of four provinces on the southern border with Malaysia in the Buddhist country of Thailand, that is, the issues of Muslim minorities in Thailand, where most people believe in Buddhism, which is different from their religious faith.

Then, in reading the two papers, it would be necessary to understand the external phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism which the two papers presuppose.

In particular, a brutal murder of civilians, and abduction, kidnap and execution of foreigners (including Japanese) in the territory of "Islamic State" established by the effective

control of the area across Iraq and Syria under the 2014 Declaration of Khalīfa (the leadership title of Sunnī Islamic Community) made ambiguous and even obsolete the former meaning of the term Islamic Revivalism. Instead, the terms "Islamic Revivalism" which began to be used in the 1980s and "Islamism," referring to the political Islamist movement aimed at seizing and establishing power, continued to be used at almost the same time and came to overlap with the image of Islamic extremists who committed indiscriminate killings during the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Soviet-Afghan War (Afghanistan Conflict 1979-89), expanding ethnic conflicts triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York (2001). If you notice it, you can understand that the two papers are not in the context of the 2014 Declaration of the Islamic State. However, the terrorist incidents by Islamic extremist groups in Asia and Europe, who were stimulated and responded by the movement (or should it be called "behavior"?) of the Islamic State skillfully using the Internet were reported at the same time through media, making it difficult to immediately grasp the meaning of Islamic Revivalism.

Thus, I would like to briefly and very generally explain "Islamic Revivalism" and the "phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism", and then point out the significance of the two papers.

Islamic Revivalism can be defined as follows: it aims at a prosperous life based on Islamic beliefs against the background that, after the integration of Arab nationalism into Islām, which was included in the cause of recapturing Jerusalem in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Persian Gulf (or Arabian Gulf) oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia invited Muslim youths from Asia and Africa to study in their states, made them learn Islām in the language of the Holy Qur'ān, returned them as local religious leaders in the Islām community, eventually reminding them of the value of Islām.

And the "phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism" is defined as follows: the atmosphere of an era when migrant workers of Arab, Asian and African countries to Persian Gulf oil-producing states returned their home countries with a certain amount of income and believed that being Muslims and enriching their life were compatible.

Therefore, Islamic Revivalism or the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism was neither a political movement nor a terrorist activity by Islamic groups since 2014. It certainly has an aspect that cannot be completely denied that it is a phenomenon that was stimulated by the "*jihād*" call through promotion of the Islamic State's Internet media after 2014, but it can be understood not as a movement of Islamic Revivalism, but as psychological conflicts of Muslim minorities.

While Nakaya's paper includes in Islamic Revivalism the movement of the Islamic

State after 2014 and defection and migration of Uyghur activists and their families to Turkey, such a way of thinking is sensitive. I have no objection to it as reflecting one of phenomenal consequences, but it also overlaps with the influence of Islamic extremists and the Islamic State's media efforts, and it is because, as described in her paper, Islamic Revivalism began with the solution to social problems based on Islamic values. Consequently, the description linking Islamic Revivalism with the choice of solving social problems based on Islamic values is extremely accurate and seems to fit the historical background that Islamic Revivalism has not been violent.

Islamic Revivalism or the phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism and movements of Islamic groups or extremists can be listed in chronological order (though sometimes overlap) as below.

1. Integration of Arab nationalism into Islamism;
   From the defeat of the Third Arab-Israeli War (1967) to the integration of Arab nationalism and the cause of Islam (recapturing Jerusalem), resulting in the Forth Arab-Israeli War (1973) and the ceasefire (the Arab understood they substantially won the war).
2. The beginning of armed struggles based on Islamism that includes Arab nationalism;
   During this period, disappointment and anger at the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (based on the 1979 Camp David Agreement) created armed struggles, and moderate Sunnī, including the Muslim Brotherhood stimulated by the Iranian Revolution, sought to expand their power through parliamentary elections. This line was abandoned and hope became extinct after the Algerian Civil War (1991-2002), which began as a result of the Islamic victory in the Algerian general election being nullified in a French-backed coup.
3. Iraq-Iran War (1990-1988) after the Iran Islamic Revolution (1979), Arab militia's participation in the Soviet-Afghan War (around 1982-), Islamic propagation in Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia (since the late 1970s-; and the support for mosque construction was accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991), and inviting and providing foreign students with educational support.
4. The terrorist attacks on New York (2001), the collapse of Afghanistan's Taliban administration (2001) and its recovery (2003-), and subsequent collapse of the Iraqi administration (2003) and the resurgence of Al Qaeda remnants, and the rise of Islamist extremist groups (the 1990s-around 2003).

5. The Arab Spring and Islamism, or collaboration between Islamist extremist groups and the remnant group of Saddam Hussein administration in Iraq (2010-), and frequent Islamist terrorism in Asia (2010-).
6. The movement to recapture territory of Iraq (later the Islamic State) by an alliance of Islamist extremist groups and the former Iraqi government triggered by US military withdrawal from Iraq, and the movement to overthrow Arab long-standing dictatorships. Spread of Islamic groups in Tunisia, Libya and Central Asia to Arab states and the West (2010-), and penetration of jihadism through Internet media to Asian Muslims.

Of these, the third point –Islamic propagation and educational support in Arab Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia -- is directly related to the two papers. After the Forth Arab-Israeli War (1973), crude oil export revenues (oil dollars) of Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states increased dramatically from the late 1970s to the 1980s, which has become possible to support Asian Muslim minorities to study in Arab states and enhance their education system (including teachers, educational facilities, scholarships). In the case of China, after Deng Xiaoping's Reform and Opening policy in 1978, Chinese Muslims were promoted to study in Arab states as a spillover effect of strengthening diplomacy with those states to secure industrial energy.

As a result of directly studying Islamic studies, mainly Qur'ān, international students to Arab states have acquired the ability to handle the doctrine and returned to their home countries, and they were able to make their presence against traditional religious authorities. They also acquired the ability to discuss with Islamic scholars in the Arab Islamic world on an equal footing, enabling to issue fatwā on the basis of Qur'ān and the Prophet's Sunnah to address social problems of Muslim minorities and to maintain unwavering positions on their authorities. Instead of following their way of life as a minority, they were able to look at reality from Islamic doctrine. Moreover, in the case of Chinese Muslims, the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed them to interact with the Islamic countries within the former Soviet Union and obtain financial support for Islamic propagation activities in the Arabian Gulf states. China was tolerant of Christianity as well as Islām, during the Shanghai World Expo (2010) and the Chinese government also supported the construction of mosques (providing construction site free of charge and supporting construction costs). For China, the tolerant Islamic policy was also a diplomatic support measure to secure crude oil imports from Arab oil-producing states, which are indispensable for its economic and industrial development.

In this context, Islamism was not that of extremists, but an ideal and harmonious

phenomenon of Islamic Revivalism, which has enriched people's life, including business and employment, by valuing Islamic beliefs and has gained respect and prestige from local Muslims through learning Islamic studies and Arabic, leading to the formation of religious authority of returned students.

Today, the minority issue comes within the range of immigration to the West, but I would like to point out that it is less serious in East Asia and Southeast Asia where the two papers are covering than in the West.

Nakaya's paper "Islamic Revival under Socialist Regime of China: A Case Study of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region" is significant in that it clarifies the religious policy of the Marxist-Leninist Chinese Communist Party and Islamic issues, and it reminds us of the relationship between religion and the ideology of Marxist-Leninist communism, after an era in which interreligious dialogue had been constantly advocated for quite a long time.

Nakaya's paper first summarizes the current situation of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (hereinafter, Xinjiang or XUAR) as follows.

After the Urumqi incident of 2009, the Islamic Revival (hereinafter, Islamic Revivalism) has been accelerating in the XUAR. On the other hand, since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2012, it has tightened control over religious activities in Xinjiang. Basically Xinjiang, bordering on eight countries, including Kazakhstan and Pakistan, is a special area where the three factors of Turkic minorities, Islām and socialism intersect. Since the Urumqi incident, issues have occurred such as social upheaval due to rapid economic growth, and conflicts, wealth gap and moral corruption due to mass migration of Han Chinese. For example, since the 1990s, the number of pilgrims to Makkah has increased in Xinjiang, mosques have been rebuilt and repaired, and Islamic Revivalism has been seen. After the Reform and Opening policy, the Baren Township riot occurred in 1990, which is said to be the first large-scale armed uprising, advocating Islamic beliefs. Four years later, the Religious Affairs Management Regulations was enacted in Xinjiang. Then, with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the Chinese Communist Party reaffirmed the geopolitical risk in Xinjiang and pointed out the five characters of religion: (i) the international character that Islām is a worldwide religion; (ii) the ethnic character that Turkic peoples are concentrated in Xinjiang; (iii) the mass character that Muslims have formed their own *Ummah* or communities of believers; (iv) the long-term character that it takes time to urge Muslims to be de-religious; and (v) the complex character of religious issues. In addition, local Muslims were left out in the cold from the benefits of natural resources in

Xinjiang. Amid economic gap and lack of respect for culture and religion, the Urumqi incident broke out in 2009. Since the incident, the Islamic beliefs of local Muslims have become stronger, and movement to make the world better through Islamic values have emerged.

As a legal control, the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations and China's Religious Affairs Regulations have been enacted, and the Chinese Constitution formally guarantees freedom of religion in Article 36. As a legal basis for control over religious activities, Article 36 of the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations revised in 2014 stipulates control over minors' religious activities in Xinjiang and prohibits minors from joining group prayers (Friday prayers). And no unauthorized organization or individual is allowed to receive *zakāh* (alms-giving) from abroad (in Article 36 of the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations). Political propaganda is mixed in with general sermons in Friday prayers. That is to say, Qur'ān and ḥadīth (a record of the words and deeds of the Prophet) are cited to explain the Communist Party's advocacy of respect for science, policy for ethnic minorities, patriotism and loyalty to the socialist regime. The sermons in Friday prayers, compiled by the China Islamic Affairs Steering Committee as an authorized subordinate organization of the China Islamic Association, are used uniformly in mosques across the country. Islamic beliefs mean loyalty and contribution to the "socialist state" in the context of China, such as economic development, hometown building, mutual unity and "Love Your Religion, Love Your Country."

Also, China's Religious Affairs Regulations of 2004 established a new chapter on institutions for religious education (Chapter 3), apart from a chapter on religious bodies (Chapter 2). Under the provisions of institutions for religious education in China's Regulations of 2017, "institutions for religious education can only be established by officially authorized religious bodies [in this case, China Muslim Association], but any other organization or individual shall not establish an institution for religious education" (Article 11). "Institutions for religious education shall implement specific systems for checking the qualifications of teachers, evaluating academic titles and making appointment, and awarding degrees to students, and the specific measures in this respect shall be formulated by the religious affairs department of the State Council" (Article 16). "To hire foreign professionals, an institution for religious education shall obtain approval of the religious affairs department of the State Council" (Article 17). In addition, "where a religious body […] intends to train religious personnel for three months or more, it shall apply for approval to the religious affairs department of a local People's Government at or above the level of a city divided into districts" (Article 18). "Non-religious bodies, non-institutions for religious education, non-religious venues and non-designated places for temporary activities shall not organize or hold religious

activities" (Articles 41 and 44). And "where anyone, without authorization, makes arrangements for citizens to […] conduct religious training, the relevant religious affairs department shall, together with other relevant departments, order it or him to stop the activity and may impose on it or him a fine of not less than 20,000 yuan but not more than 200,000 yuan concurrently; the illegal gains, if any, shall be confiscated; and if crime is constituted, criminal liability shall be investigated for in accordance with law" (Article 70).

Religious practice is constrained by law, but its target is minors, reflecting the Chinese Communist Party's perception of Islām (the long-term character that it takes time to urge Muslims to be de-religious).

Nakaya's paper also points out a situation in which religious activities of Muslim minorities have been forced to go underground, which was triggered by the emergence of Muslims trying to find solutions through Islamic values, leading to expansion of Islamic "movement to make the world better."

Nakaya's paper argued based on recent change in the Chinese Communist Party's strict policy toward religion in general, including Islām. From 2010 to 2015, when the Chinese Communist Party was taking more tolerant policy toward religion, I visited Beijing University, the State Bureau of Religious Affairs in the suburbs of Beijing, mosques in Qingdao (one), Beijing (three), Shanghai (nine), Xi'an (nine), Beijing Institute of Islamic Theology, Xi'an Islamic Association and Shaanxi Normal University for research purpose, and I remember I felt that the atmosphere there reflected the contents of China's Religious Affairs Regulations. A stone monument of "Love Your Religion, Love Your Country" was placed in the front entrance lobby of the Beijing Institute of Islamic Theology, but when I interviewed with the next and subsequent generations of people whose religious activities were suppressed and religious practice was banned by the Cultural Revolution, young Imams and the *ahon* (the Islamic leadership title of Chinese Muslims) did not warn me as a foreigner, probably because it was a period when economic development priority policy and religious tolerance policy were being implemented. And they frankly answered my questions without hiding their joy of resuming religious activities in public. Nakaya's paper conveys the subsequent Chinese Communist Party's stricter position toward religion.

Nishi's paper "Aspects of Islamic Revivalism in Thailand" examines the transformation of relationship between nation, ethnicity and religion in the historical and social context which presupposes the history of the Malaysian border area conquered by Thailand. Muslims living in the conquered territories were defined as minorities while people in the three

southern provinces except Satun speak Malay and have a religious bond with Malaysian Muslims as Muslim Brotherhood.

The new Constitution enacted by the Thai Constitutional Revolution (1932) guarantees people's freedom of religion and stipulates that the Buddhist king is a defender of various religions including Islām, but in administrative practice, the government denies Islamic clothing culture. For example, it bans wearing a waistcloth called *sarong* (Satun) and suspends administrative services for Muslims wearing traditional Malay costumes (Patterney), and harasses Muslim women wearing *ħijāb* and pilgrims to Makkah wearing the typical garb. The jurisdiction of the family and inheritance law, deeply linked to religion, was transferred from Islamic courts to prefectural courts in 1943, and the Thai Civil and Commercial Code is applied uniformly throughout the country. In 1945, the Royal Decree on the Protection of Islam, B.E. 2488 was enacted, aiming to build a hierarchical system with the Chularatchamontri at the top and mosques in villages at the end (Article 3). Under the Chularatchamontri, the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand was established as an advisory body to the Ministries of Interior and Education (Article 5).

A series of legal policies were implemented such as the Act on Application of Islamic Law in the Provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun (1946), the Islamic Mosque Act (1947) stipulating the mosque registration system and the appointment approval system for Imams, and the downgrade of Chularatchamontri position from a member of the King's advisory body to an adviser to the Religious Affairs Department at the Ministry of Education (1948). Such a traditional trend has been changed by Islamic Revivalism since the 1980s, and the influence of Salafiism can be seen there. At the core of this are those who studied in the Arab-Islamic world and returned their home countries with a degree, like Ismail Lutfi Chapakiya (1951-), an influential Salafist leader in the Deep South. Nishi explains as above.

There are several factors why they have become influential. The first is their ability to read and discuss the Islamic literature written in Arabic. If they can discuss the Islamic religion in Arabic, they can maintain an equal position with traditional scholars and intellectuals who continue to have religious influence in the Arab-Islamic world. It means they will be able to find solutions they deserve and to implement them actually, not only to the problems in their daily life, but also to Islamic political and economic challenges. This can be said to be a creation of local authority, but Nishi shows that it is not combative. The second is their direct diplomacy with Arab oil-producing states with abundant crude oil revenue and institutional investor funds, that is, their direct connectivity with governments and businessmen in Middle East countries without going through the Thai government. This will allow them to collaborate

with local businessmen and act as supportive intermediary for migrant workers. To be Islamic helps business in this world. The third is *ḥalāl* business (issuance of *ḥalāl* certificates). The fourth is the promotion of educational projects funded by Saudi Arabia and other states and the dispatch of international students to those states.

In other words, being Islamic and being wealthy in this world were actually compatible.

Islamic extremists' influence in the Middle East since 2010 has probably made Muslims radical. This is common view with Nakaya's paper, and their influence on general Muslims is not based on the cause of *jihād* they explain, but Qur'ān verses and the Prophet's words and deeds (ḥadīth) that show the way Muslims should live, and also the heaven that Muslims seek to find in the afterlife at the level of personal belief.

While the angels are removing the souls of those who have wronged themselves, they will say, "What was the matter with you?" They will say, "We were oppressed in the land." They will say, "Was Allah's earth not vast enough for you to emigrate in it?" These-their refuge is Hell. What a wretched retreat! Except for the weak among men, and women, and children who have no means to act, and no means to find a way out. [Qur'ān 4:97-98]

"I am innocent (no legal liability) of conduct of Muslims living among the mušrik (i.e., deniers of Islām in Makkah who worship with their equivalents as Allāh)." [Ḥadīth]

Both verses are teachings that Muslims should not live their life among *kāfir* or non-Muslims.

The quotes from Qur'ān and ḥadīth resonate with each Muslim in southern provinces of Thailand and Uyghur who was forced into a minority status, and those, at the same time, are easily tied to minorities' situations by arbitrary interpretation. A similar phenomenon is found among Muslim immigrants to the West. Dr. Wahbah al-Zuhaili (1932-2015) — as a leading Islamic law scholar in the modern Islamic world, he was Dean of Shariah at Damascus University and taught at universities in Arab Islamic countries. His Qur'ān interpretation book entitled *Tafsir al-Munir* and other 140 books as well as his translations have been widely read among Asian Muslim scholars and have many supporters. He received the Best Islamic Medal from the Malaysian Government in 2008. He also visited Japan twice and gave a lecture at Doshisha University. — said, "Muslims in the Arab-Islamic world are living in an almost completely Muslim society, so even if they are under pagan rulers, there is no problem as long as the freedom to practice Islamic beliefs is guaranteed." And Muhammad Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī (1928-2010) — he was an Egyptian national law judge and president of Azhar University. — said, "It is at the discretion of the French government to decide whether to implement a policy banning wearing burqa [in public places]." These remarks would show that they still have

room to breathe. However, if Muslims obtained a degree in Islamic studies in the Arab-Islamic world and then return to their home countries where Muslims are minority in a society, the verses of Qur'ān and ḥadīth mentioned above become religious challenges that need to be overcome immediately.

The urgency of everyday life, which is in a different dimension from interreligious dialogue, creates a psychological state that responds to Islamic extremists.

It is right to say that Nakaya's and Nishi's papers are significant in that they academically demonstrated a difference between Islamic Revivalism and political Islām (Islamism) by giving detailed examples in East Asia (China) and Southeast Asia (Thailand).

Islamic Revival under Socialist Regime of China:
A Case Study of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Masako Nakaya

Abstract:

Since the Urumqi incident on July 5, 2009, the Islamic Revival has been accelerating in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (hereinafter, Xinjiang or XUAR). On the other hand, since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2012, religious control in Xinjiang appears to have been tightening. Although the Chinese Constitution formally guarantees freedom of religion, the Islamic Revival in Xinjiang has been under strict control and has thus not been able to develop in an unfettered environment. What is the legal basis for control over religious activities? Here, I review national and regional laws and regulations on religion, focusing on the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations revised in 2014 and China's Religious Affairs Regulations revised in 2017. In particular, I consider the background in which the religious activities of minors in Xinjiang have been controlled under the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations, taking into consideration the internal and external circumstances of Xinjiang.

Keywords:

Islamic Revival, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Socialism, Religious Control, Religious Education

1. Introduction

In this paper, as a case study of the Islamic Revival of Muslim minorities, I examine the realities of the Islamic Revival in Xinjiang, focusing on religious control by the Communist Party of China (hereinafter, the Communist Party or CPC). In particular, I consider the current situation in which religious control has been tightened under the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations revised in 2014[1] and China's Religious Affairs Regulations revised in 2017.[2] The former stipulates control over the religious activities of minors. I review this background based on the CPC's policy on religion, remarks by Party officials under Xi Jinping's leadership, and the geopolitical characteristics of Xinjiang.

2. Islamic Revival in Xinjiang

Xinjiang, located in northwestern China, is known as a region where Turkic Muslim minorities, such as Uyghurs, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs, have concentrated. Xinjiang, bordering on eight countries, including Kazakhstan and Pakistan, is under the socialist regime of China. Xinjiang is also a special area where the Turkic minorities, Islām, and socialism intersect.

Since the Urumqi incident occurred on July 5, 2009,[3] some Muslims have come to find, through Islamic values, solutions to such issues as social upheaval due to rapid economic growth, conflicts, inequality of wealth, and moral corruption due to mass migration of Han Chinese, leading to the expansion of an Islamic "movement to make the world better." Along with this movement, Islamic study groups and schools have thrived underground. In addition, responding to the worldwide trend of Islamic Revival, new movements seeking places of worship overseas have begun to emerge. For example, some people have set out for the Islamic State (IS), which has intensified its activities from around 2012, and the flow of immigrants to Turkey has increased. In this environment, with the Islamic Revival rapidly growing, Xi Jinping became General Secretary of CPC in 2012 and has tightened religious control in Xinjiang. Consequently, the Islamic Revival in the region has not been able to develop in an unfettered environment but rather only under strict control.

3. "Freedom of Religious Belief" and Realities of Religious Control

China is ruled by a socialist regime, but it legally guarantees "freedom of religious belief" under Article 36 of the Constitution[4]. However, while this "freedom" is guaranteed, religion remains under strict control.

As a matter of course, Muslims adhere to the five pillars of Islām in striving to make their faith perfect and beautiful and to bring happiness to the lives of human beings in this world and the afterlife. However, it is difficult for them to do so in Xinjiang. No unauthorized organization or individual is allowed to receive *sadaqa* (alms-giving) from abroad, even if it wants to (Article 36 of the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations). Minors are not allowed to enter a mosque to join ṣalāt (prayer) with other Muslims.[5] In the first place, minors are prohibited from participating in religious activities themselves (Article 37 of the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations).

Sermons are offered every Friday on *ṣalāt*. However, political propaganda is mixed into general sermons on such principles as having filial piety for parents and compassion for others. The *Qur'ān* and *ḥadīth* are cited to explain the Communist Party's advocacy of respect for science, the policy on ethnic minorities, patriotism, and loyalty to the socialist regime. The contents of those sermons, compiled by the China Islamic Affairs Steering Committee as an authorized subordinate organization of the China Islamic Association, are used uniformly in mosques across the country. Specific examples are given as follows:[6]

> Righteousness is not that you turn your faces toward the east or the west, but [true] righteousness is [in] one who believes in *Allāh*, the Last Day, the angels, the Book, and the prophets and gives wealth, in spite of love for it, to relatives, orphans, the needy, the traveler, those who ask [for help], and for freeing slaves; [and who] establishes prayer and gives *zakāh*; [those who] fulfill their promise when they make a promise; and [those who] are patient in poverty and hardship and during battle. Those are the ones who have been true, and it is they who are the righteous. (2:177)
> ※The English translation of *Qur'ān* is based on the Hilali/Khan Saheeh revision.

> [Like the words of the *Qur'ān*,] as a devout Muslim and a man afraid of *Allāh*, you must adhere to the five pillars of Islām, and at the same time, respect the old, love the young, make friends with your neighbors, cherish the good, relieve poverty, prevent crisis, save the day, help others willingly, reward virtue, punish vice, spread justice, fulfill promises, trade fairly, maintain order, create social well-being, develop the economy, build your hometown, unite with each other, and love your religion and love your country. Only through these ways can you make your faith perfect and beautiful and gain happiness in this world and the afterlife.

Words and phrases that mean loyalty and contribution to the "socialist state" in the context of China, such as economic development, hometown building, mutual unity, and "love your religion, love your country" are subtly mixed into sermons. Parents with minors will find that their children cannot make their faith perfect and beautiful.

4. Legal Basis of Religious Control

4.1 XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations

In China, religious laws and regulations have a two-tiered structure at the national and regional levels. Both the central and Xinjiang governments have formulated the Religious Affairs Regulations (hereinafter, Regulations), and the latest version of China's Regulations was enacted in 2017, three years after the XUAR Regulations were revised in 2014.

It is worth noting that the XUAR Regulations say in Article 37 that "Minors may not participate in religious activities." Not only must minors not participate in religious activities, nor should any organization or individual organize, induce, or force minors to do so under the same Article. Penalties will be imposed on those who violate this provision under Article 59. That is to say, the People's Government religious affairs and education departments, at or above the prefecture level, will subject offenders to re-education by self-criticism and strictly order them to remedy their violations. Anyone who commits a breach of security control will be punished by public security agencies under law, and if the violation constitutes a crime, judicial bodies will pursue criminal liability in accordance with the law.

Control over the religious activities of minors has long been implemented by expanding the interpretation of law on the grounds of prohibiting obstruction of compulsory education for minors or guaranteeing the "freedom not to believe." The XUAR Regulations have been revised to stipulate control over religious activities of minors following General Secretary Xi Jinping's speech at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum in Beijing held in May of 2014.

> We must diligently carry out our religious work, proactively guide religions to adapt to the socialist society, and make religious leaders and lay believers better play an active role in promoting economic and social development. The basic principles for dealing with religious problems are, that is to say, to protect lawfulness, stop illegality, contain [religious] extremism, prevent its penetration, and crack down on crime. We must guarantee the normal religious needs of lay believers, respect their customs and manners, and steadily disseminate a legitimate way for them to

> correctly grasp religious common sense [i.e., indispensable religious knowledge], on the basis of law.[7]

What was emphasized in this Forum was to govern Xinjiang in accordance with law, in other words, to tighten religious control by law. General Secretary Xi Jinping's remarks were directly included in Article 4 as "protect lawfulness, stop illegality, contain extremism, prevent its penetration, and crack down on crime."

As a result, the religious activities of minors have become subject to the XUAR Regulations, preventing them from participating in religious activities, and also punishing those who have engaged in religious activities with them.

4.2 National Religious Affairs Regulations

China's Religious Affairs Regulations, as upper-level law, were revised three years after the revision of the XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations. What is worth noting is that a new chapter on institutions for religious education (Chapter 3) was established, apart from the chapter on religious bodies (Chapter 2) in China's Regulations of 2004.

According to the provisions of institutions for religious education in China's Regulations of 2017, "institutions for religious education can only be established by officially authorized religious bodies [in this case, China Muslim Association], but any other organization or individual shall not establish an institution for religious education" (Article 11). "Institutions for religious education shall implement specific systems for checking the qualifications of teachers, evaluating academic titles and making appointment, and awarding degrees to students, and the specific measures in this respect shall be formulated by the religious affairs department of the State Council" (Article 16). "To hire foreign professionals, an institution for religious education shall obtain approval of the religious affairs department of the State Council" (Article 17). In addition, "where a religious body intends to train religious personnel for three months or more, it shall apply for approval to the religious affairs department of a local People's Government at or above the level of a city divided into districts" (Article 18). Further, Articles 41 and 44 reiterate that "non-religious bodies, non-institutions for religious education, non-religious venues and non-designated places for temporary activities shall not organize or hold religious activities." And "where anyone, without authorization, makes arrangements for citizens to conduct religious training, the relevant religious affairs department shall, together with other relevant departments, order it or him to stop the activity and may impose on it or him a fine of not less than 20,000 yuan but not more

than 200,000 yuan concurrently; the illegal gains, if any, shall be confiscated; and if crime is constituted, criminal liability shall be investigated in accordance with law" (Article 70). Therefore, because they are national-level laws and regulations, those who cannot enroll in public religious schools all across the country will not have the opportunity to receive religious education.

The revision of China's Regulations was triggered by the National Religious Work Conference in April 2016. In this conference, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized, "In order to improve religious work, it is essential to adhere to the Party's basic policy of religious work, fully implement the Party's freedom of religion policy, and manage religious affairs by law, adhere to the principle of independence and self-sufficiency and proactively guide religion and socialist society to adapt to each other.[8]" These statements revealed his intention to eliminate foreign influences.

4.3 Comparison of National and XUAR Religious Affairs Regulations

In comparing the Xinjiang Regulations with the national ones, it becomes clear that the Chinese government is attempting to isolate religious education and those who receive it (i.e., minors) from religion. Control over the religious activities of minors, which is stipulated in the Xinjiang Regulations, is not provided in the national ones. In other words, the clarification of control over religious activities of minors is specific to Xinjiang.

When considering the historical timeframes when the Xinjiang Regulations and the national ones were enacted, it is also worth noting that the former were enacted earlier. While the Xinjiang Regulations were enacted in 1994 and the national ones in 2004, the former were revised earlier (i.e., 2014) than the latter (i.e., 2017). The reason why China hastened to enact lower-level regulations is probably due to growing tension in Xinjiang.

It seems that the Urumqi incident in 2009 and subsequent disruptions of Muslim society, growing terrorism, and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) since around 2012 resulted in the revision of the Xinjiang Regulations in 2014.

5. Control over Religious Activities of Minors

5.1 Legal Basis

Then, what is the basis for the Chinese government to control the religious activities of minors in Xinjiang? Shewket Imin, a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Xinjiang Committee, outlined this at a press conference at the State Council on June 2, 2016, as follows:[9]

> Concerning the issue of “children” (as he expressed at this press conference) entering a mosque, the Chinese Constitution stipulates that citizens have the freedom to believe in religion and that education and religion should be separated. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China says in Article 36 that “the state shall protect normal religious activities. No one shall use religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the state education system.” The Education Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates in paragraph (2) of Article 8 that “the state shall separate education from religion. No organization or individual may employ religion to obstruct activities of the state education system.” The Non-state Education Promotion Law of the People's Republic of China stipulates in paragraph (2) of Article 4 that “non-state schools shall abide by the principle of separating education from religion. No organization or individual may make use of religion to conduct activities that interfere with the state education system.” Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-foreign Cooperation in Running Schools says in Article 7 that “no foreign religious organization, religious institution, religious college or university, or religious worker may engage in cooperative activities of running schools within the territory of China.” And it also says that “Chinese-foreign cooperatively run schools shall not offer religious education, nor conduct religious activities.”
>
> We have strictly adhered to national laws and regulations, and the autonomous district has never enacted any provision prohibiting women and children from believing in religion, but citizens must receive compulsory education before the age of eighteen on the basis of the Constitution.
>
> The Law of the People's Republic of China on the Protection of Minors says that “[the state, society, schools, and families] shall not commit any act that harms the healthy growth of minors.” And the XUAR Regulations on the Protection of Minors says that “any organization or individual shall not induce or compel minors to participate in religious activities, nor make use of religion to engage in activities to obstruct compulsory education for minors.”

To put it simply, Imin explained that the reason for control over the religious activities of

minors is to guarantee compulsory education. He also said that religious education for minors could be a hindrance to the state education system, and that the state must "protect" minors since religious education could undermine their "healthy growth." Since religious belief itself cannot be prohibited, the state isolates minors from religion by preventing their participation in religious activities. However, if his explanation is correct, since compulsory education is a national enterprise, similar provisions should exist in national and other regional regulations. Religious affairs regulations are currently being enacted at each regional level, but, for example, the Inner Mongolia regulations do not have the above kind of provisions.[10] Therefore, aside from the guarantee of compulsory education, there must be some other reason why those provisions are specifically provided in the XUAR Regulations.

5.2 Special Regional Characteristics of Xinjiang

A special characteristic of Xinjiang is its sense of geopolitical risk. Since the 1990s, the number of pilgrims to Makkah has increased in Xinjiang, mosques have been rebuilt and restored, and the Islamic Revival has become remarkable. After the Reform and Opening-up policy, the Baren Township riot occurred in 1990, which is said to be the first large-scale armed uprising advocating Islamic beliefs.[11] Four years later, the Religious Affairs Management Regulations was hastily enacted in Xinjiang. Then, with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, the Communist Party has become more aware of the geopolitical risk in Xinjiang. It also reaffirmed the five characteristics of religion: (i) the international characteristic that Islām is a worldwide religion; (ii) the ethnic characteristic that Turkic peoples are concentrated in Xinjiang; (iii) the mass-movement characteristic that Muslims have formed their own *Umma* or communities of believers; (iv) the long-term characteristic that it takes time to encourage Muslims to become non-religious; and (v) the complex characteristics of religious issues themselves. Roughly after 9/11, the mass migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang has caused more friction between ethnic groups and growing dissatisfaction of the locals. In addition, local Muslims were left out in the cold from the benefits of extracting natural resources in Xinjiang. Under these circumstances, the Urumqi incident broke out on July 5, 2009. Since this incident, the Islamic beliefs of local Muslims have become stronger, and there have been movements to make the world better through Islamic values.

A white paper titled "Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang" published by the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China shows the Chinese government's perception of Islamic beliefs in Xinjiang as follows:

> China is a unified multiethnic country, and various ethnic groups in Xinjiang have long been part of the Chinese nation. Throughout its long history, Xinjiang's development has been closely related to that of our eternally great country and the Chinese nation. However, in more recent times, hostile forces in and outside China, including separatists, religious extremists and terrorists, have tried to split China and break it apart by distorting history and facts. […] They attempt to separate ethnic groups in Xinjiang from the Chinese nation and ethnic cultures in the region from the diverse but integrated Chinese culture.
>
> In Xinjiang, different cultures and religions coexist, and ethnic cultures have been fostered and developed in the embrace of the Chinese civilization. Islām is neither an indigenous nor the sole belief system of the Uyghur people. Islām, fused with Chinese culture, has taken root in the fertile land of China and developed in a healthy manner in China.[12]
>
> It should be noted that since the late 1970s and early 1980s, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the surge in religious extremism around the world has caused a rise in religious extremism in Xinjiang. This has resulted in an increasing number of incidents of terror and violence that pose a serious danger to social stability and to the lives and property of people in the region. […] Religious extremism is running counter to the teachings concerning patriotism, peace, solidarity, the golden mean, tolerance, and the good works advocated by Islām and many other religions, and it is essentially anti-human, anti-society, anti-civilization, and anti-religion.[13]

In short, the Chinese government recognizes that, although Xinjiang is a part of China and Islām, fused with Chinese culture, it has developed in a "healthy" manner while "religious extremists" have begun to harm the stability of society and the security of people after the collapse of the Cold War structure. As is clear from the words "the surge in religious extremism around the world," the Chinese government also perceives that the notion of religious extremism exists in Xinjiang and that extreme Islām "contaminated" with that notion might work toward dismantling China. It can be said that the Chinese government accepts only the kind of Islām that has been fused with Chinese culture and has "developed in a healthy manner" under the framework of "freedom of religion," and thus it allows religious education only at

public religious institutions. Probably, the Chinese government intends to block the passing of religious belief from generation to generation and, furthermore, to hasten the disappearance of religion by prohibiting minors from participating in religious activities and receiving religious education.

6. Bewildered Local Muslims

In a document published in 2015, Chan Qi raised critical questions about control over the religious activities of minors in Xinjiang: To what extent should minors' religious activities be allowed? Is it lawful for minors to engage in religious activities with their parents during ethnic minority holidays? Who is subject to punishment if such activity violates the law?[14] According to the Xinjiang Regulations, if any organization or individual participates in religious activities with minors, it is considered an activity to "induce" or "compel" minors to participate in religious activities. Strictly speaking, even parents cannot perform religious rituals with their own children. In Xinjiang, as in other Muslim countries such as Turkey, parents try to make their children learn Arabic and recite the *Qur'ān* from infancy, and they preach religious ethics to children. If parents encourage their children to visit their nearest religious scholar for religious teaching, these parents might be considered to "induce" or "compel" children, or even "obstruct" the children's compulsory education. The religious scholar might also be subject to punishment for opening a non-public religious institution. Even at home, it is difficult for parents to pass on religious knowledge and ethical values to their children.

7. Conclusion

As discussed above, even if one adheres to the five pillars of Islām as preached in mosques, it is difficult to practice religious freedom because all religious activities are strictly controlled by laws and regulations. Due to the theoretically negative perception of religion and also to the geopolitical risk in Xinjiang, control over religious activities, mainly those of minors, has been increasingly tightened. In education, even in the home, parents are monitored and minors are isolated from religion by reason of their being at the age of compulsory education. Wang Zuo'an, director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs as of 2016, emphasized that religious work requires "guidance" through stricter legal controls.[15] A concrete way to put this guidance into practice is to secularize minors by eliminating religious

education and activities. But conversely, the complete elimination of minors' access to religious education could render their religious knowledge "sterile," making them yet more susceptible to "extreme" religious thinking and hence hiding the religious education of minors underground. In summary, attempting to contain the influence of religion by strengthening laws and regulations could rather increase the risk to the Chinese government.

＊This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 19H01464.

Notes

1 The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Religious Affairs Regulations, by the People's Government of Xinjian Uyghur Autonomous Region (http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xinjiang/fsljzcfg/201705/ae7fbb20c9864d78bdd37f1006f21a66.shtml, last accessed on July 31, 2020).

2 China's Religious Affairs Regulations, by the State Council of the People's Republic of China (http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-09/07/content_5223282.htm, last accessed on July 31, 2020).

3 On July 5, 2009, Uyghurs and Hans clashed in Urumqi, the largest city in Xinjiang. Chinese officials have made a confrontational stance, insisting that the incident was orchestrated by "three forces of terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism." Chinese officials have announced that 197 people have been killed and more than 1,700 injured (Local Magazine Editing Committee of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region edition, *Xinjiang Year Book 2010*,15), while the World Uyghur Congress, an overseas Uyghur organization, released data that differed significantly from that of Chinese officials by showing testimony that 800 to 1,000 people were killed and 2,000 to 3,000 injured (World Uyghur Congress, "Witnesses Testified the Case of the July 5th Urumqi Massacre, Part One" (http://www.uyghurcongress.org/jp/?p=1122, last accessed on August 31, 2020).

4 Article 36 of the Constitution of People's Republic of China: Citizens of the People's Republic of China shall enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, social organization or individual shall coerce citizens to believe in or not to believe in any religion, nor shall they discriminate against citizens who believe in or do not believe in any religion. The state shall protect normal religious activities. No one shall use religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the state's education system. Religious groups and religious affairs shall not be subject to control by foreign forces.
For the translation into English, *refer to* Article 36 of the Constitution based on the website of the State Council of the People's Republic of China (http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html, last accessed on September 23, 2020).

5 When I visited Ili City and Yengisar County for surveys in August 2011, minors were already restricted from entering mosques. It is probable that the provision of the Regulations was broadly interpreted that minors' participation in group *ṣalāt* interrupts compulsory education.

6 *The New Collection of Wāʿiẓ Speeches series (1–4)*, edited by China Islamic Religious Affairs Guidance Committee, Religion Culture Publishing House (2011), 17−18. *See* Japanese translation of *Qur'ān*, edited by Ko NAKATA, Kaori NAKATA, and Kazuki SHIMOMURA, *Nichia taiyaku Qur'ān*, Sakuhinsya (2017).

[7] "Xi Jinping: We must firmly establish a correct vision for the motherland and nation among the masses of all ethnic groups" on People's Daily (http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0529/c1024-25083277.html, last accessed on August 8, 2020).

[8] "Xi Jinping attended the National Religious Work Conference and delivered an important speech" on People's Daily (http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0423/c1001-28299513.html, last accessed on August 8, 2020).

[9] "Laws and Regulations not Allowing Minor Students to Participate in Religious Activities" The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China (http://www.scio.gov.cn/xwfbh/xwbfbh/wqfbh/33978/34593/zy34597/Document/1479250/1479250.htm, last accessed on July 31, 2020).

[10] Regulations on Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Religious Affairs, *Inner Mongolia Daily*, 008th issue (December 17, 2019).

[11] An armed uprising in April 1990 in Baren Township, Akto County, near Kashgar. It is said that the "East Turkistan Islamic Party" was deeply involved in this riot, and that they have appealed against the mass migration of Han Chinese and birth control. This incident became widely known to Uyghurs abroad and awakened their nationalism and secessionism. *See* Naoko MIZUTANI, "A Consideration of the Baren Township Incident in Xinjiang," *Modern and Contemporary China Studies*, Vol. 40 (2018), 62–80.

[12] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang*, People's Press (2019), 1–2.

[13] The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, *Historical Matters Concerning Xinjiang*, People's Press (2019), 23.

[14] Chan Qi, "Study on Xinjiang Religious Affairs Legislature: Concurrent Comments on Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Religious Affairs Regulations," *Social Sciences in Xinjiang*, 1st Issue (2015) , 106.

[15] Wang Zuo'an, "A Key of Religious Work Lies in 'Guidance': Study the spirit of general Secretary Xi Jinping's speech at the National Religious Work Conference," *Study Times*, 001st issue (August 8, 2016).

Aspects of Islamic Revivalism in Thailand*

Naomi Nishi

Abstract:

How has Islamic revivalism changed the relationships among nation, ethnicity, and religion? How does each social context frame the way Islamic revivalism manifests itself? In this paper, I examine the case of Thailand as a starting point for further comparative analyses among minority Muslims in Asia.

Keywords:

Islamic Revivalism, Minorities, Muslim, Nationalism, Thailand

1. Introduction

Studies of Islamic revivalism cover a wide range of issues involving public perceptions and daily presentations of Islam, ranging from women wearing scarves, the rise of Islamic political parties and Islamic banking, to the militant groups espousing Jihadist ideology.[1] The Islamic revival in Thailand has been evident since the 1980s and continues to affect Muslim communities up to the present. In this paper, I first examine the representation of Islam in Thailand's modern nation-state building. Following this, I provide an overview of the current research on Islam and nationalism. Finally, I present insights into the various aspects of Islamic revivalism in Thai society.

Muslims consisted of 4.3 percent of Thailand's population in 2015 (National Statistical Office of Thailand). Muslims in Thailand are not a monolithic sub-group of the population, since they originate from various cultural and historical backgrounds including Malay, Arab, Persian, Javanese, Cham, Khmer, Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese.[2] However, the administrative control over Islamic affairs has mainly been aimed at strengthening governance in the southern border provinces of Thailand, where Malay Muslims comprise the majority of the population. The state once known as the sultanate of Patani has existed in the southern border provinces since the 15th century. It was incorporated into Thailand's administrative system at the end of the 19th century and became an integral part of Thailand's sovereign territory under the Anglo-Siamese Treaty of 1909. The area of the former Patani sultanate, i.e., the current Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Songkla (partial) Provinces, has been experiencing separatist movements for more than a century.

2. Administration of Islamic Organizations

Since the absolute monarchy of Thailand was overthrown by the constitutional revolution of 1932, a new constitution has been enacted following every new military coup. Throughout the 19 constitutions, though, the status of religion has not changed significantly. The Thai constitution does not recognize an official state religion, and it guarantees religious freedom to citizens as a constitutional right. Nevertheless, a significant feature of the Thai constitution is that it has always stipulated that the Buddhist King is the upholder of all religions, including Islam. Although religious freedom is protected, Theravada Buddhism, which is practiced by more than 90 percent of Thailand's population, has a significant influence on both society and the state. Against this background, the state administration and national education systems continue to have a rough understanding of Islam or Muslims.[3]

In an effort to create a "new culture," the "uncivilized" cultural and religious behaviors practiced in the Malay area of the four southern provinces (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Satun) became subject to reforms during the Phibunsongkhram administration (1938–1944). Under the cultural policies called rattaniyom, Buddhism and Thai culture were promoted as a national identity, and people were compelled to wear Western clothes. Harassment by the authorities frequently occurred, such as the forcible removal of Muslim women's scarves and the turban worn by Muslim men.[4] In 1941, the government prohibited Malay Muslims from studying the Qur'ān, as well as Malay and Arab languages[5]. Amidst the turmoil of World War II, the government attempted to destroy Islamic institutions. In 1943, the Thai government abolished the practice of Muslim judges specializing in Islamic family law and announced the application of the Civil and Commercial Codes[6].

To address the deteriorating situation in Southern Thailand during the war period, the Royal Decree on Patronage of Islam was enacted in 1945 to create a hierarchical system, with the Chularatchamontri at the top and village mosques at the bottom. Chularatchamontri was once the title given to a high-ranking official who oversaw trade and domestic matters regarding Islam during the Ayutthaya period from the 14th to 18th century. With the 1945 decree, the Chularatchamontri position was restored as a representative of Muslims in Thailand as well as an advisor to the King with respect to Islamic affairs. Furthermore, the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand was established as an advisory body to the Ministries of Interior and Education. The decree also allowed the Ministry of Interior to establish Provincial Islamic Committees in those provinces having a certain scale of Muslim population.

In 1946, the Thai government implemented the Act on the Application of Islamic Law in the area of Pattani, Narathiwat, Yala and Satun Provinces.[7] The Act required each provincial court to deal with civil cases related to Islamic law on family and inheritance, and the trials and judicial decisions were supervised by the dato yutitham (Islamic judge) in addition to the secular judge. The Masjid Act of 1947 stipulated regulations such as the registration of masjid and the requirement of approval from the Provincial Islamic Committee for the appointment of imāms (Islamic leaders). After Phibunsongkhram returned as prime minister in 1948, the Royal Decree was amended to downgrade the role of the Chularatchamontri from a King's advisor to an advisor to the Ministry of Education.

During the Cold War period from the 1950s to the beginning of the 1980s, communism presented a major threat to the Thai government. The Prime Ministerial Order 65/2523, issued in 1980, marked a major shift in government policies. Due to the change from using military actions to suppress militants to taking political measures, including amnesty, thousands of

communist guerillas surrendered and the communist threat gradually disappeared. The 1990s witnessed democratization measures that strengthened the political and social participation of Malay Muslims. In 1997, the Administration of Islamic Organization Act was enacted to replace the half-century-old Masjid Law and the Royal Decree on Patronage of Islam. A state-owned Islamic bank was established with the enactment of the Islamic Bank of Thailand Act in 2002.

The Islamic Organization Act of 1997, administered by the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Education, stipulated that the Chularatchamontri appointed by the King is the leader of Muslims in Thailand, followed by the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand. Provinces with a Muslim population and at least three Masjids shall establish the Provincial Islamic Committees. Each Masjid needs to establish a committee with an imām as a leader. Islamic institutions, including the Masjid, were granted juristic responsibilities, thus upgrading their legal status. The Chularatchamontri was granted responsibility for holding consultations with state agencies, appointing advisory committee members, announcing the beginning and end of Islamic events, in particular Ramaḍān, and issuing fatwās (legal opinions on specific points of Islamic law).

The Islamic Organization Act limited the term of the Provincial Islamic Committee to six years and introduced the election of committee members by the local imāms. The Provincial Committee selects a delegate to the Central Committee. The introduction of elections, however, caused factional conflicts within the organizations. Most notably, concern over Ḥalāl certification laid the foundation for the intervention of major political parties in the administration of Islam.[8] After conflicts between the government and Islamic militants intensified in 2004, Islamic organizations and their leadership became an issue for the state from the national security perspective. The Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents, which both occurred in 2004, caused numerous casualties among Malay Muslims, including the deaths of unarmed citizens in the heavy-handed security responses of the Thai government. The Chularatchamontri and the Islamic Committees have been unable to mitigate the conflict between Malay Muslims and the Thai government. Consequently, the politicization of Islam has effectively undermined the legitimacy of Islamic administrative organizations.[9]

3. Nationalism and Islam

Surin Pitsuwan, former ASEAN Secretary General and a self-identified Muslim, mentioned that the question of legitimacy is even more crucial for Muslims, who constitute a

minority group within Thailand. According to Pitsuwan, "For Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand, the question has always been how to participate in the political process of a state based on Buddhist cosmology…the process of 'national integration' is synonymous with 'cultural disintegration' for Malay Muslims."[10]

Scholars of the conflict in the southern border provinces mostly agree that the militant struggles are based on Malay nationalism, and the repressive policies of the Thaksin Chinnawat administration (2001–2006) triggered the intensification of conflicts. From the perspective of ethno-nationalism, the Thai government's assimilation and integration policies are assumed to strengthen the sense of belonging among Malay Muslims.[11] Malay culture and Islam have also been deeply intertwined throughout the history of Southeast Asia. Islamic education based on the Malay language and Jawi (the Malay script based on the Arabic alphabet) at pondok (traditional Islamic boarding schools) and tadika (primary Islamic education institutions generally attached to the Masjid) played a significant role in creating the sense of belonging as Malay Muslims.[12] The Thai government's control over pondok as well as the spread of the Thai school system after the 1960s are often mentioned as main reasons for the rise of the secessionist movement.[13]

Islamic revival in Muslim societies became evident worldwide in the 1970s, and in Thailand since the 1980s. Islamic revivalism as a socio-religious phenomenon should be viewed as a new wave in the research and distinguished from conventional studies on the conflict. There are two main themes regarding Islamic revivalism in Thailand. One is Tablīghī Jamā'at, a group with origins in northern India that focuses on spiritual elevation and missionary preaching.[14] The other is Salafism, a movement that has been led by religious scholars who returned to Thailand after studying in the Middle East during the late 1980s.[15] The growing presence of Salafism caused fissures between Muslim communities in Thailand's Southern border provinces. This has manifested as a cleavage between reformists (khana mai or sai mai, i.e., new school) and traditionalists (khana kao or sai kao, i.e., old school). The former seek to return to the origins, the Qur'ān and the Sunnah (the practice of the prophet), and they often raise the call for abolishing traditional Malay practices. The latter tend to value the cumulative traditions of Islam and traditional local authority.

In wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001, there was growing interest in Islam, especially Jihadism. Joseph Liow, a scholar of political Islam in Southeast Asia, concluded that in the case of Southern Thailand, the nationalist discourse is stronger than that of religion. He also highlights the fact that the Salafi movement is closely aligned with the Thai government and has no link to the armed struggle in southern Thailand.[16] Shintaro Hara, a scholar of shahīd

(martyrdom in Islam), further notes that the motivations behind jihād, as well as the interpretations of the related violence, are nuanced. Based on in-depth interviews with the people who have fought against the Thai government, Hara explained how their struggles are grounded in the sense of belonging as Patani Malay.[17]

Malays, especially in rural areas, remain traditionalist in a way that emphasizes Patani Malayness. The new movements that surfaced in the course of Islamic revivalism are quite distinct from nationalism and pose no security threat to the Thai government. As Duncan McCargo puts it, "The old school/new school dichotomy is absolutely not a simplistic divide between separatist sympathies and ideas of loyalty to the Thai state, but it is possible to read the divide at some level in these terms." [18]

4. Aspects of Islamic Revivalism

Islamic teaching covers not only the relationship between God and humans but also gives rules for human relationships and ideas of what is right and wrong. These teachings provide images of the punishments and rewards in the hereafter; accordingly, every human behavior in life is believed to be connected to life in the hereafter. The institution of pondok is said to have existed for more than 400 years. Pondok students generally live self-sufficiently in small huts built around the house of a babo (religious leader who hosts the pondok) and learn about the Qur'ān, Ḥadīth, and commentaries of distinguished Islamic scholars. There are no classes or grade systems, and the students cover a wide range of ages, from young children around ten years old to the elderly.

The Thai government has considered pondok an obstacle to the integration of Malay Muslims within Thai society. In 1961, the Thai government ordered the registration of pondok and reformed it into a private Islamic school that provides secular education and vocational training in Thai language alongside religious education. Moreover, since the late 1970s, the Thai government has gradually introduced Islamic education in public school in the southern border provinces. However, the number of pondok has been increasing even after the government maximized its control over pondok in 2004.[19] Pondok is deeply rooted in Malay Muslim society, and it means more than just an educational institution.

The influence of Islamic revivalism, especially Salafism, since the 1980s can be seen in higher education institutions. One of the most influential Salafi leaders in Thailand is Ismail Lutfi Chapakiya (1951–). Lutfi, born into a family that owns pondok, returned to Thailand in 1988 after earning a bachelor's degree from the Islamic University of Madinah and Master's

and Doctoral degrees in comparative jurisprudence from Al-Imām Mohammad ibn Saud Islamic University, in Saudi Arabia. Lutfi is known for establishing the first private Islamic university in Thailand, Yala Islamic College (the present Fatoni University) in 1998 with the support of the Gulf states. Since the 1980s, national universities, such as the Prince of Songkla University's Pattani Campus, have also been providing Islamic education where students can earn degrees in Islamic studies.[20] The improvement and expansion of Islamic higher education have been supported by a growing number of academics who have obtained degrees from universities in Islamic countries in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia.

The judgement of whether someone is a Salafi reformist is made based on such information as whether the person 1) supports Salafi scholars such as Lutfi; 2) joins in activities organized by a Salafi group; and 3) denounces the local practices as bid'ah (new innovation). Salafi reformists often condemn as bid'ah the banquet held at the cemetery on the Hari Raya Puasa (festival of breaking fast), the celebration of Hari Raya Enam (six days after the Hari Raya Puasa), and Mawlid (birthday of the Prophet). Other offenses they cite include traditional ceremonies for circumcision, marriage rites, traditional rituals for funerals, and treatments by traditional healers. Furthermore, Salafi reformists give less importance to the Malay language and Jawi in learning about Islam compared with traditionalists. Salafi reformists also argue that Arabic is an essential discipline, but that otherwise any language, including Thai, can be used as an instrument to learn about Islam.[21] These Salafi reformists manage to avoid problems with the Thai state by distancing themselves from Malay nationalism, but the Salafi-Thai alignment has caused a cleavage in the Muslim community. Traditionalists often call them Wahhabis, a name used here to imply a negative image, and view them as activists who disregard the local leaders and traditions.

When we understand Islamic revivalism as a phenomenon in which symbols and behaviors that are perceived as Islamic become more prominent in a Muslim's life, we also see words and expressions of Islam being more frequently deployed among those who advocate Malay nationalism. The current resurgence of violence is attributed to BRN (Barisan Revolusi Nasional), a separatist group that controls the militants deployed in the Southern border provinces. An imām of the BRN regarded the Southern border provinces as Dār al-Ḥarb (Abode of War) invaded by Thailand, and issued a fatwā calling for jihād against the Thai state to regain Patani's independence.[22] Since 2004, most areas of the Southern border provinces have been under the control of Thai security forces based on the Martial Law Act and the Emergency Decree of 2005. Human rights violations by the security forces, such as arrest without warrant and torture, frequently occur. This situation makes the Islamist interpretation

of events sound more realistic.

During the Kru-ze Masjid incident in 2004, a booklet titled Berjihad di Patani (Jihād in Patani) was found near one of the dead militants. This booklet explains that a militant jihād against the kāfir (non-Muslim) Thai government and the traitor munāfiq (hypocrites) aligned with the government was an individual's duty. Some scholars have pointed out that this indicates the influence of Islamic extremism.[23] However, others have emphasized that Jihadism in the southern border provinces is restricted to this area and has a distinct characteristic from the types of extremism practiced by such groups as Al-Qaeda and Daesh.[24]

Traditional religious leaders do not necessarily claim that local practices are compatible with the teachings of Islam, nor do they praise Malay nationalism. However, the rise of Salafism has revitalized the existing religious authority and created room for competition over interpretations of what is actually Islamic. In addition, the negative feelings among traditionalists toward Salafi principles are supported by the fact that Salafi reformists can evade security problems with the Thai government. The interpretation of Islam is also affected by the ongoing political situation.[25]

5. Conclusion

In Thailand, the practice of Islam itself is not suppressed. Nevertheless, Malay Muslims in the Southern border provinces, with different historical and cultural backgrounds from the rest of Thailand, have always questioned the legitimacy of the Thai government. In the course of the assimilation and integration policies of the Thai government over the 20th century, protecting the Malay tradition meant protecting Islam at the same time, from the viewpoint of the Malay nationalist movements. However, the new wave of Islam, especially Salafism, keeps a certain distance from nationalism and seeks to expand its influence within the framework of the Thai nation state and its education system. Looking at Islamic revivalism since the 1980s in the regional context, Malay nationalism has become more commonly interpreted within the framework of Islam, and Salafism has become localized and thus more accepted in Thailand.

Notes

＊ This paper is based on the public lecture at the CISMOR Research Fellows Workshop on "Islamic Revivalism among Muslim Minorities in Asia" held on January 11, 2020. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Junya Shinohe and the CISMOR Secretariat for their assistance. Part of the data in this paper were collected under the JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 19K13637.

[1] In this paper, Islamic revivalism is understood as a phenomenon in which symbols and behaviors that are perceived as Islamic become more evident and have a greater influence on various aspects of Muslim life than before. Islamic revivalism includes not only radical Islamist movements but also other moderate trends of religious revival". Kazuo Ohtsuka *Islam teki Sekaikajidai no nakade* (NHK Books, 2000), 130.

[2] Piyanak Bunnak. "Prawatsaruamkhongmuslimthai: Mongphansaitrakun," in *Lakmitimunmong: Muslimnaiphendinthai* (Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 2012): 25–41, 25.

[3] Yano Hidetake, a specialist who has been studying the relationship between state and religion especially Theravada Buddhism in Thailand, argued that Islam has not been represented in the course of history. Yano Hidetake, "Fukashika sareru thai no muslim: Islam hyoushou kara mita thai bukkyou to kokyoshuukyou" in *Asia no kokyoshuukyou* (Hokkaido University Press, 2020), 193–232.

[4] Chakemkiat Khunthongphet. "The Resistance against the Government's Policy in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand under Haji Sulong Abdul-Kadir's leadership 1939–1954" (in Thai) (Master Thesis, Silapakorn University, 1986), 30-31.

[5] Chakemkiat Khunthongphet, "The Resistance," 31-32.

[6] Chakemkiat Khunthongphet, "The Resistance," 33.

[7] For dato yutitham, *see* Shinya Imaizumi, "Thai sihousaibansho niokeru dato yutitham (Islamhou saibankan) no yakuwari," *Asiashokoku no funsoshoriseido*, (IDE-JETRO, 2003) 225–256.

[8] Ekarat Mukem, *Cularatchamontri Prawatsaphunamthaimuslim* (Bangkok: Ruamduaichuaikan, 2006), 62–65.

[9] For more detail, Duncan McCargo. "Co-optation and Resistance in Thailand's Muslim South: The Changing Role of Islamic Council Election," *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January, 2010): 93–113, 112.

[10] Surin Pitsuwan. "Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand," (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 1982), 8.

[11] For example, *see* Duncan McCargo. *Tearing apart the land: Islam and legitimacy in Southern Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

[12] Ibrahem Narongraksakhet and Numan Hayimasae. *Trisademai: Sathabankansueksamuslim changwatchaideanpaktai,* (Pattani: Salatan kanwichai lae wichakan, 2010), 78–80.

[13] For the early leading study focusing on education, *see* Uthai Dulyakasem. "Education and Ethnic Nationalism: A Study of the Muslim-Malays in Southern Siam," (PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 1981).

[14] Tablīghī Jamā'at is an apolitical religious movement founded by Maulana Muhammad Ilyas in 1927. This movement focuses on personal piety and missionary preaching to invite people to change their practices to get closer to the ideal life during the times of prophet Muhammad and his pious companions. For discussions on Tablighi Jamaat in Thailand, *see* Horstmann, Alexander. "The Inculturation of a Transnational Islamic Missionary Movement: Tablighi Jamaat al-Dawa and Muslim Society in Southern Thailand," *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2007): 107–130, and Hisashi Ogawa, *Tadashii islam o meguru dainamizumu: Thainannbu muslimsonraku no shuukyouminzokushi*, (Osaka University Press, 2016).

[15] Salafism, which was originally a trend in thought, appeared in the 19th century when the Islamic world faced colonialism by the west. It sought to overcome the crisis of the Muslim community by returning to the Qur'ān and Sunna, the original text of the times of the prophet Muhammad and his companion (Salaf, pious predecessors). It criticizes the act of following traditional schools of thought

blindly, and promotes activating the individual reasoning to derive Islamic legal rulings. Salafism later gained tendencies to interpret the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth literally. In the latter half of the 20th century, some trends connected with the ideology of militant jihadism. With the emergence of groups that use terrorism as means of changing realities to suit Islam, Salafism gained the connotation as extremism. Salafism has often been discussed with Wahhabism. Wahhabism is also a puritanical Islamic reformist movement that appeared in 18th century, and follows the interpretations of Muhanmad ibn 'abd al-Wahhāb. Wahhabism played a significant role in establishing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and is the ideological pillar of the state. The leading study of Islamic reformism in Thailand is done by Muhammad Ilyas Yahprung in "Islamic Reform and revivalism in southern Thailand: A critical study of the Salafi reform movement of Shaykh Dr. Ismail Lutfi Chapakia al-Fatani," (PhD Dissertation, Islamic University of Malaysia, 2014).

16 Joseph Chinyong Liow. *Islam, Education, and Reform in Southern Thailand: Tradition & Transformation*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009).

17 Hara Shintaro, "The Interpretation of Shahid in Patani," Asian International Studies Review, Vol. 20 (June, 2019): 137–157.

18 Duncan McCargo. "Co-optation and Resistance," 102.

19 For example, in Rueso district, Narathiwat province, 2 new pondok had been newly founded other than the 8 registered pondok. Interview, 10 August 2015.

20 Ibrahem and Numan. op cit, 144–158.

21 Naomi Nishi, "Islamic Education and Sense of Belonging in the Deep South of Thailand," (in Japanese) *The Journal of Thai Studies*, No. 18 (2018): 39–57.

22 Rungrawee Chalermsripinyora. *Thotkhwamkhit Khabuankanekaratpatani* (Pattani: Deep Book, 2013), 41–42.

23 For example, Sugunnasil Wattana. "Islam, Radicalism, and Violence in Southern Thailand: Berjihad di Pattani and the 28 April 2004 Attacks," *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2006): 119–144, 138.

24 For example, International Crises Group. "Jihadism in Southern Thailand: A Phantom Menace," *Asia Report*, No. 291 (2017).

25 Naomi Nishi, "Conflicting Interpretations on Islamic Ideologies and the Notion of Radicalization: Focusing on the Acceptance of Salāfism in the Deep South of Thailand" (in Japanese) *The World of Monotheistic Religions,* Vol. 11, (2020), 34–52.

The God Who is Affected by Human Problems:
Atonement Through Israelite Purification Offerings

Roy E. Gane

Abstract:

Ancient Israelite purification offerings removed sins and physical ritual impurities from those who offered them and brought residual defilement from these evils into the sanctuary of God. The defilements that accumulated at the sanctuary throughout the year were ritually removed by special purification offerings on the annual Day of Atonement. This two-phase process of ritual atonement, which was unique in the ancient Near East, acknowledged and highlighted the effects on God when he is involved in freeing human beings from problems that they have caused.

Keywords:

Sin, Impurity, Atonement, Purification Offering, Sanctuary

Introduction

Ancient Near Eastern (ANE) peoples were keenly aware of categories that could be regarded as "sin," i.e., "moral fault," which could be viewed as moral impurity, and various other kinds of "impurity," such as physical ritual impurity or demonic impurity. Because sin could be viewed as defiling, the overall category of "impurity" in general included sin. Both sin and other forms of impurity were to be avoided if possible and remedied if necessary because they could negatively impact relationships between ANE people and deities, whose favor was essential for their well-being.

"Sin" is fairly easy to define as violation of a divine norm. A general definition of other "impurity" that applies within all ANE cultural contexts is more elusive and is still subject to debate.[1] However, we can tentatively suggest that such "impurity" was basically some kind of disorder that involved one or more extraordinary factors, such as a superhuman source (e.g., a demon), an adverse effect on the relationship between a human being and a superhuman being, or the need for a remedy that transcended ordinary human ability.[2]

The present paper will first establish an overall perspective and baseline for comparison by identifying concepts regarding sins and other kinds of impurities in the ANE outside Israel. Then the remainder of the paper will compare and contrast ways in which the ancient Israelite ritual system dealt with these evils, including through purification offerings that uniquely revealed the way in which Israel's deity, YHWH, made himself vulnerable to human weaknesses in the process of remedying them.

Impurities, Including Sins, of Ancient Near Eastern Peoples

This section begins with sins and then turns to consideration of other impurities.

Sins of ANE Peoples

Some ANE texts identify divine norms of behavior to which humans are accountable, violation of which could be regarded as sinful. For example, according to the Ur III period (c. 2100-2000 B.C.) Sumerian text called "The Nanshe Hymn," persons who gained their sustenance or other economic benefits from the temple of the goddess Nanshe were responsible for adhering to the cultic and ethical rules of the goddess.[3] Cultic rules included proper performance of duties at the temple, such as cleaning troughs of dough and maintaining the fire at night (lines 114-115). Ethical rules prohibited bullying, altering boundaries, dishonesty in the use of weights and measures,[4] and mistreatment of children by

their mothers (lines 136, 139, 142-143, 212-223).

At an annual review or judgment on the New Year, those who observed Nanshe's rules had their contracts for employment or economic assistance renewed for the coming year, but the contracts of those who violated the rules were terminated. A person whose contract was terminated could be cleared from blame and restored by the "ordeal river in the house of Nanshe" (line 130).[5] This river ordeal served as a test of whether a person was guilty or innocent, but it does not appear to have atoned for guilt.

Another example of a text that reveals divine norms is Spell 125 of the Egyptian "Book of the Dead," which contains two series of negative confessions by a dead person to an underworld tribunal of forty-two gods.[6] These expressions of innocence reflect an understanding of what would be acceptable or unacceptable to the gods, including mostly a wide array of ethical behaviors, but also some cultic ones. At the conclusion of the first series of negative confessions, the deceased person exclaims: "I am pure, I am pure, I am pure, I am pure!"[7] This refers to an assertion of moral purity. A later passage in the same text lists good things that the person has done and repeats the claim of moral purity: "I am pure of mouth, pure of hands…"[8] However, this chapter of the "Book of the Dead" concerning judgment by the gods provides no opportunity for expiation from moral failure.

Some other ANE texts indicate means by which individuals attempted to atone for guilt. Notable examples are the "Plague Prayers of Muršili II," a Hittite emperor who pled with the Hittite gods to remove a terrible epidemic that was taking the lives of countless people in the land of Ḫatti over a period of many years.[9] Muršili says that he inquired of a god through an oracle and learned that the cause of the plague was guilt incurred years before by his father, Šuppiluliuma I, when he unjustly put to death a ruler named Tudḫḫaliya, thereby violating an oath to him. There were two serious violations of divine norms here: murder and breaking an oath.

After the murder, Šuppiluliuma himself performed a ritual to expiate bloodshed, and later Muršili did the same, although the people of the capital city of Ḫattuša did not. Nobody carried out any expiatory ritual on behalf of the land. However, Muršili promised in his prayer:

> They will perform before you, [the gods], my lords, the ritual of (transgressing of) the oath which was ascertained for you, [the gods], my lords, and for your temples in regard to the plague. They will purify [... before you]. And I will make restitution to you, the gods, my lords, with reparation and propitiatory gift on behalf of the

land.[10]

Muršili also sought to restore the favor of the gods by offering bread and a libation, by worshiping all the gods during festivals, and by confessing and pleading in prayer, but to no avail. Obviously, Muršili believed in the possibility that any or all of the strategies that he tried could atone for the guilt of his father that the land bore and that he had inherited, but their efficacy depended on the will of the gods to accept or reject them.

The partly broken Mesopotamian "Poem of the Righteous Sufferer" recounts the horrible experience of a person who suffered in many ways, which he believed to be the results of a sin that he had committed, of which he was ignorant.[11] He petitioned his god Marduk and goddess Sarpanitum (Marduk's consort) in prayer and tried to found out what he had done wrong and resolve the problem with the help of a diviner, a dream interpreter, and an exorcist who performed a ritual. He did not understand the displeasure of the gods because he was a pious man who regularly made libations, gave food offerings and performed rituals, including sacrifices, bowed down, prayed, and observed holy days and festivals. Finally, the pious sufferer gained relief and restoration, which he attributed to reconciliation with his god, who mercifully forgave his sin.

Now we can summarize several key aspects of ANE thought regarding "sin." First, sinful violations of divine norms could be cultic or ethical. Second, punishments for sin could affect individuals or groups, and punishment affecting a whole country could be referred to as resulting from guilt borne by the land. Third, some divine judgments did not allow for atonement. Fourth, the success of attempted atonement depended on the will of deities. Fifth, various strategies for atonement could be attempted, including expiatory rituals and gifts for propitiation and reparation to remedy specific, known offenses, and/or offerings and other forms of worship to regain divine favor in general. Sixth, people could suffer divine punishment without knowing what they had done wrong.

Other Impurities of ANE Peoples

ANE peoples were concerned about a wide variety of impurities. Mesopotamians and Hittites generally thought that impurities came from the underworld and should be returned there if possible.[12] Mesopotamians viewed such impurities as demonic. For example, on the fifth day of the Babylonian New Year Festival of Spring, there were two stages in the ritual purification of the Ezida apartment of the god Nabû that was located in the great Esagila temple of Marduk, whose title was Bēl, which means "Lord."[13] Marduk was the city god of

Babylon and Nabû's father. This purification prepared for the arrival of Nabû, represented by his idol, from his home city of Borsippa to participate in the festival. The Ezida had been vacant all year, and it was believed that one or more demons had taken up residence there.[14] So the purification of this cella involved exorcism.

The first stage of purification involved application of purgative agents, including water, cedar oil, incense, and torch light, and wiping the decapitated carcass of a ram on the walls of the Ezida to absorb impurity, after which the exorcist was to dispose of the impurity-laden ram by throwing it into the Euphrates River. Significantly, the Akkadian word for "wiping" is *kuppuru*, the cognate of Hebrew *kipper*, which refers to purgation of the Israelite sanctuary on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16:16, 18).

The first stage performed by the human exorcist was regarded as successful in removing lesser demons, but there could remain a greater, more powerful demon, whose expulsion required divine power. Therefore, in a second stage of purification, a kind of golden canopy was stretched over the Ezida, and the high priest and other temple personnel recited a loud cry calling on the gods to purify the temple. The incantation included the words: "Any evil that is in this temple, get out! Great evil demon, may Bēl kill you! Wherever you are, be suppressed!"[15]

Unlike the Mesopotamians, the Hittites regarded most impurities as non-demonic and impersonal.[16] Hittites were obsessed with maintaining and regaining purity, the absence of impurity, apparently more than any other ANE people group. Impurities could cause a vast range of afflictions, including serious and fatal illnesses. Some impurities could be avoided, but some could be incurred unintentionally, and others were impossible to prevent.[17]

For the Hittites, there were many sources and forms of impurities,[18] which were contagious and could attach to persons, animals, objects, buildings, or places. Most Hittite impurities can be grouped into three kinds. First, impurities could come from human bodily discharges, physical activities, or conditions, including blood, sexual intercourse, childbirth, or death.[19] Second, impurities could be abstract pollutions from social evils, including gossip, slander, theft, murder, and bestiality. Third, impurities could be of superhuman origin, such as occult sources through sorcery and witchcraft, or from gods as results of curses and/or divine anger.

Purification procedures took many forms, depending on the nature of the impurities that they targeted. Purification could be as simple as bathing after sexual intercourse, or it could be more complex.[20] A ritual could eliminate evils by banishing materials, animals, or humans (probably captives) to remote locations or by burning, burying, or sealing materials

associated with them.[21]

Hittite temples and their sancta required maintenance of purity, and purification from impurities that affected them. For example, the Hittite "Instructions for Temple Officials" (CTH 264) recorded rules for the royal temple in Ḫattuša, the imperial capital.[22] Temple personnel who served the gods were to be washed and trimmed, and the kitchen for baking the bread for the gods was to be swept and sprinkled down. These would be ordinary mundane activities outside the temple, but because this was the sacred space, maintaining its cleanliness to retain the favor of the gods carried transcendent significance.[23] It seems that ANE peoples did not sharply distinguish between physical cleanliness and ritual purity in such contexts because they regarded the divine and human spheres as interactive components of a single natural cosmic community, without a division between "natural" and "supernatural."[24]

One activity that required temple officials to wash before serving food and drink to the gods was sexual intercourse. Incurring impurity at home in this way was permitted, but purification was needed before coming in contact with the sacred domain in order to avoid polluting holy things and places. The impurity itself was not a sin, but violation of the rule "is a sin for him" (§14; cf. §10 of guards).

Sacred objects belonging to the temple could become impure through contact with a pig or dog if it forced its way in to wooden or ceramic vessels belonging to the kitchen. The vessels could not be purified, presumably because they were porous and absorbed the impurity. So they were to be discarded (§14).

In the "Instructions for Temple Officials," temple personnel need not only physical ritual purity, but also moral purity of their minds, as pointed out by Ada Taggar-Cohen.[25] The "Instructions" warn against various sins of commission, such as stealing things that belonged to the gods (§§5-8, 16-19), and sins of omission, such as neglecting to properly celebrate a festival (§12). The text does not mention the possibility of atonement for such sins. By including concern for both ritual and moral purity, the "Instructions" reinforce the close connection between these categories.

Another Hittite text that concerns cultic purity prescribes rituals for the Ninth Year Festival of the god Telipinu.[26] On the fourth day of this festival, cultic functionaries were to use a wagon to carry the images of Telipinu, his consort, other gods, and a cult pedestal in a procession from Telipinu's temple to a river. There they were to ritually wash these sacred objects in the river and perform animal sacrifices, after which they would transport the sancta back to the temple. The text does not specify the nature of the impurity that had to be

removed, but it clearly accumulated on the idols and the pedestal over a period of time. These objects were not immune to the impurity, but it did not negate their sanctity if they underwent periodic purification. The impurity was not just ordinary dirt, which could have been cleaned off at the temple, rather than having to be ritually removed at the river.

Purification of an Anatolian temple could involve the use of blood. Ritual activities for initial purification of a new temple for the underworld "Goddess of the Night" included the following: "They offer one sheep to the deity…and slaughter it down in the hole…They bloody the golden (image of the) deity, the wall and all the implements of the new [dei]ty. Then the [ne]w deity and the temple are pure" (§32).[27]

We can now summarize some points regarding ANE conceptions and treatment of "impurity" that was not sin, keeping in mind that ANE cultures differed somewhat in their views of impurity. First, impurities could be physical, social, or superhuman in origin and nature. Second, physical impurities that were seemingly mundane carried additional significance in cultic contexts because they could affect relationships with deities. Third, impurities were generally to be avoided if possible, but if they were incurred, they were to be remedied by means of appropriate purification rituals. Fourth, while impurity itself was not sin and incurring an impurity could be permitted, violation of a rule concerning impurity was sinful. Fifth, impurity was opposed to holiness, so it had to be kept out of temples and sacred objects if possible, but if they became polluted, they were to be ritually purified or, in some cases, objects lost their sanctity and had to be discarded.

Impurities, Including Sins, of Ancient Israelites

Concepts and treatment of sins and other impurities affecting ancient Israelites, according to the Hebrew Bible, are similar in many ways to those of these evils elsewhere in the ANE, although there are some differences. This section summarizes the same kinds of points regarding Israelite sins and impurities that were earlier observed in the context of the rest of the ANE, thereby showing comparisons and contrasts.

Sins of Ancient Israelites

First, sins could be violations of cultic rules, such as the prohibition against eating the meat of a well-being offering on the third day after it is slaughtered and offered to God (Lev 7:18). On the other hand, sins could be violations of ethical principles, such as those of the Ten Commandments (Exod 20) and laws related to them (e.g., in Exod 21-23).[28]

Second, punishments for sins could fall on individuals or on groups, including the entire Israelite nation (Lev 26). Furthermore, sexual offenses (Lev 18:6-20, 22-23), idolatry (Lev 18:21), and murder (Num 35:33-34) morally polluted the land, ultimately leading to exile of the people from the land if enough of this moral impurity accumulated there (Lev 18:28). Another kind of moral pollution was the automatic defilement of the sanctuary from a distance if an Israelite or resident alien living in the land offered any of his children to the god Molech (20:3) or if someone deliberately committed the sin of failing to undergo purification from impurity that they received from a corpse (Num 19:13, 20). The penalty for these sins was the divinely administered punishment of being "cut off" (verbs from the root *k-r-t*) from one's people, that is, forfeiting one's afterlife.[29]

Third, some divine judgments by YHWH did not allow for Israelites to receive atonement through expiatory sacrifices, although he could mercifully forgive apart from sacrifice (Exod 34:7; 2 Sam 12:13; Ps 51; 2 Chr 33; see below). There was no sacrificial expiation for those whose serious sins incurred the terminal penalty of being "cut off" (e.g., Lev 7:20-21, 25, 27), including those who committed "high-handed" sins, that is, in defiance of YHWH (Num 15:30-31). On the Day of Atonement, all Israelites and non-Israelite resident aliens were to gain moral purification as a result of the purgation of the sanctuary when they showed loyalty to YHWH by practicing self-denial through fasting, etc., and by abstaining from all work (Lev 16:29-31). But those who failed to do this were to be "cut off" or "destroyed" (Lev 23:29-30). Thus, the Day of Atonement was Israel's judgment day.

Fourth, as elsewhere in the ANE, the success of an Israelite in gaining atonement depended on the will of the deity. Atonement did not automatically result from performance of an expiatory ritual like a kind of magic. Divine acceptance of a sacrifice was necessary for atonement (Lev 1:4). Forgiveness to complete the process of atonement, i.e., reconciliation, was granted by YHWH himself, following an expiatory sacrifice officiated by a priest, as in Lev 4:26, for example: "Thus the priest shall make expiation for him from his sin, and he will be forgiven" (my translation). The priest made expiation, that is, removing the consequences of the sin from the sinner, but he was not authorized to forgive the sinner. The implied agent of the passive expression "he will be forgiven" is YHWH himself,[30] who alone could forgive because it was his law that had been violated. While such forgiveness was not automatic, God promised that he would grant it if the sacrifice was properly performed. However, this assumes that the sinner is sincere and repentant. Elsewhere in the Bible, YHWH rejects sacrifices and other forms of worship, even prayers, offered by hypocritical individuals (e.g., Isa 1:11-15).

Fifth, Israelites could seek atonement in various ways, especially including expiatory sacrifices (e.g., Lev 1:4; 4:20, 26, 31, 35), some of which followed confession (5:5; Num 5:7), and some of which followed payment of reparation to the wronged party (Lev 5:16, 23-24 [Eng. 6:4-5]; Num 5:7). Unlike other ANE peoples, repentant Israelites who offered the types of sacrifices specified for their kinds of offenses by YHWH's ritual law were guaranteed atonement. A sinner who committed so great a wrong that its penalty was terminal, whether death or "cutting off," with no kind of animal sacrifice available to expiate it, could nevertheless pray to God, confessing the sin and pleading for reconciliation. Kings David and Manasseh received divine mercy in this way (Ps 51 [cf. 2 Sam 12:13]; 2 Chr. 33:12-13). Individuals who were ignorant of what they had done wrong, but whose experiences led them to believe that they must have sinned, could receive expiation through reparation offerings (Lev 5:17-19; see below).

Sixth, a person could experience results of divine displeasure without knowing the nature of his/her offense. However, this should have been rare because YHWH, unlike other ANE deities, made a unique covenant/treaty with a nation, in this case Israel, and the covenant stipulations consisted of laws (especially in the collections of Exod 20-23; Lev 17-27; Deut 12-26) that specified in detail what he wanted his people to do or not do.[31]

It is true that other ANE peoples also had laws, such as the Laws of Hammurabi and the Hittite Laws. Such regulations governed various kinds of behaviors, violation of which could be regarded as crimes, or as sins in the sense that the social order governed by a human ruler was viewed as subject to the overall jurisdiction of the gods.[32] However, there was a much more direct connection between the biblical laws and the will of the one deity YHWH than there was between the other ANE law collections and any particular deities. The fact that Israelite religion was monotheistic greatly simplified matters for people who believed that they had sinned because they did not need to employ diviners to figure out which superhuman being they had offended.

Further reducing uncertainty and stress, Israelites who unintentionally violated divine commandments were required to offer expiatory purification or reparation offerings only when they came to know that they had done wrong (Lev 4:13-14, 22-23, 27-28; 5:14-16). Those who perceived that they were experiencing negative consequences of sins without knowing what they had done wrong could offer a particular kind of sacrifice—a reparation offering—to remedy the problem (Lev 5:17-19).[33]

Other Impurities of Ancient Israelites

First, for the Israelites, non-moral impurities did not come from the underworld, nor were they demonic in origin. Rather, some came from contact with certain impure species of animals when they were dead (Lev 11:24-44; cf. 5:2), but most of them originated from physical conditions and activities of human beings (Lev 12, 13-15; Num 19). Human impurities were notable manifestations of the birth-to-death cycle of human mortality,[34] including corpses (Num 19), male or female genital flows (Lev 15), or surface disease, commonly referred to as "leprosy," including scaly-skin disease on persons, as well as outbreaks of mold or other kinds of fungus on garments or houses (Lev 13-14).

In biblical narratives, YHWH sometimes punished people by afflicting them with skin disease (Num 12:10; 2 Kgs 5:27; 15:5; 2 Chr 26:19-20), but although the origin of the impurity was superhuman, the impurity itself affected physical conditions.[35] Non-moral Israelite impurities were conceptual in the sense that they involved categories, rather than just ordinary physical dirt. For example, washing a corpse could not make it pure. However, impurities were physical in the sense that they could adhere to Israelite persons, objects, or places. Social evils, such as slander (Lev 19:16), were treated as sins, rather than as other kinds of impurities.

Second, as in other ANE countries, some physical impurities that were seemingly mundane carried additional significance in Israelite cultic contexts. Israelite priests were required to wash their hands and feet with water drawn from the sacred basin in the sanctuary courtyard before they entered the sacred sanctuary tent or officiated at the outer altar so that they may not die (Exod 30:17-21). The impurity that they removed may have included some ordinary dirt, but the importance of this purification went far beyond what would be expected in a non-cultic context.

Third, as elsewhere in the ANE, impurities were generally to be avoided if possible, but if they were incurred, they were to be remedied by means of appropriate purification rituals. Incurring some Israelite physical impurities, such as secondary contamination by touching a person having a genital flow or tertiary contamination by contacting an object that the person had made impure (e.g., Lev 15:4-12), was to be avoided, if possible. However, some impurities could not be avoided because they resulted from involuntary bodily functions, such as healthy or unhealthy genital flows (Lev 12, 15) or scaly skin disease (Lev 13-14). Others were permitted and even necessary, such as the impurity resulting from sexual intercourse that was needed to maintain and grow the nation (Lev 15:18), and incurring corpse impurity to bury dead relatives (Num 19). Some impurities were forbidden, at least to

some categories of Israelites. For example, all Israelites were prohibited from eating small swarming creatures that would make them impure (Lev 11:43-44) and ordinary priests were not to become impure from corpses, except for those of close family members (21:1-4).

Rituals for purification from light one-day impurities, such those caused by male nocturnal emission (Lev 15:16-17), by sexual intercourse (v. 18), or by secondary contamination through physical contact with a person having a genital flow (e.g., vv. 7, 11; cf. v. 8—or his spittle), or by tertiary contamination through contact with an object made unclean by a person with a severe impurity resulting from a genital flow (vv. 5-6, 9-10) were simple: All that was necessary was to wash one's clothes, bathe in water, and wait until the evening. However, purification from severe impurities, that is, from primary sources of impurity that continued for an extended period of time, also required sacrifices from the individuals undergoing purification (e.g., vv. 14-15, 29-30; Lev 14:10-20).

Corpse impurity was secondary contamination, but it was serious and lasted seven days (Num 19:11) because of its close association with death, and it was transmitted not only by direct contact, but also to anyone under the same roof (v. 14). So purification required the red cow purification offering, but this was offered for the whole community (vv. 1-10), and individuals only needed to be sprinkled by a small amount of its ashes, mixed with water, on the third and seventh days (Num 19:17-19).

Fourth, physical impurity itself was not sin, as shown by the fact that Israelites who offered sacrifices to remove their physical impurities needed and received purification, but not forgiveness (e.g., Lev 12:7-8). However, violation of a rule concerning impurity, for example, by incurring a prohibited impurity (see above) or failing to undergo timely purification (5:2-3), was a sin.

Fifth, Israelite physical impurity conflicted with the holy domain of the deity. This was not only because such impurity showed lack of decorum and respect to YHWH, but because he is the God of life, the Creator (Gen 1-2), who must not be associated with impurity that comes from death and the birth-to-death cycle of mortality (see above) that results from sin (Gen 3; cf. Rom 6:23).[36] Therefore, the Israelites were to keep impurities away from sacred places and objects. For example, a woman with a flow of blood following childbirth was not permitted to enter the sanctuary precincts (Lev 12:4). It was categorically forbidden for an Israelite to eat meat from a holy well-being offering while in a state of physical impurity, and the penalty for the sin of violating this rule was "cutting off" (Lev 7:20-21). Failure to undergo purification from corpse impurity even defiled the sanctuary from a distance, and the penalty was "cutting off."

Israelite Cult Affected by Remedies for Sins and Other Impurities

Thus far, we have found that Israelites and other ANE peoples shared key concepts regarding sins and other impurities, although there were some differences between them. ANE people could sin or incur other impurities so that they would need to offer expiatory sacrifices or undergo purification, and their sacred places and objects could become impure so that they would require periodic purification. But never did their *remedies* for personal sins or impurities cause these evils to pollute their temples or sancta in any way, and there is no evidence that purification of holy spaces and/or their contents ever removed any effects of expiation or purification of sins or impurities of individuals. These were entirely separate.

By contrast, there was one important feature of the Israelite ritual system that was completely unique: Purification offerings (*ḥaṭṭāʾt* sacrifices; so-called "sin offerings") that removed residual defilements of minor sins (Lev 4:1-5:13) and what had been serious physical impurities (12:6-8; 14:19; 15:15, 30) from those who offered them left some defilement at YHWH's sanctuary residence and on his priests (6:20-21 [Eng. vv. 27-28]; 10:17). So this defilement had to be purified from the sanctuary with its sacred furniture once per year on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16). Thus, individual expiation and purification were linked to purgation of sacred space and objects. Remarkably, the ritual remedy prescribed by the deity (4:1; 6:24) for problems of persons negatively affected that deity at his sanctuary residence throughout the year until the Day of Atonement. The remainder of this paper analyzes the ritual details and their implications.

Transfer of Sins and Impurities to the Sanctuary Throughout the Year

Leviticus 4:1-5:13 presents the primary instructions for performance of purification offerings, which remedied inadvertent sins and minor sins of omission, mainly due to forgetfulness. The ritual procedure began with the offerer laying one hand on the head of the animal victim, after which he killed the animal, presumably by slitting its throat (cf. 2 Kgs 10:7).[37] A priest collected the blood in a container (cf. 2 Chr 29:22) and applied it to part of the sanctuary, after which he disposed of the remainder of the blood by pouring it out at the base of the outer altar in the courtyard. Then the offerer removed specified parts of suet, i.e., hard fat, and burned the suet on the outer altar.

There were two basic kinds of purification offerings. The first kind applied if the sacrifice remedied a sin that involved the entire community, whether it was committed by the high priest, who represented the community before YHWH (e.g., Exod 28:29-30, 38), or by the entire community itself. The high priest took the blood into the sanctuary tent, sprinkled

some of it seven times in the area of the outer sanctum in front of the inner veil, and put some of it on the four horns of the altar of incense (vv. 5-7, 16-18). After the high priest burned the suet on the altar, the rest of the animal carcass was disposed of by incinerating it outside the camp in a pure place (vv. 11-12, 21), excluding, for example, a place of human burial (cf. Num 19:16).

A purification offering to expiate a sin committed by a chieftain or common Israelite could be officiated by an ordinary priest, who would only put blood on the horns of the outer altar (Lev 4:25, 30, 34). This procedure, officiated by an ordinary priest, was the same when a purification offering remedied physical impurities (cf. ordinary priests in 12:6-8; 14:19). Leviticus 4 does not say what should be done with the rest of the animal. However, Leviticus 6 answers this question in the context of additional instructions that were especially for the priests: "The priest who offers it as a purification offering will eat it. It must be eaten in a holy place, in the meeting tent's courtyard" (v. 19 [Eng. v. 26] CEB).

A purification offering could be supplemented by a burnt offering so that the combination would amount to a greater purification offering. Thus, for example, a poor person who could not afford a sheep or goat for a purification offering (5:6) could instead offer two birds, first one for a purification offering and the other as a burnt offering (5:7-10). The function of this pair was equivalent to that of a single purification offering.

The function of purification offerings throughout the year to remedy sins was to expiate, i.e., effect removal (*kipper*, Piel of *k-p-r*), on behalf of the offerers, in this case the sinners, from (privative preposition *min*) their sins (4:26; 5:6, 10). That is, the sin was removed from the offerers. If the problem was physical impurity, rather than sin, a purification offering effected removal for the offerer from (also privative preposition *min*) that person's impurity (12:7; 14:19; 15:15, 30), i.e., removing the impurity from the offerer.[38]

Jacob Milgrom has argued that sins would be removed from sinners by repentance and physical impurities would be removed from impure persons by washing with water before they would offer purification offerings. Therefore, purification offerings would not remove evils from their offerers.[39] James A. Greenberg agrees because an impure person would not even be allowed to come to the sanctuary to offer a sacrifice.[40] But he, like Milgrom, does not adequately recognize that purification from a severe impurity took place in stages that progressively diminished and then removed the impurity.

For example, in the case of a woman who has given birth to a boy, for the first seven days she has contagious impurity, as during menstruation (Lev 12:2), so that she communicates impurity to persons and objects through touch (cf. 15:19-24). For the next

thirty-three days, her impurity is not contagious in that way, but she is still forbidden to touch anything holy or enter the sanctuary precincts "until her time of purification is completed" (12:4 CEB). Then when her "time of purification is complete, whether for a son or a daughter, the mother must bring a one-year-old lamb as an entirely burned offering and a pigeon or turtledove as a purification offering to the priest at the meeting tent's entrance" (v. 6 CEB, supplying "the mother" for clarity). By now her impurity is weak enough that she can come to the sanctuary, where the purification offering, supplemented by the burnt offering, removes the last residue of impurity: "She will then be cleansed from her blood flow" (v. 7 CEB).[41]

The additional instructions in Leviticus 6:20b-21 [Eng. vv. 27b-28] add the following regulations regarding the purification offering: "If some of its blood splashes on a garment, you must wash the bloodied part in a holy place. A pottery container in which the purification offering is cooked must be broken, but if it is cooked in a bronze container, that must be scrubbed and rinsed with water."

Because the purification offering was most holy and the priests were required to eat it in a holy place, and anything that touched its flesh became holy (vv. 18, 20a, 22 [Eng vv. 25, 27a, 29]),[42] most scholars have interpreted these verses to mean that the reason for washing the bloodied part of a garment and for breaking or scrubbing and rinsing a vessel in which the meat is cooked for the priests is to remove contagious holiness.[43] However, this interpretation does not work because, as pointed out by Jacob Milgrom and David P. Wright, these rules concerning bloodied garments and cooking vessels only applied to purification offerings. If the rules dealt with sancta contagion, they would necessarily also apply to reparation offerings, which were also most holy (7:1, 6) and made things holy by direct contact (6:10-11 [Eng. vv. 17-18]).[44] But there is no evidence that reparation offerings were subject to these regulations, so they must be required by the unique dynamics of purification offerings, which served the function of removing sins and physical impurities.[45]

Therefore, what was to be removed by washing the bloodied part of a garment and breaking or scrubbing and rinsing a vessel was not holiness, but defilement from the sin or impurity that was removed from the offerer by means of his/her animal victim.[46] There is no solid evidence elsewhere in the Israelite ritual system for ritual removal of holiness,[47] but there is plenty of evidence for washing impurity from garments (e.g., 11:25, 28, 40; 15:5-8, 10-11).[48] There is also evidence for breaking earthenware vessels that have become impure (11:33, 35; 15:12).[49]

> Sancta contagion does not make good sense in Lev 6:20-21. Aside from the points already mentioned, if purification offering blood spatters on a priest's garment or he boils the meat in a vessel, why would sancta contagion matter? The priest's garment is already holy and belongs to the sanctuary, and presumably so do the vessels used to boil such meat there. If the concern of verse 20 is restricted to clothes of laypersons, which could be confiscated if holiness were not removed from them, and does not also apply to priests' garments, why doesn't the text say so? On the other hand, impurity from the offerer makes sense because it would be a problem for both lay and priestly garments.[50]

If purification offering animals, including their blood, bore defilement that was removed from their offerers, we can understand why such blood was never physically applied to the offerers: Why put the sins or impurities back on the offerers when the ritual purpose was to remove the evils from them?[51]

Now consider this. If purification offering blood carried defilement that could be transferred to an object, such as a garment, that came in contact with the blood, what happened when the priest applied such blood to the sanctuary, whether in the outer sanctum and on the horns of the incense altar (Lev 4:6-7, 17-18) or on the horns of the outer altar (vv. 25, 30, 34)? The ritual activity would have communicated defilement to the sanctuary. This explains how *ḥaṭṭāʾt* sins and physical impurities got into the sanctuary so that they had to be purged from there on the annual Day of Atonement (Lev 16).

Weakness of Defilements Affecting the Holy Sanctuary

An objection to the interpretation that Leviticus 6:20-21 concerns impurity is the fact that the purification offering was most holy and was to be eaten in a holy place. How could such a sacrifice carry defilement from sin or physical impurity that came from the offerer?[52] We have seen that elsewhere in the Israelite ritual system, holiness and impurity were antagonistic and had to be kept apart from each other (e.g., Lev 7:20-21). Following instructions in Leviticus 15 concerning treatment of impurities from genital flows, verse 31 warns: "You must separate the Israelites from their uncleanness so that they don't die on account of it, by making my dwelling unclean, which is in their midst" (CEB).

However, we cannot escape the biblical evidence: Paradoxically, purification offerings bore defilement even though Leviticus 6 repeatedly affirms that they were most holy. It was not their purpose to bear this defilement. Their function was to remove sins or

physical impurities from offerers. The defilement that they carried was an inevitable side-effect. There is no question that the sanctuary bore pollution because Leviticus 16 says that it was removed from there on the Day of Atonement (esp. vv. 16, 19).

Lessening the problem of defilement brought into the holy sanctuary by purification offerings is the fact that this defilement would be very minor. These sacrifices did remedy what had been serious physical impurities, but remember that the impurities were weakened before the individuals undergoing purification were allowed to come to the sanctuary in order to offer the sacrifices (see above). If they could enter the sacred precincts while carrying a residue of impurity without disrupting the holiness of the sanctuary, it would be less problematic for the sanctuary to bear an even weaker trace amount of pollution that was tertiary because it was transmitted from a person to an animal and then by a priest to the sanctuary.[53] Remember that in the Israelite system of impurities, secondary and tertiary impurities resulting from contact with the primary source of impurity were weaker than the impurity of that source (see above).

Regarding defilement of the sanctuary from *ḥaṭṭā't* sins, this was mitigated by the fact that purification offerings only remedied minor sins. These included unintentional sins (Lev 4), sins of temporarily forgetting to fulfill duties to undergo timely physical purification (5:2-3) or to fulfill vows/oaths (v. 4), or temporarily withholding testimony regarding crimes committed by others (v. 1). Repentance of the sinners, as indicated by their bringing purification offerings to the sanctuary to receive expiation, in some cases after required confession (5:5), presumably further lessened the defilement. Then the small amount of remaining pollution went from the offerer to the sacrificial victim and only then by the priest to the sanctuary, again, as tertiary defilement.

Notice the following points. First, the fact that sins expiated by purification offerings caused defilement that polluted the sanctuary, a physical structure with sacred space, exemplifies the fact that sin is a form of impurity. Another example is the ritual of Azazel's goat on the Day of Atonement: The goat carries only sins, i.e., moral faults (Lev 16:21-22), but the man who leads it into the wilderness must subsequently undergo physical purification by laundering his clothes and bathing (v. 26). Second, while purification offerings transferred defilements to the sanctuary only in trace amounts throughout the year, the defilements accumulated so that they had to be removed once per year in order to not become excessive. Third, all of these defilements were symbolic and abstract; they did not exist in physical form.

Removal of Sins and Impurities from the Sanctuary on the Day of Atonement

On the Day of Atonement, the high priest removed the sins and impurities that had accumulated at the sanctuary throughout the year by means of special purification offerings, in which he applied the blood to the various parts of the sanctuary: the inner sanctum, the outer sanctum, and the outer altar (vv. 14-19; cf. vv. 20, 33). The carcasses of the animals, which absorbed the defilements, were incinerated outside the camp (v. 27).

Leviticus 16:16 lists the evils that the high priest purged from (*kipper… min*) the inner sanctum, called here the "holy place," and the outer sanctum, the (rest of) "the tent of meeting." These were physical impurities, *peša'* sins, and *ḥaṭṭā't* sins. The high priest also applied blood to the outer altar to remove these impurities and moral faults (abbreviated by referring to the impurities, the first item in the list) from it and to reconsecrate it (verses 18-19).

Notice that although purification offerings throughout the year only involved application of blood to the outer altar in cases of physical impurity and mostly to that altar in cases of sins, the impurities and sins affected the inner sanctum and the outer sanctum. The altar was an integral part of the sanctuary, so what happened to it affected the entire sanctuary, "part for all." The effects of human problems impacted all of YHWH's residence, including the inner sanctum and the ark of the covenant, above which he was enthroned above and between the cherubim (cf. Exod 25:22; Num 7:89; 1 Sam 4:4).

The *ḥaṭṭā't* sins removed from the sanctuary on the Day of Atonement were those that were expiated by purification offerings throughout the year (e.g., Lev 4:3, 14, 23, 26, 28), but the *peša'* sins are only mentioned in Leviticus 16:16, 21, in the context of the Day of Atonement, in all of pentateuchal ritual law. There were no sacrifices for such sins, so they could not have entered the sanctuary through purification offerings as impurities and *ḥaṭṭā't* sins did. Therefore, it appears that the *peša'* sins, which can be translated as "rebellious sins," came to the sanctuary through automatic defilement caused by egregious sins, such as Molech worship (20:3) and willful failure to undergo purification from corpse impurity (Num 19:13, 20).

Such defilement of the sanctuary from a distance is only attested in these cases. While these sins had to be purged from the sanctuary, this did not benefit those who committed them, who were "cut off." The penalty was terminal, so the sinners had no opportunity to gain expiation through animal sacrifices. Jacob Milgrom has argued that *ḥaṭṭā't* sins, which were expiable by purification offerings, also automatically defiled the sanctuary from a distance,[54] but there is no real evidence for this.[55]

Culpability Transferred to Priests

If purification offering blood that spattered on a garment contaminated it and such blood that the priest applied to the outer altar or inside the outer sanctum transmitted defilement to the sanctuary, what happened to priests when they ate the meat of purification offerings (Lev 6:19, 22 [Eng. vv. 26, 29]? Vessels in which such meat was cooked became impure so that they had to be broken or cleansed (v. 21 [Eng. v. 28]). This indicates that the meat, like the blood, carried some defilement, which the priests who ate the meat would receive.

Moses made this explicit when he asked the priests in Leviticus 10:17 why they had not eaten the inaugural purification offering on behalf of the community (cf. 9:15) in the holy precincts. He reminded them that the sacrifice was most holy and had been assigned to them, that is, to eat, in order to bear the culpability (*ʿāwōn*) of the community by expiating for them before YHWH.[56]

Culpability was the consequential liability, i.e., punishability, that resulted from committing a sin. For example, in Leviticus 5:1, if a person sins in a certain way, he bears his culpability unless he confesses (v. 5) and offers a purification offering (v. 6). When a priest eats the purification offering, he receives the culpability. In this way, a priest who mediates for the people participates in bearing culpability as he does (Exod 34:7). Culpabilities must be borne by the priests, not by the physical sanctuary structure or space, because only persons can be liable for punishment. However, the priest does not actually end up suffering the punishment, whether because the culpability is weakened when it is transferred to another person, or because the priest is immune to the culpability, or because the culpability is removed from him on the Day of Atonement to the live goat for Azazel, which carries culpabilities into the wilderness (Lev 16:21-22).

Conclusion

We have found that purification offerings to remedy minor *ḥaṭṭāʾt* sins and physical impurities resulted in the transfer of weak defilement to the sanctuary, and purification offerings for minor sins, but not physical impurities, caused priests to bear the culpabilities that were transferred to them from the sinners. These dynamics were limited to purification offerings, which involved only weak defilement, probably in order to avoid desecrating the sanctuary so that its function as YHWH's residence would cease because he would leave (cf. Ezek 8-11).

Why would YHWH, who according to the pentateuchal narrative is the source of the ritual instructions, direct that purification offering remedies would defile his sanctuary as a necessary side-effect of intentional ritual processes?[57] The God of the Israelites provided them with ritual solutions to their problems of sin and of physical impurities, representing the disease of mortality resulting from sin,[58] by making himself vulnerable, due to the temporary defilement of his sanctuary residence and culpability carried by his servants, the priests. This shows his unique willingness to do all he could to help human beings (cf. Isa 5:4a), who could not remedy their problems on their own (cf. Ps 49:8 [Eng. v. 7]), even if it involved sacrifice on his part.

In cases of sin, purification offerings provided expiation, prerequisite to divine forgiveness (e.g., Lev 4:20, 26, 31). As the one who granted pardon, YHWH functioned as Israel's supreme judge. The role of a judge is to vindicate those who are innocent and to condemn those who are guilty (Deut 25:1; 1 Kgs 8:32). A judge is not supposed to forgive the guilty, which would extend mercy without adequate justice. But that is exactly what God does. So he bears judicial responsibility for forgiving sinners, just as King David as judge would bear such responsibility for pardoning a murderer if his mother, the woman of Tekoa, did not offer to bear it for him (2 Sam 14:9—in the context of a juridical parable).

God bears judicial responsibility, as represented by defilement of his sanctuary residence-headquarters and the bearing of culpability by his priests, until the Day of Atonement, Israel's judgment day, when purgation of his sanctuary shows that he is vindicated for having forgiven the right people, who remain repentant and loyal to him. He is also vindicated for condemning those who do not show loyalty to him on this day. Therefore, the two stages of treating *ḥaṭṭā't* sins, first to remove them from the sinners and then to purge them from the sanctuary, both of which are carried out by purification offerings, constitute a ritual enactment of theodicy, justification of God's character, in dealing with sin. The fact that he forgives shows his mercy. The fact that an expiatory sacrifice is prerequisite to forgiveness and it defiles his sanctuary so that it must be cleansed, representing his vindication, shows his justice. He is fully just as he extends mercy, as expressed in Psalm 85:11: "Faithfulness and truth meet; justice and well-being kiss" (NJPS; verse 10 in other English versions). Justice and mercy are the two sides of God's love (Exod 34:6-7). Therefore, "God is love."[59]

Notes

[1] T. M. Lemos shows that overall rationales for ANE impurity that scholars have proposed, such as symbolism of displaced matter (Mary Douglas), death (Jacob Milgrom), or uncontrollability (Eilberg-Schwartz) do not really cover all kinds of impurity ("Where There Is Dirt, Is There System? Revisiting Biblical Purity Constructions," *JSOT* 37 [2013], 265-94).

[2] Cf. Alice Mouton, "The Sacred in Hittite Anatolia: A Tentative Definition," *History of Religions* 55/1 (2015), 59—"any disruption of the established order brings about some form of impurity"; Manfred Hutter, "Concepts of Purity in Anatolian Religions," in *Purity and the Forming of Religious Traditions in the Ancient Mediterranean World and Ancient Judaism*, Dynamics in the History of Religions 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 159-60, 172.

[3] Trans. Wolfgang Heimpel, "To Nanshe," *COS* 1.162:526-31.

[4] Cf. Lev 19:35-36.

[5] Heimpel, "To Nanshe," 528.

[6] Trans. Robert K. Ritner, "Book of the Dead 125 ('The Negative Confession')," *COS* 2.12:59-64.

[7] Ibid., 60.

[8] Ibid., 62.

[9] Trans. Gary Beckman, "Plague Prayers of Muršili II," *COS* 1.60:156-60.

[10] Ibid., 157.

[11] Trans. Benjamin R. Foster, "The Poem of the Righteous Sufferer," *COS* 1.153:486-92.

[12] Mouton, "The Sacred," 55-56.

[13] For the texts with analysis, see Roy Gane, *Ritual Dynamic Structure*, Gorgias Dissertations 14, Religion 2 (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2004), 228-38.

[14] Cf. Matt 12:43-45.

[15] Gane, *Ritual Dynamic Structure*, 235.

[16] David P. Wright, *The Disposal of Impurity: Elimination Rites in the Bible and in Hittite and Mesopotamian Literature*, SBLDS 101 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987), 261-71.

[17] Cf. Billie Jean Collins, *The Hittites and Their World*, SBL Archaeology and Biblical Studies 7 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), 178-9.

[18] See, e.g., Mouton, "The Sacred," 53-54.

[19] James C. Moyer, "The Concept of Ritual Purity Among the Hittites" (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 1969), 50-79.

[20] Various rituals involved "the use of water, in lustration (sprinkling) or complete immersion; the use of incense (fumigation); the use of metals or minerals supposed to be purifying, such as silver; or the use of wool whose color is perceived to have the power to absorb the impurity of some elements, and so on" (Mouton, "The Sacred," 45).

[21] Wright, *Disposal*, 45-49, 271; cf. trans. Billie Jean Collins, "Pulisa's Ritual Against Plague," *COS* 1.62:161.

[22] For detailed analysis of this text, see Ada Taggar-Cohen, *Hittite Priesthood*, Texte der Hethiter 26 (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2006), 33-139; cf. trans. Gregory McMahon, "Instructions to Priests and Temple Officials," *COS* 1.83:217-21.

[23] Cf. Taggar-Cohen, *Hittite Priesthood*, 123: "By washing the priests are regarded as clean *parkui-* or ritually clean."

[24] Cf. John H. Walton, *Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament: Introducing the Conceptual World of the Hebrew Bible* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 87.

[25] Taggar-Cohen, *Hittite Priesthood*, 109, 123-4.

[26] Gane, *Ritual Dynamic Structure*, 245-86, 358-60.

[27] Trans. Billie Jean Collins, "Establishing a New Temple for the Goddess of the Night," *COS* 1.70:176.

[28] On relationships between the Decalogue and the other laws, see Roy E. Gane, *Old Testament Law for Christians: Original Context and Enduring Application* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 239-80.

[29] On this punishment see Donald Wold, "The Meaning of the Biblical Penalty *Kareth"* (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1978), 251-5; Jacob Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16*, AB 3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 457-60; Baruch J. Schwartz, "The Bearing of Sin in the Priestly Literature," in *Pomegranates and Golden Bells: Studies in Biblical, Jewish, and Near Eastern Ritual, Law, and Literature in Honor of Jacob Milgrom*, ed. David P. Wright, David N. Freedman, and Avi Hurvitz (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1995), 13.

[30] On "divine passive" expressions, see Christian Macholz, "Das 'Passivum divinum,' seine Anfänge im Alten Testament und der 'Hofstil,'" *ZNW* 81 (1990): 247-53, esp. 248.

[31] On the nature and purpose of pentateuchal law, see Gane, *Old Testament Law for Christians*, 17-57.

[32] See, e.g., the Prologue to the Laws of Hammurabi (trans. Martha Roth, "The Laws of Hammurabi," *COS* 2.131:336-7.

[33] On the experience of guilt in terms of suffering misfortune, see Bruce Wells, *The Law of Testimony in the Pentateuchal Codes*, BZABR 4 (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2004), 67-69.

[34] Hyam Maccoby, *Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity System and its Place in Judaism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 60; cf. 31-2, 48-50, 207-8.

[35] Cf. the curse that David pronounced on Joab in 2 Sam 3:29: "may the house of Joab never be without one who has a discharge or who is leprous…" (ESV).

[36] Cf. Jacob Milgrom, *Leviticus 1–16: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 3 (New York: Doubleday, 1991), 731-2, 1002-3.

[37] Ibid., 154.

[38] Roy Gane, *Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 106-43; idem, "Privative Preposition *min* in Purification Offering Pericopes and the Changing Face of 'Dorian Gray,'" *JBL* 127 (2008): 209–22. Against Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16*, who argued that purification offerings throughout the year removed sins and impurities from the sanctuary (254-58).

[39] Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16*, 254, 256.

[40] James A. Greenberg, *A New Look at Atonement in Leviticus: The Meaning and Purpose of* Kipper *Revisited*, BBRSupp 23 (University Park, PA: Eisenbrauns, 2019), 105-7.

[41] For purification in stages, see also the elaborate procedure prescribed in Leviticus 14 for purification of a person who has been healed from scaly-skin disease. Such an individual has been banished from the Israelite camp (13:46; cf. Num 5:1-4), so the first stage of purification—a ritual with two birds, followed by ablutions and shaving—must take place outside the camp, When that has been completed, the person is pure, i.e., enough for that stage, and is permitted to enter the camp, but not his/her tent (Lev 14:1-8). After more shaving and ablutions on the seventh day, the one undergoing purification is again said to be pure (v. 9). On the eighth day, the person is to come to the sanctuary in order to offer sacrifices (vv. 10-20), as a result of which the residual impurity is removed from the individual (v. 19) and he will be pure (v. 20).

[42] Presumably the blood from the same animal would have the same effect, so that whatever would touch it would become holy.

[43] E.g., Christophe Nihan, "The Templization of Israel in Leviticus: Some Remarks on Blood Disposal and *Kipper* in Leviticus 4," in *Text, Time, and Temple: Literary, Historical and Ritual Studies in Leviticus*, ed. Francis Landy, Leigh M. Trevaskis, and Byan D. Bibb (Hebrew Bible Monographs 64; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2015), 118—"Presumably the most obvious reading of this passage is that it refers to the washing of the priestly vestments when the latter have been sanctified by contact with the blood of the *ḥaṭṭā't*, as is usually assumed by commentators." Cf. Christian Eberhart, "Review of Roy E. Gane, *Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy*," *RBL* [https://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/5068_5341.pdf] (2006): 5.

[44] Grain offerings were also most holy (2:3, 10; 6:10 [Eng. v. 17]) and made things holy by direct contact like the purification and reparation offerings. See the summary in 6:11 (Eng. v. 18): "Whatever touches them shall become holy" (ESV), with the plural "them" referring to the grain, purification, and reparation offerings mentioned in the previous verse (cf. Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16*, 444). However, grain offerings had no blood or flesh, so the rules in verses 20-21 (Eng. vv. 27-28) would not apply to them. The burnt offering is not explicitly called "most holy," but undoubtedly it was because it could not be eaten by non-priests or even by priests; the flesh was entirely consumed by the altar fire (Lev 1). However, the rule in 6:20 (Eng. v. 27) did not apply to it.

[45] Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16*, 405; Wright, *The Disposal of Impurity*, 96 n. 8; 130-31, although they maintained that the sins were removed from the sanctuary, not from the offerer, throughout the year.

[46] Gane, *Cult and Character*, 167-76.

[47] Ibid., 186-91.

[48] Cf. Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16*, 403.

[49] "Only impure earthenware needs to be broken (see 11:33, 35; 15:12) because its porous nature so totally absorbs the impurity that it can never again be purified" (ibid., 405). Compare the Hittite "Instructions for Temple Officials," according to which temple vessels contaminated by pigs or dogs could not be purified and had to be discarded (§14). However, in Lev 15:12, a wooden vessel that has become impure can be kept if it is rinsed with water.

[50] Roy E. Gane, Paradoxical Pollution, "Purification Offerings and Paradoxical Pollution of the Holy," in *Writing a Commentary on Leviticus: Hermeneutics – Methodology – Themes*, ed. Christian A. Eberhart and Thomas Hieke, FRLANT 276 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 122.

[51] Against Milgrom's argument that lack of application of purification offering blood to the offerers indicates that this sacrifice never purified its offerer (*Leviticus 1-16*, 254-6).

[52] Cf. Christian Eberhart, "Review of Roy E. Gane, *Cult and Character*," 5; Jay Sklar, "Review of Roy E. Gane, *Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and Theodicy*," *RBL* [https://www.bookreviews.org/pdf/5068_6109.pdf] (2007): 5.

[53] "The offerer does not directly defile the sanctuary; there is only a residual effect from the action of the priest. Therefore, the offerer does not violate the regulation exemplified in Lev 7:20-21 (cf. 22:1-7 regarding priests) that he/she must never bring impurity into direct contact with something holy, such as by eating well-being offering meat while in a state of physical impurity" (Gane, "Purification Offerings," 118).

[54] Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16*, 257-8.

[55] Gane, *Cult and Character*, 151-7.

[56] This was the normal rule, although Aaron, the high priest, explained to Moses that he and his sons had not eaten the purification offering on this occasion because of what had just happened (10:19): God had struck dead his other sons, Nadab and Abihu, because they had offered incense with unauthorized fire (vv. 1-2). So apparently Aaron and his surviving sons had not felt worthy to eat the

most holy sacrifice.

[57] *Peša‘* sins also defiled the sanctuary, but they did so directly, without sacrifice, and against God's will.

[58] Cf. Ps 103:3, praising God "who forgives all your iniquity, who heals all your diseases."

[59] Cf. 1 John 4:8, 16.

Urban Religion:
Religion and the City in Historical Perspective

Jörg Rüpke

Abstract:

This paper starts from the claim that historically religious practices and urban life have shaped each other. It develops both sides of the reciprocal formation of religion and urban ways of life in a dual terminology of religion as a) an factor promoting and acting upon urban settlements ('urbanizing') and b) as being acted upon by urban factors ('urbanized religion'). Such an enterprise needs to start from a fundamental reflection on religion as a spatial practice. If what can be loosely seen as 'urban religion' can serve as a lens onto the historical entanglement of cities or even more loosely 'urban settlements', it is the specifically spatial character of religion, antedating any urban settlement, that needs to be understood and theoretically modelled. Is religion more, or better, differently spatial than other cultural practices? In the history of research, 'sacred places' have played a prominent role as loci of epiphanic character, above all in phenomenological approaches to religion, but also in studies of sacred centers or pilgrimage. In many other perspectives, the temporal aspects of religion (routine, crisis rituals and rites de passage, conversion, calendar) have been foregrounded, place has been reduced to a mere setting. This article presents some thoughts on reconstructing religious action as a spatial practice that is sensitive to and creative of the character of settlements, in order to thus deal with 'urban religion'.

Keywords:

Urbanization, lived religion, religious change, spatial practices, urbanness

Introduction

Inquiring into the 'reciprocal formation of religion and urbanity'[1] needs concepts to more precisely define the theoretical and empirical objects of this inquiry. Evidently, my primary interest is in religion and the history of religion. 'Religion' is nothing given, but construed as the theoretical object behind the empirical respectively historical research pursued and envisaged here and also the theoretical object behind the conceptual reflections undertaken to operationalize this research.[2] Recent research that is interested in the relationship of religion and the urban suggests starting from the concept of 'urban religion'. Like 'visible religion', 'material religion' or 'iconic religion'[3] the term approaches religion from a particular angle. Urban religion, however, does not focus on aesthetic, or rather, in terms of practices, media properties of religion, but on a specific spatial setting, namely religion in the city and in particular, as we will see, post-secular religion in the contemporary globalized city – the very point I would like to question in this paper.

It is the aim of this paper to scrutinize the concept of urban religion with a view to an employment for historical research. Even if my material is taken from the ancient Mediterranean world, I suggest to apply the concept in a heuristical manner far beyond. As will quickly become obvious, 'urban religion' offers a loose umbrella term that might help to connect a nearly exclusively presentist line of research with much longer processes (1). However, as a descriptor of a contingent constellation (religion that happens to be urban religion) rather than a theorized concept of religion (religion if seen as urban religion), the current use of 'urban religion' needs to be supplemented by a more fundamental reflection on religion as a spatial practice (2). Only on such a basis the analysis can return to the question of the most fruitful perspective on religion and 'the city'. Here I suggest to look for the entanglement of religion and urbanization rather than 'the city' or even urban space (3). This entanglement needs a twofold approach, if it is to be analytically disentangled. First, I will have a quick glance at the role of religious practices and ideas in urbanization processes, that is, in the rise of cities (4), and secondly, at the effect of urbanization on religion, which is my foremost subject (5). Both paragraphs serve to plausibilize the importance of a historical turn in research on urban religion rather than to even attempt to summarize a multitude of different paths in the mutual formation. Thus, both paragraphs end with the suggestion of more nuanced and sharper terms for further inquiries, namely 'urbanizing' and 'urbanized religion'. The paper will conclude by recalling the limits of both terms (6).

1. Focusing on Religion in the City

From the point of view of a historian, and the more so a historian of ancient Mediterranean religion, the relationship of religion (probably a very old way of acting) and the city (certainly a much younger form of human settlement) has been thematized in two very different lines of research. On the one hand, religion has been viewed as an important factor in stabilizing cities and rendering them governable. In studies on the ancient Mediterranean world, 'polis religion' or 'civic religion' have been the terms to capture this. On the other hand, a fresh view into contemporary cities has discovered new forms of religion and interpreted the wide variety of religious phenomena by adducing modernization theory and identifying 'urban religion'. I will attempt in this first paragraph to briefly review these different strands and idioms and for the first time to bring them together, thus preparing the way to replace more simple explanatory models, whether focusing on legitimation of power or on diversity, by a more complex view, acknowledging diverging or even contradictory processes in the constitution of such urban religion in different historical periods and geographical spaces.

1.1 Religion and the Ancient City

It is not a new observation that religion has been the cause for dramatic developments in the history of cities: for instance, foundations and foundation rites of cities, waves of immigration, transformations, ghettoization and destruction. Religion has been a decisive factor in forming the concept of citizenship as well as in justifying the expulsion of large groups, it has contributed to the monumentalization of centers and or has given importance to ex-centric places. Even a recent introduction to 'Religion and space in the United States' goes so far as to state that 'historically religion has been largely an urban phenomenon: religion and cities have been inextricably related throughout human history, mutually dependent in their development.' Drawing on a rare historically oriented sociological account, namely Robert N. Bellah, the author of that introduction quickly indicates that this is meant to be much more narrow than it might be read. 'Religion, power, and the places of power were intricately interconnected in symbiotic relationships—in cities. This pattern of the co-production of religion and urban life has continued throughout much of history.' [4] This statement is frequently illustrated with the image of Mesopotamian temple-mounts, the *zikkurat*. In the tradition of European research, it was, however, another period that allowed for much more detailed investigation into the relationship, namely, the time-span from the Greek Archaic age to the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean basin, a period of renewed and

extended waves of urbanization.

In fact, research on the relationship of religion and urbanization in a historical perspective was opened by a classicist, Numa Fustel de Coulanges's *La cité antique*,[5] an important teacher of French sociologist Émile Durkheim. In Urban Studies, Fustel is acknowledged as a pioneer.[6] For Religious Studies, too, his complex approach has much to offer, as I have shown elsewhere.[7] In the History of Religion, however, his name is surprisingly absent even in the many studies of ancient religion, in which some of his ideas are so present. It is in this line of sustained, even if problematically narrow, reception that a term has been developed that seemed to have a larger potential, above all in the complex model of centers and periphery *(chora)* proposed by François de Polignac for Greek politically independent cities *(poleis)*.[8] *Polis religion* has widely been used in order to capture the location of temples in critical, usually central places and the creation of public space for public rituals.[9] This has led to a number of fruitful studies on political communication and the rise of ancient cities, but the focus has been on civic identity rather than spatial practices, if not spatial *political* practices.[10]

In an interesting reversal of Orsi's detection of 'Gods of the city' on the basis of his previously developed 'lived religion' approach,[11] in the research on ancient 'metropolitan religion' the concept of lived religion was adapted and enlarged into 'lived ancient religion'.[12] It could be demonstrated that funerary ritual and domestic religion, the social and ritual practices of voluntary associations ('cults' and 'religions') and the political use of religion by administrators and political elites were neither independent strands of religious practice nor replications of or counter-models to 'civic religion'. The latter is best conceptualized as a single field of action with many loci of religious authority in permanent fluctuation.

The Lived Ancient Religion approach has developed tools for analysing the religious practices of political elites, writers, practitioners and the general populace in its diversity.[13] Focusing on practices and religious action as communication,[14] this approach has questioned the simplistic dichotomy between public and private,[15] and has developed concepts for exploring religious agency, the instantiation of religion in practices and media, the effects of such instantiated religion upon action and experience, the (re-) narration of religion, and finally the roles of narrated religion. Religion here is seen as 'religion in the making'.[16] It is from this premodern study of South and West European, West Asian and North African religion that the necessity to address the city as focal point of movements and relations and a particular social and spatial arrangement crucial to religious practices and as the driving

force of religious change arose. How do other, and that is to say, different, paths of urbanization like the Chinese or Indian ones or the late ancient Eastern, medieval central and early modern north European modified religious practices and beliefs and how were these processes shaped by religion? Naturally, eyes turn to globally articulated 'urban religion'.

1.2 Religion in the Modern, Global City

On the whole, the variegated field of Urban Studies has rarely addressed religion as an essential element of cities, and even overlooked the 'geography of religion' that has been developing since the 1980s.[17] However, one has to admit that the contributions by this sub-discipline for the conceptual development of the field have remained modest; even in its latest shape it remains limited to some empirical studies and the search for further topics.[18] Modernization and globalization – above all migration due to the 'urban aspirations' themselves produced by images and imageries of cities and life in them[19] – and the concomitant development of new forms of religious practices and the appropriation of urban space by non-elites[20] have, however, triggered a new interest in religion in contemporary cities in the fields of Religious Studies and Anthropology.

These disciplines are now fully aware of spatiality and the social character of space as articulated by Michel Foucault, Henri Lefebvre and Edward Soja (exploring the counter-cultural space in particular)[21] and taken up by the sociology of space and class-based differences in the appropriation of space and 'place making'.[22] This 'spatial turn' has been taken up by Kim Knott, quickly giving her 'spatial analysis' of 'the location of religion' a programmatic drive for Religious Studies.[23] It is however anthropologist Stephan Lanz, who has proposed a comprehensive definition of 'urban religion' 'as a specific element of urbanization and urban everyday life … intertwined with … urban lifestyles and imaginaries, infrastructure and materialities, cultures, politics and economies, forms of living and working, community formation, festivals and celebrations.'[24] This is further specified as '… a continual process in which the urban and the religious reciprocally interact, mutually interlace, producing, transforming and defining each other.'[25]

Parallel to the critique of *civic religion* mentioned before, Lanz focuses on the enlargement of the range of agents when invoking 'subaltern urbanism' and characterizing religious practices as a '"prescriptive regime" (Marshall 2009:11), where technologies of power and technologies of the self intermesh in its practice of governmentality'.[26] The interest is in practices of mediation of the urban and the religious, thus opposing the idea of a principally secular character of the city, widespread in religious views of cities on the part of

traditions like Buddhism or Christianity.

Lanz's definition is deictic rather than delineating. It makes aware of the thoroughness of the interaction. The object defined by 'urban religion' is a process, in which religion and the urban are involved, a state of religion rather than an identifiable subset of 'religion' (or the 'urban'). The boundaries to the object under scrutiny are rather implied in the framework of the project represented by Lanz, 'Global Prayers'. They are spelled out more clearly by the review of the field by David Garbin and Anna Strhan in a book on urban religion in 2017.[27] Apart from older questions for example on the role of religion for welfare and justice, two related, but not necessarily convergent, processes are defining. This is on the one hand the rise of the post-secular. Regardless of the take on the new developments of the secular-religious divides and their different regimes[28] 'a pluralization of options' has been diagnosed by everybody,[29] up to the point of making religion central to 'super' or 'hyper-diversity', that is to say, the crossing of many different divisions and the complex processes of situational salience of the one or the other (which could even become hegemonic as demonstrated by 'Muslim' as a religious category in recent European discourses).[30] The old academic practice of defining religious agents by assigning them to different 'religions', I would add, simply does not work, neither for Japan or China, nor for Europe of the distant past or present.[31] On the other hand, globalization is not only a major force for urbanization and pluralization by way of the many types of migration,[32] but also the presence of flows that involve and trans-localize cities. With regard to religion, trans-local contacts and the trans-local presence of an ever growing number of 'universal' religions shape local religion – as much as cities – without denying the importance of locality. Here, a multi-layered 'glocalization' has to be accommodated for, showing very different and at times quite contrary effects, questioning or reinforcing local religious or urban power.[33]

The dominant use of 'urban religion' in these studies – and again I am trying to embrace, but also further develop the term - has three important implications and consequences. First, pervasively the generic object of them (in Jonathan Zittel Smith's terms) is not religion, but globalization. 'Religion' serves as a 'lens' onto globalization. The interlacing of globalization, cities and religion does not open up a space for historical research, even if historians of religion have been willing to employ the concept of globalization for premodern phenomena of translocality, for universalization, regionalization and localization and their interaction.[34] The underlying theories of Modernity, even if non-Eurocentric, put a stop marker here to its further use. The direction of analysis has a second implication. Religion is never more closely defined with relation to its spatial properties.

Religion just happens to be confronted with and has to employ tools to deal with space; here it is only the discourse on 'iconic religion', which more closely came to address this problem.[35] The variability of post-secular religious pluralism seems to allow begging the question. Finally, surprisingly, 'the city' or 'the urban' is just treated as a given, unquestionable in the face of global metropolises, whether defined by a minimum of eight or ten million inhabitants.[36] Cities are not regarded as culturally produced orders, making differences – of urban and non-urban, of religious and secular – that 'make a difference'.[37] These deficits set the agenda for the next paragraphs.

2. Religion as Spatial Practice

The generic object I am interested in are forms of human action and experience that are set apart from other cultural forms by consisting of or building on communication with what is conceived by the human actors as special[38] agents. These special agents (sometimes including objects) have properties different from everyday human, they are dead (ancestors) or unborn (angels), are just (demon) or fully superhuman (gods). But it is not the properties these addressees have, but the way how they are addressed, that makes this communication different. The fact that they are accorded agency, that is, the ability to act in *this* situation, and the relevancy of such an action for *this* situation is not unquestionably plausible. This relates as much to the ascribed quality of the addressees as to the situation of this ascription and hence its relevance. Religious communication, thus, is a risky form of communication. What I try to capture from the perspective of religious actors can also be aggregated into a systemic view, in which 'religion has to do with the problem of how one can describe the transcendence that *cannot be represented in everyday experience with immanent means*, so how one can transform the unavailable into the available.'[39]

From the point of view of the actors, this religious form of communication is a consequential form. Communication with or concerning such 'divine' agents (to use this as a shorthand) might reinforce or reduce human agency, create or modify social relationships and change power relationships.[40] Religious agency is a coin with two sides, a) the agency attributed to the non-human or even super-human agents, and b) the agency thus arrogated by or attributed to the addressant entering into such communication. Such a speaker can thus not only attribute agency to the 'divine' (however construed on the spot and in the underlying traditions), but also arrogates agency and can attribute her or his own agency, usually claimed to be attributed by these divine addressees, to other members of his group, whether

present or absent. Religion, as stated before, could serve as much as a technique of power as a technique of the self. In both, it is a mode of action set apart by practitioners and maybe even observers.

Like any other cultural practice, religious communication is a spatio-temporal practice, it is located in space and time and it is engaging with space and time. 'Appropriation' is one way to describe this engagement, which is not just a passive usage, as Michel de Certeau has insisted.[41] The use of a particular space is preceded by a selection, it is recognizing and accepting the character of spaces as defined by previous, common or prescribed usage, but it is also modifying this space through performance and thus also changing the future memory of the place. Even religious 'traditions' are not simply given, but need permanent reproduction and are modified by the micro (and sometimes revolutionary) modifications of the users. This is central for any dynamic view of religion.

Such appropriation relates to space as much as time, usage of both can be flexible. It can be ephemeral (to use a temporal metaphor). Usage can also be rhythmical or permanent. Given its problem to address the not unquestionably given, to transform the unavailable transcendent into an available, religious communication tends to be massively mediatized, tends to be 'material religion'. Tools for and in the communication, that is media, might be more or less, temporarily or permanently associated with religious communication and thus 'sacralized'. As such, spaces might be contested, by different religious or non-religious agents, invisibly or illegally occupied. Open, accessible space (not always centrally administrated and in 'public' ownership) might be fought about or occasionally ceded.

'Place-making' offers a different perspective on such processes, likewise metaphorically applicable to something like 'calendar-making', i.e., organizing and differently qualifying time, too. Now, the mental maps, the feeling-at-home and the patterns of actual usage correlating with the experience of a certain atmosphere and an emotional relation to places, above all attachment to places, is stressed. Identifiable relationships, clear marks or even ownership is central. Religious practices and signs can serve as tools for this, but more relevant are processes of grouping, the formation of networks or even closer organizations. Small shrines or blind alleys, a neighborhood or a widely visible sanctuary could be the result of such place-making, sometimes sacralized, sometimes not. Here, we are more and more dealing with specifics of practices seen as 'religion'. Yet, such places, too, might be appropriated by others, might be disappropriated by being declared 'heritage' of some other or larger group (like the nation) – a massive trend since the 1980s[42] or simply by the invasion of tourists as witnessed at Kyoto in recent decades.[43]

The initial definition suggests that there is a specific spatial character of religious communication, a conceptual relationship not likewise valid for other cultural practices. If place-making can be equated with 'dwelling' and is frequently achieved with religious practices, religious communication is inherently also a practice of 'crossing' – to quote the tension pointed out by Thomas Tweed.[44] 'Religion' as used here is *defined* as action transcending (in a very simple sense) the immediate and unquestionably given situation. Balancing the relationship of *hic* and *illic* is a difficulty already for the *here* and *there* of locative cult in its domestic and public variants as formulated by J.Z. Smith. The trans-local references inherent to religious communication by way of agency claims need not wait for radicalized axial-age transcendence and posterior debates on icons, re-presentation and presence, anthropomorphic or non-anthropomorphic forms, images or no image.[45]

If urbanization is about densification and differentiation of space, about inclusion (or even trapping) and exclusion on a larger scale, the type of action here defined as 'religion' and developed in periods long before any recognizably 'urban' settlement, is uniquely conducive and uniquely clashing with urbanization – uniquely at least before the rise of efficient telecommunication. Under this perspective, religious places would be at the same time a) places in an eminent, super-empirical sense, heterotopias in the words of Michel Foucault rather than non-places, transit zones without identities in the words of Marc Augé,[46] but also b) places that signal, focus and intensify specific urban identity.[47] Ritual can be miniaturized or virtualized, the prayer in the heart can take place *anywhere*. Urban techniques of control via representation have been used to escape place by shifting religious practices to intellectual debate and scripture, commenting on ritual rather than practicing ritual. For a complex notion of the entanglement of religion and urbanization this aspect needs to be taken into account.

3. Religion and Urbanization

It has become a truism among scholars of religion to stress that religion is not simply given. It is a scholarly construct that needs to be made explicit in order to allow for open discussion of its limits and usefulness. As I have argued elsewhere, in an actor-centered version as briefly sketched above, it avoids many of the pitfalls that are associated with the standard criticism of its being a Christian-biased or Western concept and allows to model religion as a spatial practice. The conceptual status of the 'urban' and even 'cities' is not different. Despite the pre-reflexive overwhelming evidence these terms need a closer

delineation. Even if such details seem to unnecessary in the face of present urban growth, we have to be aware that an unknown, but certainly substantial portion of recent 'urban growth' is the result of a reclassification of settlements as parts of urban settlements,[48] reflecting administrative approaches and ideas about cities rather than changed patterns of settlement. Cities like (Greater) London demonstrate how such conceptualizations can change within a few decades, sometimes less. What is 'urban' is a matter of classification and declaration, not of statistical facts.

I take 'city' as an object language term implying a self-differentiation from the non-city, whether described as 'rural' or 'wilderness' or 'uncivilized' or – less derogatory (at least sometimes) – villages and countryside. Thus, 'city' is just an invitation to look for the classificatory operations used by people to differentiate and often rank forms of settlements (including nomadic ways of live or transhumance).

In the following, I will use 'urban' as a meta-language term, implying dense settlement patterns of a larger number of people (far beyond the order of magnitude of 150 persons able to keep up face-to-face contacts between all[49]). It is characterized by a corresponding density of interaction. But it has also external links also with other settlements likewise seen as 'cities' in the aforementioned, culturally and historically variable sense.[50] The second element has two important consequences: Urban settlements do not appear individually, but in networks – even if these might have only very distant corresponding nodes. And urban diversity transcends the mere effect of numbers, but is reinforced by inter-cultural contacts and migration – even if this is restricted to more regional variants and distances.

On that basis I follow Erfurt historian Susanne Rau in differentiating between 'urbanization' or more precisely urbanizations as different and reversible paths of growth and spread of settlements as 'urban settlements' (that is, 'the history of the constitution, perception and appropriation of urban spaces') and 'urbanity' as the specific way of life in such cities defined by the fact that the inhabitants realized that they are living *in a city* (again, however they define 'city').[51] It is urbanizations as larger historical processes that is proposed to offer a 'lens' on religious change here. This is not closing the eyes against claims of an encompassing 'planetary urbanisation' as diagnosed for instance by Christian Schmid.[52] It is part of the unequal, hegemonic character of urbanity that elements of urban ways of life have been acknowledged and partly copied in far-distant areas, not least thus producing immigration into cities. And yet the urban did also cause violent or whole-heartedly rejections, from emigration to alternative models of living and settlement, whether

in extra-urban monasteries or – 'back to nature' in garden cities or remote islands. Whether the agents are urban ones opting out or non-urban ones rejecting absorption is an important question, not least for the history of religion. That the 'global city' today is the solution to all problems regarding climate change, demographics and sustainability is a claim by urban scientists that might be correct, but must stand the test of *Ideologieverdacht*, of primarily being part of hegemonic urban ideology. Our own enterprise needs to self-reflexive, with regard to claims about the urban as much as about religion.

4. Religions as Urbanizing Factor

In the discourse on religion and urbanization it is only very recently that the potentially disruptive effects of religion have been addressed, by pointing to the observations that the close proximity of exclusivist groups could produce tension and cause division and that religion might reinforce other dimensions of difference.[53] Failing to start from the much more complex reconstruction for instance by Fustel de Coulanges, briefly sketched above, the focus has been on religion as a way of legitimizing power or increasing the sociability of people.[54] As a tool to enlarge agency for holders of power as well as for opposing or marginalized agents religious communication is to be found on both sides of the characteristic urban tension between trapping, ruling and homogenizing on the one hand and stabilizing diversity and carving out individual space on the other. Analysing the relationship of religion and urbanization needs to follow complex and conflicting lines even looking back into pre- and early urban settlement periods.

In many narratives, religion is used as a tool in the actual foundation of cities. From the point of view of a broader range of agents another quality of religious practices, related to strategies of appropriating, sometimes marking or even sacralizing space, seems much more important. In the diversity and density of urban settlements, religious communication and its association with space and people supports making 'places' out of underdefined space.[55] At ancient Rome, the separation of settlement space and tombs, enforced from early on, drove the ancestors and all the place-claiming strategies frequently related with funerary practices and ancestor cult out of the space between the walls. Here perhaps the conceptual separation of the Lares, a type of divine addressees found at the hearth and at home, enabled an appropriation of space not any longer possible by closely relating the space of the living and the dead.[56]

Summing up the argument just hinted at here, I do not claim that religious practice were the prime factor in all or most urbanization processes. It was, however, an important factor from early on. As such, it was a factor in enabling, if not outrightly co-creating diversity and heterarchy in urban settlements.[57] You could stay in the city and also stay different. All of this is not to deny that in the history of urban settlements religious practices might shape the urban topography, architecture and even the atmosphere and the 'branding' of such a settlement in terms of memories and 'heritage'.[58] But much more fundamentally, religion catered for urban aspiration and place-making as much as for ruling and administration. This is testable hypothesis from Nara to Tenochtitlan.

5. Urbanized Religion

Religion is a factor in urbanizing processes far beyond the occasional growth of a place for pilgrimage into an urban settlement or the application of foundation rituals for urban foundations planned on other reasons or in their later narrative embellishment – even if I do not suggest that these constellations were without importance. But such religious practices, ideas and social forms of institutionalization were also changed or better: formed by urban conditions, that is by urban space and the further characteristics of urban settlements. For me, this is a central field of research for the coming years rather than a field for looking back and summarizing results. Thus, I can only offer first tentative observations, suggesting potentially fruitful questions rather than arguing causal relationships. Let me name here six different items.

1) For millennia, religion from its most immanent to its most transcendent forms had served as a means to stabilize or even establish relationship of power, from sacred kings[59] to shamans,[60] from the early empires to rulers of the 21st century. Continuing this function in the densely built environment of cities demands visibility, impressive and lasting visibility. *Monumentalization* of religion is a widespread phenomenon, now seen in Moscow, Bangkok, Istanbul, and Mecca as in many other places in past and present. Against a background of rather dim divine figures and more diffused notions of the divine, found in objects as well as in ancestors, monumental sanctuaries not only made religious use of space permanent. They also defined divine characters, codified them as gods or saints related to specific places and easily elaborated on their stories, creating images and thus an ever more stable net of material icons, names, and narratives. Such a stable form of complex poly-theisms (whether

based on gods or saints) was hard to imagine in many pre-urban societies and often flies in the face of more elaborate transcendental concepts of the divine.

2) European thinkers of the age of massive urban growth from the late 19th to the early 20th centuries stressed the demands of the new environment on the personalities of those living in cities. Urban life demanded and created new forms of subjectivization. The individual is shaped by the many social circles of which he (as the male writers put it) was a member and needed to develop a certain distance in social encounters,[61] a new type of *individualization* able to deal with the fluidity of the environment and to always imagine the significance of chance encounters.[62] In religious terms, the subject lost its connection to its ancestors and one's own (and their) place of living.[63] Religious practices like prayer, meditation, or asceticism helped to develop a new kind of urban self, a process already visible in the ancient circum-Mediterranean cities as much as in other pre-modern cultures across the world.[64]

3) If urbanization lastingly changed both ends of the axis of religious communication, it had even more consequences for the media employed between them. The challenge of administering urban crowds and complexities, amassing, storing, and distributing supplies for instance, early on created systems of notations, of writing in a broader sense. Relations and the transfer of property as employed in many acts of religious communication were influenced and developed thereby. Dedications of objects could be lastingly and visibly marked by names of donators and recipients. Complex prayers could be developed in the form of curses that were readable for the powers invoked, but remained invisible to all others, especially the persons targeted. *Scripturalization* of religion goes further, however. The production of texts not only allowed for more precise and repeatable prayers and hymns, but also for the systematization of ritual practices, for the piecemeal ascription of meaning to such practices, and ultimately for sacred scripture and a systematic reflection on the character of the addressees, resulting in what is called theology. Genealogies and historical narratives create sharp (and often polemical) identities and claims. Medieval and early modern books of secret rituals made for a virtualization of religious practices that is a precursor of today's internet religion. Calendars and maps result from the same process, religion being slightly more prominent in the systematization of time than in the systematization of space, where it is more strongly challenged by urban administrations.

4) All such activities demand specialists. The sheer number of people in the same place, the many different types of exchange, and the necessary (and possible) specialization in the hubs produced a division of labor that had repercussions on religious traditions. Supported by, and contributing to, the processes mentioned before, *professionalization* was not only also developed in religious contexts, but particularly therein. Producing cakes for offerings or for *pūjā*, selling services as diviner, caring for the soul, administrating a sanctuary—religious specialists and priesthoods are part of urban forms of religious action along lines of gender, social status, education, and wealth that were easily exported beyond the walls.

5) Such specialists often supported a consistent development that seems beyond alternatives in the present, though only at first sight, the *institutionalization* of organized religions in the plural. From the start, and even more so today, cities were places of high tensions. Support from unseen powers was not only claimed by those in power, often rivalling visible power and its unseen, but visualized resources. Religious action could likewise serve the many smaller processes of group formations, whether in small or extended families, in neighborhoods or in networks across cities. Shared religious practices and places helped very much to produce and define such groups,[65] to even produce ethnicity where unrelated individuals had just come together.[66] Such groups, whether imagined or existing, could stabilize religious options developed in the course of individualization.[67] Religious actions and ideas might be used as a resource for the homogenization of inhabitants as well as for the stabilization of differences between the people living in a city.

6) If "religions" are one pervasive legacy of the urban history of religion, the *globalization* of religion in the form of "world religions" or the universalization of religion is another to at least the same degree. If cities are not just an amassment of people, but are hubs of internal *and* external flows,[68] the discourses that define urbanness, self-reflexive urbanity, always includes references to and comparison with other cities. In such discourses and inter-urban networks the spatial dimension of religion as practices focusing on the immanent or transcendent Beyond plays out. References to other cities or places as well as references beyond all localities, to no-places like heavens or netherworlds bolster the independence of religious agents. They certainly help to build up resilience against urban mischief and even persecution. In these respects, the city is not only a prerequisite, but also the topic of religious discourses. But even here, religion reaches beyond intellectual discourses. Religion and city are something that is being "done".

6. Conclusion

In an attempt to overcome a presentist bias in many, even not all instances of employing the concept of 'urban religion' I have argued (1) that we need to understand the spatial character of religious practices more intimately (2) and to replace the timeless pair of 'religion in the city' or 'religion and the city' by a focus on the entanglement of religious change and urbanization (3). Finally, I have argued that for such a historical enterprise it would be useful to analyze religion as an (active) agent (4), preparing and pushing in processes of urbanization as well as (passive) patient (5), reacting and adapting to urban conditions and thus becoming part and parcel of urbanity. I have suggested the terminological pair of urbanizing and urbanized religion for those two different but interlinked perspectives on the same complex of phenomena.

One of the main arguments about a conceptual rather than historically contingent relationship between religion and urbanization and hence the mutual formation of religion and urbanity was the specific spatial character of religious communication even in acts as simple as prayer to refer in very different manner and multi-layered meanings to a beyond of the situation, to physically distant places and heterotopias, but at the same time being a primary tool for situationally appropriating specific place. As such, religious practices are compatible with globalization as well as localization. But they are also compatible with a *tertium*, a beyond distance and closeness. Religious practices could also serve not only to employ, but to actively create 'no-place', negating the importance of the spatial character and hence spatial limits of a place.[69] This might be translated as the 'anywhere' of Jonathan Z. Smith or approached to the transcendence and the *sui-generis*-character attributed to religion in a lot of classical studies in History of Religion. But I admonish everybody to resist that temptation. It is only in a spatial perspective that the place of no-place can be seen.

Notes

[1] I am grateful to the German Science Foundation (DFG) for funding of my work in the framework of the Kolleg-Forschergruppe of this name (FOR 2779) at the Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies of the University of Erfurt. A research stay at the Norwegian Centre for Advanced Study, Oslo, in the framework of the research group 'The Demise of Religion' (Michael Stausberg/James T. Lewis) provided the leisure time for wide reading and writing the first draft of the paper, discussions at the Max Weber Centre, Doshisha University Kyoto and the University of Tokyo improved the text. I am grateful to the audiences for the responses and Profs. Ada Taggar Cohen and Hiroshi Ichikawa for the invitations.

[2] I use the distinction of Jonathan Z. Smith, 'The History of the History of Religions' History,' *Numen*

48. 2 (2001), 142, understanding 'religion' as follows: 'The generic category supplies the field with a theoretical object of study, different from, but complimentary to their particular subject matters.'

3 For these concepts see e.g. Christoph Uehlinger, 'Visible Religion und die Sichtbarkeit von Religion(en): Voraussetzungen, Anknüpfungsprobleme, Wiederaufnahme eines religionswissenschaftlichen Forschungsprogramms,' *Berliner Theologische Zeitschrift* 23. 2 (2006), 165-184, and the earlier journal 'Visible Religion' (1982-1990, Brill); the journal 'Material Religion' (2005-, Berg) and Kim Knott, Volkhard Krech, and Birgit Meyer, 'Iconic Religion in Urban Space,' *Material Religion* 12. 2 (2016), 123-136, for 'iconic religion'.

4 Katie Day, 'Space and Urban Religion in the United States,' *Oxford Encyclopedia of Religion* (2017).

5 Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique, étude sur le culte, le droit, les institutions de la Grèce et de Rome* (Paris, Strasbourg: 1864).

6 See Norman Yoffee and Nicola Terrenato, 'Introduction: a history of the study of early cities,' in *The Cambridge world history 3: Early cities in comparative perspective, 4000 BCE-1200 CE* (Norman Yoffee ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015), 7.

7 Jörg Rüpke, 'Religion als Urbanität: Ein anderer Blick auf Stadtreligion,' *Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft* 27. 1 (2019), 174-195.

8 François de Polignac, *La naissance de la cité grecque: cultes, espace et société VIIIe--VIIe: siècles avant J.-C.* (Textes à l'appui: Histoire classique; Paris: Découverte, 1984)/Engl. Francois de Polignac, *Cults, territory, and the origins of the Greek city-state* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

9 E.g. Arjan Zuiderhoek, *The ancient city* (Key themes in ancient history; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 65.

10 E.g. Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, 'Capitol, Comitium und Forum: Öffentliche Räume, sakrale Topographie und Erinnerungslandschaften der römischen Republik,' in *Studien zu antiken Identitäten* (Stefan Faller ed.; Würzburg: Ergon, 2001), 97-132; 'Raum – Präsenz – Performanz. Prozessionen in politischen Kulturen der Vormoderne – Forschungen und Fortschritte,' in *Medien der Geschichte – Antikes Griechenland und Rom* (O. Dally, et al. eds.; Berlin, 2014), 359-395; 'Performative turn meets spatial turn,' in *Raum und Performanz: Rituale in Residenzen von der Antike bis 1815* (Dietrich Boschung, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp, and Claudia Sode eds.; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2015), 15-74; Rodney D. Fitzsimons, 'Urbanization and the Emergence of the Greek Polis: The Case of Azoria, Crete' in *Making Ancient Cities: Space and Place in Early Urban Soieties* (Andrew T. Creekmore, III and Kevin D. Fisher eds.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 220-256.

11 In the sequence of Robert A. Orsi, *The Madonna of 115th Street: Faith and community in Italian Harlem, 1880-1950* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1985); 'Everyday Miracles: The Study of Lived Religion,' in *Lived Religion in America: Toward a History of Practice* (David D. Hall ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 3-21; *Gods of the city: Religion and the American urban landscape* (Religion in North America; Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 1999); briefly: David Garbin and Anna Strhan eds., *Religion and the Global City* (Bloomsbury Studies in Religion, Space and Place New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 5.

12 Jörg Rüpke, 'Lived Ancient Religion: Questioning "Cults" and "Polis Religion",' *Mythos* ns 5 (2011), 191-204; *On Roman Religion: Lived Religion and the Individual in Ancient Rome* (Townsend Lectures/Cornell studies in classical philology; Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); 'Lived Ancient Religion,' *Oxford Research Encyclopedia, Religion* (2019).

[13] Rubina Raja and Jörg Rüpke, 'Appropriating Religion: Methodological Issues in Testing the "Lived Ancient Religion" Approach,' *Religion in the Roman Empire* 1. 1 (2015), 11-19; 'Archaeology of Religion, Material Religion, and the Ancient World,' in *A Companion to the Archaeology of Religion in the Ancient World* (Rubina Raja and Jörg Rüpke eds.; Malden: Wiley, 2015), 1-25.

[14] Jörg Rüpke, 'Religious Agency, Identity, and Communication: Reflecting on History and Theory of Religion,' *Religion* 45. 3 (2015), 344-366.

[15] See Clifford Ando and Jörg Rüpke eds., *Public and Private in Ancient Mediterranean Law and Religion* (Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 65; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015).

[16] Janico Albrecht et al., 'Religion in the Making: The Lived Ancient Religion Approach,' *Religion* 48. 4 (2018), 568-593.

[17] See Lily Kong, 'Mapping "New" Geographies of Religion: Politics and Poetics in Modernity,' *Progress in Human Geography* 25. 2 (2001), 211-233.

[18] See Peter Hopkins, Lily Kong, and Elizabeth Olson eds., *Religion and place: Landscape, politics and piety* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), and in particular 16-18. Cf. the remarks by Garbin and Strhan, *Religion*, 6.

[19] Peter van der Veer, 'Introduction: Urban Theory, Asia and Religion,' in *Handbook of religion and the Asian city. Aspiration and urbanization in the twenty-first century* (Peter van der Veer ed.; Oakland, Calif.: Univ. of California Press, 2015), 2-12.

[20] E.g. Daniel P. S. Goh and Peter van der Veer, 'Introduction: The sacred and the urban in Asia,' *International Sociology* 31. 4 (2016), 367-374; Knott, Krech, and Meyer, 'Iconic religion".

[21] Michel Foucault, 'Space, Knowledge, and Power,' in *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought* (P. Rabinow ed.; London, 1984), 239-256; Henri Lefebvre, *La production de l'espace* (Collection société et urbanisme; Paris: Éd. Anthropos, 1974); and Edward W. Soja, *Postmetropolis: Critical studies of cities and regions*, First published ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000); *Postmodern Geographies* (London u.a.: Verso, 1989); *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996); 'Regional Urbanization and the Ende of the Metropolitan Era,' in *The New Blackwell Companion to the City* (Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson eds.; Wiley-Blackwell Companions to Geography Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 679-689.

[22] Doreen H. Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production.* (London: 1984); Martina Löw, *Raumsoziologie* (Wissenschaft 1506; Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2001)/*Sociology of space. Materiality, social structures, and action* (Cultural sociology; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); *Soziologie der Städte* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2008); 'The intrinsic logic of cities: Towards a new theory on urbanism,' *Urban Research and Practice* 5 (2012), 303-315; Helmuth Berking and Martina Löw eds., *Die Eigenlogik der Städte: Neue Wege für die Stadtforschung* (Interdisziplinäre Stadtforschung 1; Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 2008); Helmuth Berking et al. eds., *Negotiating Urban Spaces: Interaction, Space and Control* (Bielefeld: transcript Verlag, 2006). For cities, these reflections go back to the Chicago School of Urban Studies of the 1930s and their successors.

[23] Kim Knott, 'Spatial Theory and the Study of Religon,' *Religion Compass* 2. 6 (2008), 1102-1116; *The location of religion: A spatial analysis* (London: Equinox, 2005); exemplary: 'Walls and Other Unremarkable Boundaries in South London: Impenetrable Infrastructure or Portals of Time, Space and Cultural Difference?,' *New Diversities* 17. 2 (2015), 15-34.

[24] Stephan Lanz, 'Assembling Global Prayers in the City: An Attempt to Repopulate Urban Theory with Religion,' in *Global prayers: Contemporary manifestations of the religious in the city* (Jochen

Becker, et al. eds.; MetroZones 13, Zürich: Müller, 2014), 25.

[25] Ibid., 26.

[26] Ibid., 24 and 28 (quotation); he adds the characterization as 'sensational form', quoting Birgit Meyer, *Aesthetic formations. Media, religion and the senses* (Religion, culture, critique; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 201. The reference is to Ruth Marshall, *Political spiritualities: The Pentecostal revolution in Nigeria* (Chicago.: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

[27] Garbin and Strhan, *Religion*, in particular 6-11.

[28] On the latter see Marian Burchardt and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, "Multiple Secularities: Religion and Modernity in the Global Age' – Introduction,' *International Sociology* 28. 6 (2013), 605-611.

[29] Peter Beyer, 'Questioning the secular/ religious divide in a postWestphalian world,' ibid., 676.

[30] P. J. Aspinall and M. Song, 'Is race a 'salient ...' or 'dominant identity' in the early 21st century: The evidence of UK survey data on respondents' sense of who they are,' *Soc Sci Res* 42. 2 (2013), 547-561.

[31] See e.g. for China, Anna Sun, 'The Study of Chinese Religions in the Social Sciences: Beyond the Monotheistic Assumption,' in *Religion and Orientalism in Asian Studies* (K. Paramore, ed.; London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 51-72.

[32] The large differences are only occasionally stressed, already for antiquity see Laurens Ernst Tacoma, *Moving Romans: Migration to Rome in the Principate*, First edition ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and Greg Woolf, 'Movers and Stayers,' in *Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire* (Luuk de Ligt and Laurens Ernst Tacoma eds.; Leiden: Brill, 2015), 438-461.

[33] Garbin and Strhan, *Religion*, 15-18; see e.g. Sara Moser, 'New Cities in the Muslim World: The Cultural Politics of Planning an 'Islamic' City,' in *Religion and place: Landscape, politics and piety* (Peter Hopkins, Lily Kong, and Elizabeth Olson eds.; Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 39-55, on 'new Islamic cities' or van der Veer, 'Introduction", on 'worlding'.

[34] Hubert Cancik and Jörg Rüpke eds., *Römische Reichsreligion und Provinzialreligion* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1997); Jörg Rüpke ed., *Antike Religionsgeschichte in räumlicher Perspektive: Abschlussbericht zum Schwerpunktprogramm 1080 der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft 'Römische Reichsreligion und Provinzialreligion'* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007); 'Reichsreligion? Überlegungen zur Religionsgeschichte des antiken Mittelmeerraums in römischer Zeit,' *Historische Zeitschrift* 292 (2011), 297-322; 'Roman Religion and the Religion of Empire: Some Reflections on Method,' in *The Religious History of the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians* (John A. North and Simon R.F. Price eds.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 9-36. Translocality: Ulrike Freitag and Achim von Oppen, 'Introduction: "Translocality": An Approach to Connection and Transfer in Area Studies,' in *Translocality: The Study of Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective* (*eaed.* eds.; Studies in Global Social History 4, Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1-21.

[35] Knott, Krech, and Meyer, 'Iconic religion', but again above all pointing to space as a contingent parameter.

[36] See Jennifer; Allen Robinson, Scott; Taylor, Peter, *Working, Housing: Urbanizing The International Year of Global Understanding - IYGU* (2016), 18.

[37] Adopting a phrase of Markus Hirschauer, 'Un/doing Differences: Die Kontingenz sozialer Zugehörigkeiten/Un/doing Differences: The Contingency of Social Belonging,' *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 43. 3 (2014), 183.

[38] For the concept of 'special' see Ann Taves, *Religious experience reconsidered: A building block approach to the study of religion and other special things* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 2009); 'Experience as site of contested meaning and value: The attributional dog and its special tail,' *Religion* 40. 4 (2010), 317-323.

[39] Volkhard Krech, 'Dynamics in the History of Religions - Preliminary Considerations of Aspects of a Research Programme,' in *Dynamics in the history of religions between Asia and Europe: encounters, notions, and comparative perspectives* (Volkhard Krech and Marion Steinicke eds.; Dynamics in the history of religions 1, Leiden: Brill, 2012), 24.

[40] Rüpke, 'Religious Agency.'

[41] Michel de Certeau, *Arts de faire*, Nouvelle ed. par Luce Giard ed. (Paris: Gallimard, 2007)/*The practice of everyday life* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

[42] Yamini Narayanan, *Religion, heritage and the sustainable city: Hinduism and urbanisation in Jaipur* (Routledge research in religion and development; Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).

[43] See Michael Stausberg, *Religion and tourism: Crossroads, destinations,and encounters* (London: Routledge, 2010).

[44] Thomas A. Tweed, *Crossing and dwelling: A theory of religion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006; repr., 2008); cf. 'Space,' *Material Religion* 7 (2011), 116-123.

[45] Bibliography is endless within and across religious discursive formations.

[46] Marc Augé, *Non-lieux: Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité* (La librairie du XXe siècle; Paris: Seuil, 1992).

[47] For the concept of cultural intensification see Douglas Davies, 'Cultural Intensification: A Theory for Religion,' in *Religion and the Individual: Belief, Practice, Identity* (Abby Day ed.; Bodmin, Cornwall: MPG Books, 2008), 7-18.

[48] See Robinson, Scott, and Taylor, *Working, Housing*, 18.

[49] Cf. Greg Woolf, *The Life and Death of Ancient Cities: A Natural History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 35.

[50] Cf. Robinson, Scott, and Taylor, *Working, Housing*, 5: 'Cities are distinguished from other human settlements by two key features: they constitute dense and large clusters of people living and working together, and they are the focus of myriad internal and external flows. This is what makes cities uniquely active and vibrant places that are always more cosmopolitan than culturally uniform.'

[51] Susanne Rau, *Räume der Stadt. Eine Geschichte Lyons 1300-1800* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2014), 405-6.

[52] E.g. Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid, 'The "Urban Age" in Question,' *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 38. 3 (2014), 731-755.

[53] Thus Inger Furseth, 'Why in the city? Explaining urban fundamentalism,' in *The fundamentalist city? Religiosity and the remaking of urban space* (Nezar AlSayyad and Mejgan Massoumi eds.; London: Routledge, 2011), 46. On such a role of religion in warfare see Jörg Rüpke, 'Krieg,' in *Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe* (Hubert Cancik, Burkhard Gladigow, and Karl-Heinz Kohl eds.; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1993), 448-460; 'Holy War,' *The Brill Dictionary of Religion* 2 (2006), 877; 'War/Armed Forces,' *The Brill Dictionary of Religion* 4 (2006), 1960-1963.

[54] For the latter e.g. Ara Norenzayan, *Big gods: How religion transformed cooperation and conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), critized by Jörg Rüpke, 'Is history important for a historical argument in religious studies,' review of Norenzayan, Big Gods, *Religion* 44. 4 (2014), 645-648. See more general Michael Stausberg, 'Bellah's Religion in Human Evolution: A Postreview,' *Numen* 61. 2-3 (2014), 281-299.

[55] For the differentiation see Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and place: The perspective of experience*

(Minneapolis, Minn.: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1977), see also Helmuth Berking, 'Contested Places and the Politics of Space,' in *Negotiating Urban Conflicts: Interaction, Space and Control* (id. *et al* eds.; Bielefeld: transcript, 2006), 29-39. For Rome, Jean Christian Dumont, 'L'espace plautinien: de la place publique à la ville,' *Pallas* 54 (2000), 103-112; Carlos R. Galvao-Sobrinho, 'Claiming places: Sacred dedications and public space in Rome in the Principate,' in *Dediche Sacre nel mondo greco-romano: Religious Dedications in the Greco-Roman World* (John Bodel and Mika Kajava eds.; Acta Instituti roman Finlandia, Rome: Institutum Romanum Finlandiae 2008), 127-159; Harry O. Maier, 'From Material Place to Imagined Space: Emergent Christian Community as Thirdspace in the Shepherd of Hermas,' in *Early Christian Communities between Ideal and Reality* (Mark R. C. Grundeken and Joseph Verheyden eds.; WUNT Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 143-160, and Jörg Rüpke, 'Crafting complex place: Religion, antiquarianism, and urban development in late republican Rome,' *Historia Religionum* 9 (2017), 109-117.

56 For the debate see Jörg Rüpke, *Urban Religion: A historical approach to urban growth and religious change* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2020), 88-113.

57 For the concept of a diversity of conflicting or at least changing systems of ranking power or prestige see Alison E. Rautman, 'Hierarchy and Heterarchy in the American Southwest: A Comment on Mcguire and Saitta,' *American Antiquity* 63. 2 (1998), 327 with the definition of Crumley: 'heterarchies are systems in which the component elements have (1) "the potential of being unranked (...)' and/or (2) ... of being 'ranked in a number of ways, depending on systemic requirements".'

58 Cf. Moser, 'New Cities". For Antiquity see Carla Sulzbach, 'From Urban nightmares to Dream Cities,' in *Constructions of Space V: Place, Space and Identity in the Ancient Mediterrranean World* (Christl M. Maier and Gert T. Princeloo eds., LHBOTS 5; New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 226-243.

59 Alan Strathern, *Unearthly Powers: Religious and Political Change in World History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

60 Peter Jackson ed., *Horizons of Shamanism: A Triangular Approach to the History and Anthropology of Ecstatic Techniques* (36; Stockholm: Stockholm University Press, 2016).

61 Georg Simmel, 'Individualismus,' *Marsyas* 1 (1917), 33.39.

62 Manfred Russo, *Projekt Stadt: Eine Geschichte der Urbanität* (Basel: Birkhäuser, 2016), 67-164.

63 Jörg Rüpke, *Pantheon: A New History of Roman Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 234-247.

64 Jörg Rüpke, 'Urban Selves: Individualization in the Cities of the Ancient Mediterranean,' in *The Self in Antiquity* (Maren R. Niehoff and Joshua Levinson eds.; Leiden: Brill, 2019), 391-416; *The Individual in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Martin Fuchs *et al* eds., *Religious Individualisations: Historical Dimensions and Comparative Perspectives* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2020).

65 Éric Rebillard and Jörg Rüpke, 'Introduction: Groups, Individuals, and Religious Identity,' in *Group Identity and Religous Individuality in Late Antiquity* (*id.* eds.; CUA Studies in Early Christianity, Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2015), 3-12.

66 Joane Nagel, 'Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture,' *Social Problems* 41. 1 (1994), 152-176; Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004).

67 Jörg Rüpke, *Religious Deviance in the Roman World: Superstition or Individuality*, trans. David M. B. Richardson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

68 Robinson, Scott, and Taylor, *Working, Housing*, 5.

[69] On the term see Joanne Punzo Waghorne ed., *Place/No-Place in Urban Asian Religiosity* (ARI - Springer Asia Series Singapore: Springer, 2017).

Impact of Iran-U.S. Relations on Women's Movement in Iran: From Ahmadinejad Era to Today

Hisae Nakanishi

Abstract:

After the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Iran severed diplomatic ties with the U.S. Since then, Iran-U.S. relations have continued to be hostile and tension-filled to this day. Relations between the two countries have particularly worsened after the Ahmadinejad era, which had a significant impact on the women's movement in Iran. This article analyzes how "martyrdom," an iconic concept of Iranian identity, has influenced the women's movement in Iran, and it examines how women's rights activists have responded to state control by asserting the principles of feminism, gender equality, and other secular ideas. This study also points out that the discourse on women's rights has moved beyond the framework of Islam by citing an analysis of assertions made in Iran's only surviving women's magazine, *Zanān-i Imrūz* ("Women of Today"). These assertions reveal a divergence between the ideologies of Iran's Islamic political system and the human rights sought by civil society.

Keywords:

Iran, women's movement, gender equality, Shiite identity, feminism

1. Introduction

Iran-U.S. relations have been strained ever since revelations were made in 2002 of Iran's nuclear development activities. These tensions somewhat eased just prior to and following the signing of a nuclear agreement, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2015. However, after the Trump administration came to power in 2017, the U.S. imposed tougher unilateral economic sanctions against Iran, dealing a heavy blow to the country's economy. This article focuses on the women's movement in Iran from the Ahmadinejad era to the present. It also describes how progress made in the women's movement's is not unrelated to the strained relations between America and Iran.

Research on the women's movement in Iran tends to focus on the context of Iran's domestic political and social situation.[1] Previous research has shown how Iran's post-revolutionary ideologues imposed Islamic values on state governance. As a result, legislators constrained women's legal rights in laws related to women and family. Conflicts have arisen between reformists and moderates on one side and hardline conservatives on the other. Consequently, women's rights are sometimes curtailed and sometimes improved.[2] However, even as women's rights deteriorate under a particular conservative administration, it cannot be assumed that the women's movement always advances under the next administration with a moderate stance. In other words, differences between conservative and moderate regimes alone have not necessarily changed the environment for the women's movement.

Nayereh Tohidi carried out exceptional research and analyzed the Iranian women's movement in a more global context. She pointed out that transnational movements in the Middle East and America have influenced the women's movement in Iran. She also argued that since 2006, the One Million Signature Campaign (described later) and other movements calling for women's empowerment gained support online through collaboration with Iranian communities in the U.S.[3]

On the other hand, the author draws attention to the significant relationship between changes in Iran-U.S. relations and the women's movement. In particular, America's unilateral sanctions have greatly increased the hardships Iranians face in their daily lives, which continue to get worse day by day. The breakdown in Iran's relationship with America has shaped Iran's political landscape, which has cast a shadow on the government's policies on women's movements for forty years. The recent surge in unemployment due to the rial's significant devaluation over the past few months is merely another case in point.

One of the factors behind the strained relations between Iran and America is Iran's national identity. Trying to stand up against a global power like the United States, Iran's

political leaders often address their citizens with warnings about the monopolization of power in world politics, the use of global influence to pressure Iran's government, and dangers foretold by conspiracy theories involving the U.S. or Israel. They also insist that Iran is fighting against these pressures and abuses of power. Some scholars attribute these discourses to Iran's inclination to exhibit "subaltern nationalism."[4] Simply put, "subaltern" refers to a people who feel alienated from a power structure and are unable to gain hegemony. Shafi pointed out that "Iran has continuously maintained its subaltern character from the Qajar Dynasty to the present," since "Iran had a hard time gaining hegemony, both domestically and internationally."[5] Meanwhile, some researchers have stressed that Iranian women were stripped of various rights after the Revolution. Thus, they tend to view women's rights activists in Iran as subaltern nationalists, like the leaders of student and labor movements.[6]

These studies view both Iran, as a nation, and Iran's women, particularly women's rights activists, as subaltern in nature. Indeed, if the U.S. is the dominant nation, Iran, being subject to its economic sanctions, is a nation under America's influence. It is also true that Iran's rights activists have experienced having their publishing activities suspended and censored by the government. If the government's power is conceived as "control," in the language of Spivak, the women's rights activists may be viewed as "social subordinates."

In reality, however, Iran as a nation has not entirely succumbed to America's domination; the fact that the nuclear issue has not been resolved to this day points to Iran's continuing defiance against American hegemony. Iranian women have likewise continued their publishing activities within and outside Iran up to the present time. Therefore, if we refer to both Iran as a nation and Iranian women activists as subaltern, we would naturally assign them to the dualistic stereotypes of being in "control" and being "marginal" or "subordinate." As the author believes, this view would lead to an oversimplification of the dynamic relationship between the state and civil society. Some studies view the voice of women's rights activists as an agency of change, asserting that "the subaltern speaks," in response to the thesis of "*Can the subaltern speak?*" However, the use of the term "subaltern" in itself could, in the author's view, lead to the labeling of women as a socially subordinate group.[7]

This article first looks into the impact of Iranian identity, which underlies the worsening relations between Iran and America. Then, the study examines how women activists have responded to Iran's political environment. By considering the above trends in research on the women's movement in Iran, this article focuses on the period from the Ahmadinejad administration to the present, as Iran-U.S. relations had started to worsen to the brink of military conflict.

The current study first examines the process by which the U.S.-American relations have worsened and then points out the relationship between the "spirit of martyrdom," which was further strengthened during this worsening process, and the characteristics of the women's movement in Iran. In the third section, this article delves into the interaction between the Iranian state and civil society regarding women's activism in Iran. Finally, the author analyzes the trends of thoughts espoused in *Zanān-i Imrūz* ("Women of Today"), the only existing women's political magazine in Iran today, to shed light on the relationship between the state and society in Iran.

2. Worsening of Iran-U.S. relations and women's movement in Iran

2.1. Worsening relations during the Ahmadinejad era

Iran-U.S. relations drastically changed during the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy at the start of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. After Iran achieved post-war recovery in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88), it pursued diplomatic dialogs under the Khatami administration, pointing to an apparent improvement in Iran-U.S. relations. After the 9/11 attacks in 2001, relations soured as Iran was named part of the "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea, by President George W. Bush. After the Anglo-American-led military campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran had to establish its national security policy while having U.S. forces stationed in its two neighboring countries to the east and west.

President Ahmadinejad's administration, which was established in June 2005, took shape under such circumstances. The so-called "nuclear development problem" in Iran began through propaganda activities by Iranian dissident forces during the Khatami era in 2002. However, for around nine months from November 2004 to August 2005, Iran had stopped its uranium-enrichment activities. Accordingly, allegations by Europe, America, and Israel that Iran posed a threat did not come to the forefront during the Khatami era.[8] In this light, only after 2005 did the nuclear development issue in Iran come to be considered a threat to international peace. The first United Nations Security Council resolution demanding the suspension of Iran's uranium-enrichment activities was adopted in 2006.

Former President Ahmadinejad was well-known for making controversial statements against the U.S. and Israel. His denials of the Holocaust naturally aggravated relations with Israel. Such extreme statements heightened the perception of a threat held by Europe, America, and Israel, leading to suspicions of Iran's nuclear development program. As a result, along with

the US-led imposition of unilateral economic sanctions against Iran, the possibility of military attacks by Israel and America also became imminent. At that time, the president's harsh and combative language and the heightening of the perception of Iran's threat were escalating rapidly, pulling Iran into an adverse chain reaction leading to the continued worsening of relations with America.

In the background of these aggressive statements from the former president, as Heiman has already suggested, is the dichotomy of two opposing worldviews about "us, Iranians" aiming for inner "solidarity" against America as an external adversary. After the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized the political slogan "*liberation of the oppressed*," particularly when the Revolutionary Guards fought on the frontlines of the Iran-Iraq War. America, Israel, and the former President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, were naturally branded as the oppressors, and the Revolutionary Guards who died in the Iran-Iraq war were hailed as martyrs.[9]

This spirit of martyrdom in Iran is an essential element of Shiite identity. This spirit was inflamed by pressure from foreign enemies, strengthening Iranians' sense of solidarity as they boldly fought their oppressors. Iran came under pressure from Western countries during the nuclear crisis. In this period, the more imminent military attack from America became, and the more acutely Iran became isolated, its resistance against America as the oppressor became the defining elements of the Iranian national identity.[10]

The Ahmadinejad administration reversed its approach from the dialogue-based diplomacy of the Khatami administration. One example of this was its nuclear policy. Ahmadinejad promoted the ambition of Iran to become a nuclear power as a national strategy. Iran was discontent because international society was wary of its possession of nuclear weapons. Iran argued that countries like India and Pakistan openly declared that they possessed nuclear weapons, while Israel does not but is allowed by the international community to actually possess such weapons.[11]

Apart from its strategic and military importance for nuclear deterrence, nuclear development for Iran was also a source of national pride. The development of nuclear energy as a product of superior scientific technology was highly significant for Iran in gaining self-respect as a technological superpower that would not succumb to pressure from the West. Displaying this national pride, Ahmadinejad made the following statement in the UN General Assembly on September 19, 2006:

> Citizens of Asia, Africa, Europe, and America are all equal...Nations are not equal in exercising their rights recognized by international law...Enjoying these rights is

dependent on the whim of certain major powers.

He asserted that Iran would not succumb to American pressure and attacks, since Iran was equal to the U.S.[12] He believed that sharing this sense of national pride among the general public would ensure the legitimization of his rule. In addition, the Ahmadinejad administration faced the problem of how to reduce widening economic disparities after the revolution. Thus, the administration aimed at strengthening its power base by subsidizing the country's middle class, which had grown after the Revolution. It also provided various benefits to the lower classes, which included the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij security forces and their families. This sentiment reflected a "cult of worship" for martyrdom peculiar to the Shia sect.[13] The Revolutionary Guards and the Basij soldiers, who served as volunteer militia, sacrificed their lives during the Iran-Iraq War. Those who died in war were worshipped as martyrs in the annual Ashura Festival, with surviving family members marching on the streets while carrying pictures of the martyred soldiers. How has this spirit of martyrdom in the Ahmadinejad era impacted the women's movement in Iran? The next section explores this issue.

2.2. Women's Movement in Iran

After the revolution, Iran adopted a system called the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists (*Velāyat-e Faqīh),* in which religious leaders *(Ulamā)* ruled the state at the center of sovereign power. During the Pahlavi Dynasty (1919–1979), Iran had adopted the Family Protection Law in 1967, which was amended in 1975. It increased the minimum age of marriage for women and expanded the rights of women in family-related laws, such as a women's right to ask for a divorce. Iran's Civil Code had not been thoroughly secularized since the Pahlavi Dynasty. Its constitution, based on Sharia law, had been preserved from the 1928 Civil Code. On the other hand, the Civil Code, which stipulated provisions related to family matters, was amended with the condition "*according to the principles of Islam*." This insertion was made while the authority of the religious leaders, who held the theocratic right to interpret Sharia, became stronger as the country's system of government took an increasingly Islamic turn.

The Family Protection Law of 1975 was rescinded after the revolution because it did not conform with Islam. The minimum marriage age for women was reverted from 15 to 9 years old immediately after the revolution, although it was later raised to 13 under the Khatami administration. Child custody, inheritance, marriage, divorce, and other family rights of

women markedly retrogressed. Even polygamy became less restrictive than before the revolution.

In short, the views of Ayatollah Motahhari, the leading ideological figure of the Islamic Revolution, became the prominent view after the revolution. He asserted that "although men and women are equal before God, because of their biological sexual differences, their rights are different and complementary."[14]

After the revolution, women intellectuals opposed these changes and fought to reform the Civil Code by publishing newspapers and magazines. Thus, for the next 20 years from the 1980s, various women's magazines, which were edited and written by women, were published[15]—from conservative magazines published in Qom, the center of Shiite seminaries, to progressive magazines advocating feminism. It was during the Khatami era that both the quality and quantity of women's publications reached their peak. After the revolution, women's rights activists worked to empower women, either as parliamentarians or publishers of women's magazines. Their leaders ranged from Islamic ideologists to secular feminists. As a result of these relentless efforts by women's rights activists, specific improvements were seen in women's family rights by the end of the 1990s. Also in this era, the number of conditions by which women had the right to ask for divorce increased to more than ten.[16]

However, this trend was reversed when the new Family Protection Bill was submitted to the Iranian Parliament under the Ahmadinejad administration in 2007. While the new bill mandated the registration of legitimate marriages, it effectively removed the requirement to register temporary marriages. Based on Ministry of Justice provisions (Article 22), the bill simplified the procedures for polygamy (Article 23). It also imposed a tax on the dowry paid by the husband to the wife (Article 25). Therefore, it was criticized as a move back to the conditions prevalent during the Iran-Iraq War, immediately after the revolution. [17] Importantly, in that immediate post-revolution period, Motahhari and other members of the *Ulamā* asserted that polygamy and temporary marriage systems were deeply rooted in the Islamic value of the "complementarity of roles of men and women."[18]

During the Ahmadinejad era, the spirit of martyrdom also influenced the stricter enforcement of women's wearing of the hijab. From 2005 to 2007, the so-called morality police revived patrols to check whether women were adequately wearing the hijab. A law-enforcement organization called the *Komīte* played the role of morality police from the 1980s to the 1990s. They laid low in the Khatami era but resurfaced during Ahmadinejad's regime.

After the revolution, the political system created a distinction between a "correct hijab" and a "bad hijab," exalting women wearing the "correct hijab" as ideal, virtuous Muslim

women of the Islamic Republic.[19] The Basij, an organization broadly involved in national defense as a security force along with the Revolutionary Guards, had a Women's Basij unit, which also underwent military training during the Iran-Iraq War. The Women's Basij was founded on the revolutionary spirit of Islam and was regarded by the political system as women who were willing to actively enlist in "holy war" when the nation calls upon them. Thus, as explained in the previous section, the worsening relations with the U.S. further inspired the spirit of martyrdom within Iran and underscored the notion of "virtue" among Muslim women. The image of the ideal Muslim woman, shaped during the war in the 1980s, was revived during the Ahmadinejad era, resulting in stricter adherence to wearing the "correct hijab" and in a more conservative view of women's family rights.

3. Feminism in Iran

3.1. The political system's outlook on feminism: "Feminism" that supports imperialistic rule

During the Khatami era, the debate surrounding the hijab became significantly heightened. Although the mandatory wearing of the hijab was enforced in 1982, the political climate was not conducive to public discussions of its propriety. The compulsory hijab is a symbol of patriarchy, not merely an issue of clothing. It involves the question of a woman's right to self-determination, such as her right to freely dress herself as she wishes.

Iran has been surrounded by U.S. military forces occupying two of its neighboring countries, i.e., in Afghanistan since 2001 and in Iraq since 2003. Under these circumstances, Iran has formulated national security policies to cope with the apparent risk. Former President Ahmadinejad, on various occasions, called the U.S. and Israel imperialistic forces and vowed that Iran would continue its resistance against these forces. In his speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2011, he accused the West of "being full of hypocrisy and deceit," "tolerating the drug trade and the murder of innocent people," and "pursing imperialistic ambitions."[20]

Feminism was naturally perceived by Iran's regime as an ideology opposed to Islam. In Iran's context, national security policies are founded on resistance to the West, where feminism is rooted. Iran's government placed the importance of the family as the central ideology of Iran's political system. This system has focused on amending the norms and rules regarding the family increasingly toward conservatism.

How did women activists respond to this tide of events? The next section addresses this question.

3.2. Feminism in Iran: Aspiring to gender equality

After submitting the Family Protection Bill to Parliament, women's rights activists from within and outside Iran raised their voices claiming that the Bill would further infringe upon women's rights. Before proposing the Bill, women activists had already taken issue with Iran's not ratifying the "Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women." Although Iran's Parliament approved the signing of the Convention under the Khatami Administration, the Guardian Council rejected it, and thus it was not ratified by Iran.[21]

Formal objections against the non-ratification of the Convention and protest movements against the 2007 Family Protection Bill were presaged by a demonstration in front of Tehran University demanding "gender equality" in 2005, with the reported participation of around 600 men and women.[22] On August 27, 2006, 54 women's rights activists started the One Million Signatures Campaign seeking the repeal of discriminatory laws against women, and they distributed a pamphlet titled "The Effects of Laws on Women's Lives" at Tehran's Haft-e Tir Square. The pamphlet listed eight demands. Among them were equal divorce rights for men and women, ending polygamy and temporary marriage, raising the age of criminal responsibility to eighteen years for both boys and girls, and the right of women to transfer citizenship to their children (such a provision was later passed in the same year). The demands also included equal compensation between women and men for bodily injury or death, equal inheritance rights, reform of laws that reduce punishment for offenders in cases of honor killing, and equal rights between men and women to give testimony in court.[23]

According to the accounts of women's rights activists, middle-class women living in new residential areas in Tehran and other big cities led the campaign. They also reported that the campaign eventually spread and gathered wide support from women in their 20s to their 60s, across different ideologies and social classes. This signature campaign is a significant event in the history of Iran's women's movement because it was the first one that promoted the slogan of "gender equality." The campaign merged into the Green Movement, which started with a recount of the votes cast in the disputed 2009 presidential elections.

However, how to evaluate the Green Movement has remained a question among scholars. Women's rights activists and Iranian researchers involved in the movement focused on how discriminatory the government's policies were against women, how much pressure the government exerted on the activists, and how the activists bravely challenged them. However,

it remains difficult to objectively measure how actively the Green Movement promoted the activists' demands to expand women's rights among the various other causes it supported. Reports by the activists are basically insider stories, which cannot fully inform a serious academic discussion.[24]

In other words, the author believes that what is essential is not the actual circumstances of the women's activities in the signature campaign or the Green Movement, nor the nature of the rights being asserted. The question is why they had to stand against the political system.

Friction against the women's rights activists in Iran also existed during Khatami's reformist government. There was a massive increase in the number of civil society organizations. Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani (daughter of the late former President Rafsanjani) published the *Ruznāmah-i Zan* ("Women's Newspaper"), in which she promoted the importance of feminism. But the newspaper was banned within one year. Moreover, another women's magazine, *Zanān* ("Women") also introduced feminist views more often in the Khatami era. That was a time when feminism blossomed in Iran. However, as Ziba Mir-Hosseini pointed out, feminism in Iran was considered "harmful to society, a deviation from Islam, and dangerous as instigated under Western influence." Otherwise, feminism was labeled a ploy by the Zionists and Americans aimed at regime change, and feminists were thus subjected to suppression.[25]

In this environment, after 2005, the provocative remarks made by President Ahmadinejad worsened the conflict with America. Then, Iran declared that it would fight against the foreign enemy represented by the so-called imperialistic forces of the U.S. and Israel and leveraged the spirit of martyrdom nurtured during the Iran-Iraq War. In this context, Iran's regime tended to view all those who demanded empowerment as complicit with Western imperialism.

On the other hand, some women's rights activists in Iran chose a different path from the secular feminists who employed an antagonistic relationship with the state. One of them was Shahla Sherkat, the editor of the only existing women's magazine in Iran. Sherkat published *Zanān* ("Women") from 1992 to 2008, and during the Khatami era hosted round-table discussions between secular feminists like Mehrangiz Kar and Shirin Ebadi and Islamists like Azam Taleghani. By doing this, Sherkat created a forum for discussing women's rights from both secular and Islamic viewpoints.[26]

Zanān had to cease publication in 2008 as the campaign and the Green Movement emerged and developed. It was during the Rouhani era that Sherkat relaunched *Zanān* in 2014 under a new name, *Zanān-i Imrūz*. While the magazine has often featured feminism, gender

equality, and other similar topics, it also dealt with various political, economic, social, and cultural issues involving women. Therefore, the magazine made itself distinct from other women's publications in that it did not centrally focus on feminism.

The next section analyzes how *Zanān-i Imrūz* developed its arguments on women's rights. The analysis clarifies how this approach differed from that of secular feminism, which was viewed as being in direct opposition with Iran's source of national pride, namely the resistance against imperialists and the spirit of martyrdom championed during the Ahmadinejad era.

4. Objections from a global social awareness stance

After six years remaining dormant, *Zanān-i Imrūz* gained a new license to publish and reemerged as a new women's magazine in 2014. The back of its front cover says "*Mahnamah-ye Ijtima`ī*" ("Monthly Social Magazine"). However, soon after it restarted publication, this magazine was again forced to close after publishing a critique on the social phenomenon of "white marriages" in its 5th issue. After six months this time, it was again relaunched, and it addressed various topics on social problems occurring domestically and abroad as news reports on current events. From its resumption in 2014 to March 2020, *Zanān-i Imrūz* has published stories on a diverse range of domestic and international issues. Among these issues, particular focus has been given to problems often discussed in the post-revolutionary women's movement. The following section examines whether the magazine continued its legacy from the pre-Rouhani period or adopted a new approach.

4.1. Cohabitation and Iran's marriage systems

Iran has witnessed a phenomenon called "white marriages," which refers to the cohabitation of unmarried couples and is said to be increasing. Why is it called white marriage? Iranian citizens have ID booklets that are stamped when they vote in regularly held elections, such as parliamentary and presidential elections. These booklets are likewise stamped when a person marries and then registers the marriage. The page in the ID booklet indicating proof of marriage is left blank for cohabiting couples or those who live as married couples without registering their marriage. The blank page is white, and thus the arrangement is named "white marriage." *Zanān-i Imrūz* published a special issue dealing with the reality of this phenomenon in Iran.[27]

The first noteworthy thing about this issue is its cover page, which shows a young

couple walking together, each carrying equally sized bags. The suggestion of "gender equality" is conveyed on the cover, where cohabiting couples share equal gender roles.

As mentioned above, achieving complete gender equality is difficult under Iran's Civil Code provisions. The concept of gender equality increasingly became accepted during the first term of the Rouhani administration, as one of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In May 2016, Vice President for Women and Family Affairs Shahindokht Molaverdi pointed out the importance of achieving the 5th SDG, "gender equality." However, women's rights did not significantly expand in terms of laws related to women during the Rouhani era.[28] The suggestive image of gender equality on the magazine cover symbolically reflected the editor's intention. How was "white marriage" depicted in this special edition?

First, an article entitled "*White Marriage – Pain or Cure?*" (*Iztivāj-i Sefīd: dard yā darmān*), pointed out that "white marriage," which is increasing in Iran's urban areas, is based on volatile relationships, compared to legitimate marriage relationships. The article also clarified that this social phenomenon is rife with problems. The magazine then featured interviews with women in such a relationship to enable them to voice their side. Some women admitted that they wanted to have a legitimate marriage and expressed guilt at being in a relationship against their will because their "husbands" did not agree to marrying them legally.[29] One woman expressed her experience with her partner as follows:

> I asked him until when we would have to continue in this kind of relationship. He replied that, although he agrees with marriage, he thinks it's better to stay this way. I often feel self-conscious about what my neighbors think, when I leave home to throw out the garbage, etc. I can never tell my parents, who also live in this province.

This woman's words indicate a sense of shame in knowing that cohabitation is not socially accepted. She could not tell her parents and family in her hometown that she is being frowned upon by her neighbors.[30] This article also emphasized how the woman expressed how she felt like a *sigheh* (woman in a temporary marriage). The article asserted that "white marriage" is not necessarily based on the free will of both the man and the woman but is in fact disadvantageous for the woman.[31]

"White marriage" has been criticized by hard-liners in Iran. Since they consider marriage to be a religiously, socially, and legally recognized institution, a union, according to them, should only be called marriage when legal procedures have been taken. Consequently, they even disagree with the mere notion of calling it "white marriage."[32]

Zanān-i Imrūz was banned for a while after publication of the issue mentioned above. Then, it changed its cover along with the magazine's contents. The cover came to resemble that of a straightforward, academic journal. The contents ranged from topics on social issues such as water shortages, caused by drought due to climate change, to child marriage (particularly of girls in Iran) and street children—expanding the scope of its coverage to include Iran's development problems. Therefore, it shifted its focus from feminism during the time of *Zanān* to depicting development problems from a woman's point of view.

Iranians have been forced to live under much hardship due to the severe economic sanctions imposed on the country for the five years after the U.S. withdrew from the 2015 nuclear agreement, which is now essentially in deadlock. There is mounting dissatisfaction with the government, while the conservative hardline forces are gaining strength. Under these circumstances, *Zanān-i Imrūz* has been conducting comprehensive research on women's lives and has positioned women's issues in the broader spectrum of societal problems. The next section discusses the assertions made in *Zanān-i Imrūz* regarding the amendment of the citizenship law, which Parliament started to debate in the Ahmadinejad era and continues to debate today.

4.2. Citizenship issue for children of Iranian women with foreign husbands

As mentioned above, several laws are discriminatory to women in Iran, e.g., marriage age, filing for divorce, and inheritance. Another such law is discrimination against women under the citizenship law. Citizenship laws are generally based on citizenship by birthplace or by blood. But in Iran, citizenship is based on the paternal line. In other words, the citizenship of the child is determined by that of the father. Even if they are born in Iran, children born of foreign fathers cannot have Iranian citizenship, and thus they grow up without civil rights under the law.

There are at least one million Afghan refugees and workers living in Iran due to the Soviet invasion in 1979 and the war following 9/11 in 2001. Some statistics have shown that this number has reached up to three million.[33] Furthermore, Iraqi refugees have also been living in Iran due to the country's unstable political situation since the war against Saddam Hussein in 2003. Children born between Iranian women and these Afghans and Iraqis living in Iran have not been granted Iranian citizenship.

The necessity of amending the citizenship law—from the perspective that granting citizenship to children born in these circumstances implies the expansion of women's rights and the upholding of the children's human rights—has been discussed in past Iranian

Parliaments. A bill granting citizenship to children born of fathers with a foreign nationality has been deliberated since 2004. However, no progress has been seen in these discussions for fourteen years after the Ahmadinejad administration came to power in 2005.

Zanān-i Imrūz has tackled this problem in an article entitled "*So near, yet so far*." Featuring numerous interviews with parliament members, the magazine presented a critical assessment of the various discussions made in the Iranian Parliament. The magazine published different views on the issue. It emphasized the need to grant citizenship to stateless and statistically unaccounted-for children because the current situation poses a national security problem for Iran. It also argued that they should be granted citizenship because citizenship based on paternity represents suppression of women's rights as well as those children's human rights.[34]

The need for amending the citizenship law was raised in the 1990s by Shirin Ebadi, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. Yet, one year after the article mentioned above was published, namely, in May 2019, the bill was passed in the Iranian parliament. It was then approved on October 2 of the same year by the Guardian Council, which is equivalent to Iran's upper house. The persistent voice of the feminists finally bore fruit.

4.3. The hijab issue: Toward a virtual world beyond national borders

The hijab issue has been controversial in Iran since the time of the Pahlavi Dynasty. It has always been a point of contention between policymakers and civil society. When the hijab became mandatory after the revolution, many women's magazines published different views about its propriety. However, as pointed out by Ziba Mir-Hosseini, discussion over the hijab in public was considered taboo for about twenty years after the revolution. It was only taken up by civil society after President Khatami's reformist administration came to power in 1997. However, as an exception, Azam Taleghani made an unprecedented objection from an Islamic perspective against the compulsory hijab in an article in *Payām-i Hājir* ("Message of Hajir"), which was a pioneering women's magazine after the revolution.

After the end of the Khatami era in 2005 and then in 2007, morality police were briefly mobilized to crack down on the improper wearing of the hijab in campaigns against "bad hijab." But they failed to stop women from not following the prescribed hijab style. As mentioned below, although women's rights activists had focused on issues related to amendment of the family law from the Ahmadinejad era, throughout the One Million Signatures Campaign and the Green Movement, and even up to the current administration, the hijab issue has been subject to active discussions, particularly online.

A famous example of this is the Facebook page for a movement called "*My Stealthy Freedom*," which has many versions as to its origin. According to one version, it was started on May 5, 2015, by Iranian women living in exile in America. Posting pictures without a hijab on the Internet became a hit and caught widespread attention among women living in Iran. Some claim it turned into a movement that gained the support of almost one million people, although it is difficult to ascertain this claim.[35]

Women in Iran have not been strictly wearing hijab in the prescribed way since the latter half of the 1990s. Many of the women opposing the compulsory hijab belong to the younger generation. In Iran, where more than 60% of the population are under 25 years old, it is common to see women refusing to wear the "correct" hijab in urban areas. There are many ways women show their refusal to wear the hijab, not only by exposing their hair through their scarf but also by wearing short jackets and coats. In addition, some women adopt styles like body-hugging clothes that emphasize their figure or long-hemmed overcoats with the front buttons open as they walk on the streets.

This refusal to wear the hijab in the prescribed manner came to be regarded as a problem by the political system from around the end of December 2017, after the launch of a protest movement where women not wearing hijabs stood on platforms in the streets and waved their hijabs like flags. This movement has been called "*Girls on Revolution Street.*"[36] A video was made as a news report about the protests being shared on social media within and outside Iran, as well as the arrest of dozens of women who participated.

These images of protest have been shared among women in exile as well as the next generation of Iranians, and they have received messages of approval on social media. Thus, the issue of Iranian women wearing the hijab has elicited a widespread response, beyond Iran's borders, in protest of its compulsory use. Although it is believed to have increased the sense of solidarity among women sharing the same sentiments, some suspect these protests have in fact been limited.[37]

Under these circumstances, *Zanān-i Imrūz* published an article entitled "*Rights and punishment of women not wearing a hijab*." The article pointed out that there was no legal or social definition of what constitutes "no hijab." It argued that without a clear explanation or criteria, the act could not be punished. It also criticized the political atmosphere that regarded the act of not wearing the hijab as a problem by questioning whether women's hijab-less images posted on the Internet should be considered a violation of the law commanding compulsory wearing of the hijab in public.[38]

The article asserted that "the police cannot exert its authority in private homes and on

social media. Therefore, home parties and social media should not be considered a public place, unlike the streets."[39] To further quote:

> Social media is a virtual space and is different from the real world. The police can exert its authority in real, public places. However, whether women wear the hijab or not on social media is beyond the police's authority because it is in the virtual realm. The state can exercise its authority in the real world, but not in virtual space.

Zanān-i Imrūz, therefore, asserted that punishment could not be imposed for private actions that occur in virtual space. It criticized the government's censorship of the media, claiming that women not wearing hijab should be punished neither in Iran nor overseas.

The above articles express some of the most prominent viewpoints in *Zanān-i Imrūz*, which are important in the context of Iran's current domestic affairs. We can observe from these writings that *Zanān-i Imrūz* has raised Iranian women's rights in a global context. The article on "white marriage" included criticisms against temporary marriage, which remains institutionally recognized in Iran. It also portrayed the reality of cohabitation as a westernized lifestyle. Moreover, it featured women's voices to highlight the disadvantages cohabitation presents for women from the perspective of gender equality—assertions that are different from those made before by Sherkat in the time of *Zanān*.

In *Zanān*, arguments on women's rights were presented by featuring Islamic and secular feminists, and even enlightened *Ulamā*, mainly within the framework of the Islamic ideology of this Islamic republic. From its first issue in 1992, *Zanān* gradually deepened its feminist hue during the Khatami era. After the Khatami and Ahmadinejad eras, it took on a new perspective when it was relaunched as *Zanān-i Imrūz* under the current administration.

This new perspective can be seen through its focus on global social issues that transcend the confines of Iran, such as the call for gender equality, western-style cohabitation, and international marriage—issues that have swept over Iran amidst the advances of globalization. By tackling the refusal to wear the hijab by Iranian women within and outside the country, the magazine widened its vision by focusing on Iranian immigrants in the West and the Iranian community connected through social media. This wider perspective also reveals glimpses of cosmopolitan ideas. As mentioned earlier, *Zanān-i Imrūz* did not only publish news and discourse about domestic affairs. It also focused on the existence of socially and economically vulnerable members of society, as a negative consequence of globalization and climate change, by drawing attention to Europe's refugee crisis, water-related problems,

and human trafficking.

5. Conclusion

The demand for gender equality by women's rights activists is, in itself, a call for the state to end its denial of women's human rights and, moreover, can be regarded as a continuation of the demands the women's movement has made on the state in the post-revolutionary period. On the other hand, the more Iran was forced to adopt a hardline stance against external forces, the more it needed to assert that it does not have (in the language of Spivak) a "subaltern" existence in relation to the major powers to maintain the authority of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists. This sentiment was manifested in asserting the country's right to carry out uranium enrichment activities and in expressing its self-image as a "strong Iran" by taking pride in being a nation making progress in its scientific technologies.

This self-image of a strong Iran particularly conveys a display of masculinity. Both Iran's nuclear energy development and its missile development programs overlap the image of a muscular male. This image buoyed the patriarchal system and the Shiite Islamic value system and mentality. The logic of this power center considers the women's movement a dangerous social campaign as it seeks gender equality. Accordingly, we can understand why the women's rights activists advocating feminism and gender equality had to fight against the political establishment. As long as the Iranian political system sees the realization of gender equality—the goal of the women's rights activists—as a "western" value system, the feminist movement will continue to be treated as the "handiwork of imperialists" and subjected to intense pressure.

Zanān-i Imrūz attempted to transcend the starkly opposing views of the political system and the women's rights activists advocating feminism. This approach is distinct from the strategy taken during the Khatami and Ahmadinejad eras by the Islamic women's rights activists, who demanded the empowerment of women based on an interpretation of the *Qur'ān*. To put it simply, the magazine adopted a global social awareness rather than an Islamic or secular feministic one.

The Islamic Republic of Iran marked the 42nd anniversary of the Iranian Revolution in February 2021. Currently, Iran faces two major problems: the economic sanctions and the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, its people's very survival, i.e., sustaining everyday life, is a critical issue for Iran. There is an increasing cry among its citizens for upholding the value of human existence over ideology. People have voiced their concerns about whether the state would listen to their opinions in civil society. The global social awareness perspective adopted

by *Zanān-i Imrūz* has upended the historical tendency of maintaining a distorted view of women's rights issues as merely matters confined to women. This political stance points to the disparity between the state's adherence to Islamic principles and the realities of civil society. It is also noteworthy that the global social awareness perspective has effectively contextualized the women's rights issue within a broad social perspective. Underlying this perspective is an attempt to highlight the problems that are fundamental to human survival, such as the rapidly increasing disparity between the haves and have-nots, divisions in society, water shortages caused by droughts due to climate change, and various natural disasters—not only in Iran but around the globe.

Notes

1 Arzoo Osanloo, *The Politics of Women's Rights in Iran* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009). Marianne Bøe, *Family Law in Contemporary Iran: Women's Rights Activism and Shari'a* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015).

2 Janet Afary, *Sexual Politics in Modern Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

3 Nayereh Tohidi, "The International Connections of the Women's Movement in Iran, 1979-2000," in *Iran and the Surrounding World: Interaction in Culture and Cultural Politics* (Nikki Keddie and Rudi Matthee, eds., Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), 205-231.

4 Majid Shafi, *Imagining Iran: The Tragedy of Subaltern Nationalism*, Lexington Books, 2013.

5 Ibid.

6 Alireza Asgharzadeh, "The Return of the Subaltern: International Education and Politics of Voice," *Journal of Studies in International Education* 12-4 (2007), 334-363.

7 Tina Davidson, Ruth roach Pierson, "Voices from the Margins: Subaltern Women Speak and Rewrite History," *Journal of Women's History* 13-2 (Summer 2001), 169-179.

8 Semira N. Nikou, TimeLine of Iran's Nuclear Activities, United States Institute of Peace, 2015. [https://iranprimer.usip.org/sites/default/files/201806/Timeline%20of%20Iran's%20Nuclear%20Activities%20June%202018.pdf] (Accessed on July 20, 2020).

9 Former President Ahmadinejad was known for appointing former members of the Revolutionary Guard to critical positions in his administration and tolerated the expansion of the Revolutionary Guard's influence in Iran's politics and economics in 2010.

10 These manifestations of the national identity can be generally observed among conservatives, moderates, and reformists alike, but was particularly characteristic of the political and religious statement of the Principlists (*Osul-Garāyān* in Persian).

11 AM Haji-Yousefi, "Iran's Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: From Confrontation to Accommodation," *Perspective*: *Turkish Journal of International Studies* 9-2 (2010), 8-11. [https://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2010/Haji-Yousefi1.pdf] (Accessed on May 20, 2020).

12 Transcript of Ahmadinejad's UN Speech, September 19, 2006. [https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6107339] (Accessed on July 10, 2020).

13 Elisabeth Jane Yarbakhsh," Green martyrdom and the Iranian state," *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies* 28-1 (2014), 77-87.

[14] Hisae Nakanishi, "Power, Ideology, and Women's Consciousness in Post-revolutionary Iran," in *Women in Muslim Societies: Diversity Within Unity* (Herbert L. Bodman & Nayareh Tohidi eds., London: Lynn Rinner Publishers, 1998), 82.

[15] Hisae Nakanishi, "Islam and Modernity," *Aspects of Contemporary Iran,* Fubaisha, 2002, p. 177-181 (in Japanese).

[16] Hisae Nakanishi, "Islam and Modernity," Fubaisha, 2002, p. 194 (in Japanese).

[17] Marianne Bøe, *Family Law in Contemporary Iran: Women's Rights Activism and Shari'a* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 66-68.

[18] Maryam Poya, *Women, Work, and Islamism: Ideology and Resistance in Iran* (London: Zed Books, 1999), 65.

[19] Hisae Nakanishi, "Islam and the Veil: Women living in Contemporary Iran," Koyo Shobo, 1996, p. 59-68.

[20] "Iran's Ahmadinejad attacks West, prompts walk-out," Reuters, September 22, 2011. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-iran/irans-ahmadinejad-attacks-west-prompts-walk-out-idUSTRE78L4XR20110922].

[21] Shahra Razavi, "Islamic politics, human rights and women's claims for equality in Iran," *Third World Quarterly* 27-7, (2006), 1232.

[22] Negin Nabavi ed., *Iran: From Theocracy to the Green Movement* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

[23] Noushin Khorasani, *Iranian Women's One Million Signatures Campaign for Equality: The Inside Story* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010). The Parliament rejected the Bill on equal inheritance rights for men and women in 1998, but the law on inheritance was eventually rescinded in 2008. Also, in January 2009, the law allowing women to inherit one-fourth of land was approved.

[24] Pouya Alimagham, *Contesting the Iranian Revolution: The Green Uprisings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). Noushin Khorasani, *Iranian Women's One Million Signatures Campaign for Equality: The Inside Story* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010).

[25] During the second term of the Khatami government, two secular feminists, Mehrangiz Kar and Shirin Ebadi, were active as lawyers against human rights violations but went into exile in America due to various pressures.

[26] Hisae Nakanishi, "Islam and Modernity," p. 185-192 (in Japanese).

[27] *Zanān-i Imrūz* No. 5, Mehr 1393 (September-October, 2014), p. 5-19.

[28] During the Khatami era, a women's magazine called *Zan* ("Women") was published as an advocate of feminism by Faezeh Hashemi Rafsanjani (daughter of the former President Rafsanjani). Still, the newspaper was banned within less than one year. "Feminism" is a concept that originated from the West and has been considered taboo in Iran until today.

[29] *Zanān-i Imrūz* No. 5, p. 9.

[30] *Zanān-i Imrūz* No. 5, p. 10.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Interview with Shahla Sherkat by the author (February 20, 2016, Tehran).

[33] Alessandro Monsutti, "Afghan Migration Strategies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee Problem," *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 27-1 (UNHCR, 2008). [https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article-abstract/27/1/58/1532871] (Accessed on May 21, 2020).

[34] *Zanān,-i Imrūz* No. 32, Ordibehsht, 1397 (April-May, 2018), p. 19.

[35] There is a website that currently uses this name. [https://www.mystealthyfreedom.org/] (Accessed on July 28, 2020).

[36] "Iran's Hijab Protests: the Girls of Revolution Street," BBC February 5, 2018 [https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-42954970/iran-s-hijab-protests-the-girls-of-revolution-street] (Accessed on May 20, 2020).

[37] Ladan Rahbari, Susan Dierickx, Chia Longman & Gily Coene, "Transnational Solidarity with which Muslim women? The case of the My Stealthy Freedom and World Hijab Day Campaigns," *Politics and Gender 1-24* (2019). [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335857578_Transnational_Solidarity_with_Which_Muslim_Women_The_Case_of_the_My_Stealthy_Freedom_and_World_Hijab_Day_Campaigns] (Accessed on June 21, 2020).

[38] *Zanān-i Imrūz* No. 21 Esfand 139（February-March, 2018), p. 30-31.

[39] In Iran, the police may break into home parties where men and women drink and dance together. This scene is portrayed at the beginning of the movie "*My Tehran For Sale*." Regardless of whether the film is a true story, it suggests that house searches could be enforced if police authority is used for the purpose of imposing Islamic morality.

Judaism in the World of Monotheism：Collection of Articles Dedicated to Professor Hiroshi Ichikawa, Etsuko Katsumata, Daisuke Shibata, Masahiro Shida, and Keisuke Takai eds. (Lithon, 2020)

Akio Tsukimoto

This collection of academic articles is a worthwhile read. Despite having "*Judaism*" in its title, all the 15 articles in fact cover, both temporally and spatially, a wide range of research areas. The collection was organized into four chronological sections and each section contains four articles (except Section 4 with only three articles). All the contributors were students of Professor Hiroshi Ichikawa at the University of Tokyo Graduate School and are active, young (at least from the reviewer's point of view) researchers in their own areas of specialization. Each of the articles does not necessarily put forward theories but focuses on the elucidation of religious phenomena based on historical sources. The reviewer was able to gain many new insights into facts and events regarding "Jews and Judaism" through the articles and was deeply impressed with some of them. Below is just an introduction to the main points along with a brief review of each article. Although the reviewer might sometimes use critical language, it is hoped that any critical comment is regarded as an expression of encouragement from the reviewer who has been engaged in research in this field a little bit longer than the contributors.

(1)

Section 1, "*The World of Ancient West Asia and the Hebrew Bible*," includes four articles by Mr. Daisuke Shibata, Ms. Ayako Hosoda, Mr. Keisuke Takai, and Ms. Kumiko Kato, respectively.

D. Shibata's "*Monotheism in Ancient Mesopotamia*" discusses "monotheistic theology" in ancient Mesopotamia. Although ancient Mesopotamia is generally understood to be a "polytheistic" world, there are a number of cuneiform documents that consider many deities with different characteristics as attributes of a most powerful god, which indicates a

unique propensity for "monotheism." Shibata collected these documents and examines them carefully with attention to their religious and historical connotations and recognizes in them the "intellectual tradition" of the "scholars," a tradition to be differentiated from that of Mesopotamian folk religion. Therefore, this article implies as a conquence that the "monotheism" in ancient Mesopotamia was a religious phenomenon different from the "Yahwistic monotheism" which was established in ancient Israel and was passed on to Judaism and to Christianity.

The concept of "*Monotheiotetismus*" (= *Lehre von einer Göttlichkeit,* which should be translated into Japanese as "単一神性論" rather than "一神性教" as translated by Shibata) mentioned on p. 35, was first put forward not by Wolfram von Soden, but by his mentor, Benno Landsberger. The reviewer believes that this concept offers an important perspective for discussing "monotheism and polytheism." For example, any Shinto shrine in Japan has its own deity or deities, which shows the polytheistic character of Shintoism, where the average Japanese visitor to the shrine does not call on its deity or deities by name but refers instead to any deity simply as "God." In Buddhist temples, ordinary Japanese people pray to Bodhisattva simply as "Buddha" folding their hands together in worship without differentiating between Buddha and Bodhisattva. The reviewer surmises that this kind of piety could probably be explained by means of the concept of "*Monotheiotetismus.*"

Next, A. Hosoda's "*The Power of Fire and Water in the Mesopotamian Maqlû Ritual*," gives detailed descriptions based on recent studies of the incantation ritual called "*maqlû*," which may not be familiar to those who are not well acquainted with Akkadian religious documents. The ritual aimed at healing illnesses that were considered to have been caused by witchcraft (black magic). The ritual included religious acts such as reciting various incantations (referred to by Hosoda in Japanese as "唱えごと") and the burning ("*maqlû*" means "burning" in Akkadian) of figurines representing the sorcerer, in order to purify the sick person by removing the disease. The ritual was performed by a priest called "*āšipu*" in Akkadian. Hosoda points out the important function of fire and water in the ritual and concludes that the "*āšipu* who freely manipulated fire and water" is to be regarded as a *shaman*.

The reviewer, however, cannot agree with this conclusion. This is because, as Shibata mentioned on pp. 50-51 of the book, the *āšipu*s were "scholars" belonging to the royal palace and state temple. The *āšipūtu* was not a folk religion as the shamanism. The "extraordinary direct experiences" peculiar to *shamans*, such as spirit possession, ecstasy and trance, which are characterized as *shamanistic* by Prof. Kokan Sasaki and others, are not likely to be found among the ritual performances of *āšipu* priests. Shamanistic phenomena in ancient

Mesopotamia can be found rather in activities of the "prophets" called "*maḫḫû / maḫḫūtu*" in Akkadian ("*muḫḫû / muḫḫūtu*" in Mari, and "*raggimu / ragintu*" in Neo-Assyrian texts).

K. Takai's *"'Satrap of Abar-Nahara (Ebir Nari)' and the Al-Yahudu Community*" refers to the 6th-5th century BCE cuneiform documents published in 2014 and discusses the administrative functions of the 'satrap of Abar-Nahara' who is mentioned in the Aramaic part of the Hebrew Bible (Ezra 5:3, etc.). Viewed against the political background in the Achaemenid Empire of Persia, Takai explains aspects of the economic activities of the Judahites who remained in Babylonia in the post-exilic period. Under the reign of the Achaemenid Dynasty, some of the Judahites borrowed "leasehold farmland" from the satrap of Ebir Nari ("beyond the river Euphrates," an Akkadian equivalence to Abar-Nahara in Aramaic) and engaged in the cultivation of fruit trees and cereals. Takai carefully and thoroughly examines these circumstances based on the new documents.

Unfortunately, however, the settled towns of these Judahites in Mesopotamia which are referred to as Al-Yahudu (Judah town) etc. in these documents cannot be localized, because these new documents were not artifacts unearthed by legitimate archaeological excavations. They can, however, be dated to the second half of the 6th through the first half of the 5th century BCE and the four generations of a remaining Judahite family are clearly discerned in the texts. Along with the "Murashu tablets" excavated at Nippur at the end of the 19th century and dated to the second half of the 5th century BCE, these new documents bring a wealth of important information about economic activities of the Judahite people who did not return to their homeland but remained in Mesopotamia. Other similar documents are also scheduled for publication. The reviewer hopes that Takai will continue to examine these documents and clarify the social conditions of Judahite life in Babylonia in the post-exilic period. A semantic research on theophoric names of the Judahites there would shed light on aspects of their religious life (Laurie E. Pearce and Cornelia Wunsch, who published the new documents, did not go further beyond a philological analysis of the theophoric names).

The last article in Section 1 is a philological study on "*Structure and Meaning of Proverbs 11:16-22*" by K. Kato. Kato, who has been studying the Book of Proverbs for a couple of decades, makes a thorough linguistic analysis of the vocabulary as well as the literary style of the short paragraph, Prov. 11:16-22. She also investigates the ethical meaning of each maxim in it and insightfully shows that the paragraph that initially appeared to be just an arbitrary collection of maxims is in fact deliberately organized according to a distinct theme and purpose.

This kind of meticulous research should be an orthodox method for studying the

Hebrew Bible. The accumulation of such careful investigations could contribute much to a better understanding of the editing process of the Book of Proverbs and enable the wisdom reflected in the sayings of Proverbs to transcend hundreds of generations and shine its light in the present day. If the reviewer remembers correctly, Kato is currently planning to write a commentary on the Book of Proverbs. The discussions in this article will be included in it.

(2)

Section 2, entitled "*Ancient Mediterranean World and Christianity*," includes four articles by Ms. Keiko Kobori, Mr. Shizuka Umemura, Ms. Yumi Doi, and Ms. Kyoko Nakanishi, respectively.

K. Kobori's "*Divination in Ancient Rome*," as the title suggests, talks about "augury" and "haruspicy" in Ancient Rome. Divination in the Roman state was based on "science," "technique," and "knowledge" and carried out by an augur who was appointed as an official priest by involvement from the Roman Senate. Furthermore "the College of Augurs (with 15 members)" was organized to interpret the signs of extraordinary phenomena in nature. "Haruspicy," divination by means of color and shape of the entrails (mainly the liver) of sacrificial animals, was originally performed by priests from Etruria. From the 3rd century BCE onwards, however, "the Corps of the Haruspices" was composed of 60 priests who were responsible for performing haruspicy for the Roman state.

Due to its emphasis on the official system for performing divination in Ancient Rome, the article does not delve into the aspect of divination as "science," a systematic method for interpreting a phenomenon observed in nature as a sign of an occurrence to come (the logic of divination). The reviewer is much interested in the comparison of Roman divination with Ancient Mesopotamian divination, the latter having a rich and large volume of so called "omen texts" available. In the reviewer's book, "*Myths and Rituals of Ancient Mesopotamia*" (Iwanami Shoten, 2010, in Japanese), one chapter is dedicated to the "*Logic of Divination in Ancient Mesopotamia—with a Focus on Augury*" (pp. 182-209).

S. Umemura's "*Leaders of Galilee in the Second Temple Period—Questions on Being Jewish*," introduces the figures ("the leaders of Galilee") who tried to resist the political forces oppressing people in the region called the "Galilee of the Gentiles" (1 Maccabees 5:15 ← Isaiah 8:23) during "Judaization" of the region, namely in the period of the Hasmonean Dynasty and later. Apart from Jesus of Nazareth, movements of "the leaders of Galilee" are only briefly mentioned in the works of Josephus and in Rabbinical literature. Examining these

scarce literary sources, searching their backgrounds, and deciphering their hidden meanings, Uemura delves deeply into the actual circumstances of these resistance movements and the ideologies behind them. According to Umemura, "to be Jewish" must have been the primary motivation for these leaders conducting their resistance movement to protect the livelihood of the Galilean peasants. The article claims that Jesus of Nazareth was the only exception among the "leaders" because he refused "to be Jewish," which eventually led to the birth of Christianity.

In the chapter on "*Judaization of Galilee*" there is a paragraph on "the archeological materials" in which, with the help of Mordechai Aviam's research, Uemura confirms the archeological basis for the facts mentioned above. Discoveries from ongoing excavations of Tel Rekhesh in Lower Galilee conducted by the Japanese Archaeological Expedition in Israel since 2007 (M. Aviam is also a member of the team and Professor Ichikawa has supported the excavations since 2013) would have served the above-mentioned paragraph more. The findings in Tel Rekhesh include a farmhouse, chalk vessels used by devout Jews to avoid religious defilement, and the remains of a synagogue. All of which are dated to the first century CE.

Christianity developed into a major world religion by preaching neighborly love and transcending the formalism and exclusivism of Judaism at that time. It is Professor Ichikawa who raised an objection to this kind of historical interpretation, which is still found in high school World History textbooks. Y. Doi's "*From Judaism to Christianity—Close to the Pagan Word*" tries to validate Professor Ichikawa's criticism by interpreting passages from the related literary sources of the Roman period. The first half of the article claims, primarily based on the Books of Gospels, that "the main premise of the execution of Jesus" was not his violation of Jewish law, but his criticism of the Jerusalem temple. Based on the Pauline Epistles as well as archeological records, the second half of the article points out that the process which separated Christianity from Judaism was a diverse and gradual process.

The reviewer fully agrees with Doi's analysis that Jesus' criticism of the Jerusalem temple was the primary reason for the Jewish authority accusation against him. The execution of Jesus, however, was not carried out by the Jewish authorities but by the Roman prefect—a fact disregarded in the article despite its announcement of the "premise of the execution of Jesus." The latter half of the article entitled "*From Judaism to Christianity*" does not clearly explain what caused Christianity to separate from Judaism and set off on its own path. This is probably due to a lack of clear understanding of the most essential element that constituted Judaism as well as Christianity in the late first century. It is also regrettable to find in this

article conspicuous proofreading errors in spelling: ("Chirstiani" for "Christianity," "20062" for "2006[2]" on p. 208, "Gen. 2" for "Gen. 22" on p. 210) and improper expressions ("Hebrew" for "Aramaic" on p. 194, "Jerusalem mission" by Paul (?) on p. 205, "Council of Jamnia" (?) on p. 212, etc.).

The last article in Section 2 is K. Nakanishi's "*'Religion of the Earthly City' in Augustine's 'The City of God.'*" It goes without saying that the "Religion of the Earthly City" refers to the Roman religion that Augustine considered to be "wrong." Augustine refuted the Roman pagan religion by citing the religious theories of Varro and Cicero. Nakanishi discusses Augustine's refutation from the perspectives of "rituals," "mythology," and "philosophy." According to Augustine, true religion must be the service to God, whereas in Rome the religious rituals were performed for the pursuit of benefits gained in this world. Myths originating from the creative imaginations of writers were used for nature worship accompanied with vulgar rituals. They were devoid of virtue and reason and deviated from morality. Even philosophical faith that believes in "the One", which is derived from an abstract concept, must incorporate an intermediate existence, i.e., the daemons that in fact embody "the Many." Such criticism by Augustine of pagan religions, aside from functioning as apologetics for Christianity, points to the necessity of denying the "world of abundant life." Nakanishi closes the article by saying that the world that Augustine denied, however, was "passed on as a source of allegory" even beyond the Medieval Ages.

Although the article presents the viewpoints of "rituals," "mythology" and "philosophy" at the beginning, these three perspectives are intertwined in the following discussions, which makes it difficult for the reviewer to grasp the point of the arguments. The concluding statement that the worldview that Augustine had denied was passed on as a "source of allegory" beyond the Medieval Ages would be conceivable to some extent if one thinks of the Renaissance. Otherwise, this statement seems to be somehow a reckless interpretation of history. At least it needs an explanation of how Augustine's criticism of pagan religions was inherited beyond the Medieval Ages and who denied Augustine's criticism. Be that as it may, the reviewer would like to imagine that Augustine's shame and remorse over his own pagan experiences in youth before his conversion might have been reflected in his criticism of pagan religions.

(3)

Section 3, "*Development of Rabbinic Judaism*," includes four articles contributed by

Mr. Joe Sakurai, Ms. Etsuko Katsumata, Mr. Hideharu Shimada, and Mr. Masahiro Shida, respectively.

J. Sakurai's "*Redefinition of the Origin of Jewish Ethnicity*" deals with discussions in the Babylonian Talmud regarding the treatment of Jewish converts who had pagan relatives. One of the juridical problems concerning converts was whether their first male child born before conversion could keep inheritance rights or not. According to Sakurai's analysis of the Talmudic texts, the earlier view that converts should be regarded as "fatherless" was replaced by the later one that they should be characterized as "newborns." This was because all blood relationships before conversion had to be rejected completely. So, the compilers of the Talmud, called the "*Stam*s," tried to demonstrate the "transversion" of the origin of Jewish ethnicity, i.e., the emergence of "the fictive blood ties" resulting from conversion. Sakurai concludes that through "the fictive blood tie" "*the subjective construction of the convert's Jewish ethnic identity became possible*" (p. 269).

It puzzled the reviewer a lot that the article does not mention "circumcision" while discussing the conversion of pagans to Judaism. As is well known, circumcision was commanded by God to the forefather Abraham to be performed on a male newborn on the eighth day after birth. It is also performed on adult male converts as a physical sign. First and foremost, it must be the physical as well as psychological pain of circumcision that brings about the decisive change in ethnical consciousness. Circumcision, therefore, should take precedence over the "fictive blood ties" generated by being treated as "newborns." The reviewer surmises that the religious law treating converts as "newborns" was probably derived from the figurative expression of applying circumcision, which was stipulated to be performed on the eighth day from birth, for adults. In addition, the reviewer also believes that the article should have taken into consideration some possible association of the concept of "newborn" in the Torah law with the "new life" as seen in Christian baptism (John 3:5, Romans 6:4).

E. Katsumata, based on the records in Chapter 41 of "Exodus Rabbah," a Midrash text concerning the "Golden Calf Story" of Exodus 32, discusses the relationship among "people," "freedom," and "idol worship" in Rabbinic Judaism. According to Chapter 41, God had already granted "freedom" to the Israelite people to deliver themselves from the "Angel of Death" through the law (Ten Commandments). However, the people "sat" and corrupted into "idol worship" (the act of "sitting" suggests a voluntary action of the people, p. 294). Therefore, Moses had to intercede with God for the people. Chapter 41 of "Exodus Rabbah," therefore, gives a diametrical description of the "freedom" and the "idol worship" of the "people." Katsumata concludes the article by criticizing Jewish studies in modern Germany that tend to

idealize Rabbinic Judaism as "democratic."

The article, however, does not provide any referential basis pertaining to Jewish studies in modern Germany that argued for the "democratic characteristics" of Rabbinic Judaism. Without information regarding how and why German scholars idealized Rabbinic Judaism, the readers can hardly agree with the conclusion of this article.

What especially interests the reviewer is the Rabbinic interpretation of the word *ḥārûṯ* ("engraved") in Exodus 32:16. Verse 16 says that the Ten Commandments are "engraved" on the (two stone) tablets. The Rabbis interpreted this by saying that the word *ḥēyrûṯ* ("freedom") was hidden in *ḥārûṯ* ("engraved") and thus the idea of "freedom through the Torah" stemmed from there. The interpretation of this verse that goes back to the time of *Mishnah* (see Ab. 6:2) became common property of Judaism. The reviewer thus finds this a good contrast with the Pauline theology of "freedom from the law," which, as a result, separated Christianity from Judaism.

H. Shimada's "*Education and Excommunication Functions in Jewish Society in the Medieval Islamic World*" first summarizes the aspects of children's education in Rabbinic Judaism as well as the case of the Medieval Jewish community as shown in the Cairo Genizah documents in general. It then discusses the three types of "excommunication" from the Jewish community (one whole day, seven days, and an indefinite period), including a partial transliteration and translation of a letter in Judeo-Arabic from among the Cairo Genizah documents that pertains to "excommunication."

Almost half article is nothing but a summary using articles from the Jewish Encyclopedias and some studies of other scholars. It discusses "excommunication" in the Genizah but does not clarify how the three types of "excommunication" are related to the "excommunication" observed in the Genizah text. As far as the reviewer has checked, the part that mentions the aspects of "excommunication" in Judaism (pp. 310-312) is just a translation of an article in the Jewish Encyclopedia which one can read online, except for the last three lines. Furthermore, the "excommunication" for "thirty days" in the paragraph on "*niddui*" is wrongly copied as "*for thirty-one days*" on p. 311. Regarding "children's education," the author uses expressions such as "*In the following I will show you just a few of the accounts*" (pp. 306 and 307). This style of writing seems to the reviewer, to be impolite to the readers. As for the terminologies used in the article, the expression "*Genizah society*" (p. 302) is incomprehensible, the use of "*illiterate*" ("mon-mou" in Japanese, p. 308) is inappropriate, and "*excommunication for one whole day / seven days*" (p. 311) sounds odd in Japanese

because the Japanese word *hamon* the article uses for "*excommunication*" implies "indefinite duration." *Tsuihou* would be better.

The article does not refer to the "Damascus Document" that was found among the Genizah documents at the end of the 19th century and is now supplemented in the *Halakha* part with the Dead Sea Scrolls. The text includes the Jewish law regarding the period of "banishment / excommunication" based on the weight of sin. It is therefore doubtful, at least in the reviewer's eyes, whether this article has anything to contribute academically or not.

M. Shida's "*Hayyim ibn Musa 'Shield and Sword'—15th Century Religious Controversy and Its Intellectual Background*" is an introduction to "*Shield and Sword*," the work of Hayyim ibn Musa, a Jewish scholar who refuted Christianity and launched an apologetics for Judaism in the 15th century. The article, however, goes beyond a mere introduction. It begins with an explanation of circumstances surrounding the Jews in 15th century Spain, such as persecution, pressure to convert to Christianity, skepticism and despair in Judaism itself and so on. These matters cast light on ibn Musa's intention to write "*Shield and Sword*" for Jewish people. The article then gives a detailed discussion of ibn Musa's "way" of refuting Christianity and defending Judaism.

The writing style that ibn Musa used was a "dialogue" with Nicholas of Lyra, a Franciscan priest who wrote an extensive Biblical commentary from the Christian perspective more than a century earlier. Ibn Musa accepted the method of Biblical exegesis based on the literal interpretation (*peshat*) from Rashi and Rashbam, two great exegetists of the Hebrew Bible in the Medieval Age. In the process of the "dialogue," ibn Musa attempted to understand the Christian interpretation of the passages of the Hebrew Bible that were considered prophecies for the Virgin Birth of Jesus and the Messiah's Coming. He then studied words and phrases of the Biblical passages in detail and eventually refuted their Christian interpretation. Shida describes this kind of approach as an "intellectual dialogue" between ibn Musa and Nicholas. Ibn Musa did not side with the Jewish folklore that was meant to ridicule Jesus and Christianity. From here one can see the reason why Shida used the subtitle "*15th Century Religious Controversy and Its Intellectual Background*."

The article is about one of the most meaningful cases in the history of "religious dialogue." It reminds the reviewer of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's "*Nathan the Wise*."

(4)

Section 4, which is entitled "*Jews and Judaism in Modern Europe*," includes three

articles by Ms. Mina Lee, Ms. Ryoka Aoki and Ms. Yukie Tatta, respectively.

In the first article, "*Formation of the Modern Stereotyped Image of the Jews,*" M. Lee clarifies from a social perspective, the history and background of the formation of the Jewish image as being "greedy moneylenders" and having "a lack of loyalty to the nation" in the 17th century Venice. Without going into the historical details discussed by the author, the reviewer first presents the conclusion only of the article. The notion that "Jewish people are greedy moneylenders" arose from a prejudice harbored by Christians to make a distinction between Jewish financial businesses and the "public pawnbrokers" (*Monte di Pietà*) that were run by the Franciscans under the pretext of "charity to the poor," whereas "disloyalty of the Jews to the nation" could be said to be a discriminatory catch-phrase that was fabricated to distinguish Jewish businessmen from the Venetian merchants, even though the Venetian Republic acknowledged the economic contributions of the Jews.

As such, these stereotyped images of the Jews did not arise from religious discrimination. Rather, these prejudices were born when the influence of religion weakened and religious differences between Christianity and Judaism became irrelevant in the process of building the "concept of citizen" and a "commercialistic nation" (p. 361). This is the main point of the article. At the end of the article, Lee remarks that not a few Rabbis had interactions with Christian clergy, while some Christians were in fact opposed to any prejudice against the Jews. The reviewer hopes that the author will introduce more examples of the interaction between Christians and Jews in 17th Venice to those Japanese who are only acquainted with *Shylock*.

R. Aoki's "*Study on Volozhin Yeshiva—the Cradle of Misnagdim*" is a study on Chaim of Volozhin, a Lithuanian Rabbi, and the *yeshiva* he founded. The *yeshiva*, which was founded in the rural town of Volozhin, Lithuania in 1802 and started with only ten students, rapidly became well known in Jewish society and gathered students from around the world. By the 1880's, the *yeshiva* had around 400 students. Even after that, amidst pressure from the Russian government, the *yeshiva* continued to operate until the Holocaust persecution. It served as a model for *yeshivas* in Eastern Europe from the 19th to the 20th century and was known as the "mother of all *yeshivas*."

As the background behind the establishment of the *yeshiva* by Chaim, the article points out two other Jewish movements, the Enlightenment Movement (*Haskalah*) that looks up to Moses Mendelssohn as their "leader" and Hasidism that was gaining more influence over the Jews in Eastern Europe. After the death of his teacher, Vilna Gaon, Chaim visualized a *yeshiva* that would advocate studies of the Torah and compliance to and practice of the *mitzvah*. He

rejected the adoption of the Jewish Enlightenment Movement as well as immersion into Hasidism. Inheriting from the works of his teacher, he taught the *Halakha* to his students based on the Biblical exegesis that emphasized literal interpretation (*peshat*). His *yeshiva* was run on funds from supporters all over Lithuania and eventually from around the world, which enabled it to support the living expenses of the students and become independent from its local community.

Through this article, the reviewer, who, concerning "Lithuania and Jews," could only think of the name Chiune Sugihara before, was able to get a glimpse of an unforgettable aspect of Judaism in Lithuania as the root of modern Orthodox Judaism. Aoki concludes the article with a brief history of the *yeshiva* after the death of Chaim.

The final article in this collection is Y. Tatta's "*Jewish History and Society in Bosnia*." Sarajevo is stamped indelibly on the mind of those belonging to the reviewer's generation as a "City of Tragedy" in the wake of the Bosnian War, which took place within less than ten years after the 1984 Winter Olympic Games. The article begins with an interview with the leader of the Jewish community in Bosnia who believed that Sarajevo was the "safest place to live in Europe" and returned thereto after the Bosnian War. It then delves into the reasons for such a conviction.

The article first looks back into the history of the Jews who settled in this region, where the three religions of Islam, Serbian Orthodox, and Roman Catholicism had taken root under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. After that it refers to the Jewish cultural heritage in the city, particularly the Sarajevo Haggadah. Further on, it introduces Jewish humanitarian activities that demonstrated love of one's neighbor (*La Benevolencija*) during the Fascist Era as well as the Bosnian Civil War and invites the readers to a heart-warming episode of two families, Muslim Hardaga and Jewish Kabiljo, who supported each other during the war.

Most of the records mentioned in the article are not copies of other documents but first-hand information obtained through numerous visits by the author to the area and interviews with the local people. Tatta used a reportage-like style of writing to elicit the readers' empathy towards the "Jews of Sarajevo." The article concludes with the author's view of the reason why the Jews in Sarajevo can still assert that it is the "safest place in Europe": It is because the city offered and still offers "*assured happiness that can only be gained by persons that stand afar from the majority in society*."

This collection of articles is dedicated to Professor Hiroshi Ichikawa who was engaged in teaching and researching in the field of Jewish studies at the University of Tokyo for 28

years and retired in April 2019. The reviewer has been friends with Professor Ichikawa for almost half a century and is filled with gratitude for the many favors he has unselfishly shown him, including his cooperation in archaeological excavations in Israel since the 1990's. To close the review, the reviewer as one of his friends would like to extend his heartfelt congratulations to Professor Ichikawa for the publication of such a *Festschrift* as this one by these enthusiastic researchers who have studied under his supervision.

Can Religion Save Modern People? Perspectives of Buddhism, Thoughts of Christianity, Shizuka Sasaki and Katsuhiro Kohara (Heibonsha, 2020)

Takehito Miyake

The title of the book is provocative. Religion is generally considered to be "something that aims to bring salvation to people." Since the title seems to ask "whether something that is aimed at the salvation of people can actually save people," it appears to be asking a tautological question that points to the need for rethinking something that is normally taken for granted.

Of course, the object of the title—modern people—is important. The reference to the generational circumstance in the word "modern" poses a new question—one that had not been foreseen during the early periods of traditional religions—to modern people. Can religion, which (possibly) fulfilled the role of providing salvation in the past, solve the problems unique to modern times? From this title, we see a two-pronged direction in which the question is asked: an invitation to rethink "modernity" as well as to rethink "religion." The first issue focuses on the deep-seated problems that the modern generation is facing, i.e., a reflection on the need to ascertain the nature of those problems. What are the problems faced by modern people? Are these problems that require completely new solutions? The other issue is the need to examine the state of religion in modern times. How have the different traditional religions, which aimed to save humanity in the initial stages of their establishment, changed through the generations to become what they are today? Are these religious orders currently able to respond to the difficulties faced by the modern world?

If you read the book with these questions in mind, you will not be disappointed. This book is a documentation of the dialogue between Shizuka Sasaki and Katsuhiro Kohara, academic researchers who have practiced Buddhism and Christianity, respectively, as faiths. The book uses simple language to present a myriad of suggestions for the future and recommendations for the current situation. Here, it takes a multifaceted perspective, using a method of inquiry that simultaneously considers contradictory elements, such as Buddhism and Christianity, particular and general aspects, and past and future, and presents an analysis of the present situation and an understanding of history backed by broad and profound

knowledge.

Kohara himself clarifies three points that make this book different from similar compilations of dialogues on Buddhism and Christianity. First, “it tries to deepen the understanding of self and of others by taking into consideration the origins and historical diversity of Buddhism and Christianity while taking advantage of the benefits of cutting-edge scholarship” (p. 207). Second, “it takes into account current global issues—such as the effects of the Internet, the worsening of global warming and other environmental problems, the individualization of religion and the weakening of religious organizations due to the secularization of society, which are not touched on in previous dialogues, as common issues for both Buddhism and Christianity.” “Third is that rather than dwelling on Buddhism and Christianity as separate religions, nor asking what religion is based on generalities and abstractions, the book tries to provide hints for understanding the meaning of religion in human history and for grasping it from a total perspective through comparisons of Buddhism and Christianity” (p. 208).

The book begins with an introductory chapter by Sasaki, followed by six chapters of dialogue and a concluding chapter by Kohara. While it delves into a wide range of topics, the discussion flows smoothly from one topic to another. For example, the first half of Chapter 1 alone, which begins with the academic standpoints of the two interlocutors, presents a wide range of assertions: Buddhism is not a religion revealed by some supernatural agent but a religion founded on the truth discovered by Buddha; the teachings of Buddha in their original form do not exist in the modern world; pointing out similarities of insignificant details of the scientific and religious worldviews means nothing, but there is a need to inquire about their fundamental relationship; although the concept of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) is similar to the scientific worldview, the former includes morality whereas the latter does not; the virtue that Buddhism aims for is different from the virtues of daily life, wherein it aims for the complete extinction of the driving force of the cycle of life and death (nirvana); the true follower of Buddhism does not aim for the improvement of the everyday world but for the formation of the monastic world (Sangha); the most important teachings of Buddhism for modern people are “impermanence of all things” and “absence of self;” and, although “all suffering” (dukkha) originally teaches that “there is no savior,” Mahayana Buddhism supposes the existence of transcendent saviors like Amida Buddha and the realization of an internal subsistence like the Buddha-nature. All of these topics are discussed within a mere 15 pages of the first half of Chapter 1. Therefore, it is not possible to cover everything the book touches on in this review; in fact, the beauty of the dialogue would be lost if I attempted to summarize

everything here. Accordingly, I will simply choose a single topic that piqued my interest from each chapter and briefly introduce these issues here.

In Chapter 1, what Sasaki called the "heart religion" I think aptly describes the current state of religion in modern society. The religious worldview, which has been driven out by the scientific worldview, has been abandoned as a representation of the real world, persisting only as an affair confined to the human heart and relegated as something that provides temporary comfort, identified using keywords like "heart," "life," and "living." Although the "heart religion" appears to be comprehensive, these keywords are in fact meaningless. Therefore, anybody can attach any meaning they want to them, without having to go a single step out of their private world, making this type of religion powerless to build up a community. Hearing this argument brought to my mind the problem surrounding the inclusion of "moral education" in the elementary and junior high school curriculum (although not discussed in the book). Prior to the implementation of this program, there was a controversy over the need for the "cultivation of general religious sensibility," which refers to fostering "reverence for life," "appreciation for nature," and, further, "attitude of love for country and birthplace," without the use of specific religious concepts and symbols such as "God" or "Buddha" (since their use in public schools is prohibited). I think this "cultivation of general religious sensibility" is nothing other than the "heart religion." It is not that I deny the importance of moral education. However, the "cultivation of general religious sensibility" does not touch on the fundamental evils that are rooted in humanity, which religion refers to as "worldly passions" or "sin" and regards as problematic. Moreover, it does not confront the danger of these evils becoming embedded into the structures of social systems. In other words, as mentioned by Sasaki in quoting Yuval Noah Harari in the Introduction, morality cannot be cultivated without fostering the perspective of relativization of para-religions such as "capitalism," "nationalism," and "humanism," and by merely advocating for "nurturing respect for life and living in harmony with one another."

Chapter 2 talks about fundamentalism as a reaction, so to speak, against the "heart religion." If "heart religion" is religion that has struggled to remain alive in the human heart in submission to the scientific worldview, fundamentalism has rejected the scientific worldview by holding fast to the reality of the religious worldview. The chapter begins with the origin of fundamentalism in America and discusses many topics surrounding fundamentalism. To mention one particular topic, Sasaki views fundamentalism as something that manifests itself in two types: "historical fundamentalism" and "legitimate fundamentalism." Historical fundamentalism regards religious writings and traditions

embraced by religion as absolute, such as the “supremacy of the sutras” in Buddhism and the “verbal inspiration of scripture” in Christianity, rejecting everything else that deviates from them, even to the point of becoming violent in extreme cases. On the other hand, legitimate fundamentalism does away with impurities and extraneous elements that have accumulated throughout history and tries to go back to the original essence of that religion. Sasaki, who aims to reestablish the original teachings of Buddha and their practice through academic research, self-professes to be a “fundamentalist” in the latter sense of the word. According to Kohara, the Protestant Reformers, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. were also fundamentalists in the latter sense of the word. With that said, however, I think in reality the line of demarcation between “historical fundamentalism” and “legitimate fundamentalism” is a thin one. One can easily transform into the other, the dangers of which I wish the authors had also elucidated.

The most interesting discussion for me was that about “Internet karma” in Chapter 3. The word “karma” refers to “deeds” in terms of “action,” “speech,” and “thought” that surely bring about inevitable consequences. In other words, either good or bad results arise depending on whether a deed is good or evil. This exactly corresponds to the saying that “as a man sows, so shall he reap.” Sasaki points out the following characteristics of “karma”:

1. All of the good and bad activities of people are recorded.
2. Although there is surely a consequence for every activity, the interval between the activity and its consequence is unclear.
3. There is no obvious resemblance between the cause (activity) and the result (inevitable consequence).

And the exact same structure can also be seen within the Internet today:

1. All of our activities are recorded as big data.
2. Flaming (stirring up strong online criticism) is a sure result of such activities.
3. Unexpected results may occur, such as one member of a family getting caught up in the scandalous affairs of some other member of the family.

Getting entangled in this system of Internet karma, modern people are being controlled by the “thirst, craving and desire” for approval expressed in the number of “Likes” and are unable to break free from their attachment to this system. Moreover, worldly passions, which

have thus far been naturally restrained in human relationships conducted mainly through face-to-face interaction, have been unleashed by the anonymity of the Internet. The Internet is a far more severe system of karma than that in the time of Buddha.

Since Buddha had found a way to break away, i.e., to become emancipated from the karma system, the teachings of Buddha are also effective against Internet karma. In particular, devoting oneself to the "impermanence of all things" and the "absence of self" is the way to extinguish this "thirst, craving and desire," the driving force of the karma system (through the so-called "Noble Eightfold Path," which is not mentioned in the book). In the past, practitioners of Buddhism who strived to emancipate themselves renounced the world completely and formed monastic communities (Sangha). Sasaki recommends various levels and degrees of "renunciation" to break away from Internet karma. Kohara, on the other hand, points out that the Sabbath was in fact a once-a-week renunciation of the world and suggests the creation of a "renunciation app" for modern times. Kohara has come up with this interesting and unique idea of a "renunciation app" where the Internet would be embedded with a function that could forcefully and periodically cut off all seamless connections to the Internet.

Hearing these arguments, I felt as if they had taken the words out of my mouth, because in the past I have proudly claimed that I have achieved the "State of Gelassenheit in the Internet world." I learned the term "Gelassenheit" from Heidegger, a term that he actually borrowed from Meister Eckhart and when translated using Buddhist terminology means "releasement." It points to the tranquil state of being "withdrawn yet involved and involved yet withdrawn"—a serene state of mind of being "neither too close nor too distant" from your surrounding entities, i.e., your daily life. To borrow the words of the Apostle Paul: "Those who deal with the world must do so as though they had no dealings with it. For this world in its present form is passing away" (1 Corinthians 7:31). In the case of Eckhart, this refers to "self-renunciation," which is based on the mystical experience of the "birth of the Son of God in the innermost soul," and the "state of dealing with surrounding entities while being separated from those dealings" achieved through that mystical experience. My experience is not as profound as that described by Eckhart, however. Although I still do not own a smartphone, and I absolutely never use SNS, this is not because I have intentionally renounced the Internet world but only because I cannot catch up with the latest technologies, since I will happily become a member of the "young-old" demographic on my birthday this year. In other words, people like me, who are starting to become a bit doddering, have unintentionally reached the ideal state of being "neither too close nor too distant" from the Internet without any effort. This is not a state of mind that I eventually achieved as a result of getting caught up in Internet karma and after

struggling to break free from it, but rather the ignorant are emancipated as they are, without purposely aiming for a state of renunciation and composure and without engaging in ascetic practices. While I was having this delusion and feeling the exhilaration of leading the way despite being an old man who is behind the times, I recently found out that the term "Gelassenheit" has been revived in Germany. Apparently, the word is being used to refer to "relaxation," or providing relief to people who are exhausted from competing in this cutthroat capitalist society (consequently, to complement the competition society). However, this is nothing but a mere example of the "heart religion" or "healing religion," so I was only slightly offended. I somehow went off-topic here, but I agree with the two interlocutors that one of the important roles of religion in the modern world is to provide a completely different worldview and to offer a perspective that radically relativizes the sense of values upon which the Internet world is built.

Chapter 4 begins by talking about how the advances of modern literary criticism have stripped off the sanctity of the sacred books (particularly the sutras of Mahayana Buddhism) as well as the Bible. Since the modern period, Buddhism and Christianity have been subject to attacks by the rapidly advancing fields of natural science and philology, and the changes that they have undergone separately as well as in relation to each other have been viewed and analyzed in terms of their social and cultural contexts. In this chapter, the authors point out that the values of general society tend to penetrate into religious orders, as shown by the adoption of common principles of organizational expansion and the incorporation of hierarchical structures into religious systems. Perceiving that this is a warning that also applies to educational and research institutions that study religion, to which I belong, I was moved to reflection.

Chapter 5 compares Protestantism and Mahayana Buddhism, and particularly interesting for me was the comparison and contrast of the Protestant Reformation and Kamakura Buddhism. The authors pointed out that although both movements were aimed at curtailing the clergy's complicated doctrines, intricate ceremonies, and bloated bureaucracies and thus at bringing religion closer to the public, the Reformation returned to the Bible as the starting point, while the Kamakura Buddhists created the "latest mode" of teachings that were increasingly different from the teachings of Buddha. Although they had the same goal, they took opposite approaches. Moreover, their having resulted in the birth of sects and denominations with analogous teachings, such as "sola fide" (justification by faith alone) and "salvation through the benevolence of Buddha," somehow points to the universality of the human spirit, as shown by the analogy that can be drawn from these two movements, despite

having been affected by different social and cultural contexts and historical backgrounds. As his scholarly pursuit, Sasaki aims for a return to the practice of Buddha's original teachings. After reading Chapter 5, however, I had a vision akin to "eternal recurrence," i.e., even after the teachings of Buddha become reestablished in the modern world, some of those who follow those teachings may eventually lose hope thinking that "no matter how much they engage in ascetic practices, they may never attain enlightenment in the way that Gautama Buddha did." Or, members of the general public may start to argue that "Bodhisattvas who prioritize the salvation of others to the point of setting themselves aside are superior to ascetics who train as a way to seek their own enlightenment." In other words, Mahayana Buddhism would eventually emerge again, leading to a repetition of the events in the history of Buddhism.

Chapter 6 analyzes the current state of Buddhism and Christianity in the world (particularly in East Asia). I was drawn more, however, to the last part of the dialogue between the two interlocutors, where they shared the opinion that religion should be confined to a niche that is separate from worldly values. The major part of modern society operates based on values founded on the infinite cycle of desire, and religion has nothing in particular to offer to people who find happiness in this cycle. The authors assert that religion should only discretely wait and prepare a completely different way of life for those people who feel incompatible with this everyday cycle of desire. Inspired by this assertion, I came to the following conclusions. It is said that there was a time in the past when religion had offered the dominant value and norm system for all areas of society. For example, in Western Europe during the High Middle Ages, Roman Catholicism had exclusive control over prevailing worldviews and philosophies. Although that might be the case, the majority of people, including the clergy, might actually have lived their lives mainly in the pursuit of selfish desires, and a different set of values and norms had only silently existed in the recesses of the convents and monasteries. Also, although Kierkegaard in 19th century Denmark had challenged the public by crying out loudly that "not despairing is one form of despair," he shone through because he was literally a "single individual." If the entire nation had become influenced by Kierkegaard and agreed with his thinking, that would have been uncanny. Even in 21st century Japan, religion is shying away from becoming mainstream, and it is those who are at the fringes that are shining their light on the world. When you think about it, Jesus himself was doing his work at the fringes of the Roman Empire, and when he spoke of being the "light of the world," it seems he was talking about a very small light. However, if the entire world is covered in complete darkness, this small light can be seen as an amazingly bright light.

In this review, I have chosen one topic that piqued my interest from each chapter,

among the many topics mentioned in the dialogue, and freely gave my own thoughts (or delusions) that were inspired by those topics. My goal in doing this was to somehow showcase the profundity of the dialogue, and to let readers know that they can receive intellectual stimulation from every page of the book. It goes without saying, however, that you need to read the book to truly enjoy the beauty of the dialogue.

Finally, I would like to end this review by pointing out just one thing that I felt was lacking. In this modern society where the scientific worldview prevails, the authenticity of conventional religious tenets and symbols is continually being diminished. In regard to this situation, the book talks about how the images of "Amida Buddha" or "Pure Land," in the case of Buddhism, are being treated today and the problems that are inherent in these treatments (the tendency of stressing the dichotomy between "heart religion" and fundamentalism mentioned above). Kohara, however, tended to be more on the listener side of the dialogue, leaving something to be desired during discussions on Christianity. For example, what is the current state pertaining to "incarnation," "resurrection," and other highly held tenets and symbols of Christianity? I do not mean to say, however, that these tenets and symbols should be altered to match the scientific worldview, because doing so would also make them a mere "heart religion." My concern is how to enable modern people, who perceive this world based on a scientific worldview, to experience the impact that these tenets and symbols had originally generated. I have in fact hoped to hear the opinions of the authors about this matter. I hasten to add, however, that although I presented the good points of the book along with pointing out a few areas that I felt were somewhat lacking, the authors are very aware of these points, and they have already addressed them in their other writings.

60 Chapters to Learn about Libya (2nd ed.), Area Studies 59, Kazuko Shiojiri ed. (Akashi Shoten, 2020)

Maki Iwasaki

1. Background of the Publication of the Book—"*Arab Spring*" and Libya

This book is a general introduction to Libya (State of Libya), a country located along the coast of the Mediterranean Sea in the Middle East. This is the second edition of the book, "6*0 Chapters to Know Libya*" (Area Studies #59), the first edition of which was published under the sole authorship of Kazuko Shiojiri, the editor of the second edition, in 2006. Within the approximately 14 years between the publication of the first edition and this second edition, Libya has undergone a major transformation. The "*people's uprising*" took place in 2011, and as a result of the assassination of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhāfī (Gaddafi), who ruled the country for 42 years (1942-2011), Libyan society has fallen into a state of civil war that continues until today (October 2020). The so-called "*Arab Spring*[1]," the series of people's demonstrations in the Middle East that started in Tunisia in December 2010, brought about drastic changes in the political system and social circumstances of many countries in the region, but the impact on Libya has been particularly substantial.

The editor specializes in research on medieval Islamic theology but had focused on Libya in the modern times during the first edition of the book. This focus was influenced in part by the fact that the editor's spouse, Hiroshi Shiojiri, who is also a co-author of the second edition, had worked in the capital city of Tripoli for two years and nine months from June 2003 to March 2006 during his appointment as ambassador to Libya. During this period, the editor had stayed for a total of three months each year to conduct field work (p. 8), the results of her experience there were published as the first edition. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 and the major social changes that followed, the editor was joined by six co-authors to eventually publish this second edition after nine years from the time she first thought of publishing it. The six co-authors of the second edition are Hiroshi Shiojiri (former diplomat), Hajime Kamiyama and Yuki Tanaka (researchers on modern Libya), and three authors from Libya: Aḥmad Nailī (researcher and diplomat), Intiṣār K. Rajabāny (officer of an international organization), and Ḥātim Muṣṭafā (researcher and politician).

2. Structure of the Book in Comparison with the First Edition

The following are the similarities and differences between the first edition and the second edition. First, although both editions consist of 60 chapters, the first edition has a total of 339 pages comprising 6 sections and 12 columns, while the second edition is thicker with 382 pages comprising 9 sections and 23 columns. In particular, the second edition, which includes Libyan researchers and Japanese researchers on Libya as co-authors, includes more details on the local situation in Libya. As to their contents, although details on Gaddafi's political ideas which were written in the first edition were deleted from Sections I, III, V, and VI of the second edition, they remained largely the same except for a few revisions and corrections. The second edition does not include the Japanese translations of "*Reference documents and speeches by Gaddafi*" included in the first edition. The rest of the book, namely, the major part of the Introduction, the first part of Section II, Sections IV, VII, VIII, and IX, and the "*Structure of the new Libyan administrations*" at the end of the book are new.

3. Overview of Each Section

Section I includes the geography, history, and the ethnic groups in Libya. Chapter 1 describes Libya as a country with rich nature—the fourth largest country in the African continent having the longest coastline of 1,770 kilometers among countries along the Mediterranean Sea coast, with 93% of the country covered by desert, and highlands, oases, wetlands, and lakes scattered across the country (p. 26-30).

Chapters 2 to 10 mention the current state of archeological sites listed also as UNESCO World Heritage Sites and talk about the history of Libya from the ancient times to its declaration of independence in 1951 and about the ethnic groups and languages of modern Libya. One of the interesting things is the account of its history until its independence, which describes the region near the Mediterranean Sea coast as being almost always under the control of foreign forces, beginning with the settlement of Phoenicians in 2000 B.C. and the rule of the Roman Empire, the Vandals, the Byzantine Empire, the Arabs, Spain, the Ottoman Empire, and Italy (p. 31). In contrast, the inland regions were inhabited by the nomadic tribes (p. 31), whose traditions have a major impact on modern Libyans.

Section II describes the life of Gaddafi, after discussing the people's uprising in 2011, which eventually resulted to his death. The section focuses on Gaddafi as a person and about his death.

Gaddafi was born to a family of six that belonged to one of the Bedouin tribes called

al-Qadhādhfah, which lived in the desert region south of Sirte, in 1942 (some accounts say 1940 or earlier) (p. 105-106). Despite the fact that many of his fellow tribe members were illiterate as was often in the case with the nomadic people in the region, Gaddafi was blessed to have the opportunity to study and was an excellent student, but he remained attached to the nomadic traditions throughout his life (p. 106-107).

He was a child during the Second World War, when German and British forces repeatedly engaged in fierce battles on Libya's Mediterranean Sea coast (p. 107). The editor surmises that "*it was probably during this period that he subconsciously developed anti-imperialism thought and aversion against not only the Axis powers of Italy and Germany, but also towards other foreign powers like Britain and America*" (p. 106).

Gaddafi, who was greatly influenced by the Islamic holy book *al-Qur'ān* and neighboring country Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser (in office from 1956 to 1970), matured early and started joining political activities when he was in junior high school. Later on, in 1969, when he became a Colonel of the army, he succeeded in leading the revolution when he was only 27 years old (p. 110). He then implemented policies that were hostile to the Western powers under a unique socialist system called "*Jamahiriya*" and ruled Libya as its supreme leader for 42 years. Gaddafi coined the word "*Jamahiriya*" by changing the Arabic word *jumhūr*—"public"—to its plural form, *jamāhīr*, to refer to a state or political system based on the rule of the masses (p. 104). However, the editor points out that since this system was "prone to autocracy" (p. 92), the public gradually resisted Gaddafi's prolonged rule, and as a result of their strong hatred against him, the people did not only overthrow him, but eventually killed him.

Section III discusses Libya's international relations with Western countries and Japan, depicting the strenuous efforts by citizens of these countries to build relationships with Libyans, after the lifting of the UN sanctions, which had continued for seven years, and Libya's official declaration of its reengagement with the international community in 2003.

Among the accounts of the authors' experiences of living in Libya, the reviewer found "*Column 6: Women's Revolution Memorial Day*" (p. 128-133) of this section particularly very interesting. On a certain day in 2005, the editor received a call at the ambassador's residence from Libya's protocol office. She was invited to a dinner party celebrating the Revolution Memorial Day hosted by Gaddafi's wife to be held in two days. The time and place were not made clear until the day of the event. Although unfortunately not recorded in the second edition, the account of Hiroshi Shiojiri in "*Column 5: Sirte Memorial Event: To an unknown destination*" in the first edition was even more interesting. Mr. Shiojiri was invited to a

ceremony commemorating the revolution, but the invitation came to the embassy at 9 pm of the previous day, so they only found out about it on the day of the event. The place was somewhere near Sirte, Gaddafi's birthplace, around 500 kilometers from Tripoli. Without knowing the exact location of their destination, they rode in a government-chartered plane and bus for several hours before finally arriving. Despite being an official event, he was only told of the initial meeting place, without knowing exactly where they were going, about the details of the event, and what time it would finish. He reminisced that although he was not very anxious because he went with more than a dozen people, he imagined that it would have been an unnerving experience if he was the only one invited.

One of the possible reasons for not disclosing the location beforehand was the personal security of Gaddafi and his wife, who had been targets of failed assassination attempts. However, these stories also point to the difficulties faced by Western countries and Japan in their efforts to build business and diplomatic relations with Libya. In regard to this, the book points out that "*even the Western forces trying to invade Libya, once they entered the country, were in no time thrown into confusion by the country's unique political system that was embedded with the peculiar political ideas of the Jamahiriya, by the irrational procedures that had taken root during its long period of isolation from the international community, and by the opacity of its chain of command and hierarchy of authority*" (p. 134).

Section IV discusses the problems surrounding the increasing number of immigrants and refugees entering Libya. Aiming to become the leader of the African Union, the Gaddafi administration granted entry visa exemptions to African natives. This attempt had led to an increase of immigrants particularly from countries south of the Sahara Desert, but after Libya reengaged with the international community in 2003, the government implemented a strict crackdown on illegal immigrants to support EU countries. Further, destabilization of the Middle Eastern countries as a result of the "*Arab Spring*" uprisings and the worsening of the economy of African countries have led to the increase of immigrants and refugees heading towards Europe via Libya. This situation has led to many problems, such as the drowning of immigrants due to failed attempts to smuggle into Europe and the abuses suffered by immigrants in detainment facilities in Libya (p. 165-166). There have also been many reports of violence, non-payment of wages, and other human rights violations by employers, as well as attacks, robberies, killings, and other abuses by the militia toward immigrants and refugees living in Libya (p. 172).

The subject of Section V is different from the previous chapters. It focuses on Libya's society and culture. More than 95% of Libyans are Sunni Muslims (p. 182). The Mālikī school,

a very influential Sunni Islamic jurisprudence school in Libya, is known to be conservative and prohibits drinking and smoking. According to the editor, however, tobacco was sold in Tripoli under the Gaddafi regime; and although alcohol was not, the country did not impose very strict inspections against bringing in alcohol from outside despite the supposed prohibitions (p. 186). Also, this section discusses in detail about the life of ordinary people, such as the food culture, educational systems, social advancement of women, etc., as gleaned from the editor's extensive experience living in the country.

Section VI focuses on Libya's natural resources and its relations with Japan. According to the editor, Libya is one of the few countries producing internationally high-quality crude oil and not only has the 10th largest oil reserves in the world, but also harbors potential petroleum and natural gas reserves in its undeveloped regions, which comprise more than 70% of its territory (p. 218). Petroleum was discovered in Libya in 1959, and Gaddafi, who came into power in 1969, fought off the domination of Western oil majors by increasing the crude oil price by almost 40% and nationalizing the industry. However, as a result of the successive economic sanctions imposed on it, the country's oil production volume went down from 3.3 million barrels per day in the 1970s to only 1.7 million in 2006, further going down to 250,000 barrels per day due to the civil war (p. 219-220). Under the ongoing civil war, there is tension surrounding the regulatory authority over oil facilities between the armed organizations and the government as they try to secure sources of funds (p. 234).

Section VII to the last section, IX, chronologically detail the people's uprising, the collapse of the authoritarian regime, and the birth of a new Libya and the ensuing chaos that occurred within the approximately 10-year period from 2011 to the end of 2019. Section VII describes the people's uprising and the civil war, followed by an account of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. While the first part of Section II covers most of these topics from a broad perspective, this section includes more detailed events.

Section VIII discusses the establishment of the interim government and the ensuing confusion as "*birth pangs of the new Libya*" (p. 267). The National Transitional Council formed by anti-Gaddafi forces (hereinafter, "anti-regime forces") was recognized by the United Nations Assembly in March 2011, and Libya's first free national election was held in July 2012. Although the election itself went generally smoothly, and a transitional cabinet was launched in November of the same year, clashes between the tribes and the paramilitary groups and attacks on international organizations and government agencies continued, leading to an increasing deterioration of the peace and order situation (p. 291-293). Through these developments, General Khalīfah Ḥaftar (1943-), who had once been disavowed by Ghaddafi

and was forced to live in America for almost 20 years, came to prominence. Haftar, who had close ties with the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA, returned to Libya during the 2011 uprising and organized the Libyan National Army (LNA) in May 2014 to strengthen his presence among the anti-regime forces (p. 315-317).

An election of the House of Representatives to replace the General National Congress was held in June 2014, where many seats were won by members of the liberal faction, leading to the defeat of the Islamist bloc (p. 318). However, members of the old General National Congress who did not recognize the legitimacy of the House of Representatives organized themselves to form the National Salvation Government (NSG) (which became the Government of National Accord (GNA) in 2016) in Tripoli (p. 318-319). This translation did not only result in divisions in Libyan politics and society, but also led to intervention by other countries. The old General National Congress (Tripoli Government), which was composed of the Islamist bloc, was supported by Turkey and Qatar, while the House of Representatives (Tobruk Government), which is composed of the liberal faction and federalists, is supported by UAE and Egypt (p. 319).

Finally, Section IX describes the efforts of various political forces towards the unification and rebuilding of the country. The book's description of the extremely complicated and chaotic situation of the country today would most likely leave the readers—as was the case of the reviewer—in a state of gloom. The conflict between the Tripoli Government and the Tobruk Government, the war with the "*Islamic State*," and the military intervention of Western and Middle Eastern countries with competing interests have become major hindrances to the establishment of the new Libya. Also, the stagnation of administrative functions due to the removal of politicians and public servants who played an active part during the old regime also significantly affected the life of the people (p. 347-348). The parliamentary and presidential elections announced to be held by the end of 2019 have not happened until today (p. 356).

Moreover, today, Libyan society is said to be in search of a new charismatic leader in place of Gaddafi. One person that fits the bill as Gaddafi's successor is his second son, Saif al-Islam (p. 351). The editor herself has attended a lecture by Saif al-Islam, whom she felt was an "*educated person*" (p. 352). However, the "*emergence of a longing for another "charismatic leader" to bring the intricately intertwined chaotic situation in the country under control*" (p. 349) in Libyan society, "*which had supposedly deposed a dictator in its quest to build a democratic state*" (p. 349), speaks of the difficulty of running a nation in the aftermath of the collapse a dictatorial regime.

4. Academic Significance of the Book

As a researcher on related fields, one of which is folk religious practices of the people in modern Egypt, the reviewer found that the breadth of scope and depth of treatment in each section of the book was remarkable. Probably no other document in Japanese comes close to the book in terms of the depth and breadth of its coverage on Libya, making the book an extremely valuable resource. Although the number of Japanese researchers who focus on the Middle East has been increasing, those specializing on Libya still remain few. Thus, as far as the reviewer is concerned, there are few Japanese documents focusing on Libya; in particular, there are not so many references delving on the situation in modern Libya other than this book and the references mentioned in it. Ordinary Japanese people, therefore, who want to know more about Libya, would have to depend on mass media news reports, which are in fact also scarce in Japan, with majority of the recent ones dealing mostly with the terrorism and the civil war in the country. This tendency has resulted in Japanese people having mostly an image of Libya being a dangerous country. Even at the university where the reviewer teaches, a lot of students equate the Middle East with being a dangerous place. Amidst this kind of bias, this book serves as an excellent introduction to Libya as it provides a clear explanation about the country based on the authors' experiences and using many pictures to depict the rich history and culture of Libya and its people as "*sincere and mild-mannered*" (p. 81) and as "*people who have not lost their kind-heartedness*" (p. 360).

The book, however, also deals with specialized information. Akashi Shoten's "Area Studies" series are considered as general-interest books, but this book's account of the ever-changing domestic political affairs and international relations after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime makes substantial reading even for researchers specializing in Middle Eastern studies. The "*Structure of the new Libyan administrations*" at the end of the book (p. 372-373) provides a straightforward graphical representation of the complex flow and relationships of political organizations after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, which could only have been possible because of the author's expert knowledge on the subject and excellent communication skills.

The reviewer believes that this book also offers a certain ethnographic value. Other than the fact that there are only a few Japanese literature on Libya, the country has not been easily accessible for Japanese during the Gaddafi regime, and it is more so now due to the ongoing civil war. In fact, when the reviewer was a graduate student under the supervision of the editor, she had visited Libya upon the invitation of the editor and her husband; the preparations and procedures to enter the country turned out to be the most complicated and time-consuming among the more than 20 countries that the reviewer has visited. If a researcher

of the Middle Eastern studies has difficulty entering the country, ordinary Japanese people would all the more find it difficult to visit and learn about its society and its people's customs. This book, with its depiction of the people's religious practices, food culture, educational system, women's social advancement in modern Libyan society, and the inner workings of its diplomatic relations, is therefore significant as a valuable primary resource for Japanese people.

In closing, the reviewer would like to point out a few issues regarding the structure of the book. Although the current contents of the book are sufficient in themselves, Section II and part of Section VII include similar discussions regarding the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. The reviewer feels that it would probably be easier to read if these two sections instead focused on different topics; namely, the personal background and ideas of Gaddafi in Section II and the collapse of the regime in Section VII. This observation, however, is not a denial of the outstanding quality of the book.

Although the reviewer knew about the extremely harsh conditions that Libya fell into compared with the other Middle Eastern countries after the "*Arab Spring*," reading the book has left her shocked because the severity and complexity of the situation was beyond what she imagined it to be. At the same time, however, it evoked nostalgia and flooded the reviewer with warm personal memories of the peaceful streets of Tripoli under a wide blue sky. She earnestly hopes that peace would soon come and that the people can live in safety again.

Note

[1] Although the term "Arab Spring," which was coined by western media in reference to the popular movements that occurred in Middle Eastern countries starting the end of 2010, is also used in Arab countries, many people from the Middle East and researchers of the Middle Eastern studies object to this reference. Some of the reasons for these objections are: that the movements and changes it has brought about were not peaceful as the word "spring" suggests, and that the term only looks at the situation based on one criterion set by Western countries, i.e., as a movement towards democratization, whereas in fact there were various demands from different groups and sectors that led to these uprisings (Eiji Nagasawa, "Another view on the modern history of the Middle East—Looking back on the five years of the Arab Revolution," *Understanding the Modern Middle East: Political Order after the Arab Revolution and Islam* (edited by Akira Gotou and Eiji Nagasawa) Akashi Shoten, 2016, p. 29-31 (in Japanese)). The reviewer has also many friends and acquaintances living in the Middle East, and instead of "Arab Spring," they use the Arabic word "thawra," which means "revolution." Although the book does not give any particular explanation about the term, it first refers to it as "the so-called 'Arab Spring'" (p. 3) and consistently uses quotation marks when referring to the term throughout the book. This terminology indicates that the authors are not using the term "Arab Spring" uncritically.

Thoughts and Practice of Islamic Mysticism in Turkey, İdiris Danışmaz (Nakanishiya Shuppan, 2019)

Naoki Yamamoto

1. Structure and Summary of the Book

This book is an analysis of Sufism (*taṣawwuf*) based on the works of İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bursevî (d.1728), a prominent Muslim scholar during the Ottoman Empire.

This review summarizes the book and analyzes its significance in the field of Sufism research. First, the review looks into the significance of Bursevî's concept of the "unity of being" and, second, the significance of his interpretation of the Qur'ān. This review focuses on these two points to investigate the validity of Bursevî's "ethical and practical interpretation," which are used in the book as keywords for analyzing Bursevî's thoughts on Sufism.

The book is organized as follows:

First, in the Preface, the author summarizes previous research and describes the distinct features of cosmology theories according to the Ibn Arabi School and of the Sufi interpretation of the Qur’ān. The author claims that previous Islamic scholarships have not thoroughly tackled the relationship between the knowledge that Sufis aim to acquire, and the knowledge obtained through the interpretation of the Qur’ān. Likewise, previous studies have not examined how the practical aspects of Sufism, such as the prayers and ascetic practices of the Sufi orders, are related to their cosmology theories and Qur’anic interpretations. The author aimed to comprehensively investigate Sufism according to Bursevî using the keywords “ethical and practical interpretation” rather than separately discussing cosmology theories and Qur’anic interpretations, as done in previous research.

Chapter 1 discusses the life and works of Bursevî. His experience as a tariqa sheikh appears to be important in establishing the necessity of the “ethical and practical

interpretation" emphasized in the book. The book provides a useful appendix of Bursevî's works at the end. Chapter 2 summarizes Bursevî's interpretations regarding the concept of the "unity of being" (*waḥda al-wujūd*), a major idea espoused by the Ibn Arabi School. The concept of the "unity of being" views the "sum of things (everything)" as a result of the self-manifestation of Allah, the Absolute One. Bursevî divided this process of Allah's self-revelation into five stages. He further explained the "unity of being" by comparing the relationship between Allah and the creatures to that of the "King and Vizier." As the Vizier does not exist without the King, the creatures also do not exist without Allah. The author mentions this figurative comparison of existence to the worldly social structure as an example of Bursevî's "ethical and practical interpretation."

Chapter 3 briefly explains the characteristics of the Sufi interpretation of the Qur'ān. Chapter 4 delves into the attributes of Bursevî's Qur'anic exegetic work, namely, the "Spirit of the Qur'ān," after giving a summary of Qur'anic exegesis in the Ottoman Empire. In particular, a very interesting point that the author makes is that other than explaining mystical inner knowledge (*'ilm al-bātin*) according to the conventional Sufi Qur'anic interpretation, Bursevî interpreted the Qur'ān using an "*exposition style that creates the atmosphere of listening to an actual sermon*" (p. 90). In Bursevî's "homiletic" expositions, he "*even used humorous anecdotes to draw the interest of the audience*" (p. 90), clearly showing that his experience of preaching at the Grand Mosque of Bursa heavily influenced his works.

In Chapter 5, to further examine the distinctive features of Bursevî's Qur'anic interpretation in detail, the author discusses Bursevî's expositions of stories in the Qur'ān that were favorite subjects of Sufi commentaries; namely, the stories of the "Companions of the Cave," the "Prophet Musa and Khidr," and the "Two-horned One." Bursevî's "ethical and practical interpretation" is characterized by a constant reference to the ascetic principles of Sufism, such as in pointing out the importance of solitary retreat (*khalwa*) in the "Companions of the Cave," and the proper attitudes for the master (*shaykh*) and the disciple (*murīd*) in the "Prophet Musa and Khidr." The author also compares Bursevî's interpretation with the tafsirs of Nûruddîn al-Âsam al-Karamânîand Naqshbandi, Anatolian Sufi thinkers during the Ottoman Empire. Through the comparison, the author shows that Bursevî represents a combination of these two thinkers—namely, al-Karamâanîi's mystical interpretation from the ascetic perspective and Naqshbandi's interpretation from Ibn Arabi's mystical-philosophical perspective—while being distinct in writing expositions based on his own experiences.

A distinct feature of the book is its discussion of the thoughts espoused by the Ibn Arabi School from the "ethical and practical" perspective. Traditionally, these thoughts were

analyzed in terms of their mystical-philosophical aspects. The "ethical and practical interpretation" that the author speaks of points to Bursevî's attempt to show that the mystical knowledge of Sufism is not confined to the elites; namely, the Islam scholars and Sufi saints. Bursevî tried to show that ordinary people could also personally experience this mystical knowledge and practice it as moral virtues for day-to-day life. As pointed out in the book, Bursevî wrote most of his works in Turkish so that ordinary people who did not speak Arabic or Persian, the academic languages of that time, could understand and practice Sufism (p. 23). The author has chosen the "Treatise of the Five Divine Presences of Allah" and the "Spirit of the Qur'ān" (a Qur'anic exegesis) as the primary materials for the book. The former was written for ordinary Turkish people who did not understand Arabic, while the latter emphasized the "homiletic" approach to enable ordinary people to understand and practice the message of the Qur'ān. The author's choice of materials appears to be effective in conveying the book's message.

The following sections look into a few arguments in the book that the reviewer found inconclusive.

2. Significance of Bursevî's Concept of the "Unity of Being"

First, in Chapter 2, the author explains Bursevî's concept of the "unity of being" based mainly on the "Treatise of the Five Divine Presences of Allah." There are only a few examples given, however, to explain Bursevî's "ethical and practical interpretation." Also, in this chapter, the author mentions the "*Allegory of the King*" (p. 27) as an analogy between the dependence of the subject's existence upon the King's existence and the dependence of the existence of all things upon Allah's existence. The author claims that this is an example of Bursevî's attempt to simply explain the ontological theories of the Ibn Arabi School to ordinary people. However, this could instead be interpreted as an attempt to validate the political powers' mystical legitimacy at that time. For example, Özkan Özturk discussed Bursevî's interpretation of the government system as a manifestation of Allah's diverse attributes as an example of the mystical political philosophy in the Ottoman Empire[1]. Theoceanssertions on esoteric political philosophy were not rare among adherents of Sufism. They can also be seen in Ibn 'Arabī's (d. 1240) "Divine Governance of the Human Kingdom" (*Tadbīrāt al-Ilāhīya*) and, during the Ottoman Empire, in Taşköprîzâde Ahmet Efendi's (d. 1561) "Epistle on the secret of the vicariousness and spiritual sovereignty of man" (*Risāla fī Bayān Asrār al-Khilāfa al-Insānīya wa al-Sulta al-Ma'nawīya*). Also, some researchers have pointed out that the

theories on the "stations of existence" and the "perfect man" by Shamd al-Dīn al-Sumatrāī (d. 1630), an adherent of the Ibn Arabi School from Southeast Asia, have been adopted by King Iskandar Muda to justify his existence and power as manifestations of Allah's will[2]. These examples point to other more persuasive arguments to demonstrate Bursevî's "ethical and practical interpretation." The author also claims that "*generally, scholars discuss the theory of the "Five Divine Presences of Allah" only at the ontological level; Bursevî, however, dared to carry out interpretations at the ethical and practical levels*" (p. 47). However, among the prominent adherents of the Ibn Arabi School, at least from the 17th century onwards, there are several examples of practical interpretations founded on the concept of the "unity of being" not as mere metaphysical philosophy. For example, Liu Zhi's (d. 1730) "The Five Phases of the Moon" explained the importance of man's spiritual perfection and discipline along with the self-manifestation process of Allah based on the concept of the "unity of being" using the metaphor of the waxing and waning of the moon[3]. Likewise, Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1731), a contemporary of Bursevî and an adherent of the Ibn Arabi School from Arabia under the Ottoman Empire, tried to advance the concept of the "unity of being" as a universal message to humanity, as an undeniable truth both for Muslims and non-Muslims[4].

Sufism traditionally refers to the process of Allah's creating the creation as "descent" (*nuzūl*), the process of man's attaining truth through repeated training and discipline as "ascent" (*'urūj*), and this dynamic relationship between Allah and man as the "circle of existence" (*dā'ira al-wujūd*)[5]. Sufis had, therefore, spoken of ontological and practical theories that connect this circle of existence using these terminologies. These examples show that the author's arguments asserting Bursevî's originality as an "ethical and practical" exegetist of the concept of "unity of being" are not entirely persuasive.

3. Significance of Bursevî's interpretation of the Qur'ān

Next is Bursevî's "ethical and practical" approach in interpreting the Qur'ān, which Chapter 5 analyzes in detail. A mere comparison of his interpretations with those of al-Karamâanî and Naqshbandi, however, appears to be insufficient to demonstrate the originality of his interpretation throughout the history of Sufi Qur'anic exegesis. This section looks into Bursevî's interpretation of the story of the "Prophet Musa and Khidr," one of the examples discussed in this book, by referring to other major Sufi Qur'anic commentaries.

First is regarding the translation of the "two oceans" (*baḥarayn*) mentioned in "*I will not give up until I reach the junction of the two oceans even if I have to spend untold years in*

my quest" (Qur'an 18:60). Alī al-Qārī (d.1605), a leading Islam scholar in Arabia under the Ottoman Empire, interpreted the "two oceansoceans" in his Qur'anic commentary entitled "Lights of the Qur'ān and Mysteries of Wisdom (Anwār al-Qur'ān wa Asrār al-Furqān)" to mean contradicting states of mind, such as fear (*khawf*) and hope (*rajā*), tension (*qabḍ*) and relief (*basṭ*), or reverence (*hayba*) and intimacy (*'uns*)[6]. These "two oceansoceans" also point to the human heart (*qalb*) and ego (*nafs*), wherein virtue lies in the sea of the heart, while vice lies in the sea of the ego. According to al-Qārī, reaching the "junction of the two oceans" means finding a balance between conflicting emotions, and between the heart and the ego. Although this is consistent with the *maqaamat* (spiritual stations) philosophy of classic Sufism, focusing on human emotions appears to be an "ethical" interpretation typical among Sufis. Next, North African Sufi thinker Aḥmad Ibn 'Ajība (d.1809), in his Qur'anic commentary entitled "The Immense Ocean (*al-Baḥr al-Madīd*)," viewed Musa as representing the futility of external knowledge, and Khidr as representing the futility of inner wisdom. Musa stood in the sea of Sharia, while Khidr stood in the sea of truth[7]. Ibn 'Ajība explained that Musa's quest to find Khidr was a quest for inner wisdom. Citing the authority of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), he asserted that the search for inner wisdom, i.e., knowledge of Sufism, is the personal duty of Muslims because no one can escape from committing shameful mistakes and sins. Theoceanssertions are based on al-Ghazālī's works, namely, his discussions in the chapter on Salvation (*munjiyāt*) in Part 4 of "The Revival of the Religious Sciences (*Ihyā 'Ulūm al-Din*)" and the chapter on Repentance (*tawba*) in the "Forty Principles of the Religion (*Arba'īn fi Uṣūl al-Dīn*)." The search for inner wisdom underscores the importance of the ascetic life, i.e., man should face and repent from sin, purify his mind and body from vices, and aim to acquire virtue.

Next is the Sufi tradition of interpreting the story of the "Prophet Musa and Khidr" as a metaphor for the master-disciple relationship. Hugh Talat Halman discussed this in detail in his Ph.D. dissertation, which would have served as a useful material in analyzing Bursevî's Qur'anic interpretations, in addition to the discussions made in Chapter 5 of the book. For example, Halman asserted that according to the Qur'ānic commentary entitled "The Brides of Explanation on the Realities of the Qur'ān ('*Arā'is al-Bayān fī Ḥaqā'iq al-Qurān*)" by Rūzbihān Baqlī (d. 1209), a Persian Sufi thinker, Allah caused Musa to encounter Khidr to enable Musa to ascertain the way (*ṭarīqa*). By so doing, Musa was to become an example for those seeking the truth by dedicating their lives as practitioners of Sufism (*murīdīn*) and as tariqa masters[8]. Interpretations that liken Khidr to the perfect master can be seen in the Ottoman Empire in the works of İsmâ'îl Rusûhî Anḳaravî (d. 1631). For example, in his main

work entitled “Stations of the Seekers (*Minhâcü’l-Fuḳarâ*)” on *maqaamat*, he viewed Khidr and Musa as examples of how to follow the master[9].

The above commentaries suggest that the lack of studies on Sufism dealing with the “ethical and practical” interpretations by Sufi thinkers is a problem that has to do with the researchers on Islamic thought. This method of interpretation could be more widespread among Sufis, not only during the Ottoman Empire.

Conclusion

This book is one of the most informative monographs in Japan regarding Bursevî, the greatest thinker in the history of Sufism in Anatolia during the Ottoman Empire. However, it should be noted that from the 17th to the 18th century, the influence of the Ibn Arabi School had spread from West Africa to Southeast Asia to different regions of the Islamic civilization. Thus, this is a period in history where many works were written to explain Sufism based on different intellectual backgrounds and local languages. Therefore, the historical and philosophical significance of Bursevî’s works must be analyzed from a wide regional perspective beyond Anatolia. Further, regarding his “ethical and practical” approach to Sufism, which are emphasized as keywords in the book, also focusing on the aspect of the life of Bursevî as a tariqa sheikh (also mentioned in the book) would perhaps reveal more insights into his distinctive exegetic approach. For example, it would be interesting to look at how Bursevî discussed solitary retreat (mentioned in the book as part of his Qur’anic interpretation in p. 104) in his works on the ascetic practices and manners of the Celveti Order.

Sufism in the Ottoman Empire became the subject of active research worldwide particularly in the last 20 years. Therefore, this book is a groundbreaking monograph that considerably raises the standard for research on Sufism during the Ottoman Empire in Japan.

Notes

1 Özkan Özturk, *Siyaset ve Tasavvuf: Osmanlı Siyasi Düşüncesinde Tasavvufun Tezahürleri* (İstanbul: Degah Yayınları, 2015), p. 433.

2 Peter G. Riddel, *Islam and the Malay-Indonesian World: Transmission and Responses* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), p. 113.

3 劉智『五更月』呉海鷹主編『回族典蔵全書』第 26 巻、甘肅文化出版社、2008 年、1119-1134 頁。Liu Zhi, “The FivePhases of the Moon,” Wu Haiying (ed.), The Hui Collection, Vol. 26, Gansu Cultural Publishing House, 2008, pp. 1119-1134.

4 ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, *Īḍāḥ al-Maqṣūd min Ma‘nā Waḥda al-Wujūd*, Suleymaniye Kütüphanesi,

Halet Efendi 759, 115a.

5 Muḥammad al-Dhawqī, *Sirr-e Dilbarān* (Karachi: Maḥfil Dhawqīye, 1998), p. 200.

6 ʻAlī al-Qārī, *Anwār al-Qur'ān wa Asrār al-Furqān* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīya, 2013), p. 76.

7 Ibn ʻAjība, *al-Baḥr al-Madīd fī Tafsīr al-Qurān al-Majīd* (Cairo: n.p., 1999), vol. 3, p. 285.

8 Hugh Talat Halman, "Where Two Oceans Meet: The Quranic Story of Khidr and Moses in Sufi Commentaries as a Model for Spiritual Guidance," Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 2000, p. 224.

9 İsmâʻîl Rusûhî Anḳaravî, *Minhâcü'l-Fuḳarâ* (İstanbul: Vefa Yayınları, 2008), pp. 73-74.

Contributors

Junya Shinohe
Professor, Graduate School of Theology, Doshisha University

Masako Nakaya
Assistant, Organization for Research Initiatives and Development / Faculty of Global and Regional Studies, Doshisha University

Naomi Nishi
Part-Time Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University

Roy E. Gane
Professor, Hebrew Bible and Ancient Near Eastern Languages, Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University

Jörg Rüpke
Professor / Vice Director, Max Weber Centre for Advanced Cultural and Social Studies, University of Erfurt

Hisae Nakanishi
Professor, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University

Akio Tsukimoto
Professor Emeritus, College of Arts, Rikkyo University
Distinguished Professor, Faculty of Theology, Sophia University

Takehito Miyake
Professor, Graduate School of Theology, Doshisha University

Maki Iwasaki
Associate Professor, Faculty of Economics, Matsuyama University

Naoki Yamamoto
Assistant Professor, the Alliance of Civilizations Institute, Ibn Haldun University

Editor's Postscript

We are pleased to present you with the sixteenth issue of the *Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions* (*JISMOR*). The current issue features studies on Muslim minorities in Asia and includes articles dealing with religion in ancient and modern times, e.g., papers on Atonement in Israel, Religion and the City, and the Women's Movement in Iran. With the addition of four book reviews, the editors believe this issue offers a stimulating and eclectic evaluation of the relation between religion and the world.

In both feature and article formats, *JISMOR* also reports on the activities of CISMOR. However, it also gratefully receives scholarly submissions, the themes of which may deal not only with religious subjects, but, as well, with the historical contexts of religion. It is the earnest desire of the editors that *JISMOR*'s articles and activities will contribute to the nourishment of the ever-thirsty soil of interdisciplinary communications. Now that *JISMOR* has been accepted into the ATLA Religion Database with ATLA Serials, we are able to expand the reach of our publications far more extensively than ever before. It is our sincere hope that you, as faithful readers of *JISMOR*, will continue to support our project, our *mission*, by contributing an article, based on your own research, to one of our future issues.

March 2021

Mika Murakami, Chief of Editorial Committee

Guidelines for Submissions to the *Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions* (*JISMOR*)

Revised on April 15, 2019

1. *JISMOR* is an online journal published annually in or around March in Japanese and English, and it is made publicly accessible on the Doshisha University Academic Repository and the website of Doshisha University Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (CISMOR).

2. In principle, eligibility for contributed papers is limited to research fellows of CISMOR and individuals recommended by at least one research fellow of CISMOR.

3. Each submitted paper will be peer-reviewed, and the editorial committee will decide whether to accept it for publication.

4. In principle, submissions are limited to unpublished papers. (If you submit a paper that has already been published, you must obtain permission from the relevant institution for its publication in *JISMOR*.)

5. Send a summary of your paper (approximately 600 characters in Japanese or 250 words in English) via e-mail by the end of May to the address given below (any format is acceptable). You will receive a response stating whether your proposal has been approved from the editorial committee by mid-June. If your summary has been approved, follow these instructions:

6. Your paper must be received by the end of July.

7. Prepare your paper in both Word (see below) and PDF formats, and submit them as e-mail attachments.

8. *Use a template* for Microsoft Word available for downloading from CISMOR's website (http://www.cismor.jp/en/publication/). If using the Japanese template for Latin alphabet, Hebrew, Greek and Arabic, use "Times New Roman" size 10.

9. The paper should be written in either Japanese or English.

10. In either language, the paper's text should be read from left to right.

11. The paper's length should be 16,000–24,000 characters if written in Japanese or 6,000–9,000 words if written in English.

    Research notes, book reviews, and research trends should be within 8,000 characters if written in Japanese or within 3,000 words if written in English. (Figures are not counted as words, but text within charts and tables is counted.)

12. The first page should include the title of the paper, the name(s) of the author(s), and the organizational affiliation. In the case of articles or research notes, also add an abstract (approximately 400 characters if written in Japanese or 150 words if written in English) and 5 key words. In principle, provide your title, name(s) of author(s), and organizational affiliation in both Japanese and English.

13. All notes should be provided together at the end of the paper. No bibliography is published, in principle.

14. If your paper includes references to books, magazines, and/or newspapers in a European language, please use the following citation rules in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style:

Books

Joseph Blenkinshopp, *Sage, Priest, Prophet: Religious and Intellectual Leadership in Ancient Israel* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster-John Knox Press, 1995), 20-50.

Edited books

Gary Anderson and Saul M. Olyan eds., *Priesthood and Cult in Ancient Israel* (Journal for the Study of the Old Testament Supplement Series 125; Sheffield, JSOT Press, 1991), 20-35.

Articles or chapters in a volume

Frank Moore Cross, "The Priestly Houses of Early Israel," in *Constituting the Community: Studies on the Polity of Ancient Israel in Honor of S. Dean McBride, Jr.* (John T. Strong and Steven S. Tuell, eds., Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 35-55.

Entries in a series volume

John F. Robertson, "The Social and Economic Organization of Ancient Mesopotamian Temples," in *Civilizations of the Ancient Near East* 1 (Jack Sasson *et al* eds.; New York: Scribner, 1995), 443-454.

Journal articles

Oliver Robert Gurney, "The Annals of Ḫattušili III," *Anatolian Studies* 47 (1997), 127-139.

Journals/articles online:

Ada Taggar-Cohen, "Hittite Laws and Texts," *Bible Odyssey* (date of access).
http://www.bibleodyssey.com/places/related-articles/hittite-laws-and-texts.aspx

If the same writer appears more than once, write the name in full again. For example:
Frank Moore Cross, "The Priestly Houses of Early Israel," pp. 20-25.

Give journal/series titles in full form, not in abbreviations.

If your paper includes references to books, magazines, and/or newspapers in Japanese language, the citation methods are as follows:

著書

市川裕『ユダヤ教の精神構造』東京大学出版会、2004 年、50 頁。

ロバート・N・ベラー『社会変革と宗教倫理』河合秀和訳、未来社、1973 年、343 頁。

三木英・櫻井義秀編著『日本に生きる移民たちの宗教生活－ニューカマーのもたらす宗教多元化』ミネルヴァ書房、2012 年、215 頁。

堀江宗正責任編集『日本の宗教事情 国内編Ⅰ』（シリーズ「いま宗教に向き合う 1」）岩波書店、2018 年、111 頁。

日本海地誌調査研究会『人道の港敦賀－命のビザで敦賀に上陸したユダヤ人難民足跡調査報告－』日本海地誌調査研究会敦賀上陸ユダヤ難民足跡調査プロジェクトチーム、2007 年、35 頁。

共同訳聖書実行委員会『聖書 新共同訳』日本聖書協会、2018 年。

雑誌

基督教研究会『基督教研究』第 76 巻、第 2 号、同志社大学神学部、2014 年 12 月。

新聞

久保健一「曖昧な法学者統治 ; 民主化実現の余地残す」（読売新聞 2009 年 2 月 12 日号所載）。

論文

市川裕「罪の赦しと父祖の徳－ユダヤ教『スリーホート』の祈り－」『筑波大学地域研究』第 6 号、筑波大学地域研究研究科、1988 年、260-261 頁。

小原克博「一神教と多神教をめぐるディスコースとリアルポリティーク」『一神教学際研究』第 2 号、同志社大学一神教学際研究センター、2006 年、13-14 頁、http://www.cismor.jp/uploads-images/sites/2/2014/02/d2c51acebf75bce1ecce270c28433c92.pdf（閲覧日）。

If you have any questions, please ask the editorial committee.

15. Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic can appear in its original script. In principle, other languages should be transliterated into Roman alphabet, using the same system of transliteration throughout the paper.

For the transliteration system, please comply with the guidelines specified in Chapter 5 (p. 55) of Billie Jean Collins, project director, *The SBL Handbook of Style: For Biblical Studies and Related Disciplines*, second edition, Atlanta, Georgia: SBL Press, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as "SBL"), as much as possible. SBL specifies two systems of transliterating Hebrew words—academic and general-purpose—so please use the one that best suits your purpose. (Use of SBL is also recommended for transliterating the words of ancient languages such as Coptic, Akkadian, Egyptian, and Ugaritic.)

To transliterate Arabic words, Japanese authors should comply with the guidelines of K. Otsuka, et al., eds., *Iwanami Isuramu Jiten* (*Iwanami Dictionary of Islam*) to the extent possible. While no particular system for transliterating Arabic words is specified for authors from other countries, ALA-LC (Library of Congress) is recommended for transliterating Arabic, Persian, and Turkish words.

If you have difficulty obtaining any of the abovementioned guidelines, please contact the editorial committee.

16. Published papers will be converted into a PDF file and returned to the authors.

For inquiries and paper submission, please contact:

Editorial Committee for the *Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions*
Doshisha University Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions
E-mail: journal@cismor.jp

Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions
(*Isshinkyou Gakusai Kenkyu*)

Editor in Chief: Mika Murakami Doshisha University
Cover Design: Keiko Kinuta

Published by CISMOR, Doshisha University
(Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions)
Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto 602-8580
http://www.cismor.jp
E-mail: rc-issin@mail.doshisha.ac.jp

Doshisha University
Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions
http://www.cismor.jp

CISMOR, Doshisha University, Kyoto 602-8580, Japan
rc-issin@mail.doshisha.ac.jp

ISSN 1880-1080
Isshinkyou Gakusai Kenkyu