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Paul and Judaism

Introduction: Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity

Ada Taggar-Cohen

The fourth meeting of the project “Jews and Judaism in Japan” took place on September 24, 2016 (Sat.) 13:00-17:00, and included a public lecture followed by a workshop, both delivered by professor Moriyoshi Murayama and associate professor Etsuko Katsumata, scholars of the School of Theology, Doshisha University. The theme of the research meeting was “Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity: Mutual Influence.” Each scholar presented the subject through his or her research perspective, indicating the way in which Judaism and Christianity shared texts and values, and showing where these religions started diverging from each other during the said period.

The recent decade or two have indeed witnessed an increase in studies trying to reveal the historical and religious developments of Late Antiquity that separated Christianity from Judaism and created two completely different religions.¹

Prof. Murayama indicated how the establisher of Christian beliefs, Paul of Tarsus, revered Judaism, and how his writings reveal his roots in one of the different Jewish sects that flourished during late antiquity Judaism, becoming the main stream of Christian thought. Prof. Murayama shows how themes in Jewish thought, mostly originating in the Hebrew Bible, such as universalism, God’s judgment, observance of the Law (Jewish Halacha), were newly interpreted by Paul, paving the way for Christianity as an independent religion. These two religions each tried to maintain its separate identity and thus one of the important questions raised by the two groups was its attitude towards foreigners, or to be more precise: whom each religious group accepted as belonging to its group of believers, if at all.

Prof. Katsumata focused mainly on the perspective regarding these issues of the Jewish community at the time. After introducing the absence of Paul in Jewish rabbinical texts of the time, she referred to Paul’s interpretations of the Jewish law in the case of pure food, or more critically, the freedom to observe Jewish law in general. This question

led her to discuss the attitude of Jewish sources to foreign worship or religions, and “Gentiles” in general, while treating the issues of food and idolatry. She pointed out, based on rabbinical texts, the fact that these issues prompted the question of flexibility in obeying Jewish law and the fact that the biblical law offers freedom of choice to the believer. In her conclusions, she suggested that the Jewish rabbinical group chose strict fulfilment of the law as interpreted by the Rabbis, while Christianity offered by Paul, opened itself to freedom of choice whether to observe the law, observe it in part or later not observe it at all, in order to accommodate the multitudes of non-Jews.

Consequently, both presenters touched each in their own way of reading the texts, on similar issues that arose during Late Antiquity, of how, when Judaism was on the verge of change as a result of the dismantling of its main religious institutions, one religious group managed to evolve into a competing religion within several hundred years.

This meeting, we hope, is the beginning of joint efforts by scholars in the field of Late Antiquity, at CISMOR and the School of Theology of Doshisha University, to present the conclusions of their research to the Japanese scholarly community as well as the Japanese public.

Note

- ¹ For example, see CISMOR *Conference on Jewish Studies 5: Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages* published (2012): <http://www.cismor.jp/jp/archives/coe/> 出版物/ユダヤ学会議/. See the article by Peter Schäfer, “Jewish Responses to the Emergence of Christianity,” pp. 120-134. See also the series *Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity* published by Brill, and established by Martin Hengel since 1976 (with its volumes in the last five years).

Paul in Jewish Studies and Judaism

Etsuko Katsumata

1. Introduction

During my undergraduate days, I encountered Midrash literature (Jewish scriptural exegeses). Out of my surprise that such a fantastical world of ideas could be interpretations of scripture, I eventually entered the world of Judaic studies. Seen through Judaism, the Bible is human and unfiltered. This was fresh to me. I was fortunate enough to become a member of this university's School of Theology, and I have thought since that it would be nice to research a topic bridging Christian and Jewish studies. It is quite an honor to have this opportunity to give a presentation alongside Professor Murayama.

Thinking that I could present the topic of Paul from the Jewish perspective, as he was a key figure in Christianity who was also of Jewish origin, in the planning for this conference, I suggested that he be today's theme. There have been many discussions of Jesus within Judaism, so I thought it would be good to alter the focus to a discussion of Paul. However, I realized when preparing for this presentation that this was a somewhat foolish idea. I was amazed by the quantity and diverse content of the documents and letters allegedly written by him.

2. Paul in Jewish Studies and Judaism

2-1. Paul in Jewish Studies

Troublingly, I found that he has not received much attention in Judaism or Jewish studies. In the few discussions of Paul in Jewish studies, he is surprisingly treated as predominantly Christian, despite having described himself as an enthusiastic Jew. Furthermore, Paul and Paul's hometown of Tarsus are not mentioned in the Rabbinic texts of the era. Thus, I was blocked in all directions.

On the handout, I have listed the views on Paul by leading Jewish thinkers and experts in Rabbinic Judaism textual research. While they point out the continuity between Jesus' teachings and Judaic thought, they treat him completely differently than

Paul.¹ Abraham Geiger, a predominant scholar in modern German Jewish studies and a leader of German Reform Judaism at the end of nineteenth century, was the first person to engage in research on Judaism in terms of its relationship to the other monotheistic religions, including Christianity and Islam. In this research, he was a pioneer in Islamic textual research and contributed to the emergence of Islamic studies in Germany. However, he claimed that many Islamic teachings were inherited from Judaism, and thus, his work aimed to prove the truth of Judaism.² Moreover, he equated Jesus' teachings with the Judaism of the Pharisees,³ emphasizing their commonalities. His intention was to highlight that the roots of Christianity lay in Judaism. Furthermore, the proponents of Liberal Judaism at the time (such as Claude Montefiore) saw Jesus as the embodiment of Judaism's essence by treating *halakha* as secondary and its prophetic and ethical aspects as primary.⁴

Criticism arose within the field of Jewish studies in response to these scholars on the grounds that they took an excessively friendly attitude towards Jesus. However, Geiger and Montefiore also took Paul out of his Jewish context. A. Geiger thought that Paul's criticism of Judaism was due to the influence of other religions, and Montefiore saw a misunderstanding of Judaism in Paul's criticism of the law.⁵ Furthermore, like Geiger, Leo Baeck, a member of the second generation of German Jewish studies who lived through the Shoah, saw Jesus as an embodiment of the Pharisaic Judaism. He stated that while Jesus adhered to Rabbinic Judaism, Paul departed from Judaism when he advocated salvation by faith only.⁶ Martin Buber furthered these conclusions by arguing that Paul converted Jesus' teachings into an ideology, and he is thought to have seen Jesus as having espoused Jewish teachings.⁷

The great Jewish thinker Ephraim E. Urbach touched upon Paul in his monumental Volume: *The Sages*; however, he discussed him as the polar opposite of adherents to Rabbinical Judaism.⁸ David Flusser, the flag bearer of academic research that sought to create a dialogue between Christianity and Judaism, saw Jesus initiating the first stage of Christianity which shared the message of Rabbinical Judaism, and Paul and post-Paul Christianity as symbolic of the second stage of Christianity which was influenced by the Essenes.⁹

In the research of comparative monotheism, Abraham is often the research theme. Without fail, the image of Abraham found in the Jewish scriptural exegeses (the Midrash) is contrasted with Paul's understanding of Abraham as represented in his Epistle to the Romans:¹⁰ in the latter, we find an understanding of Abraham as a model for faith and obedience to God, while in the former, he struggles with and is troubled by

human problems. None of these comparisons of Jewish and Pauline views of Abraham take into account the fact that Paul himself was Jewish.

In fact, when I recently met two Judaic scholars from abroad, I asked about their opinion of Paul, to which they replied that he was someone who converted and someone that made Christianity unable to return to its Judaic roots.

However, in Pauline research, it appears that there is a considerable amount of research on Paul's identity as a Jew.¹¹ It is said that the consideration of Paul as a Jew has been a trend that has occurred to reconcile the two religions after the Shoah.¹² However, there is not much interest in Paul from the Jewish studies side.

2-2. Paul in Jewish Texts

As far as I know Paul is not directly mentioned in Rabbinic texts. In database searches of these texts, there are no hits for the names or places associated with Paul (Paul, Saul, Tarsus etc.). It appears that Tarsus, Paul's birthplace, was conflated with Tarshish, which appears in the Book of Jonah. While it is said that Paul studied under Rabban Gamliel, a famous rabbi, if one checks a tree diagram of the rabbinic networks (which shows in great detail the human relationships of the Rabbinic world, including siblings, colleagues, parents, children, etc.), one does not find Paul or Saul of Tarsus.¹³ As someone who harshly persecuted Christians and then left Judaism, one would think that there would be some indication of him in these texts. In fact, Rabbinical Jewish texts often mention people who crossed the boundaries of Judaism. For example, Rabbi Elisha ben Abuyah—the teacher of the famous Rabbi Akiva—is also called *Acher* (other one). Rabbi Elisha rode on a donkey on the Sabbath, which was prohibited. While worrying about his teacher, Rabbi Akiva walked alongside him until they reached the greatest distance allowed for walking on the Sabbath. Rabbi Akiva stopped walking, but Rabbi Elisha continued. As his nickname indicates, he crossed a boundary and went “over there,” that is, to an *acher* world.¹⁴ Jesus is also mentioned (although briefly), as “Yeshu” and “Child of Panthera.”¹⁵ Other figures appear to have meddled with heretical thought.¹⁶ While it is possible that Paul was already being superimposed with the impressions of such people, we cannot point to any direct traces of him.

2-3. Approaching Paul

Then, how can Paul be approached from the perspective of Jewish Studies and Judaism? Direct accounts are unlikely to be found. Therefore, I think we should look for environments in Jewish society of his era that could have given rise to his ideology.

Again, looking at Paul's texts from the perspective of someone engaging in textual research on Judaism, Paul often brings people's attention to and offers instructions regarding food and other aspects of daily life. He particularly highlights various issues related to eating with people from other religions. I was the most surprised as a reader when I encountered the following passages:

I know and am convinced in the Lord Jesus that there is nothing unclean in itself; still, it is unclean to the one who considers it unclean. . . . Do not destroy the work of God for the sake of food. For although all things are clean, it is wrong to cause anyone to stumble by what you eat. . . . But the man who doubts is condemned if he eats, because he does not do so from faith, and whatever is not from faith is sin. (Rom 14.14-23)¹⁷

With regard, then to eating food sacrificed to idols, we know that "an idol in this world is nothing," and that "there is no God but one." (1Cor 8.4)

From the perspective of Judaism, the conclusion that nothing is unclean is unacceptable. In this attitude that such things are only of concern to those who are worried about them, lies the danger of departing from the foundation of Judaism's vast legal structure. If there is nothing that is actually impure, or nothing that is actually an idol and the identification of impurity or idols is completely subjective to the individual, the purpose of the massive legal system regarding impurity or orders avoiding the worship of idols is brought into doubt. If one expands this way of thinking, it could lead to the idea that Judaism's various rules are not absolute because belief itself is not absolute. In other words, laws based on belief are dependent on one's personal feelings. It could thus shake the foundation of the Jewish faith.

However, from this perspective, a stance arises that counters the argument that everything is feeling dependent: one can assert that, despite understanding that uncleanliness and idols are not real, one still attempts to follow the rule of law. Thus there is a divergence between observable knowledge and belief. According to this argument, it appears that there is room for the freedom to choose a path according to one's own will.

I have previously analyzed and written about the concept of freedom in Judaism. Using the idea of freedom found in Paul's letters for comparative purposes, I have been overwhelmed by the differences in the ways that freedom is discussed in Jewish texts and

in Paul's letters. In the Rabbinic texts, "freedom" is only used in the sense of one's status within society. In other later contexts, one finds the beginnings of a concept of the "freedom" that comes from studying the Torah.¹⁸ In contrast, Paul uses the word "freedom" frequently in a sense similar to the way we understand it (that is as personal freedom). It appears that Paul arrived at a more personal idea of freedom because a space appeared for individual freedom and volition (in terms of following or not following the law) as a result of his view that impurity did not objectively exist.

If one thinks that impurity actually exists, its existence necessitates acts to avoid it. However, the moment one says that the impurity does not exist, one has to choose whether he follows the law of impurity or not. Here are the core concepts of Paul's faith: freedom, conscience, and belief. These concepts are the foundation for the world of his faith, which is completely divergent from Rabbinical Judaism.

At the same time I suppose that the passages about gentiles in the rabbinic texts contain elements of Paul's faith. There are similar rules relating to non-Jews in the Mishnah. It appears that Rabbinic Judaism's *halakha* also confronts the same kinds of problems that Paul encountered: how to maintain a distance from non-Jews.

Paul is significant in spreading Christianity from the Judaic to the Hellenistic world and from the Jews to the gentiles. In other words, he lived in the border between Jewish society and the rest of the world. This relationship is reflected in his close ties with diaspora cities, such as Tarsus and Damascus (where Paul converted). Therefore, I searched for passages that reflect Paul's background, perhaps describing how gentiles were treated within Rabbinic Judaism. While there are no accounts specifically on Paul from Jewish sources, there are sources that explain how Jews treated non-Jews at the time, which can help us understand the core of Paul's faith

3. Gentiles and Those Who Worship Multiple Gods in Rabbinic Literature

Let us consider how foreigners and those of others faiths are treated in Jewish texts, specifically the Mishnah and other legal texts, during the time of early Christianity.

The first text compiled during the early period of rabbinical Judaism, the Mishnah, is a collection of rules (*halakha*) regarding Jewish life. After the AD 70 destruction of the Second Temple, the center of Judaism shifted from temple rituals to the study of the Torah. With the loss of Judaism's center, *yeshivot* (schools) came into being, institutions focused on both interpreting the written Hebrew Torah and compiling the various oral

traditions surrounding the Torah. These oral transmissions, called the *Torah shebe'al pe* (Oral Torah), served as manuals for implementing the written Torah into everyday life and included detailed commentary. The massive legal framework made of both written and oral traditions was brought together in AD 200 as the Mishnah. The discussions found in the Mishnah were then further interpreted and studied, and eventually compiled into the Talmud. Those oral transmissions not included in the Mishnah were gathered into the Tosefta (i.e., the “supplement”).

This paper focuses on the Mishnah and its supplement, the Tosefta.

3-1. Distinctions Between Those Who Worship Other Gods (*‘Oved Kokhavim*) and Foreigners (*Goy, Nokhri*) in the Rabbinic Texts

I realized that there are different terms for “those of other religions” and “gentiles” in both the Mishnah and Tosefta. In rabbinic literature, *‘oved kokhavim*, *goy*, and *nokhri* are all terms used for non-Jews. In English, these words are often all translated as “gentile,” however, there is a slight difference in meaning between *‘oved kokhavim* and *goy* or *nokhri*. *‘Oved kokhavim* refers to one who worships the stars or one who worships multiple gods. It seems to apply to followers of polytheistic religions; *kokhavim* is plural, implying multiple gods. On the other hand, the word *goy*, which means “nation,” does not necessarily suggest the worship of multiple gods. *Nokhri*, which was used widely in later rabbinic literature, simply means “foreigner” or “outsider”; it, too, does not suggest the worship of multiple gods.

The Mishnah generally uses *‘oved kokhavim* in its plural or abbreviated form, while the use of *goy* or *nockri* is much less common. I found only a few instances of either word in the Mishnah (i.e., Mishnah Taanit 3.7, Yebamoth 7.5). In the description of the rules regarding idol worship (*‘avodah zarah*), the Mishnah uses *‘oved kokhavim*. That implies that the compilers of the Mishnah believed that those who were not Jewish worshipped multiple gods.

The usage of these three words in the Mishnah becomes even more intriguing when comparing their usage in the Tosefta, which is of the same genre but was compiled slightly later. In both Midrash *halakha* and the Tosefta, there were no instances of the word *‘oved kokhavim*, only *nokhri* and *goy*. In other words, when referring to non-Jews, that is, people with other religious beliefs, both the Tosefta and Midrash *halakha* do not use the polytheistic term, but simply refer to them as outsiders.

Analyzing the use of the term *minim* gives us further insight into the Mishnah’s specific attitudes towards gentiles. While it is unclear exactly who *minim* refers to in the

Mishnah, the term was generally used to refer to heretics, and it is believed that early Christians were often referenced using this term. In a past CISMOR research meeting presentation,¹⁹ I focused on rabbinic texts as a whole and addressed the uneven distribution of this term, hypothesizing that it could have been used to refer to people of other religions. However, when limiting my analysis to the Mishnah, it appears as if *minim* (heretics) and polytheists are differentiated. This suggests that at the time of the Mishnah, there were assumed to be two, opposing worldviews: the polytheistic beliefs of the *'oved kokhavim* and the monotheistic religion of Judaism. Within this structure, *minim* (largely early Christians) were still considered to be Jews—Jewish heretics, perhaps, but with a shared worldview.

However, in later rabbinic literature this understanding of the world breaks down. The term *minim* also appears in the Tosefta and *halakha*, where, as I have described, the term *'oved kokhavim* does not appear. There is a discussion regarding *nokhri*, which involves a conflict between a group of *minim* (probably early Christians) and rabbis.

In other words, while there was a differentiation between the *'oved kokhavim*, who worshiped many gods, and *minim* at the time the Mishnah was compiled, it appears shortly thereafter—at the time of the Tosefta, Midrash *halakha*, and other texts—Jewish *minim* (heretics, including Christians) were merged in the texts with *goy* and *nokhri*. All three were grouped together as non-Jewish others. This change was caused by the conflation of a variety of texts.

3-2. Relating to Gentiles

Followers of rabbinical Judaism came into contact with gentiles every day. We can assume this not only due to the nature of the legal collections, but from the fact that Jews during this time focused not on theological problems, but the important issue of how to relate to followers of other religions while following Jewish law in their daily lives. For example, consider the following text:

Beit Shammai says: One may not give anything to them, or containers to a launderer of the worships of multiple gods *'oved kokhavim*, unless there is sufficient time for them to complete the work that day. Beit Hillel permitted this. (Mishnah Shabbat 1.8)²⁰

This passage is part of a debate between the Academy of Hillel and the Academy of Shammai. The debate centered on a specific rule for the Sabbath, namely, that one cannot

give hide to a tanner on the Sabbath, because to do so would be to make him work that day, which is prohibited. From this passage, we can see that it was acceptable, however, for Jews to bring their laundry to a non-Jewish launderer, and that there was a laundering industry. The text continues as follows:

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: It was the custom in my father's house to deliver white garments to a launderer of the worship of multiple gods (*'oved kokhavim*) three days before Shabbat. Both schools agree regarding the beams of the oil press, and the cylinders on the wine press. (Mishnah Shabbat 1.8)

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel was the son (*ben*) of Rabban Gamliel, and thus "my father's house" refers to the house of Rabban Gamliel, a very famous Rabbi under whom Paul supposedly studied. The reason white garments could not be given to launderers closer to the Sabbath was that it took more time to wash white garments than colored ones, and thus washing would not be completed by the Sabbath at sundown on Friday.


The quote also refers to olive oil and the wine press. Both Jews and gentiles used presses and worked together to make these products. In this joint work, if one continued using the press after the Sabbath had begun, they would desecrate the Sabbath. It was important that Jews and non-Jews use the same equipment and work together, thus the rules surrounding the presses.

In the next quote, we find the word *'avodah zarah*. While in English it is often translated as "idol worship" or "idols," in Hebrew it does not refer to idolatrous religions. Its original meaning was "odd worship."

One may not make jewelry for purposes of idolatry (*'avodah zarah*): necklaces, nose rings, or rings. Rabbi Eliezer says: It is permissible to do so for a salary. One may not sell them something that is connected to the ground. But it may be sold once it is chopped. Rabbi Yehuda says: One may sell it to them on the condition that they will chop it. One may not rent them houses in the Land of Israel, and we need not even mention fields. In Syria, they were rented houses. However, they were not rented fields. However, outside of the Land of Israel they were sold houses and rented fields. These are words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yosei says: In the Land of Israel, they were rented houses but not fields, and in Syria they were sold houses and rented fields. Outside of the Land of Israel, they could be sold either one. (Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1.8)

This indicates that Jews made and distributed goods to followers of other religions. While there are various understandings what it means to rent houses and fields, we can see that it was possible for them to have a relationship that included this, whatever the exact definition was.

However, the renting and leasing of fields and joint cultivation brought about a complicated set of problems: It was necessary for some of Jewish people's crops to be set aside for priests.



As can be seen in this simple chart, Jews had to set some of the harvest aside for priests (*terumah*). From what remained, they removed that which would be given to the Levites (*ma'aser*; first tithe) and the *ma'aser sheni* (second tithe), the recipient of which would change depending on the year. After doing so, they could keep the rest. However, when renting fields from a gentile or cultivating a field alongside a gentile, it was important to account not only for who would pay the rent, but also at what point the jointly cultivated harvest should be divided. Thus, we find rules like the following:

If a man leased a field (on the condition that he would pay the owner a fixed proportion of the crop as a rent) from an Israelite, a worshipper of multiple gods ('*oved kokhavim*), or a Samaritan, he should divide up (the produce) in their presence. One who hired a field (for a prescribed quantity of produce, irrespective of the total yield) from an Israelite must separate the *terumah*

(produce consecrated for priestly consumption) and then give the Israelite the (rent). (Mishnah Demai 6.1)

This rule stipulates that when rent consists of a fixed proportion of the harvest there is no need to set aside *terumah*. Such rent should be a prescribed quantity that is divided after setting aside the *terumah*. Here, we can see how Jewish law made it possible to rent or cultivate a field with gentiles.

Furthermore, as we can see from the next passage, Jews were aware of gentile holidays.

And these, according to Rabbi Meir, are the festivals of a worshiper of multiple gods ('*oved kokhavim*): *Kalendae* (calendar beginning of the year), *Saturnalia*, (festival one week before the winter solstice), kings' days of accession, the day of birth, and the day of death. And the Sages say: every funeral in which a conflagration is present (thereby) involves idol worship. One that has no conflagration does not involve idol worship. The day on which a man cuts his beard or his hair (coming of age day), that he came ashore from the sea, and the day he was released from prison, and the day a non-Jew holds a wedding for his child: on these days, transactions with just this person is prohibited. (Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1.3)

This rule states that on such festival days, rituals to worship idols would be carried out, and thus, transactions should not be carried out with non-Jews. It was probably thought that to do so would be to take part in idol worship. Another rule discusses where to engage in transactions when there are idols on the town walls.²¹

The Mishnah also includes rules regarding the slaughter of animals. It discusses meat that might have been slaughtered for animal worship, the handling of meat slaughtered for gentiles' food, the slaughter of impure animals, and so on, focusing on issues such as acceptability when viewed from the law as well as the permissibility of eating and enjoyment.

. . . The slaughter of a gentile (*nokhri*) is a *nevelah* (meat from an animal that has died due to natural causes) and renders impure through carrying. . . . One who slaughters on Shabbat, or on Yom Kippur, even though he is liable for death, his slaughter is valid. (Mishnah Chullin 1.1)

Meat that is slaughtered for idol worship (‘*avodah zara*), for offering its blood, and that has had its fat removed for idol worship is dead meat [is disqualified]. If after slaughter the blood is sprinkled for idol worship, if the fat is removed for idol worship, it is living meat. (Tosefta Chullin 2.13)

The slaughter of cattle and impure birds in the hall of the temple cannot be enjoyed. Of course, eating them is prohibited. Living livestock and clean birds can be enjoyed. While Rabbi Meir prohibits enjoyment of the slaughter of *terefah* animals (injured animals are already not acceptable) and animals which after slaughter are found out to be *terefah*, Rabbi Gamliel allows it. (Tosefta Chullin 2.14)

From these texts, we can see that prohibitions are discussed in terms of two stages: the procedure of slaughter and the usage of the slaughtered meat—eating or enjoying (receiving benefit). We can see that Jews during Paul’s era were concerned about the same issues as he was when he discussed meat offered to idols. The number of rules in place indicate that it was necessary for Jews to eat meat dressed by gentiles. At the same time, gentiles ate meat that Jews had slaughtered. We can again see here how Jews lived open lives within the world of non-Jews. In Paul’s texts, he discusses encountering gentiles in daily life. We can see that he was concerned with many of the topics that are addressed in the Jewish texts—such as when eating alongside gentiles, whether it is acceptable to consume meat offered to idols, how wine should be handled, and situations involving joint work with non-Jews.

Next, let us turn to texts that discuss the issue of impurity. Paul also dealt with this topic in his writings. It is said that Paul was an artisan who made tents, and tents were discussed in relation to impurity in the *halakha* of Rabbinic Judaism. This relationship is derived from the question of what could make the restricted space of a tent impure and how this impurity could be removed. An entire order (volume; Oholot) in the Mishnah is devoted to the topic. We can thus understand why Paul was sensitive to the issue of impurity.

Everyone is made impure by *Negaim* except for a worshiper of multiple gods ‘*ovedei kokhavim*. Everyone is valid for examining *Negaim*, except that the impurity and the purity (of the examined person) is in the hands of a priest. They say to him (i.e. the priest), “Say (he is) impure,” and he says, “Impure.”

(They say to him), “Say (he is) pure,” and he says, “Pure.” (Mishnah Negaim 3.1)

All clothing can become impure from *Negaim* except for a worshiper of multiple gods ‘*oved kokhavim*. One who buys clothing from a non-Jew should examine it (for signs of the *Nega*) and make it new. Sea creatures do not become impure from *Negaim*. If attached to that which is of the ground—even with thread or even a string—and is anything which can become impure, it is impure. (Mishnah Negaim 11.1)

Here, *negaim* refers to skin disease as well as mold on clothes and in houses. The Mishnah and Tosefta contain various discussions regarding whether these bring about impurity. Another important problem is how to purify *negaim*. However, as can be seen from the above text, Jews’ *negaim* do not make gentiles impure. This is because *negaim* itself is not impure. In other words, impurity depends on the receiver. This is similar to the idea expressed by Paul that surprised me: “It is unclean to the one who considers it unclean.”

In the Rabbinic Mishnah, it appears that when gentiles are involved, the concept of relative impurity and legal obligation appears: non-Jews are exempt from laws applied to Jews. In other words, the laws of Judaism state that they are not absolute ones that everyone must follow. If so, the focus shifts to the intention or volition of the person who carries out the law, that is, the person who acts. Therein, a gap between action and consciousness or belief emerges within Judaism, characterized by the unity of faith and action (the idea that to act is faith).

3-3. Between Belief and Action

Based on the above discussion, it becomes clear that a person’s intention was important in the laws regarding dealing with non-Jews. The rabbinic texts make the following statement:

(If on Shabbat) a worshiper of multiple gods ‘*oved kokhavim* lights a candle, an Israelite may use its light; but if (he lit it) on behalf of an Israelite, it is prohibited (to use it). If he filled (a vessel with) water to give to his cattle to drink, an Israelite may have his cattle drink (from that vessel) after him; but if he did so on behalf of the Israelite it is prohibited (to use it). (If) a worshiper of

multiple gods had (his) sheep pass, a Jew may (have his sheep) pass afterwards; but if (a worshiper of multiple gods had his sheep pass) on behalf of the Israelite it is prohibited (to do so). It once happened that Rabban Gamliel and the Elders were on a ship. A worshiper of multiple gods had the sheep descend [from the ship], whereupon Rabban Gamliel and the Elders then (had their sheep) descend. (Mishnah Shabbat 16.8)

Lighting a flame, filling a vessel with water, having sheep pass, and so on were forms of work that were banned on the Sabbath. However, there is no particular problem with gentiles doing such things. In other words, lighting a candle on the day of the Sabbath is not an absolute law, but one that must be followed by Jews. Furthermore, if a non-Jew lit a flame for himself, then even on the Sabbath, Jews can also use it. However, if the gentile lit the flame for a Jew, for them to use it would be to defile the Sabbath. In other words, non-visible intention—here, that of the gentile—becomes related to the execution of the law. The next passage lists things prohibited when buying and selling to and from gentiles:

It is forbidden to sell the following items to a worshiper of multiple (*oved kokhavim*) gods: pinecones, white figs and their stalks, frankincense, and white chickens. Rabbi Yehuda says: one is permitted to sell them a white chicken amongst a group of chickens; or, one is permitted to clip its toe and sell it, since they do not sacrifice blemished animals for idolatry. As for all remaining items, if [their intention was] not specified one is permitted [to sell them], but if there is a doubt about it, it is prohibited. Rabbi Meir says: fine palm dates, sweet dates, and the Nikolaos dates are also forbidden to be sold to non-Jews. (Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1.5)

It is stated that these items could not be sold to non-Jews because they could be used as offerings in their worship. This shows that Jews knew—in considerable detail—what kind of things were being used in such situations. Furthermore, they also knew the rules regarding their offerings: the above passage states that damaged items would not be offered. Other items were allowed if it was not specified what they were going to be used for. In other words, the act of selling things to gentiles itself and the things sold were not the issue. The problem was carrying out such an act knowing that it would be used for idol worship.

One who slaughters for a non-Jew (*nokhri*),²² his slaughtering is valid. And Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid. Rabbi Eliezer says: “Even if he slaughtered it so that the non-Jew will eat it, even just the diaphragm, it is invalid, for just thinking of a worshiper of multiple gods leads to idolatry.” Said Rabbi Yose, “These matters are *qal vachomer* (the principle of reasoning about major things based on minor ones). If intention brings about the result of invalidity (just like animal sacrifice), it is related to (only) the (intention of the) person carrying out the action. Furthermore, if that is the case, if intention does not make the result invalid (as is the case with beasts offered), it is (only) related to the (intention of the) person doing the slaughtering. (Mishnah Chullin 2.7)

This also shows that understandings regarding slaughter for foreigners were not unified. The anonymous opinion appears to be the general view of the time, but Rabbi Eliezer held a significantly different opinion. He said that just thinking of non-Jews could lead to idol worship. Subsequently, the discussion turned to the relationship between intention and results. Rabbi Yose said that if intention led to invalidity, this result was only related to the intention of the person carrying out the act. This could lead to the view that the law is not universal in nature but in the realm of individual intention. It appears that the beginnings of a criticism of the universality and absoluteness of the law can be found in Rabbinic Judaism.

4. Analysis and Summary

In the past, as Leo Baeck has asserted, Judaism was a religion of acts. Action remains its foundation. However, when Jews come into contact with non-Jews—when they have to carry out their lives alongside them—a situation emerges in which the law itself has not always been applied to everyone. This variable application creates space for the individual to choose whether or not to carry out a given law.

Why did Judaism during the time of Paul go in a different direction (the unity of faith and action), while confronting the same problems that Paul addressed? I would like to look into this process more in the future. However, I do think that Jews, while being aware that the law was not absolute, consciously chose to follow it.

In the previous discussion of a flame lit by gentiles on the Sabbath, it is said that since gentiles do not have to observe the Sabbath, Jews may use the flame. However, here one would need to know the intention of the individual who lit the flame, that is,

whether it was done specifically for the use of a Jew. This intention is not clearly determined. One's intention does not have to be freely divulged, and one has the option to lie. If both Jews and non-Jews were silent about the matter, it would be possible for the former to use it. If one does not use it due to unknown intention, here we would find the law being carried out based on an individual's will characterized by the choice to not use it, even though one can. At the same time, space arises for freedom or conscience that influence the decision of whether or not to use it.

Even in the discussion regarding things that are prohibited from being sold, we can see that selling itself is not prohibited, but the act of assisting the other person in their idol worship is. However, one can overlook the issue of how to demonstrate the existence of the intention to use items for idol worship. Yet, by being aware of intention, a space emerges to make a choice. Those who think that the non-Jew has a certain intention and thus choose to follow the law are making a choice to carry it out.

Similarly, it is said that there is no impurity in the things of gentiles. If this is the case, one can arrive at the opinion that things themselves are not impure. If one thinks that everything depends on the eye of the beholder, there emerges a freedom from which one can either see something as impure and follow the rules regarding impurity, or not do so.

Paul and Judaism confronted issues regarding how to interact with gentiles in concrete daily life situations. In the boundary realm of interacting with non-Jews, the freedom to choose whether or not to carry out the law emerged. For Paul to make his way into the world of gentiles, it was necessary for him to develop his thought in the direction of the freedom to not carry out the law. Similarly, Judaism of the same era maintained thought that was based on the free decision to follow it.²³

Notes

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¹ Regarding modern and contemporary approaches to Jesus and Christianity by scholars of Jewish studies, see F. A. Rothschild ed., *Jewish Perspective on Christianity* (New York: Continuum, 1990); N. Stahl ed., *Jesus Among the Jews: Representation and Thought* (London

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- and New York: Routledge, 2012); S. Heschel, *Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 239-242, etc.
- ² Heschel, *Geiger*, 50-75.
- ³ Heschel, *Ibid.*, 127-130.
- ⁴ Heschel, *Ibid.*, 235-237.
- ⁵ Heschel, *Ibid.*
- ⁶ For excerpts of Baeck's words on Christianity, see Rothschild ed., *Jewish Perspective*, 42-108.
- ⁷ M. Buber, *Der Jude und sein Judentum: Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden* (Köln: Joseph Melzer Verlag, 1963), 105. For excerpts of Martin Buber's words on Christianity, see Rothchild, *Ibid.*, 122-153. Particularly see "Introduction" by E. W. Stegemen in Rothschild, *Ibid.*, 111-121.
- ⁸ E. E. Urbach, *The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs* (Cambridge: The Harvard UP, 1987), 34, 95, 258, 289, 293, etc. He contrasts them with Jewish sages in general and Rabbi Akiva.
- ⁹ D. Flusser, *Judaism and the Origins of Christianity* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1988), XVII-XVIII, 23-74.
- ¹⁰ For example, P. Joyce, "Abraham from Christian Perspective," in N. Solomon, R. Harries and T. Winter eds., *Abraham's Children: Jews, Christians and Muslims in Conversation* (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 18-27; Avigdor Shinan, "Ningen Aburahamu no shōgai: Rabi Yudayakyō, Kirisutokyō, Isurāmu ni oite" 「人間アブラハムの生涯:ラビ・ユダヤ教、キリスト教、イスラームにおいて」[The Life of the Man Abraham as Reflected in Ancient Jewish, Christian and Muslim Literature] *Yudaya gaku kaigi*『ユダヤ学会議』[CISMOR Conference on Jewish Studies], vol. 4 (2011), 72-90.
- ¹¹ R. Bieringer and D. Pollefeyt eds., *Paul and Judaism: Crosscurrents in Pauline Exegesis and the Study of Jewish-Christian Relations* (London, New York: T&T Clark, 2012); G. Boccaccini and C. A. Segovia eds., *Paul the Jew: Reading the Apostle as Figure of Second Temple Judaism* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016); K. Stendahl, *Paul among Jews and Gentiles* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1976), and many other works.
- ¹² Regarding the developments in Paul research after World War II and their background, see R. Bieringer and D. Pollefeyt, "Prologue: Wrestling with Jewish Paul," in R. Bieringer and D. Pollefeyt eds., *Paul and Judaism*, 1-14.
- ¹³ R. Halperin, *Atlas Eytz Chayim* vol.4 (Tel Aviv: Hotsat haqadesh Ruach Yaqov, 1980).
- ¹⁴ Kohelet Rabbah 7.8.1. In this episode Deutscher sees a prototype for a model of a "non-Jewish Jew" who transcends the Jewish world and is active for all of humanity. I. Isaac Deutscher, *Hi Yudayateki Yudayajin*『非ユダヤ的ユダヤ人』[*Non-Jewish Jew*], trans. Suzuki Ichirō 鈴木一郎 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1970), 35-36. Translation of *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968).
- ¹⁵ Tosefta Chullin 2.24, Jerusalem Talmud Sabbath 14.4, 14d, etc.
- ¹⁶ In Babylonian Talmud Hagigah 14b, there is a story about four wise men who enter a *pardes* (orchard). One of them was Rabbi Akiva, who returned safely. The other three are said to have deviated from the road in some way, in other words, turned to heretical thought. Rabbi Elisha was one of them.
- ¹⁷ This and the translation that follows are the New English Translation (<https://lumina.bible.org>). Accessed December 12th, 2016.

- ¹⁸ Katsumata Etsuko 勝又悦子, “Yudayakyō ni okeru jiyū” 「ユダヤ教における自由」 [Freedom in Judaism], *Kirisutokyō kenkyū* 『基督教研究』 [*Studies in Christianity*] 77:1 (2015), 1-23.
- ¹⁹ Katsumata Etsuko 勝又悦子, “Rabi Yudayakyō bunken ni mirareru Rabi to mīnīmu (ikyōto, itansha) no taiwa” 「ラビ・ユダヤ教文献に見られるラビとミーニム（異教徒、異端者）の対話」 [Dialogues Between Rabbis and *Minim* [Non-Jews, Heretics] in Rabbinic Literature] (2004 Academic Year 2nd Research Meeting in Tokyo “Isshinkyō no saikō to bunmei no taiwa” 「一神教の再考と文明の対話」 [Reconsidering Monotheism and Dialogues Between Civilizations], held by Doshisha University’s Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions); Katsumata Etsuko 勝又悦子, “Rabi to mīnīmu: T Chullin 2.20-24, Kohelet R1.8 o chūshin ni” 「ラビとミーニム：T フリン 2・20-24、コヘ R 1・8 を中心に」 [Rabi and *Minim*: Tosefta Chullin 2.20-24; Kohelet R1.8], *Namar Port* 11 (2006), 35-54.
- ²⁰ Quotations from Rabbinical literature in this paper generally use (sometimes with major modifications) the translations available at <https://www.sefaria.org>. Accessed December 12th, 2016.
- ²¹ Mishnah Avodah Zarah 1.4.
- ²² As previously described, in the Mishnah, ‘*oved kokhavim* and its derivatives are used to refer to followers of other religions and foreigners. However, in this Chullin order (volume), we find *nokhri* / foreigner, and *nokhri* and *minim* (which often refers to early Christians) are discussed in relation to each other. This, in turn, would develop into the Tosefta’s discussion of *minim*. Here, we can see that when the term *nokhri* (which does not indicate a plurality of gods) was used to refer to foreigners, *minim*—which was distinguished from ‘*oved kokhavim* (roughly meaning worshippers of multiple gods)—was absorbed into it.
- ²³ Here, we should take note of the *qal vachomer* technique applied at the end of Mishnah Chullin 2.7: using insignificant things to reason about significant ones. In this discussion, intention bringing about the result of invalidity is *qal* (minor things), and intention not bringing about the result of invalidity is *vachomer* (major things). In other words, Rabbinical Judaism faced an issue similar to Paul, in Judaism there was the view that emphasized intention not bringing about the result of invalidity. As a result, a situation became mainstream in Judaism in which while people were cognizant of intention, it did not lead to invalidity, and the religion developed to emphasize carrying out the law more than intention and the like.

Judaism as Presented in Paul's Sayings

Moriyoshi Murayama

1. Introduction

Paul constructed the basis for Christianity as a world religion. However, when he was alive, a “religion” called Christianity did not exist. Of course, it is clear that there were people who believed that Jesus of Nazareth was Christ (the savior), in other words, people with Christian faith. However, these early period individuals were Jews that formed the core of the group of Jesus’ disciples. It appears that the activities of these individuals unfolded entirely as a sect of Judaism. Therefore, we could call the group of early period Christian believers the Nazareth sect or Jesus sect.¹

Before conversion, Paul persecuted Christians. As a Pharisee, he did study the law, and was proud that he was perfect and “blameless”² in terms of its observance (Phil 3:4-6; Gal 1:13-14). However, after his conversion he came to see it all as a “loss” and “rubbish” (Phil 3:7-8). At the time, in addition to the Pharisees, there was a large number of sects within Judaism: from the Herodians, Sadducees, Essenes (out of which apparently came the Qumran community), and Zealots to the extremist Sicarii. Furthermore, there was also the Baptism movement (the most well-known member of which was John the Baptist) and the apocalyptical enthusiasts.³ These groups, each offered various interpretations about the Torah (law). In other words, Judaism was not monolithic. However, at the same time, one can find shared theologies between these sects. E.P Sanders explains that the greatest common denominator shared by the various sects of Judaism at the time was that “history had a direction and God was in charge. Thus, they thought that sometime, some way, he would intervene in history and improve the lot of his chosen people.”⁴ This view of history can also be applied to the Jewish Paul.

In the case of Paul,⁵ his experience of conversion led him to have an unshakable faith that Jesus of Nazareth is Christ (the “anointed one” or *mashiach* in Hebrew, the messiah; Gal 3:23-25).⁶ He acquired confidence that, with the coming of the Messiah, history had entered its climax and was heading towards the “eschaton” (1Thess 4:17; Rom 13:11). However, Christ had ascended to heaven and “God’s kingdom” had not yet

been established. Furthermore, believers in Christ, who had physical bodies, had not yet achieved resurrection (Phil 3:10-11; Rom 8:23). In fact, some of them were dying (1Thess 4:13-14). Facing this reality, Paul came to think that strong patience is necessary until the approaching end. Furthermore, he also adopted the view that ultimately when Christ returns those who endured until then would be resurrected. He thus took the view that the present was an intermediary stage between the arrival of the Messiah and his second coming.

This was, of course, a first experience for Paul. Furthermore, it appears that there was no systematic theology in Judaism that discussed an interim period between the Messiah's arrival and the climax (end) of history.⁷ It was necessary for Paul himself to consider how to live in such a period. In the Pauline Epistles, we find a record of some of this as I further discuss.

I have titled this paper "Judaism as Presented in Paul's Sayings." Thus, the Pauline Epistles—the materials which I will be using—are written from Paul's unique perspective (Christian belief, his conversion experience, and the interim period until the "eschaton"). From these perspectives, he reinterprets Judaism, which is regarded Pauline theology. However, today I rather consider and discuss the theological thought that Paul himself carried over from before his conversion, that is God's judgment, law observance, conferment of God's words, "chosen people" thought, sense of belonging, etc.; the theology that the various schools of Judaism shared during his time (covenantal nomism); and Paul's scriptural (Old Testament) quotations. My consideration of these topics will be today my answer regarding the question how Paul viewed Judaism.

2. Universalism in Early Judaism⁸

One of the theological ideas that Paul inherited from Judaism was regarding foreigner's pilgrimage or the worship of God by foreigners. It is important in that it served as a driving force for his missionizing activities after his conversion.

In the Prophets, it is written that when the twelve tribes of Israel come together at the climax of history (the eschaton, the appearance of the Messiah, the final judgment, the appearance of new heavens and a new earth, etc.), foreigners will also come together to go on a pilgrimage, and both groups will praise and worship God together. For example: "In days to come the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established as the highest of the mountains, and shall be raised above the hills; all the nations shall stream to it. Many peoples shall come and say, 'Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord,

to the house of the God of Jacob; that he may teach us his ways and that we may walk in his paths.' For out of Zion shall go forth instruction, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. He shall judge between the nations, and shall arbitrate for many peoples; they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isa 2:2-4; Mic 4:1-3; Isa 60:10-14). Furthermore, foreigners bringing gifts (treasures) to Zion was a sign of the eschaton that Jewish people had looked forward to, from the time of the prophets (Isa 60:6 "They shall bring gold and frankincense." 60:10 "Foreigners shall build up your walls, and their kings shall minister to you." 61:5 "Strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, foreigners shall till your land and dress your vines." Also, see Ps 72:10, 11, 15). In Matthew's story of Jesus's birth, foreign scholars (of astrology) present treasures to an infant Jesus. We can see that Matthew depicted the birth of the Christ the Messiah using this motif from the Old Testament.

Paul does not directly quote the text regarding foreigner's pilgrimage (Isa 2:2-4; 60:10-14). However, while quoting multiple Old Testament passages he does describe in Rom 15:7-13 how foreigners will praise and worship God along with Jews (Rom 15:9=Ps 18:49, Rom 15:10=Deut 32:43, Rom 15:11=Ps 117:1, Rom 15:12=Isa 11:10. See also Rom 15:21=Isa 52:15 <the Servant Song> Isa 52:13-53:12).⁹ Of course, in some Jewish groups there were people who looked down on foreigners, declaring that they would be ruined (i.e., 1QM 11-12, Jub 15:25-34; 22:16-24, etc.).

Old Testament texts describing foreigners going on a pilgrimage and worshipping God do not concretely explain the basis for foreigners being accepted. While there was conversion to Judaism (via circumcision; as in Jdt 14:10, Joseph. *Ant* 20.17-48, etc.), it appears that there were no legal interpretations (*halakha* interpretations) dictating conditions for foreigner's joining "God's chosen people" at the "climax of history." Of course, foreigners would have had to worship Israel's God as the sole God. However, it is unclear what else was asked of them.

Paul did not demand anything but monotheism and Christian belief from foreigners (he does not require that they be circumcised and become Jewish), thus revising an important part of the traditional Jewish theology that he had inherited. Paul asserted that even if foreigners were not circumcised they could be part of God's chosen people just with Christian belief, and as a result he would develop the ultimate universalism. This has been highly acclaimed in the world of Christianity as one of Paul's achievements: constructing the foundation for Christianity as a world religion. However, a universalism with an eye to the salvation of foreigners could also already be found in Judaism.

First, the Old Testament discusses the universality of sin and of God's grace. The former is clear in the story of Adam and Eve as well as that of Noah, and the latter in that of Abraham. It is the role of Abraham's descendants to act as a mediator for God's grace for all peoples of the world (Gen12:3; 18:18; 22:18; 26:4; 28:14). Paul touches upon the story of Abraham in Galatians (Chapter 3) and Romans (Chapter 4) to discuss justification by faith because he found the universality of God's grace in this story. Furthermore, the Prophet Jeremiah (7th c. – 6th c. BCE) is appointed "to be a prophet to the nations" (Jer 1:5), and given "authority" over "nations and kingdoms" (Jer1:10). This can be seen as an expression of a view of God as ruling over the whole world and thus universal; it is not limiting the Jewish God to one group of people. This view (a universalistic understanding of God) is also expressed in Isa 2:2-4, Isa 41, and Isa 56. Furthermore, in Jeremiah, one finds the concept of circumcision of the heart, which is contrasted with the "circumcision of the flesh" that is a symbol of being a person of the covenant (Jer 4:4; 9:25; cf. 31:33 "I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts.") In Deuteronomy 10:16 we also find "Circumcise, then, the foreskin of your heart, and do not be stubborn any longer," and in 30:6 "God will circumcise your heart." We should note that we find discussion of the internal aspects of belief when observing the law. In the Book of Jubilees, an Old Testament pseudepigrapha (ca. 2nd century BCE), we find, "I shall cut off the foreskin of their heart and the foreskin of the heart of their descendants" (1:23).¹⁰ Paul probably inherited this concept and thus discussed it in Romans saying how "real circumcision is a matter of the heart" (Rom 2:29).

Of course, in Paul's universal understanding of God the only condition for joining is Christian faith. However, the majority of other Jews appear to have made law observance a condition for joining (primarily circumcision and Sabbath and dietary restrictions) (Isa 56:2-7 "who keeps the Sabbath, not profaning it . . . and hold fast my covenant," Isa 58:13 "If you refrain from trampling the Sabbath . . . if you call the Sabbath a delight," Isa 66:23 " . . . From new moon to new moon, and from Sabbath to Sabbath, all flesh shall come to worship before me, says the Lord.") On the other hand, we find Jewish texts that as a result of seeking dialogue and peaceful relationships with surrounding people, do not recommend law observance centered on Jewish customs but rather the universal or general ethical virtues of the time. For example, The Book of Tobit teaches primarily about almsgiving, respect for the dead, duty to one's parents, and Wisdom of Sirach (ca. beginning of 2nd c. BCE), while not doing away with ethnic traditions, is critical of the narrowness of Jewish ethnicity. This is part of the tradition of wisdom

literature that includes Ecclesiastes, the Book of Job, and the Book of Proverbs. We could say that there was a desire to enlighten people inside and outside of Judaism regarding the universal nature of the religion by discussing issues and wisdom that transcend ethnic boundaries and are universal to humanity. Of course, it is emphasized that the source of wisdom is God.

In Rom 2:14-15, Paul also clearly states that foreigners can share the ethics taught by the law, arguing that even if foreigners do not keep the law, what is demanded by it, is written in their hearts. If they carry it out naturally they themselves are the law. The law in this context refers to ethical and moral teachings; it is hard to think that foreigners would naturally carry out circumcision and observe rules regarding diet, cleanliness, and the Sabbath. While Paul does not distinguish between ritual law and ethical law, at the very least it appears that he had in mind a universal ethical law that could be shared with foreigners and was distinct from dietary, cleanliness, and Sabbath restrictions. In fact, Rom 2:15 touches upon qualms of “conscience” (*syneidēsis*). Furthermore, in Rom 2:26-29, he discusses being Jewish externally and internally, emphasizing that not external circumcision (ritual law) but internal circumcision (ethical law) is important.

When seen in this way, it is apparent that Paul’s universalistic thought was a carryover from the Old Testament. He did not have a monopoly on it. However, as already noted above, there were differences of opinion regarding the conditions for admission of foreigners. Even though the Book of Tobit and the wisdom literature in general, emphasize universal ethical virtues, this does not mean that their authors completely did away with the “chosen people” idea or with ethnicity.¹¹

However, did Paul leave behind such thinking? With this question in mind let us turn to our next discussion.

3. Judaism from Paul’s Viewpoint

Next, I will consider not the Judaism Paul reinterpreted based on Christian faith or the events surrounding Christ, but textual evidence in which he touches upon Judaism, Jewish people, and the law from a comparatively neutral position.¹²

(1) God’s Judgment (Rom 2:6-8)

“For he will repay according to each one’s deeds: to those who by patiently doing good seek for glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life; while for those who are self-seeking and who obey not the truth but wickedness, there will be wrath and

fury.”

While the relationship between good works and eternal life is also found in stories about Jesus (e. g. “The Rich Man” in Mark 10:17-22), Paul does not reject ethical law but rather advocates it, warning that in the final judgment ethical acts will be judged. In the above passage the relationship between acts and final judgment is clear. This is an important point when understanding Paul’s ideas regarding justification by faith. In other words, Paul recommends action (good works). In other places, as well, he clearly makes the same statement (1Cor 3:13; 4:3-5; Rom 2:16; 1Thess 5:6-11. See also 1Cor 6:9-10; 11:31-32; 2Cor 1:14; Phil 2:14-16).

(2) Observance of the Law (Rom 2:17-25)

“But if you call yourself a Jew [*Ioudaios*] and rely on the law and boast of your relation to God and know his will and determine what is best because you are instructed in the law, and if you are sure that you are a guide to the blind, a light to those who are in darkness, a corrector of the foolish, a teacher of children, having in the law the embodiment of knowledge and truth, you, then, that teach others, will you not teach yourself? While you preach against stealing, do you steal? You that forbid adultery, do you commit adultery? You that abhor idols, do you rob temples? You that boast in the law, do you dishonor God by breaking the law? For, as it is written, ‘The name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you.’ Circumcision indeed is of value if you obey the law; but if you break the law, your circumcision has become uncircumcision.”

The above passage states that being Jewish and the teachings of the law are indivisible, as well as touches upon Moses’ Ten Commandments. Righteousness by the law is mentioned in Rom 10:5 (“Moses writes concerning the righteousness that comes from the law [*tēn dikaiosynēn tēn ek tou nomou*], that ‘the person who does these things will live by them’” [Lev 18:5 (LXX)]) and Phil 3:5-6 (“[I have more:] circumcised on the eighth day, a member of the people of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin, a Hebrew born of Hebrews; as to the law, a Pharisee; as to zeal, a persecutor of the church; as to righteousness under the law [*kata dikaiosynēn tēn en nomō*], I was blameless.”).

(3) Entrustment of the Words of God (Rom 3:1-2)

“Then what advantage has the Jew [*Ioudaios*]? Or what is the value of circumcision? Much, in every way. For in the first place the Jews were entrusted with the oracles of God [*ta logia tou theou*].”

“The oracles of God” designation refers to the words which God gave through

Moses and the prophets. *Logion* (the diminutive of *logos* or “words”) means “the Old Testament’s revelation and promises: entrustment, God’s responses, God’s statements, and, sometimes, the Old Testament as a whole.”¹³ While Paul says that there are many advantages to being Jewish, he actually does not point them out in his discussion that follows. Furthermore, he also does not concretely provide any answers about the benefits of circumcision. However, he connects benefits, circumcision, and God’s entrustment of the “oracles.” We find here a view that Jews preferentially enjoy their status as the chosen people, their covenant with God, various religious rules, and prophecies.

The question of Rom 3:1 is presented by an imagined conversation partner, and is in response to the discussion that immediately precedes it (2:28-29). The aim of this discussion is to relativize what could be called Jews in appearance—those who have been given the law in the form of circumcision and texts—and commend those who are Jewish “internally.” In response, the imaginary partner is forced to inquire about the meaning of “Jew” and “circumcision.” The technique of making arguments with an imagined partner is called *diatribē*,¹⁴ and was used by groups of philosophers at the time.

(4) Chosen People (Rom 9:4-5a. Also see 11:1, 28-29)

“[They] are Israelites, and to them belong the adoption [*hyothesia*], the glory [*doxa*], the covenants [*diathēkai*], the giving of the law [*nomothesia*], the worship [*latreia*], and the promises [*epangeliai*]; to them belong the patriarchs, and from them, according to the flesh, comes the Messiah.”

Nomothesia means “the establishment or giving of the law, a legal code.”¹⁵ Paul uses not the normal word *nomos* but *nomothesia*. Why is this? Furthermore, *nomothesia* appears only once in the New Testament. It appears that he did that for stylistic reasons: making the passage rhyme. In it we find six terms: the adoption, the glory, the covenants, the giving of the law, the worship, and the promises. All words are feminine singular or plural nouns, and end with either *a* or *ai*: the adoption (*hyothesia*), the glory (*doxa*), the covenants (*diathēkai*), the giving of the law (*nomothesia*), the worship (*latreia*), and the promises (*epangeliai*). If *nomos*—the word normally used to mean “law”—was used, the rhyming scheme would be thrown off.

Latreia means temple worship (including sacrificial rituals) (Heb 9:6), worshiping the sole God Yahweh as written on the first tablet of the Ten Commandments.¹⁶ Furthermore, after this passage Paul reinterprets *latreia* to mean the worship offered by the Christian faithful: “[P]resent your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to

God, which is your spiritual worship [*latreia*]” (Rom 12:1). Furthermore, he represents foreign converts as worship offerings with himself as the priest (Rom 15:16 “to be a minister of Christ Jesus to the Gentiles in the priestly service of the gospel of God, so that the offering of the Gentiles may be acceptable, sanctified by the Holy Spirit.”) It is rather interesting that Paul metaphorically uses Jewish temple worship to discuss the worship and missionary activities of believers in Christ.

The terms “glory,” “covenant,” “law,” and “worship” were recognized by both Jews and non-Jews as expressing the characteristics of early Judaism. In other words, “glory” means belief in the one God, “covenant” refers to Israel as the people of God’s covenant, “giving of the law” or the bestowal of the law to Moses as rules for these people of the covenant (as we have seen, observing the law and law-based righteousness appeared to always be an important concept for Paul, and we should note that he mentions it here as well), and “worship” that refers to belief in the one God as well as rituals for atonement and pardon and God’s temple.¹⁷

Hyothesia means “to adopt, adoption, and the status of being an adoptee.”¹⁸ While it can be understood to mean “sons of God,” it does not have the prefix *theo*. This concept is not a major one in the Old Testament, but it can be found (Exod 4:22 “Then you shall say to Pharaoh, ‘Thus says the Lord: “Israel is my firstborn son . . .”’ Hos 11:1 “When Israel was a child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son.”) Matthew, who appears to have been a Jewish follower of Christ, quotes Hos 11:1 in the story of Jesus’ birth during the episode about Jesus fleeing to and returning from Egypt (Matt 2:15).

(5) Sense of Belonging (Rom 9:3; 11:14)

“For the sake of my own people, my kindred according to the flesh [*kata sarka*]” (Rom 9:3), “in order to make my own people [*mou tēn sarka*] jealous” (Rom 11:14).

We should note that Paul uses “flesh [*sarx*]” (Rom 9:3; 11:14 / the Hebrew *bāsār*), which means “same tribe, blood relatives, blood relations, and flesh-based relations.” It is clear that Paul has an ethnic identity as a Jewish person. Furthermore, in Phil 3:4-5 he boasts of his origins, again using “flesh [*sarx*].” In 2 Co 11:22 he lists being “Hebrews,” “Israelites,” and “descendants of Abraham” as something people can be proud of.

(6) Other

Summarizing the Law

Rom 13:8-10 “Owe no one anything, except to love one another; for the one who loves another has fulfilled the law. The commandments, ‘You shall not commit adultery;

You shall not murder; You shall not steal; You shall not covet;’; and any other commandment, are summed up in these words, ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ Love does no wrong to a neighbor; therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law.” Gal 5:14 “For the whole law is summed up in a single commandment, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’”

Here the law is summarized up with an ethical precept. This can also be seen in the words and actions of Jesus. Mark 12:29-31: “The first is, ‘Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God, the Lord is one; you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength.’ The second is this, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’ There is no other commandment greater than these.” Furthermore, we can find the law summarized in the same way in Matt 7:12 (the so-called “Golden Rule”): “In everything, do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the prophets.” Such summaries can also be found in the statements of Rabbi Hillel (b. *shabb.* 31A) and the Book of Tobit (4:15). However, here we find the negative version of the Golden Rule: the Book of Tobit 4:15 states, “And what you hate, do not do to anyone.”¹⁹ Such summaries of the law are efforts to grasp the spirit of the law rather than summarize its various precepts, and were a part of Jewish theology at the time.²⁰ Here it can be seen that Paul overlapped with the tradition of the Jewish rabbis (teachers) Hillel and Jesus.

Using the word *Ioudaismos* (Jews), Paul says that he was “far more zealous for the traditions of my ancestors” (Gal 1:14), and mentions following dietary and purity rules with the phrase “like a Jew [*Ioudaikōs*], . . . live like Jews [*ioudaizō*]” (Gal 2:14).²¹ From his usage of these terms we can see that for Paul, Judaism was cherishing the traditions of the ancestors and maintaining on a daily basis certain characteristics or customs.

4. Theology Shared with Early Period Judaism

At the beginning of this paper I emphasized the diversity of Judaism at the time of Paul, still one can also find theology common to its sects. E. P. Sanders points out six of them.²² Of these I will introduce the ones that contributed the most to research on Paul and exerted the greatest influence on its subsequent development. Sanders’ discussion brought about a major paradigm shift in Paul studies.

In order to carry out research on Paul, it is necessary not only to look at the correspondence that he left behind, but also know about the Judaism of his time. This is

because by considering his position vis-à-vis this Judaism we can understand the characteristics of his theology. Before Sanders' research there was a strong prejudice against Judaism. Particularly Protestant biblical scholars tended to look at Paul and the Judaism of his time, from a biased viewpoint, partially due to the influence of Lutheran theology. In other words, they thought the mature, wonderful, and refined religion of Christianity emerged with Jesus and Paul as its major actors in order to correct Judaism's emphasis on deeds, justification by works, and formalism. They saw it as a poor and inferior religion that did not value the actual content of faith.

While there were attempts to rectify this incorrect and prejudiced view of Judaism (Jews), Sanders' research developed the most persuasive argument and is still influential today. Sanders argued that from around 200 BCE to 200 CE Judaism was not simply legalism but a covenantal nomism.²³ By closely examining Rabbinical texts, the Dead Sea Scrolls (Qumran community), and Old Testament apocrypha and pseudepigrapha, he found in Jewish theology a covenantal nomist pattern. His research thus demonstrated that Judaism was a religion with a system of grace and redemption, and that law observance was to maintain membership in the saved group of God's people rather than a means of attaining God's blessings or salvation. By doing so he rectified to some extent the biases towards Judaism that had existed.

Covenantal nomism is "the view that one's place in God's plan is established on the basis of the covenant and that the covenant requires as the proper response of man his obedience to its commandments, while providing means of atonement for transgression. . . . *obedience maintains one's position in the covenant, but it does not earn God's grace as such.* . . . Righteousness in Judaism is a term which implies the maintenance of status among the group of the elect."²⁴

God chose Israelites as the chosen people and a covenant was formed between them. By following the law given at that time, Jews renewed it. This covenantal nomism was central thought that formed the core of a diverse Judaism, and shaped the ethnic identity (self-understanding) of the Jewish people. Following the law was not a means to enter into a covenant with God, but rather necessary as norms that dictated and maintained the relationship of Jews with God that was established by the covenant. Therefore, the law was not for obtaining salvation but rather a means by which Jews already saved by God's grace maintained their covenant relationship with Him. The image of Judaism presented by Sanders considerably differed from that of scholarship on Judaism—particularly that by Protestant biblical scholars. Judaism at the time did not preach the acquisition of salvation via accumulating good works (the acquisition of righteousness). Sanders

pointed on the inaccuracy of previous understandings of Paul's idea of justification by faith and law criticism.

However, even if, as Sanders asserts, Judaism is a covenantal nomism, I do not think that Judaism completely rejects the cause-effect relationship that law observance gains merits. When good acts only are emphasized with the aim of maintaining the status as one who has entered into the covenant, it appears that there are cases in which one falls into what could be called "justification by maintaining one's status within a chosen group," in other words, justification by works. One comes to praise the deeds that one can renew and maintain one's status as a partner in a covenant. However, as Sanders argues, since Jews are already saved as chosen people, this does not mean that one obtains salvation or God's grace by acts. Followers of Judaism are redeemed by God, and respond to the blessing of this redemption by observing the law, and their covenantal relationship with God is renewed and maintained. Paul also adopted this way of thinking, and after his conversion his Christian faith would function as its axis.

5. Paul's Quotations from the Old Testament

As I have already touched upon, in Rom 15:7-13, Paul describes how foreigners will praise and worship God along with Jews while using multiple Old Testament passages. At the beginning of the Romans he shows a strong interest in explaining that God's gospel is based on the holy scriptures (Old Testament).

In Rom 1:2-3a, he states, "[the gospel of God], which he promised beforehand through his prophets in the holy scriptures [*en graphais hagiais*], the gospel concerning his Son." Paul normally refers to "scripture" in the singular, using the word *graphē* (Rom 4:3, Gal 3:8), but here he is doing so in the plural with *graphai* (in 1Cor 15:3-4 he also quotes testimony for Jesus's resurrection and uses *graphai*). Many scholars believe that he is quoting an early period Christian tradition (a formula for professing faith). Even if it is quoting such a tradition, the fact that he is quoting a formula that includes this kind of content shows us how Paul is trying to base the "gospel" on Israel's holy text (scripture).²⁵

In the authentic letters of Paul, one can count around ninety Old Testament quotations (this figure varies slightly depending on the scholar). Over fifty of these are in Romans. This indicates the extent to which Paul would think while in close conversation with the Old Testament. Furthermore, we can see from the materials that have been distributed²⁶ that many of his quotations use introductory phrases indicating that they

are written somewhere else: that Isaiah announced what follows, that Moses wrote what follows, and so on. Many of his quotations match or resemble the Septuagint (Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible). Quotations from Genesis and Psalms match the Septuagint frequently. Quotations that do not are probably from currently unknown Old Testament manuscripts. There are only three quotations that match the Masoretic Text (Hebrew scriptures), rather than the Septuagint (Rom 11:34; 1Cor 3:19; 2Cor 8:15).

In the letter to the Romans Paul discusses the relationship of God's act of salvation (justification) and Israel. In the discussion, he demonstrates how the "gospel" is the fulfillment of God's promise (or promised words), which was given to Israel. That explains why there are so many quotations from the Old Testament in the letter.²⁷

6. Summary

Paul reinterpreted Judaism and the Old Testament as a Jew who had faith in Christ after conversion. In fourth century Christianity became the religion of the Roman Empire, and subsequently it would strengthen its foundation as a world religion. Much tension and many conflicts and disputes unfolded between it and Judaism in European and American history. We are a living extension of history, and as such, we cannot help but avoid interpreting Paul's thought based on these circumstances. However, Paul has not experienced this history. To the end he was a Jew with faith in Christ who reinterpreted Judaism. For Paul Judaism was a basis that cultivated his flesh and blood as a Jew and a believer in God. With regard to this point he does not completely reject the ideas of the chosen people and ethnicity. After his conversion, for Paul, Judaism became the historical background for faith-based righteousness and missionizing foreigners.

Through his experience of conversion he gained Christian faith and was able to make a leap (acquire a membership as one of God's people that does not require observance of the law) with his eyes fixed on the future (the climax of history or the eschaton). When reconsidering Judaism, his conversion experience (religious mystical experience) became his paradigm, and he then reinterpreted Judaism within a theoretical framework based on it. In this regard, for Paul, faith in Christ acted as a springboard for that leap. While sometimes there is forced logical leaps in his writings, the primary cause of this was his springboard. However, Judaism continued to exist as the basis that was his flesh and blood.

Notes

- * This is a revised presentation manuscript from the presentation “Judaism as Presented in Paul’s Sayings” originally given at the public lecture meeting “Paul and Judaism” at Doshisha University on September 24th, 2016, which was part of the “Jews and Judaism in Japanese Research” project’s fourth research meeting “Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity” (held by the Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (= CISMOR), and Doshisha University’s School of Theology, Graduate School of Theology). Since this article was originally written for Japanese readers, the footnotes include bibliographical notes relating to Japanese language and works written in Japanese.
- ¹ Satō Migaku calls early Christians “the Jesus sect of Judaism” (*Yudayakyō iesu-ha* ユダヤ教イエス派) movement (Satō Migaku 佐藤研, “Maegaki” 「まえがき」 [Forward], in *Seishojidaishi shin'yakuhen* 『聖書時代史 新約篇』 [*Bible Era History: New Testament Volume*] [Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2003], p. vi). According to sixth century material, during the era of Evotius, the first bishop of Antioch, Christian believers were called *Christianos*, however until then they had been called Nazarenes or Galileans (Hosaka Takaya 保坂高殿, *Rōmateiseishoki no Yudaya-Kirisutokyō hakugai* 『ローマ帝政初期のユダヤ・キリスト教迫害』 [*Persecution of Jews and Christians During the Early Roman Empire*] [Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 2006 (2nd Edition)], p. 186).
 - ² Bible quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version (Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 1989).
 - ³ Martin Hengel, *Sauro: Kirisutokyō kaishin izen no Pauro* 『サウロ キリスト教回心以前のパウロ』 [*Saul: Paul Before His Conversion to Christianity*], trans. by Umemoto Naoto 梅本直人 (Tokyo: Nihon Kirisutokyōdan Shuppanyoku, 2011), p. 103. Translation of *The Pre-Christian Paul* (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1981).
 - ⁴ E. P. Sanders, “Paul,” in *Early Christian Thought in Its Jewish Context*, John Barclay and John Sweet eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 113-114. However, the Sadducees, who did not believe in resurrection, angels, or souls (Act 23:8), respected humans’ free will and did not believe in fate, according to Joseph (*The Jewish War* 2.165). Therefore, we can imagine that the Sadducees did not think that God ruled history. However, we cannot completely deny the possibility that some Sadducees believed based on the Bible and their faith in God that God would intervene to save His “chosen people” (E. P. Sanders, *Judaism: Practice and Belief 63BCE-66CE* [London: SCM Press, 1992], pp. 287-288).
 - ⁵ Regarding the diverse visions of the future held by the various schools, see Sanders, *Judaism*, pp. 279-303. For example, the Sadducees, who did not accept fatalism and emphasized humans’ free will, probably did not expect much from God’s intervention, and there were groups that earnestly desired the glorious independence of the Jewish people based on military force (the Zealots, Sicarii, etc.) as well as people who were confident that like the Exodus from Egypt, God would intervene when they were united in their faith. Furthermore, there were people who hoped that a Jewish state would be peacefully established through their lives of prayer, as well as group that looked forward to two messiahs (a priestly and secular one; 1QS9:11, 1QSa 2).
 - ⁶ *Mashiach* was translated into Greek as *messiās*. The English translation is messiah, and the Japanese translation is *meshia* メシア.

- ⁷ Sanders, "Paul," p. 114.
- ⁸ My discussion in this section relies primarily upon Toki Kenji 土岐健治, *Shoki Yudayakyō no jitsuzō* 『初期ユダヤ教の実像』 [*The Real Picture of Early Period Judaism*] (Tokyo: Shinkyō Shuppansha, 2005), pp. 30-50, 149-54.
- ⁹ Richard B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 70-73.
- ¹⁰ Translation from "Jubilees," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha*, volume 2, ed. J. H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1985).
- ¹¹ Toki, *Shoki Yudayakyō no jitsuzō* [*The Real Picture of Early Period Judaism*], pp. 41-42.
- ¹² I have consulted James D. G. Dunn, *Romans 1-8, 9-16* (Dallas: Word Books, 1988) when interpreting passages in *Romans*.
- ¹³ Oda Akira 織田昭, *Shin'yakuseisho Girishiago shojiten* 『新約聖書ギリシア語小辞典』 [*Glossary of New Testament Greek*] (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 2002).
- ¹⁴ *Diatribē* means "Passing time, recreation, entertainment, work, research, talk, wasting time, a (philosophical) school" (Furukawa Harukaze 古川晴風, ed., *Girishago jiten* 『ギリシア語辞典』 [*Greek Dictionary*] (Tokyo: Daigaku Shorin, 1989)).
- ¹⁵ Oda, *Shin'yakuseisho Girishiago shojiten* [*Glossary of New Testament Greek*].
- ¹⁶ See also Sanders, *Judaism*.
- ¹⁷ Dunn, *Rom 1-8, 9-16*, p. 528.
- ¹⁸ Oda, *Shin'yakuseisho Girishiago shojiten* [*Glossary of New Testament Greek*].
- ¹⁹ Translation from the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books of The Old Testament, New Revised Standard Version (Division of Christian Education of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, 1989).
- ²⁰ Sanders, *Judaism*, p. 259.
- ²¹ James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus, Paul and the Law: Studies in Mark and Galatians* (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), pp. 129-182.
- ²² Sanders, *Judaism*, pp. 241-278. (1) Theology seen in Shema and the first (there is only one God) and second (prohibition of idol worship) commandment (Ex 20:3-4; Deut 5:7-8). Theology of (1) derives the following (2) ~ (5), and (6) summarizes several important aspects of Jewish theology. (2) is the creator God and His ruling over history, (3) sacrificial ritual theology, (4) summarizing the law, (5) theology of prayer, (6) covenantal nomism / (covenantism / legalism).
- ²³ Satō Migaku proposes the Japanese translation of *keiyakuteki junpōshugi* 契約的遵法主義 for this term (Satō Migaku 佐藤研, *Hajimari no Kirisutokyō* 『はじまりのキリスト教』 [*Early Christianity*] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2010), p. 204).
- ²⁴ E. P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1977) pp. 75, 420, 544. For a Japanese translation, see James D.G. Dunn, *Shin'yakugaku no atarashii shiten* 『新約学の新しい視点』 [*The New Perspective in New Testament Studies*], trans. by Yamada Kōta 山田耕太 (Tokyo: Sugu Shobō, 1986), p. 53.
- ²⁵ Hays, *Echoes of Scripture*, p. 34.
- ²⁶ D. A. Carson and H. G. M. Williamson, eds., *It Is Written: Scripture Citing Scripture*

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 268-272.

²⁷ Hays, *Echoes of Scripture*, p. 34.

**Sacrifice, Religion and Nation:
Essentials for Peace-building in the Age of Terror¹**

Katsuhiko Kohara

Abstract:

“Sacrifice” is one of the keywords that require serious consideration when discussing specific aspects of war and peace, because the concept of sacrifice has often been used to raise nationalism and justify war. The act of dying for some noble cause is sometimes regarded as justifiable. In fact, people who died for their country during war were praised for their noble sacrifices. Similarly, people who die for God are praised as martyrs. The logic in praising death for some noble mission is embraced by both nations and religions, and this commonality has often led to the combination of nationalism and religion. In other words, religions can serve to complement the logic of sacrifice required by a nation. To address such a logic of sacrifice, pacifism should be more substantial than mere idealism. In this paper, I will discuss the relationship among nations, religions and war, centering on the keyword of “sacrifice.” I will also examine idolatry as a logic used to justify sacrifice, and offer perspectives we should adopt to achieve peace.

Keywords:

peace, violence, sacrifice, nation, idolatry

Therefore, I urge you, brothers and sisters, in view of God's mercy, to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God—this is your true and proper worship. (Romans 12:1)

1. Introduction: Reflection on the 70 Years following the End of World War II

1-1. Germany and Japan in Prewar Days

To commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, issues relating to the war have been the focus of many TV programs and various discussions in Japan in 2015. However, we cannot fully explore the meaning of the war that Japan fought simply by reflecting on these 70 years. As the period of war is closely associated with the history of the modernization of Japan, we must take into consideration the process of development of Japan as a modern nation that started with the Meiji Restoration in 1868.

I would like to say a few words about the relationship between Japan and Germany. While Japan was allied with Germany during World War II, Germany had had a huge influence on Japan even before the war. Simply put, Germany was one of the exemplary models for Japan to follow in its modernization process. The Meiji government placed the highest priority on modernizing the nation to catch up with the Western great powers and dispatched missions to the U.S. and Europe. Japanese intellectuals who were sent to Prussia (present-day Germany) took note of the fact that Kaiser Wilhelm had the support of the Lutheran Church and both were closely associated with each other. They decided that this relationship in Germany between politics and religion could be usefully applied to the Japanese political system that centered on the Emperor. In this way, not only the German Constitution provided a model for the Constitution of the Empire of Japan before the war, but also the German political theology had a significant influence on the relationship between politics and religion in Japan. Needless to say, the religion that played a central role in Japan was not Christianity, but Shinto (State Shinto), which connected the Emperor and the Japanese people as an ethical code of the nation.

This reveals one of the important points that must be taken into consideration when discussing the issue of peace. In both Germany and Japan, nationalism was linked to religion, which consequently led to the involvement of the religious community in the war. In both countries, there were people who were opposed to their country going to war, but they were in the minority and many of them were suppressed. These historic events teach us that to attain peace, we should not allow religion to be used as a tool of

narrow-minded nationalism.

1-2. Japan in Postwar Days: The Constitution of Japan and Article 9

After World War II, Japan enacted a new constitution with an article stipulating that “Japanese people forever renounce war ... and land, sea, and air forces ... will never be maintained.” The spirit of the Preamble and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan has been the keystone of postwar pacifism of Japan. In 2015, however, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party reinterpreted Article 9 and submitted national security-related bills to give more power to the Self-Defense Forces, triggering huge protest movements in various parts of Japan. Though these bills were eventually passed into law, the protest movements against the government made a meaningful contribution by stimulating heated discussions among Japanese people and helping to renew our awareness of the significance of Article 9 and the no-war pledge.

While the provision of Article 9 renouncing war itself might concern Japanese people only, the ideal of pacifism enshrined in this article is relevant to other countries, too. We should develop an understanding of the origins of the pacifist thought embodied in Article 9 in the wider context of human history, so that we can see that pacifism is not a domestic issue of Japan, but is a universal issue affecting all humanity.

Though Christianity has had only a small influence on Japan, the pacifist thought upheld by Article 9 has something in common with Christian pacifism. It should also be noted that pacifism has stemmed from versatile ideological sources, although it has never been a mainstream thought in human history. For example, the Indian tradition of ahimsa, or nonviolence towards all living things, was inherited by Buddhism and prevailed throughout East Asia. In the 20th century, Mahatma Gandhi put the idea of ahimsa into practice in leading the nonviolent resistance movement. Early Christians struggled to practice nonviolence in a manner faithful to the teachings of Jesus and persevered through the hardships of persecution. After Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, the pacifist thought was removed from the main thrust of the doctrine. However, this thought was consistently maintained by minority sects of Christianity until the 20th century when Martin Luther King, Jr. led the civil rights movement, upholding the principle of nonviolence. Also, the works of Leo Tolstoy and other pacifist novelists, as well as the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (especially his *Perpetual Peace*), gave Japanese intellectuals in the modern age the opportunity to think about pacifism. With an understanding of the pacifism embodied in Article 9 in the light of these historical backgrounds, we can clearly see that pacifism does not reflect the Japanese historical

context alone, but is a universal issue affecting all humanity.

1-3. Just War Theory: The Justification of War as a Necessary Evil

However, the validity of pacifism has been questioned by many, both in Japan and abroad. Especially in international politics, pacifism is regarded simply as an idealistic thought and is rarely even discussed. An overwhelming majority of countries around the world keep military forces in the belief that military power enables them to defend their people and deter possible attacks by enemies. Seen from this standpoint, we could say that not all wars are wrong and that some wars are necessary to establish peace. This is called the “just war theory,” which is supported by most countries. Even the United Nations embraces this idea, and has occasionally resolved to resort to military intervention when a humanitarian crisis is occurring.

In the United States, the A-bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been seen as exemplary cases of the just war theory: the A-bombings were considered necessary to bring peace and thus justifiable. In recent years, there is growing criticism among American people that the A-bombings were inhumane, but a majority of them still believe that the bombings were justified.

The just war theory is taken for granted not only in the United States but also the rest of the world, where pacifists who are basically opposed to the use of any kind of armed force remain a tiny minority. This also applies to the world of Christianity. While Jesus was a pacifist who was expressly opposed to violence, many of today’s Christians are not pacifists: they support the just war theory and accept war and the use of armed force as necessary. If we simply insist on the importance of pacifism without recognizing this reality, our voice will certainly not be heard by international society. Thus, at least the Japanese should establish an ideological and political base that enables us to logically convince international society of the importance of pacifism.

1-4. Overcoming the Paradox of Sacrifice

“Sacrifice” is one of the keywords that require serious consideration when discussing specific aspects of war and peace, because the concept of sacrifice has often been used to raise nationalism and justify war. The act of dying for some noble cause is sometimes regarded as justifiable. In fact, people who died for their country during war were praised for their noble sacrifices. Similarly, people who die for God are praised as martyrs. The logic in praising death for some noble mission is embraced by both nations and religions, and this commonality has often led to the combination of nationalism and

religion. In other words, religions can serve to complement the logic of sacrifice required by a nation.

The most serious problem pertaining to the logic of sacrifice is that loyalty to someone can cause others to sacrifice themselves, or, in other words, that being responsible to someone (our nation) can in turn mean not being responsible to others (people of other nations). The “paradox of sacrifice” in which absolute self-sacrifice for a country requires the sacrifice of people of other countries becomes most apparent during wartime.

It is wrong to think that this problem was settled in 1945, because the same logic has been repeatedly adopted by religious extremists, such as Islamic State. Absolute loyalty to God and one’s mission as well as the spirit of self-sacrifice has led to the deaths of tens of thousands of innocent people. In 1995 in Japan, members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin gas in subway trains in Tokyo, killing and injuring many people. What motivated them to do so was their loyalty to the guru and belief in self-sacrifice. In order to bring peace to the world, we must recognize the danger of the logic of self-sacrifice that claims the lives of others, and put an end to the “paradox of sacrifice.”

Pacifism should be more substantial than mere idealism. Pacifists must calmly analyze the logic behind a great many sacrifices during wartime and start to take action based on the lessons learned from history, including offering apologies and reconciliation. In this paper, I will discuss the relationship among nations, religions and war, centering on the keyword of “sacrifice.” I will also examine idolatry as a logic used to justify sacrifice, and offer perspectives we should adopt to achieve peace.

2. Logic of Sacrifice

2-1. Logic of Self-sacrifice: Nationalism and Religion

I mentioned earlier that nationalism and religion are easily combined with each other. So first, I would like to take a look, from the viewpoint of Mark Juergensmeyer, at secular nationalism and religious nationalism, which came to be often used for organizing the relationships between nationalism and religion in the contemporary context.

Focusing on “ideologies of order,” Juergensmeyer says that both religion and secular nationalism serve to maintain or strengthen orders in society and consequently, they may be put in a competing relationship. He also explains, as follows, that there is a

significant similarity between the seemingly conflicting two.

(Secular nationalism and religion) serve the ethical function of providing an overarching framework of moral order, a framework that commands ultimate loyalty from those who subscribe to it. . . . nowhere is this common form of loyalty more evident than in ability of nationalism and religion, alone among all forms of allegiance, to give moral sanction to martyrdom and violence (Juergensmeyer 1994: 15).

Figuring out the mechanism to enhance group affiliation up to “martyrdom and violence” and searching for ways to prevent it, must be a more significant challenge than just trumpeting war against terrorism. His approach is to look for clues in the proximity and tensions between secular and religious nationalism. Juergensmeyer acknowledges that the concept of nationalism is a Western structure and questions whether secular nationalism could accommodate religious nationalism. His case studies on various countries in the Middle East and South Asia and former communist countries show that secular nationalism did not necessarily work out well.

In the West, modern states were formed based on the separation of church and state. Likewise, in non-Western countries, it was considered possible to realize a modern and tolerant society by dividing social life into public and private spheres, and placing religious activities into the private sphere. Actually, just such a policy was implemented under the colonial administration by Western powers. That is also the reason why religious nationalism took place in the early 20th century, often as a movement against Western modernism. In some Islamic countries such as Turkey, secularism was considered essential for modernization. While some countries virtually aimed for the separation of religion and politics, there appeared also religious nationalism, such as those found in a number of Islamic movements, which strictly separated modernization from secularization and aimed for the formation of modern states within the Islamic ideal and law.

Here, it should be noted that the terms “secular” and “religious” should not be interpreted as a confrontational dichotomy. In fact, Juergensmeyer’s understanding has a dichotomic tendency, but it unintentionally reflects the Western tradition, which separates the public and private spheres. I would like to emphasize that it is preferable not to interpret religious nationalism as measures against modernization and secularization and that it is necessary to accept religious nationalism as a product of the

modern age in search for a new ideology of order. This approach enables us to keep a distance from the temptation to easily regard religious nationalism as a deviance from modernity.

In reality, the modern age is characterized by the rise of passionate nationalism that can be even described as religious. In modern Japan, religious nationalism served as a driving force to mobilize Japanese people to action. From the viewpoint of modern nationalism, regardless of whether religious or secular, sacrificing oneself for the nation was seen as a natural thing to do. As such, modern nationalism brought about the two world wars in the past. If we are to prevent such tragedy from happening again, we should think about the meaning of sacrifice for humanity, or the logic in compelling or justifying sacrifice.

2-2. Considering Sacrifice in the Context of Human History

Though Christians do not have the custom of sacrificing animals as offerings to God, the redemptive meaning of the crucifixion of Jesus is closely associated with the concept of sacrifice that has been known since ancient times. In the early days of human history, ritual, especially the practice of offering animal sacrifices, was religion itself. Everywhere in the world, men could not contact the transcendental being or access the transcendental world without some medium. For example, due to the critical importance of rain for any agricultural community, rain-making rituals played a crucial role, in which various animals were sacrificed as offerings to the divinity.

The Bible, especially the Book of Leviticus, contains many accounts of “burnt offering.” The most famous of these is surely the story of Abraham’s near-sacrifice of Isaac.

Some time later God tested Abraham. He said to him, “Abraham!” “Here I am,” he replied.

Then God said, “Take your son, your only son, whom you love—Isaac—and go to the region of Moriah. Sacrifice him there as a burnt offering on a mountain I will show you.” (Genesis 22:1-2)

The Hebrew word for “burnt sacrifice” is “olah,” which is translated as “holocaust” in Greek, as is well known. I’m sure I don’t need to describe here how this famous story ends. This story poses a very difficult question as to the absolute loyalty to God and sacrifice, which has been discussed throughout the history of Judaism and Christianity,

and has also been addressed by many philosophers.

In some sense, modern thought in postwar days began with criticism of the system of sacrifice, as demonstrated by the thinkers such as René Girard, Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault. Through the two World Wars, modern nations caused an unprecedented number of victims, and it has been asked what caused such disastrous consequences. Simply put, the answer to this question is that modern nations upgraded the system of religious sacrifice (victimization) to a more elaborate one, instead of overcoming or eliminating it. In other words, the issue of sacrifice we are discussing here is not an ancient issue relevant only to the time of Abraham, but is a contemporary issue of the 21st century, passed down to us from the 20th century.

Before discussing this issue in detail, let me check the broad meaning of sacrifice in the context of human history by referring to *Sacrifice and the Body* written by John Dunnill. According to him, the following factors are commonly identified in various types of sacrifices.

1. Action. A sacrifice is a thing done, and therefore necessarily external and material.
2. Ritual. The action is ritualized, that is, it requires some index of difference, either in the materials used, or the personnel, or the mode of sacrificing, or in the understanding of what occurs. Abnormal things are done, or normal things done differently.
3. Transcendence. A sacrifice is a ritual action mediating relations with a power of another order, in some sense 'divine' or 'sacred.'
4. Exchange. In sacrifice something is handed over to the god, with some sense of something else received: some physical, social or spiritual benefit or 'blessing'; or the offering is made in response to a prior divine gift received.
5. Transformation. Both as action and as exchange, a successful sacrifice is understood to involve a change (whether in the god, or the material or the sacrificer) through access to transcendent power.
6. Solidarity. The actions and materials used are always closely related to the life circumstances (the habitat, economy, social structures and concerns) of the sacrificers, which by being brought into relation with the divinity unite the god also to their life.
7. Cosmology. While individual sacrifices may be routine or trivial, the system or set of practices (insofar as they can be perceived as a whole) may be understood to represent the totality of life (biological, social, existential) for the sacrificing group. (Dunnill 2013: 177)

Of course, the influence of each of these factors varies depending on region and culture, but we can say that the seven factors cover the main characteristics of sacrifice in general. Among them, I would like to focus on the 4th factor, “Exchange,” as the logic of exchange has often been used to justify sacrifice for the sake of religion or nation.

2-3. Sacrifice and Christianity

Christianity started as a non-sacrificing religion, which was quite extraordinary in those days. Because the Roman Empire recognized the ritual of offering sacrifice as a religion itself, early Christianity was seen as a superstition, rather than a religion. Two factors contributed to Christianity starting as a non-sacrificing religion. One was the influence of Judaism in those days and the other was the redemptive understanding of the crucifixion of Jesus.

Alongside the older sacrificial system based in the Temple in Jerusalem, at least from the time of the Babylonian Exile (sixth century BCE) there developed a weekly or daily practice of verbal praise and law-obedience in the synagogue. These two co-existed in harmony for several centuries, but after the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE, Judaism survived as a religion of the Law and the Book. This happened at the very time that the Christian church was separating itself from Israel and defining itself over against Israel as a rival, non-sacrificing, religion (Dunnill 2013: 105).

In addition to this historical reason, there is another reason, a theological one, that explains why Christianity started as a non-sacrificing religion. This is the redemptive interpretation of the crucifixion of Jesus, which holds that as Jesus sacrificed himself for the redemption of mankind, it is no longer necessary for us to offer sacrifice.

It should be noted that while this understanding of the crucifixion became a central doctrine of Christianity, part of it served to lead Christians to martyrdom. Christian literature of martyrdom contributed to the conception of the idea that Christians should prove their faith by dying for God, just as Jesus did on the cross. The idea praises martyrdom as an exemplary act, holding that dying for a noble cause is a respectable thing to do, and has led an increasing number of Christians to be martyred for their faith. In Japan, for example, intense persecution against Christians began in the 17th century, and many Japanese Christians chose to die for their faith. As a result, only a few Christians remained in Japan, who secretly maintained their faith as “hidden Christians.” Reportedly, Christian literature of martyrdom brought by Catholic priests from Europe to Japan helped to spread the idea of martyrdom as an admirable act among Japanese Christians.

With an understanding of this historical background, let me summarize the relationship between sacrifice and Christianity. Historically, Christianity started as a non-sacrificing religious community. It is true that Christianity rejected the ritual of sacrificing animals, but it also positively accepted the practice of Christians sacrificing themselves for their faith. Against the backdrop of the rise of nationalism from the 19th century to the 20th century, the idea of self-sacrifice for a noble cause was further developed by modern nations and incorporated into their national systems. In those days, fighting and dying for one's own country was generally considered to be perfectly compatible with the Christian faith, because offering one's life for a noble cause was acclaimed as an exemplary practice of self-sacrifice, and dying for one's country became almost synonymous with dying for one's faith. This is what I call the logic of exchange in sacrifice. One of the modern examples of the embodiment of the logic of exchange in Japan is Yasukuni Shrine, where people who fought and died for Japan are enshrined as noble spirits in reward for sacrificing their lives.

Indeed, the concept of sacrifice is important in Christianity. However, is the logic of sacrifice that can easily slide into the logic of exchange compatible with the teachings of Jesus? Would Jesus wish for Christians to die a noble death, urged by church or nation? To answer these questions, let me next discuss the characteristics of the ethics of Jesus.

3. Ethics of Jesus

As Jesus often used parables in his teachings, we cannot derive any rational logic from them. Yet, Jesus' parables have a power that is destructive to the existing social order, which we can call the "ethics of Jesus" in a broad sense. Here, I will focus on the following three characteristics of the ethics of Jesus in light of sacrifice.

3-1. Denial of the Logic of Exchange

Jesus denied the simple dualism between good and evil and the principle of rewarding good and punishing evil, and instead indicated an ethical horizon extending beyond them. Obviously, the principle of rewarding good and punishing evil is based on the logic of exchange, and Jesus was explicitly opposed to this logic as shown by his words:

You have heard that it was said, 'you shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.' But I say to you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute

you, so that you may be sons of your Father who is in heaven; for He causes His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. (Matthew 5:43-45)

The parable of the workers in the vineyard (Matthew 20:1-6) also indicates the love of God that surpasses the logic of exchange that is familiar to us. According to the logic of exchange, it is natural that those who have worked all day long grumble about being paid the same as those who have worked only one hour. However, this parable teaches us the generosity of God, and the radical love of God that defies the logic of exchange. In other words, the ethics of Jesus serve as a power to free us from the logic of exchange.

3-2. Absolutely Individual-centered Ethics

The logic of sacrifice often requires individuals to sacrifice themselves for the whole. Individuals offering their lives for the nation were praised for dying a noble death, and this logic drove people to war. Jesus was opposed to individuals sacrificing themselves for a group and steadfastly insisted on the value of each individual, which is especially evident in the parable of the lost sheep (Luke 15:1-7). In our daily life, we think and act in a utilitarian manner, so we will keep the ninety-nine sheep rather than go searching for the missing one. However, Jesus asks us to consider the “lost one” and in this sense, his ethics are absolutely individual-centered and simply incompatible with collective ethics that justify the sacrifice of individuals for a group.

3-3. Internalization of Sacrifice

The teachings of Jesus are characterized by the deep internalization of the formal aspect of law. In terms of sacrifice, this characteristic is clearly seen in his words: “If you had known what these words mean, ‘I desire mercy, not sacrifice,’ you would not have condemned the innocent.” (Matthew 12:7) When some trouble arises, we are inclined to seek a target or scapegoat to blame. On the contrary, the ethics of Jesus turn our mind to “mercy,” not sacrifice.

So far, I have outlined the ethics of Jesus in terms of sacrifice and argued that the act of an individual to sacrifice his/her life for a nation or community is never justified in the ethics of Jesus. The ethics of Jesus go beyond the logic of sacrifice, and indicate a world where no one dies for a community or nation. If we accept the crucifixion of Jesus as the last sacrifice for the sake of humanity, then I believe that continuing to offer human sacrifice should be prohibited.² This interpretation helps us gain an insight that

the idea of absolute nonviolence and pacifism not only manifests itself in the words of Jesus, but it paradoxically culminates in the crucifixion of Jesus, which is the ultimate form of violence.

At the same time, however, it should be noted that the naïve spirit of self-sacrifice was skillfully exploited by nations. To draw attention to this historical fact, I will discuss the relationship between modern nation and violence from the viewpoint of patriotism.

3-4. Ethical Paradox in Patriotism

For this purpose, let me quote a rather long text from the work of an American theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 1932.

There is an ethical paradox in patriotism which defies every but the most astute and sophisticated analysis. This paradox is that patriotism transmutes individual unselfishness into national egoism. Loyalty to the nation is a high form of altruism when compared with lesser loyalties and more parochial interests. It therefore becomes the vehicle of all the altruistic impulses and expresses itself, on occasion, with such fervor that the critical attitude of the individual toward the nation and its enterprises is almost completely destroyed. The unqualified character of this devotion is the very basis of the nation's power and of the freedom to use the power without moral restraint. Thus the unselfishness of individuals makes for the selfishness of nations. (Niebuhr 1960: 91)

Of course, the historical context on which Niebuhr bases his discussion is different from that of modern Japan, but the ethical paradox in patriotism discussed in this text was also seen in Japan in the modern age, and other nations also shared a similar structure to a considerable extent. Then what insight should we have if we are to prevent the unselfishness of individuals or the spirit of self-sacrifice from being taken into narrow patriotism and exploited as a tool of the nation or war? Modern nations have to continue to create some “idol” as a means to promote patriotism and unify people. The concept of noble sacrifice is one of such idols. To explore this issue in depth, I will discuss idolatry in the following section.

4. Invisible Idolatry

4-1. Idolatry in the Bible

Idolatry has been the subject of harsh criticism in monotheistic religions that believe in an absolute God. The prohibition of idolatry is not only a tradition common to the three major monotheistic religions; one could even say that the identity of these monotheistic religions is dependent on the denial of idolatry. In this sense, we could say that the true opposition to monotheism is neither polytheism nor atheism but idolatry. In the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament), the prohibition of idolatry is associated with the second commandment as expressed in Exodus, Chapter 20, while in Judaism, the prohibited worship of other gods is called *Avodah Zarah* and is not limited simply to visible idols (*pesel* in Hebrew). In order to examine the problems of the modern world, we must understand “idolatry” not only as serving visible idols but also in the broader sense of “invisible idolatry” (Kohara 2006: 10). The following comments on this point by the theologian Paul Tillich are helpful:

Idolatry is the elevation of a preliminary concern to ultimacy. Something essentially conditioned is taken as unconditional, something essentially partial is boosted into universality, and something essentially finite is given infinite significance (the best example is the contemporary idolatry of religious nationalism). (Tillich 1951: 13)

Tillich wrote *Systematic Theology* in 1951, but the importance of understanding religious nationalism as idolatry has increased dramatically since the terrorist attacks of September 11. As Tillich’s words imply, all people and all religions can be exposed to the danger of idolatry.

Isn’t it, however, too easy to say that something finite should not be given infinite significance? If idolatry could be avoided with such simple formulations, idolatry would not be a serious problem to begin with. Tillich recognizes the danger of making the nation into an “absolute” in the fervor of religious nationalism. But while God’s sovereignty can coexist with the nation-state in the West, the idea of the nation-state itself is occasionally considered dubious in the Islamic world. Tillich never witnessed in his lifetime the extremely purified prohibition of idolatry that has become popular among certain Islamists who are hostile to Western society and its values. In this sense, we cannot be content with Tillich’s formulations.

4-2. Invisible Idolatry and Structural Violence

If materialism, represented by capitalism, and imperialism, especially in the form of military intervention by the U.S., extend themselves through the power of proliferation and impact the entire world (these are typical images of the “West” in Occidentalism), then it should come as no surprise that the persons who are oppressed by materialism and imperialism would see that power as a kind of idolatry. Put another way, “invisible idolatry” can become the breeding ground for structural violence, and at times people resort to direct, physical violence in order to stand up against such structural violence.

While “structural violence” is a well-known term especially in peace studies, let me introduce the meaning of this term, defined by Johan Galtung. Galtung believed that peace could not be achieved simply by getting rid of personal and direct violence, and he expanded the notion of violence. According to Galtung, violence exists if people are influenced in such a way that their immediate somatic and intellectual self-realization does not fully meet their potential self-realization (Galtung 1991: 5). This is what he terms “structural violence.” In the context discussed earlier, if Muslims are deprived of inherent human dignity or allowed less freedom as a result of Western materialism or imperialism, then structural violence exists. In this sense, “invisible idolatry” can generate structural violence, and those who have become aware of such structural violence might exercise “direct violence” to destroy idols.

This formula took its most extreme form in the terrorist attacks of September 11. In the eyes of the terrorists, the World Trade Center may have appeared as an “idol” that embodied the riches and violence of capitalism. The Pentagon may have appeared as an “idol” embodying military force. This is why, despite the loss of many precious lives, the attacks were greeted among some Muslims with jubilation aroused by the desire to see the destruction of those idols. What can we do to prevent the repetition of an iconoclasm that combines both despair and jubilation? To find an answer to this question, I will rather discuss the worst scenario that can result from the structural violence; a possible future situation that we can predict based on the lessons learned from the past.

4-3. Consequences of the Structural Violence and Challenges Imposed on Us

Ironically, people become able to remove heterogeneous others without a feeling of hate against them when the invisible idolatry and structural violence prevail in society. In other words, the “culture of hate” created by these powers enables people to remove specific groups, to whom they are indifferent, from society. In fact, many of the mass

murder incidents that have occurred in modern times result from systematic violence triggered by indifference, rather than by accumulation of hate.

A typical example is an anti-Jewish pogrom (the Holocaust). On November 9, 1938, Jewish-owned stores and synagogues were attacked and destroyed by German people driven by a hatred for Jews. This incident was called the Kristallnächte (Crystal Night). This was a day of extensive looting and mass murder, about which Zygmunt Bauman, a sociologist who studied the Holocaust, writes as follows: “One could neither conceive of, nor make, mass murder on the Holocaust scale of no matter how many Kristallnächte.” (Bauman 1989: 89) His point is that this was not an incident of mass violence stemming from a hatred, but that ethical indifference prevailing in society drove people to annihilate heterogeneous others without feeling hatred for them.

Organized violence triggered by indifference was unknown before modern times, and we may say that this is the ultimate form of the culture of hate. This form of violence did not end with the Holocaust, and is still prevailing around the world. We should learn the danger of indifference from the lessons of history and the realities currently going on in the world, and make constant efforts to explore a new manner of discourse to prevent people from feeling indifference. Certainly, there is truth in the message “All religions seek peace” but I fear that the sheer monotony of the message can drive people to indifference. If the message of peace is trapped in a dichotomy that makes a sharp distinction between allies and foes, then, ironically, the message can serve to supplement the culture of hate. Making unceasing efforts for self-criticism and self-transformation is the only way to overcome the culture of hate that can artfully lure us into a trap.

The culture of hate does not originate in religious differences. The fact is that the culture of hate creates boundaries of religious differences or cultural differences, justifies hate, and eventually drives people to expel heterogeneous others from their boundaries, even without feeling hatred for them. In this light, repeating the message “All religions seek peace” can be understood to be an embodiment of the positive naivety of truth on the one hand, while doing so entails the danger of reinforcing the boundaries created by the culture of hate despite the original intention on the other. To avoid such a danger, we should engage in not only interreligious dialogue, but also dialogue with secular society and develop a technique to have meaningful discourse on human identities.

5. Conclusion

To conclude, I will briefly summarize the discussion and highlight the matters we

should keep in mind to achieve peace.

First, we should develop a critical view on the logic of sacrifice. While ritual involving sacrifice began early in human history, it has been upgraded to a more elaborate form by modern nations and incorporated into national systems. We should be fully aware that the logic in praising death for some noble mission is commonly seen among nations and religions, and this commonality has often led to the combination between them. This means we should have the ability to think beyond the simple religious/secular dichotomy.

Second, we can base our criticism of the logic of sacrifice that justifies violence and war on the ethics of Jesus. If we do nothing but simply observe the ever-changing international situation, we can be easily imbued with nationalistic fervor when a national crisis arises. In our effort to achieve peace, therefore, we should take a firm stand that will not be affected by the changes of the times. The teachings of Jesus have continued to pose radical questions to us as the basis of pacifism.

Third, we cannot solve problems simply by trying to root out evil by means of exercising military power (direct violence), as typically shown by war against terrorism. Instead, we should recognize and alleviate structural violence that can provide a breeding ground for “invisible idolatry” and iconoclasm against it, thereby spreading the basis of peace.

Fourth, we should not offer our bodies as a sacrifice to any being other than God, and the sacrifice must be a living one, not a dead one, as described in the passage, “Therefore, I urge you, brothers and sisters, in view of God’s mercy, to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God” (Romans 12:1). We should never be easily seduced by the idea of “noble death.”

Fifth, followers of Jesus should emphasize the universal “love your neighbor” principle across national borders and serve as mediators to reconcile peoples to achieve peace, especially in East Asia where nationalism is rapidly rising. By doing so, we can be “a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God” and at the same time, present an antithesis to the logic of sacrifice (logic of exchange) that is used to justify human death.

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Notes

- ¹ This paper is based on the keynote speech at the 2015 International Colloquium on War and Peace: Religious Perspectives, Alliance Bible Seminary, Hong Kong, Oct. 31, 2015, but modified.
- ² Heim (2006), who reinterprets the meaning of the cross in comparison with other sacrifices, supports this idea.

**Mortaza Motahhari and William James:
The Background to the Compilation of *The Stories of the Righteous*
(*Dāstān-e Rāstān*)**

Takamitsu Shimamoto

Abstract:

As a Motahhari's (Iranian religious scholar and philosopher, 1920-1979) motivation to edit *Dāstān-e Rāstān* (*The Stories of the Righteous*), we can assume that Motahhari, like W. James, thought it necessary to avoid serious misunderstanding in dealing with religio-ethical judgments made by people because they are a highly subjective matter. Although Motahhari and James did not have any direct contact with each other (James was born in 1842 and died in 1910, 10 years prior to the birth of Motahhari), the former apparently read the latter's book in translation. Whether Motahhari had been directly influenced by James or not, their approach looks the same in that both of them supply raw materials (mainly the records left by the past religious geniuses) concerning religion or ethics for readers with a view to entrusting the final judgement in the hands of the readers. In this paper, it is shown that Motahhari resorted to this method James adopted in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* so that Persian readers can pass their own judgement through reading the materials which have not been altered by the author's arbitrary intention. This kind of method could be useful in establishing each reader's positive attitude towards his or her religio-ethical belief.

Keywords:

Motahhari, William James, Islam, religion, ethics

Introduction

In November 2014, I had the opportunity to participate in an anti-Islamic State international conference held in Iran's religious city of Qom. The conference itself ended filled with unidirectional and intense anti-Islamic State speeches. After the conference, a few scholars from Japan visited several religious facilities and universities in this holy city. At a gathering of religion scholars at one of them, one scholar in his forties severely criticized Mortaza Motahhari, the topic of this paper. Thus I was very interested. According to this scholar, if Iran actually did what Motahhari called for, the country would become backward and return to primitive times. My first impression was that there has been quite a change in how people see Motahhari, who had been a dominant figure around the time of the revolution.

Of course, thirty-seven years have passed since the revolution and the circumstances in the world have changed, and thus the scholar's argument was reasonable. However, I also felt that there is not much meaning in assessing Motahhari in the dimension of political and economic policies. Motahhari's true worth lies in the Islam-based ethics that he advocated, and thus I thought that I would use this valuable experience as a chance to once again consider them, particularly his ethics-education-related work for Muslims. From the end of last year to the beginning of this one I had an opportunity to carefully read *The Stories of the Righteous (Dāstān-e Rāstān)*, a work somewhat different from his others. Based on the information I obtained while doing so, I considered the educational tools and methods that lay in the background to him compiling of this work. Each person's understanding of religious and ethical "truth" varies, and thus it is quite a difficult task to offer a message that can be shared by everyone. While many wise people have attempted to do so and made some accomplishments in this regard, there have been no universally valid teachings.

The Stories of the Righteous was created with the aim of educating ordinary Muslims in ethics. In this paper, by partially analyzing and examining the circumstances by which this work came into existence and its content, I will try to make clear its characteristics as well as Motahhari's intention in compiling it. When doing so, I will refer to the ideas of the US thinker William James, who also was responding to the same kind of difficult issue.

1. The Issue at Hand

One of the difficult tasks remaining for humanity is knowing God, transcendental

beings, and eternal truth. While an incredible amount of time has passed with people attempting to do so, this issue has not been solved. Knowing God is the first step in learning about ethics as a human. If so, in the end the meaning of ethics will remain unclear for religious people if they cannot know God. Many religious professionals and individuals with an interest in religion have worked to give some sort of answer to this question, but they have not given any that are decisive. Rather, with its abundance of visual stimulation, contemporary society has a tendency to forget religion itself on the one hand, and, on the other hand, let very arbitrary interpretations run free.

It can almost certainly be said that this tendency was accelerated by the advancement of science in the nineteenth century, which was prompted by the Industrial Revolution, which began at the end of the eighteenth century. This era was a time of never before experienced trials for all religions, especially Christianity. This issue was particularly pronounced in Europe. With the total amount of humanity's knowledge increasing along with the advancement of science, people acquired confidence, and sought liberation from the fetters of "faith" in a traditional God or traditional gods. Or perhaps we should say that based on their "rational" judgments, they felt that recognizing the existence of God, gods, or supernatural beings not only went against the demands of reason, but that it was unnecessary to do so. During this era people were able to feel human's vitality to this extent.

There are many famous individuals who responded to this issue. Amongst them, a group of people active primarily in the United States gave rise to an intellectual trend known today as "pragmatism." While during the nineteenth century a clear outline of it had not yet been formed, in general terms pragmatism was a method for settling endless metaphysical discussions about the world, such as whether it is singular or multiple, decided by fate or free, and material or physical.¹ Pragmatism tries to offer interpretations of an issue by tracing its consequences. It says that if we want to acquire a clear idea about a certain subject, we should think about the predicted actual results to which it is related. In other words, what kind of feelings can be expected from its results? What kind of preparations can we make regarding its results? Pragmatism is not attached to an existing, specific position but adopts one that tries to flexibly respond to actual phenomena. It was an intellectual and philosophical trend with such content at its basis. Representative pragmatists included Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. William James is the best-known of them in Japan and took a particular interest in religion. He influenced multiple early Japanese philosophers such as Nishida Kitarō.

In this paper I will focus on *Dāstān-e Rāstān* (*The Stories of the Righteous*), a work

by Mortaza Motahhari (1920-1979), who played the role of major ideologue in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. I will make clear his intention in compiling this book while referring to the methodology found in James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience*.² My aim is not to provide an introductory analysis of this work. Rather, I will identify its potential as an effective method for making religious people awaken to religious and ethical truth (discussed above) as something certain. While in this sense it could be said that this paper is still at an exploratory stage, I would like to use this work of Motahhari, which I have come across in my survey of Iranian modern and contemporary history, in the hopes of aiding our understanding of this above difficult issue.

Materials

This paper's primary text is Mortazā Motahharī's *Dāstān-e Rāstān, Majmū'eh-ye Āthār-e Ostād Motahharī*, jeld.18, Enteshārāt-e Sadrā, 1382 (2004).³ Excluding cases when it was unnecessary I have referred to this version. While *The Stories of the Righteous* ended up being two volumes, it is clear in light of the circumstances surrounding its publication that the first volume is the more important one. Even if it is true that Motahhari wanted to publish the first volume as a work larger than it currently is, his intention in compiling *The Stories of the Righteous* can be clearly seen in the first volume, which this paper will thus use. The first volume's introduction is very important for understanding this text's nature. However, before discussing it, let us briefly turn to Motahhari himself. Since I have covered him in detail in my monograph *Isurāmu kakumei no seishin* 『イスラーム革命の精神』 (*The Spirit of the Islamic Revolution*),⁴ I will limit myself to the minimal amount of information necessary for understanding what follows.

Mortaza Motahhari was born in 1920 in Fariman, a town in the northeastern part of Iran. He was from a family of religious people: his father was a scholar of Islam, and his mother the daughter of one. While he seriously agonized over his future path for a time when he was young, in the end, during his late teenage years he went to Qom, a city approximately 150 kilometers south of Tehran which had come to be known as the center of Shia scholarship, and decided to become a scholar of Islam. While for a time he suffered economically and psychologically, he met distinguished leaders such as Ruhollah Khomeini (1902?-1989) and stood out as both a scholar and an educator. However, even after marrying subsequent to turning thirty, his daily life was difficult, and he decided to move to Tehran. Motahhari's abilities fully expressed themselves after he made this move to the capital. While particularly emphasizing ethics, he shared

Islam's teachings with a wide variety of people through speeches, writing, and educational activities. He is notable for coming into contact with ordinary Muslims (such as bazaar merchants and students) through his daily life in the capital without breaking off his relations as an Islam scholar with his circle of other individuals in the same field that were centered around Qom. His interest in ethics and society probably came from this experience. From 1951/1952, when he went to Tehran, until 1960 he published the massive work *Osūl-e Falsafah (Principles of Philosophy)*, commentaries on his teacher Allameh Tabataba'i's writings. *The Stories of the Righteous*, on the other hand, was compiled in the early 1960s, approximately ten years after moving to the capital. The latter work stands quite in contrast with the former. The former explains and compares his teachers' lectures on western philosophical thought and Islamic thought. It is a masterpiece in which he cultivated the thought that ran at the basis of his lifelong research theme: criticism of the West. Subsequently Motahhari would actively give lectures at the Islamic educational institution, Husayniyah Irshad, and publish writings. As I will describe below, the political environment during this time definitely cannot be described as favorable for religious interests. In 1963, Hossein Borujerdi passed away. He had been the top scholar of Shia Islam, the sole remaining "source of emulation" (*marja' al-taqlīd*), and one of Motahhari's teachers. Subsequently the Shi'ite world could not even identify a sole leader. Furthermore, with the East-West issue that separated the world into two spheres in the background, the young Shah Mohammad Reza went on the offensive, carrying out the White Revolution while relying on US support. Religious interests were as a whole on the defensive, and were not in a situation that allowed them to take a defiant stand.⁵

Upon entering the 1970s, the situation considerably changed. There was the oil boom (the oil crisis in Japan), which led to gathered anti-Pahlavi dynasty, anti-US & England, and anti-Israel momentum. Motahhari would himself participate in the revolutionary movement as the top disciple of Khomeini, who would become its leader. Motahhari also associated with establishment intellectuals and was somewhat politically vague, and thus sometimes was harshly criticized by its enemies. Regardless, in 1979 Motahhari played a principal role in the final phase of the revolutionary movement as Khomeini's spokesman, and was expected to be active after the revolutions succeeded. However, on May 1st of the same year he was assassinated by an enemy at the age of fifty-nine.

Above I have briefly described Motahhari's life. As I have already stated, the central topic of this paper is Motahhari's intention behind compiling and publishing *The*

Stories of the Righteous. It is difficult to transmit religious or ethical convictions to other people. While insofar as each person deals with such convictions on their own no major issues arise, if one tries to transmit them to others as something that is “correct,” usually this involves unimaginable difficulties. Insofar as one has to rely upon a means of transmission that is mediated by language, it is almost impossible to accurately transmit them in their entirety. There are some who are skeptical of whether or not universal ethics and the like exist.⁶ However, it is a fact that there are many thinkers who dauntlessly confronted this issue while facing such difficulties. I will be discussing one such individual, William James, because he was one of the few Western philosophers accepted by Motahhari. While he did not write articles or monographs discussing James in detail, even though he criticized materialist and empiricist thinkers in the West when discussing Islamic belief, it appears that Motahhari took a favorable view of James and Henri Bergson, who actively spoke of the importance of religion’s existence.⁷ Therefore, I would like to discuss somewhat in detail the methodological approach of James’ research on religion to provide some base knowledge for our examination of Motahhari’s work.

2. The Methodology of William James’ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*

In his *Introduction to Islam’s Worldview (Moqaddameh-ye Jahānbīnī-ye Islām*; pp. 180-195), Motahhari discusses Prophet Muhammad’s last miracle (his revelation). In this passage, he touches upon on the issue of revelation and science, expressing his understanding that the main point of the Quran’s message is connected to the natural world and sensory phenomena paying attention to the non-sensory phenomena of the supernatural world (*māverā’ tabī’yat*, metaphysical world), and explains that it is important to not simply submit to supernatural phenomena but follow reason, ethics, and knowledge. To strengthen his point, he touches upon William James:

As discussed by William James, overall, the difference between the religious world, especially the world represented by Islam, and the world purely depicted by human science and philosophy is that, when constructing a religious world, other factors are involved in addition to the material and legal elements generally recognized by man.⁸

While the precise location of the statement by James to which Motahhari is referring is unclear, James argued that within the structure of world, religion exists along with material factors, and that laws exist in addition to those known by humanity. There is no need to dwell on the fact that the main reason that James wrote *Varieties* was to make clear this situation with regard to religious phenomena. *Varieties* was originally given as a series of lectures in Great Britain. In the first and second lecture, James discusses his method for handling this issue.

As is well-known, William James (1842-1910) was a psychologist and philosopher who played a major role in early period pragmatism, a major modern / contemporary school of American thought. While the primary interest of pragmatism was the relationship between conviction and results in human action, the results of actions were particularly emphasized. It adopted a very practical approach, judging the meaning and value of actions based on their results. It appears that it was partially for elucidating the relationship of religious belief with science during a period (the nineteenth century) in which modern science was developing to an extent never before seen. It was both an expression of scientism as well as one way of responding to the serious issues faced by religion during this time. While as stated above pragmatists thought the results of actions were of the utmost importance, their points of emphasis were diverse. Charles Peirce (1839-1914)⁹ emphasized statistical laws, while James—who in the end parted ways from Peirce—focused on religious belief.

While James left behind an outstanding set of psychology related scholarship, his *The Varieties of Religious Experience* is particularly important for this paper. Below, while referring to passages related to methodology found in this work (which was originally given as a set of lectures in Edinburgh, Great Britain between 1901 and 1902), I will examine some major points.

James' own area of specialization was psychology. After first making it clear that he thus does not have any specialized knowledge regarding theology, religious institutions, or anthropology, he emphasizes that he will discuss religious emotions and impulses while focusing on humans' religious disposition.

If the inquiry be psychological, not religious institutions, but rather religious feelings and religious impulses must be its subject, and I must confine myself to those more developed subjective phenomena recorded in literature produced by articulate and fully self-conscious men, in works of piety and autobiography. Interesting as the origins and early stages of a subject always are, yet when one

seeks earnestly for its full significance, one must always look to its more completely evolved and perfect forms. It follows from this that the documents that will most concern us will be those of the men who were most accomplished in the religious life and best able to give an intelligible account of their ideas and motives. These men, of course, are either comparatively modern writers, or else such earlier ones as have become religious classics. The documents humans which we shall find most instructive need not then be sought for in the haunts of special erudition—they lie along the beaten highway; and this circumstance, which flows so naturally from the character of our problem, suits admirably also your lecturer's lack of special theological learning . . .¹⁰

Next, James, points out that direct deductions cannot be made from (1) existential propositions / judgments concerning a topic of inquiry (in other words, a topic's structure, origin, history, and the like) regarding (2) value or spiritual propositions / judgments, as well as vice versa. He states that the mind first separates these two kinds of judgments and then puts them back together in order to integrate them together. Concretely speaking, (1) is the level of issues surrounding Christianity's concrete history and (2) is the level of the question of how the revelations in the Bible shared by its creators are useful as guiding principles or teachings for our lives.

Thus if our theory of revelation-value were to affirm that any book, to possess it, must have been composed automatically or not by the free caprice of the writer, or that it must exhibit no scientific and historic errors and express no local or personal passions, the Bible would probably fare ill at our hands. But if, on the other hand, our theory should allow that a book may well be a revelation in spite of errors and passions and deliberate human composition, if only it be a true record of the inner experiences of great-souled persons wrestling with the crises of their fate, then the verdict would be much more favorable. You see that the existential facts by themselves are insufficient for determining the value; and the best adepts of the higher criticism accordingly never confound the existential with the spiritual problem. With the same conclusions of fact before them, some take one view, and some another, of the Bible's value as a revelation, according as their spiritual judgment as to the foundation of values differs.¹¹

The above covers basically all of the methodological issues relating to James' understanding of religion. I am of the opinion that while this understanding involves a set of profound issues, if one takes into account the uniqueness of religious and ethical values, it is valid. However, James' position has been harshly criticized for being an excessively subjective methodology. For example, Bertrand Russell states,

James's doctrine is an attempt to build a superstructure of belief upon a foundation of scepticism, and like all such attempts it is dependent on fallacies. In this case the fallacies spring from an attempt to ignore all extra-human facts. Berkeleian idealism combined with scepticism causes him to substitute belief in God for God, and to pretend that this will do just as well. But this is only a form of the subjectivistic madness which is characteristic of most modern philosophy.¹²

In this way, Russell severely criticized James' methodology as one of the evils of modern thought's subjectivism.

Putting aside of the validity of this criticism, since within religion (a human sphere of activity in which individual experiences are indispensable) particularly the experience of conversion (which is unavoidable for religious individuals) is based upon personal, absolute, and direct contact with the object of one's religious belief, I believe that there is a basis for handling such experiences while emphasizing the individual value of such experiences.

While the above quotation relates to Christianity, such phenomena can to some extent be applied to all religions, including Buddhism and Islam. James states that in order to comprehend such phenomena—which is essential for understandings of religion—we should study so-called religious geniuses (who, though, might not necessarily be famous historical figures) instead of “second-hand” formalized religious customs: “We must make search rather for the original experiences which were the pattern-setters to all this mass of suggested feeling and imitated conduct.”¹³ He notes that religious “geniuses” are sometimes strange or eccentric, and often show signs of nervous hypersensitivity. However, “Often, moreover, these pathological features in their career have helped to give them their religious authority and influence.”

James points out that the pathological understanding of religion cannot be ignored, but also shows hesitation towards intellectually dealing with religious emotion to academically classify religious phenomena and to make clear the causes behind the

arising of such religious phenomena.¹⁴ This is because, “we know that . . . our mental states have their substantive value as revelations of the living truth.”¹⁵ He also says that he wishes to silence the above-described “medical materialism,” which would judge Paul, Saint Teresa, and Saint Francis of Assisi as being epileptic or having a “discharging lesion of the occipital cortex.” According to James, medical materialism “has no physiological theory of the production of these its favorite states [of mind]” and it attempts “to discredit the states which it dislikes, by vaguely associating them with nerves and liver, and connecting them with names connoting bodily affliction.”

James adopts an impartial attitude in general. Wanting to be completely candid with regard to ourselves and facts, he says that there are two reasons that we could think of a certain mental state as being superior to another: when immediate joy is felt in it, or we believe that it will bring positive results to our lives in the future. Here we find a clear expression of pragmatism’s position. A similar intention lies behind Motahhari’s *The Stories of the Righteous*.

At another point, James states,

It is the character of inner happiness in the thoughts which stamps them as good, or else their consistency with our other opinions and their serviceability for our needs, which make them pass for true in our esteem.¹⁶

However, internal criteria and external criteria do not always match: that which brings about inner happiness is not necessarily useful. If we use judgment from other experiences to measure that which we directly feel to be the most “good,” we might find that it is not necessarily the most “true.” Thus is the quality of religious experience, and those in religious studies handle them in a way completely different than, say, the scholarship of people in the natural sciences or industrial technology. Those in the latter fields generally examine things based on logic and experiments. In contrast, religious understandings can only be established by judgments based on (1) our direct religious emotions and (2) the empirical relationships perceived between these religious understandings, our moral claims, and the knowledge we recognize as truth. In short, there are only three useful criteria: (1) plain apparentness, (2) philosophical rationality, and (3) moral usefulness.

Here we should take note of the position occupied by “experience” in pragmatism. Pragmatists are existentialists; they do not recognize metaphysical principles. Experience is their means for confirming that something really exists: “You see that at bottom we are thrown back upon the general principles by which the empirical philosophy has always

contended that we must be guided in our search for truth.”¹⁷ We can thus see that pragmatism basically inherits the English empirical tradition.¹⁸ Therefore, James holds that the issue is not metaphysically inquiring into the origins of the gods and buddhas but rather that the ultimate test of religious faith is its overall function:

This is our own empiricist criterion; and this criterion the stoutest insisters on supernatural origin have also been forced to use in the end. Among the visions and messages some have always been too patently silly, among the trances and convulsive seizures some have been too fruitless for conduct and character, to pass themselves off as significant, still less as divine. In the history of Christian mysticism the problem how to discriminate between such messages and experiences as were really divine miracles, and such others as the demon in his malice was able to counterfeit, thus making the religious person twofold more the child of hell he was before, has always been a difficult one to solve, needing all the sagacity and experience of the best directors of conscience. In the end it had to come to our empiricist criterion.¹⁹

Above I have made clear the methodological position of James’ research on religion. Finally I would like to summarize his understanding in the book’s third chapter, “Circumscription of the Topic.” Here James addresses the issue of the definition of religion.

. . . Meanwhile the very fact that they [definitions of religion] are so many and so different from one another is enough to prove that the word “religion” cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name. The theorizing mind tends always to the over-simplification of its materials. This is the root of all that absolutism and one-sided dogmatism by which both philosophy and religion have been infested. Let us not fall immediately into a one-sided view of our subject, but let us rather admit freely at the outset that we may very likely find no one essence, but many characters which may alternately be equally important in religion.²⁰

Here he makes clear not the religious thought of a specific sect or institution, but the “many characters which may alternately be equally important.” While such an approach is required in all fields of research, if it is excessively permitted, it leads to a fatal

subjectivism, a fundamentally irretrievable situation. Clearly, we can see this as a reflection of the major issue facing European and American society during the nineteenth century. Here we find an attempt to recognize the emotional side of religion while at the same time ensure a balance between the rationalist and liberal mainstream trends of the era.

At any rate, here James is focusing on the idea that “religious sentiment” is not special or unique. He notes that scholars of psychology and the philosophy of religion have tried to define religious sentiment—as feelings of “dependence,” “fear,” or “the infinite,” something related to the sexual life, etc.—and that these diverse interpretations show that religious sentiment is not a specific emotion.

As concrete states of mind, made up of a feeling plus a specific sort of object, religious emotions of course are psychic entities distinguishable from other concrete emotions; but there is no ground for assuming a simple abstract “religious emotion” to exist as a distinct elementary mental affection by itself, present in every religious experience without exception.

As there thus seems to be no one elementary religious emotion, but only a common storehouse of emotions upon which religious objects may draw, so there might conceivably also prove to be no one specific and essential kind of religious object, and no one specific and essential kind of religious act.²¹

Adopting such a position to consider religion, James inevitably does not touch at all upon institutional religious divisions or systematic theology; his interest is focused on personal religion. This is because:

In one sense at least the personal religion will prove itself more fundamental than either theology or ecclesiasticism. Churches, when once established, live at second-hand upon tradition; but the founders of every church owed their power originally to the fact of their direct personal communion with the divine. Not only the superhuman founders, the Christ, the Buddha, Mahomet, but all the originators of Christian sects have been in this case;—so personal religion should still seem the primordial thing, even to those who continue to esteem it incomplete.²²

In closing, James states the following as the grounds for his above opinion:

“Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us *the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.*”²³ He also says that religious experience is a solemn one, and he will not use the word “divine” too generally: “The divine shall mean for us only such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor a jest.”²⁴

Thus concludes my somewhat long summary of the major points of the methodology of James’ research on religion. Below, while referring to this, I will consider M. Motahhari’s intention in compiling and publishing his *The Stories of the Righteous*.

3. An Analysis of *The Stories of the Righteous*

As I have already mentioned, in the first half of the 1960s, the Shiite world faced major problems regarding their next leader, and the Pahlavi dynasty was on the offensive. Religious parties were made to take a defensive position, with their vested interests in the fields of religious law and education being interfered in. Under such conditions, public stands against authority were met by repression, as was shown by Khomeini’s banishment in 1964. During this time it was uncommon for Motahhari to publicly air political criticisms like his foes did with regard to him. People are divided as to whether this was a strategy on his part or simply an opportunistic “go along with the crowd” approach. However, it appears that Motahhari was more interested in the field of ethics and philosophy rather than in constructing a political ideology, as I pointed out in my monograph *Isurāmu kakumei no seishin*.

The circumstances by which *The Stories of the Righteous*—which was published during this time—came into existence can be seen in the introduction to its first volume. Originally this work arose out of discussions at a publication committee comprised of university professors and intellectuals.²⁵ Motahhari, while recognizing that many books containing explanations and instructions regarding Islamic ethics and thoughts did exist, pointed out that they were all lacking in that their authors excessively asserted their own opinions and made up stories that never happened to educate and enlighten readers. In contrast, he was thinking of publishing a work that would make readers think for themselves instead of making them accept the author’s own theories.

In books and other writings authors must reduce the burden of thinking for

readers and at the same time making them engage in contemplation, thereby heightening their thought. “Thought” that frees them from this load refers to [not manipulated] sentences and phrases. Therefore, insofar as time and opportunities allow, one must work to use appropriate and understandable phrases. However, the conclusion is held to be the responsibility of the author. If the author himself does not do anything with regard to the thought [in the conclusion], not adding his own thought, it will not enter readers’ minds, not influence their hearts in any way, and not leave any trace in their behavior. Of course, thought to which the author can make additions himself regarding its subject can in the same way naturally be acquired from its premises [by readers].²⁶

In this way, Motahhari wanted his work to not be an intellectual tract but something that provided readers with materials that made them actively think for themselves. Of course, judging from his subsequent works and lectures, Motahhari did have intellectual views of his own. While he actively expressed them, in *The Stories of the Righteous* he proclaims that he will not do so at all.

This shares fundamental commonalities with James’ research method that we examined in the second section of this paper. Of course, Motahhari is not stating that he adopted this approach under James’ influence. I do not think the probability of this is very high. Rather, what I want to highlight is the technique of not teaching religious or ethical “truth” to readers but making them think and understand it for themselves in order to effectively impart it to them. The views people hold are diverse, even if they have the same educational or family background. Education is a means of leading people, particularly those of the younger generation, to a certain ideal or principles. In modern and contemporary society, it is impossible for education to be completely free from power and authority. Personal judgments vary greatly and can include many errors. One method to avoid this is through state-led national education that guides people (nations, societies) in the “right” direction while comparing the collective experience of humanity to standards of good and evil. Of course, there is no guarantee that this will be correct. On the other hand, there is also the approach of leaving such decisions to individuals. It goes without saying that Motahhari was not free from all prejudices and power / authority. As is well-known, he subsequently became an important ideologue of the Islamic Revolution. It cannot be denied that in the end his thought tried to lead people to proper Islam. However, out of the many religion scholars that existed, he was one of the

few that took as his life goal leading people to the proper path in a comparatively unbiased fashion.

At any rate, it appears that Motahhari had for a while held his own ideas about the need to publish a work that made people think for themselves. When one of the attendees of the aforementioned meeting proposed that a book of stories should not rely on exposition (*bayān*), Motahhari had irresistibly accepted it since it was really matching his own ideas. In this way, the work of compiling this book began.²⁷

While many people recognized the benefit of creating such a book, some people told Motahhari that he was not really fit for such a job, and that he should do what he had been doing and was cut out for (writing books like *Principles of Philosophy*). Furthermore, another person “advised” him that while what’s started can’t be stopped, he should not attach his name to its publication. Motahhari in turn harshly criticized such advice as a reflection of the tendency in Iranian society to judge the value of a book not based on how beneficial its content is but rather whether or not it is hard to understand.

The people introduced in this book living in Iranian society are from a diverse set of classes. It includes heroes who participate in Islamic movements, and is based on the premise that through the activities of such people readers can awaken to the meaning and truth of Islam. Motahhari states that it emphasizes not individuals from the privileged class but ordinary people, an interesting remark. He says that he has chosen to create such a book because while the decay of society’s strata begins with the privileged class and then exerts an influence on ordinary people, flourishing, on the other hand, begins with ordinary people who are oppressed and awaken to this oppression. He thought that ordinary people could reform the corruption of the privileged class. In other words, generally decay begins from the top and flows to the bottom, while reforms go from the bottom to the top. This view brings to mind the concept of “the dispossessed / oppressed” (*mostaza’fin*), which shows the core of the Islamic Revolution. I see this as both a reflection of the thought emphasized by Khomeini, as well as reflection of the strength of Motahhari’s interest in society’s weak.

The first volume of *The Stories of the Righteous* is comprised of seventy-five stories. Motahhari at first wanted to include one hundred stories, however, it was reduced because the book would have been too large as well as due to a lack of printing paper. The chosen stories all have “active” content, besides two or three that express humans’ ethical weakness. There are no stories of passivity. After worrying a great deal, it appears that he was thinking of removing two or three stories of the latter category, but in the end included them. The book is almost entirely comprised of content from hadith literature,

or Islamic collections of narratives. Characters are almost entirely great religious leaders. However, they are also taken from tales about great persons, translated books, history, and biographies, and include non-Muslims. Motahhari writes clearly that he took great care when translating them from Arabic, working to make sure that there are no errors or erroneous understandings and trying to not change the original texts even one bit. He states that even when passages are omitted and their orders changed, if readers consult the original texts they will see that there are no changes or omissions that affect stories' intended meanings.

The Stories of the Righteous was thus compiled, and published in 1961 in Tehran. It subsequently was reprinted multiple times, and came to be known by not only many Persian speakers but also readers of the world through translation. As a result, it received an award from UNESCO in 1965.²⁸ Like Volume 1, Volume 2 continues seventy-five stories. While these volumes were first published as two separate books, subsequently they were published as one.

Content

As stated above, *The Stories of the Righteous* consists of seventy-five tales. Their titles are as follows: 1. Rasūl-e Akram va do Helqeh-ye Jamī' at (The Great Prophet and the Two Groups), 2. Mardī keh Komak Khāst (The Man Who Sought Help), 3. Khāhesh-e Do'ā (A Prayer's Wish), 4. Bastan-e Zānū-ye shotr (Binding the Knees of a Camel), 5. Hamsafar-e Hajj (Companions on the Hajj), 6. Ghazā-ye Dasteh-ye Jamī'i (A Group Meal), 7. Qāfeleh-i keh beh Hajj mī-raft (The Caravan that Went on the Hajj), 8. Mosalemān o Ketāī (Muslims and People of the Holy Books), 9. Dar Rekāb-e Khalīfah (Making an Offering to the Caliph), 10. Emām-e Bāqer va Mard-e Masīhī (Iman Baqir and the Christian), 11. 'Arabi va Rasūl-e Akrahm (Arabs and the Great Apostles), 12. Mard-e Shāmī va Emām-e Hosein (The Man from Sham and Iman Husayn), 13. Mardī keh Andarz Khāst (The Man Who Sought Advice), 14. Masīhī- va Zarreh-ye 'Alī (The Christian and Ali's Armor), 15. Emām Sādeq va Gorūhī az Motasavvefeh (Iman Sadiq and a Group of Sufis), 16. 'Alī va 'Āsem (Ali and Asem), 17. Mostamand va Servatmand (The Poor Man and Rich Man), 18. Bāzārī va 'Āsem (The Bazaar Merchant and a Passerby), 19. Ghazzālī va Rahzanān (Ghazali and the Robber), 20. Ibn Sīnā va Ibn Miskawaih (Avicenna and IbnMiskawayh), 21. Nasīhat-e Zāhed (The Ascetic's Advice), 22. Dar Bazm-e Khalīfah (At the Caliph's Banquet), 23. Namāz-e 'Eid (The Holiday Prayer), 24. Gūsh beh Do'ā-ye Mādar (Hearing Mom's Prayer), 25. Dar Mahzar-e Qāzī (In Front of the Judge), 26. Dar Sar Zamīn-e Mīnā (In Mina), 27. Vazneh-ye Bardāran

(The People Having a Contest of Strength), 28. Tāzeh Mosalemān (The New Muslim), 29. Sofreh-ye Khalīfah (The Caliph's Dining Table), 30. Shekāyat-e Hamsāyeh (Complaints about the Neighbor), 31. Derakht-e Kharmā (The Date Tree), 32. Dar Khāneh-ye Umm Salmah (At Umm Salama's House), 33. Bāzār-e Siyāh (The Black Market), 34. Vāmāndeh-ye Qāfeleh (The Person who Fell Behind the Caravan), 35. Band-e Kafsh (Shoelaces), 36. Heshām va Farzdaq (Hesham and Farzdaq), 37. Bazantī (Bazanti), 38. 'Aqīl, Mehmān-e 'Alī (Ali's Customer Aqil), 39. Khāb-e Vahshatnā (The Scary Dream), 40. Dar Zelleh-ye Banī Sā'edeh (In the Shadow of Bani Sa'edeh), 41. Salām-e Yahūd (The Jew's Greeting), 42. Nāmeḥ-i beh Abū Zarr (The Letter to Abu Zarr), 43. Mozd-e nā-Moa'yyen (Undecided Wages), 44. Bandeh ast yā Āzād? (Slave or Freeperson?), 45. Dar Mīqāt (At the Hajj's Gathering Spot), 46. Bār-e Nakhl (The Fruit of the Date Tree), 47. 'Arq-e Kār (The Sweat of Labor), 48. Dūstī keh Borīdeh Shod (A Cutoff Friendship), 49. Yek Doshn ām (Name-Calling), 50. Shamshīr-e Zabān (The Sword of Words), 51. Do Hamkār (The Two Collaborators), 52. Man'-ye Sharābkhareh (The Banning of Alcohol Consumption), 53. Peirāhan-e Khalīfah (The Shirt of the Caliph), 54. Javān-e Āshofteh hāl (The Hysterical Youth), 55. Mohājerān-e Habshah (The Abyssinian Migrant), 56. Kārgar o Aftāb (The Laborer and the Sun), 57. Hamsāyeh-ye No (The New Neighbor), 58. Ākharīn Sokhan (The Last Word), 59. Nusaibah (Nusaibah), 60. Khāhesh-e Masīh (The Wish of the Savior), 61. Jame'-ye Heizām az Sahrā (To Gather Firewood of the Desert), 62. Sharāb dar Sofreh (Dining Table Alcohol), 63. Estemā-ye Qor'ān (To Listen to the Quran), 64. Shahrāt-e 'Avām (The Good Name of Commoners), 65. Sokhanī keh, beh Abū Tāleb Nīrū Dād (The Words that Gave Power to Abu Taleb), 66. Dāneshjū'i-ye Bozorgsāl (The Old Student), 67. Gīyah Shenās (The Botanist), 68. Sokhanvar (The Speaker), 69. Samāreh-ye Safar-e Tā'yef (The Benefits of the Trip to Ta'if), 70. Abū Eshāq-e Sābī (Abu Eshaq-e Sabi), 71. Dar Jostejū'-ye Haqīqat (Seeking Truth), 72. Jūyā-ye Yaqīn (Seeking Faith), 73. Teshneh-i keh Mashk-e Ābash beh Dūsh Bud (The Thirst Felt despite Having Water in the Leather Bag on One's Back), 74. Lagd beh Aftādeh (Stepping on Someone Who's Down), 75. Mard-e Nāshenās (The Unfamiliar Man)

Since I cannot discuss all of the stories in this paper, while describing concretely its content to present its overall characteristics and several of its themes, I will consider Motahhari's aim in compiling this work. While its themes are diverse, they include (1) the relationship between Islam and other religions (particularly Christianity), (2) the characteristics of the Twelver Imami Shiism (the work includes many deeds of historical

Imams), (3) ethical issues, work, the importance of academic effort, (4) women, and (5) the wise (includes foreigners).

As already described, Motahhari's basic interest was religion and ethics. While topics in *The Stories of the Righteous* can be categorized as I have done away, their tone overlaps. In other words, at this book's basis are discussions of ethics (how humans should live) tied to religion. Therefore, while my five categories themselves do not have that much meaning, using them for ease of explanation, I will briefly present some concrete examples from each. Representative stories falling under each category are listed below.

- (1) Islam and other religions: 14, 28, 60
- (2) The characteristics of the Twelver Imami Shiism: 10, 12, 16, 43, 44, 56
- (3) Ethical issues, work, academic effort: 17, 52, 53, 66
- (4) The societal role of women: 24, 32, 59
- (5) The wise; 19, 20, 65, 67

Below I will introduce one to two stories from each category.

Fourteenth Story²⁹ A Christian did not acknowledge his crime of stealing the armor of Caliph Ali. While Ali brought the Christian to Court, in the end he followed the decision of a judge in favor of the Christian that was based on a lack of proof. However, the Christian, upon seeing Ali's praiseworthy attitude, subsequently felt guilty, and then recognized his wrongdoing. In the end he became a Muslim.

Twenty-eighth Story³⁰ A man who succeeded in converting a Christian to Muslim continued to interfere in the details of the new converts' faith (due to excessive enthusiasm), in the end making him leaving behind his Muslim faith.

Here we find a Muslim's excessive interference as well as an effort to draw a new Muslim into his religious duties to the extent that it deprived the latter of time in his daily life. Interestingly, while he may have been working within the confines of his position as a scholar of Islam, Motahhari is attempting to have readers make balanced judgments by including the above two contrasting stories.

Motahhari belonged to the Twelver Imami Shia tradition and thus, of course, inevitably the majority of the tales involve the activities of Imams. Therefore, such stories are the greatest in number.

Twelfth Story³¹ Someone from Sham (present-day Syria; the headquarters of the Umayyad Caliphate and known for harshly persecuting Shia Muslims) was abusively swearing at the third Imam Husayn. The Imam did not reply but rather acted generously towards this foreigner, offering words of support. As a result, this person from Sham came to love Husayn from his heart.

Fifteenth Story³² This story, which is about the sixth Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq, is the longest in *The Stories of the Righteous*, spanning fourteen pages. Therein the Imam intensely criticizes ascetics (Sufis) for not having a normal job and looking down on or renouncing societal relations while looking for God. While the Imam approves of almsgiving itself, he discusses the foolishness of doing so when one's family is suffering from hunger.

Fifty-sixth Story³³ This story is also about the sixth Imam. Someone offered to help in his farming work after seeing him under the blazing sun. However, the Imam refuses their offer, and says that he enjoys working for one's daily bread.

As I stated above, much of the subject matter in *The Stories of the Righteous* is taken from hadith literature about Imams.³⁴ Of course, since these stories are records that exist to praise the virtue of the "infallible" Imams, they are apologetic in nature. Motahhari includes many tales regarding Imams. While on the one hand they are presented as paragons of ideal humans, in many cases, on the other hand, readers get a candid glimpse into them as people. For example, the Imam Kadhim is described working in the field while covered in sweat.³⁵

The third theme is the theme that, as I have repeatedly stated, Motahhari probably had the most interest in. We find various examples that show the correct way to act as a human (ethics). It seems that there are many pronounced stories regarding wealth distribution and disparities.

Seventeenth Story³⁶ A man wearing shabby clothes joined people at the Prophet Muhammad's regular gathering. Since it was not decided where people should sit, this man sat next to someone with a fine appearance. Then, lifting up his clothes, this man moved away to the side of the gathering. The Prophet then scolded this rich person, who, reflecting on his actions, promised to give half of his wealth to the poor man. However, the poor man, fearing that he would become like this rich man, firmly refused the offer.

Fifty-third Story³⁷ The second Caliph Umar was moving his hands in a peculiar way while preaching from the pulpit. The people who saw this found it strange, and asked the

caliph about it. He replied that despite being the caliph he only had one T-shirt, and had put it on while it was still wet from washing. He was drying it while preaching. The caliph was doing this in imitation of his predecessors, working to eliminate wasteful use of government funds.

Around the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the ethics of Islam—particularly as they related to poverty and wealth—was a major topic. It appears that the rich and the poor was an important topic for Motahhari, and in the aforementioned introduction to *The Stories of the Righteous* it occupies a central position. Evil comes from material pride, and the wealthy lose modesty. There are many stories which lead readers to think that the true spirit of Islam lies in those who are not rich. Today, conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims is frequently covered by the mass media. Certainly, they have their differences in terms of teachings regarding Imams, and have had conflicts in history. As is well-known, when conflict between the two branches was raging, at a Mosque in a Shia-ruled area the names of the first three caliphs were cursed. In other words, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman “usurped” the right to succession of Ali that he had received from the Prophet. It is interesting that a hadith is included which presents Umar as the paragon of a leader in Islam.

It is well known that Motahhari was deeply interested in the societal role of Muslim women. In his later years he wrote a book on their rights.

Twenty-fourth Story³⁸ This story is about the second Imam Hasan and his mother. When the latter would pray, she would never pray for herself. Hasan was mystified by this, and asked why. She replied that first neighbors and then family members are important.

Fifty-ninth Story³⁹ A woman named Nusaibah participated in the Battle of Uhud (625) with her husband and son in order to give water to the wounded and take care of them. However, when the battle took a turn for the worse for the Muslim army, Nusaibah took a sword and bow for herself and courageously fought. Despite having fallen with an injury while fighting with the enemy, she encouraged her son to continue fighting. When her son gets injured, she finds out the enemy general who caused his injury and, ignoring her own injury, attacks and defeats him. Some time after the battle she recovered from her injury, but its scars remained on her body for life.

Here gentle and strong women are contrasted. The above story about Nusaibah can also be understood to mean that women should also participate in jihad for their faith’s

teachings. It appears that Motahhari understood the “greater” or “true” jihad to be more of a battle with one’s heart and mind than with an actual enemy one is battling with in the real world. Imam Hasan’s mother gave up selfish desires to quietly pray for others and her family. This stands in contrast to Nusaibah. Perhaps Motahhari is trying to make readers think that there is no difference between men and women in terms of self-sacrifice, and that women’s role in promoting Islamic faith—whether it take the form of actual battles for one’s life or daily prayer—is indispensable.

Finally, there are stories regarding great people.

Nineteenth story⁴⁰ This story is about the sage Ghazali, who is universally known in the Islamic world. As a young man Ghazali went to Nishapur, the center of academics during his time, to go to school. He resided there for some years and achieved success. He subsequently decided to return home, however on the way he was attacked by robbers. They were looking through his possessions, and he pleaded with them to just not take a bundle that contained papers which were the fruits of his years of study. Upon hearing this, they spit back at him that things in a bundle do not contain real knowledge. Upon hearing this he realized that he had received true advice from none other than robbers.

Sixty-Seventh Story⁴¹ This story is unique in that its main character is the Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus. When young he was not good at school, the kind of student that teachers would given up on. However, his parents didn’t give up and supported him in his education. In the end he entered university to become a doctor, however he was interested in botany, which went against the expectations of his parents. In this field he was like a fish in water, he worked hard and compiled a new way of classifying plants. When he was unable to publish the fruits of his study due to people’s envy, not discouraged he carried out a journey by foot that totaled eight thousand kilometers, carrying only his luggage, a microscope, and some papers. Finally he was able to publish his work *Systema Naturae* and became a great botanist known to the world.

Unfortunately I cannot discuss the content of all of the stories that appear in Motahhari’s work, and I have only been able to provide an outline of the above stories. Furthermore, it is contradictory that the present author, an outsider, is adding such explanations while knowing Motahhari’s intention in compiling this work. However, having recognized this, I believe the following can be said based on my above explanations. We must recognize that he was motivated to publish this work because he continued to see it his duty to share with ordinary people the overall set of values he had

acquired as a scholar and thinker belonging to Twelver Imami Shia Islam. This is clearly him working to propagate his faith, which, being in the position that he was, he never wavered in. We could also say that this is one of the limitations of him as a thinker. However, at the same time we should note his criteria for choosing stories. First, we can see that through them he was consistently working to promote Islam. He does not particularly distinguish between the Sunni and Shia branches. There are a comparatively large number of stories about the Orthodox Caliphs. Furthermore, his collection is also distinguished by its inclusion of a considerable number of stories regarding followers of other religions. There are many related to Christianity. With regard to the two stories I introduced above, a balance is maintained by his inclusion of one regarding the interfering Muslim. In the first volume one particularly notices (for example in the sixty-seventh story) that even in the case of stories regarding great people from foreign countries, they are chosen because they depict a person working sincerely in their studies. The fifty-ninth story “Nusaibah,” about a brave mother who participates in the Islamic path as a fighter, leaves quite an impression on the reader. Motahhari took a considerable interest in the position and role of women in society. It is certainly true that it is unclear whether he is trying to get women to participate in jihad or, rather, hoping that women will simply exhibit a strong determination and action. Its content is such that one could interpret it in any way. As I have already pointed out, when a Shia scholar of Islam compiles a book, it is unavoidable that it will end up having a general framework of values based on Shia Islam. One cannot help thinking that it was compiled with the hope that readers will interpret its stories in a certain way. While recognizing this, Motahhari ventured to compile this collection of stories, and it is clear that he did so in this format on purpose. If the compiler’s interpretations are unidirectionally pushed upon readers it might lead to misunderstandings, and, if things go badly, a backlash from them. As I stated at the beginning of this paper, interpretations regarding religious and ethical issues are never without complications: the criteria for each person’s interpretation vary enormously. In the end they can only be left up to individual judgments. This technique is certainly similar to James’ in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*. Again, I am not saying that, for example, Motahhari adopted this approach under James’ influence. However, when compiling a collection of stories regarding great religious figures from throughout the world and history, he took into account the effectiveness of presenting them while including unchanged subjective descriptions of their writers as well as eliminating as much as possible third party interpretations. This is undoubtedly because he judged readers making a subjective effort to interpret content indispensable in

religious and ethical education.

Conclusion

Likes James, a premise of Motahhari's *The Stories of the Righteous* was the diverse ways in which ordinary people respond to religious and ethical phenomena. They did not come into direct contact and do not handle subject matter that is of the same nature. While it appears that Motahhari read and was thus edified in some way by James' works, he probably did not compile *The Stories of the Righteous* under the direct influence of him. However, I believe that they shared a similar motivation or intention in creating their works, namely, the author leaving out as much as possible their interpretation to offer unmodified content that readers can interpret. Generally speaking it is difficult to universally define with language religious and ethical values, and it is incredibly hard to make people understand this. Wise people throughout all times and in all places have done so, however there are basically no examples of success. While Motahhari's early period publication *The Stories of the Righteous* has a different flavor than his other works, one can be almost sure that he compiled it with the above-described goal in mind.

Notes

- ¹ The works of W.K. Clifford, Aldous Huxley, W. James, C. S. Peirce, Herbert Spencer and so on are representative of this period. All of them philosophically express the changes in their era that accompanied the rapid development of science. One of the primary topics that they addressed was the issue of scientific knowledge and religion. Their approaches varied: some saw science and religion as opposed to each other, others tried to find an eclectic balance, and so on. However, they all emphasized the functioning of human reason and tried to handle issues in a "rational" fashion. The beginnings of various academic methods that would develop in later generations can be found in their works.
- ² For this paper I used the original (*The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature*, Routledge Classic, London, 2008) while also referring to its two-volume translation by MASUDA Keizaburō, *Shūkyō teki keiken no shosō* 『宗教的経験の諸相』 (Iwanami Shoten, 2008). The translator has taken direct quotations of this work from *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature*, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York, London, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, 1917 (<http://www.gutenberg.org/files/621/621-h/621-h.html>). Below, referred to as *Varieties*.
- ³ This paper uses Mortazā Motahharī, *Majmū'eh-ye Āthār*, 2 jeld. Enteshārāt-e Sadrā, Tehran, 1382 (2004), pp.183-348, 349-497. Both of volumes of the work were published together as *Dāstān-e Rāstān*, Enteshārāt-e Sadrā, Tehran, 1377 (1999).

- ⁴ SHIMAMOTO Takamitsu 嶋本隆光, *Isurāmu kakumei no seishin* 『イスラーム革命の精神』 [The Spirit of the Islamic Revolution], Kyōto Daigaku Gakujutsu Shuppankai, Kyoto, 2011.
- ⁵ There are many works on the historical and intellectual situation before the 1979 revolution. Major ones include Heinz Halm, *Shi'a Islam, from Religion to Revolution*, Princeton, 1997; Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*, Yale Univ. Press, 1985; and Yann Richard, *Shi'ite Islam*, tr. by Antonia Nevill, Blackwell, 1995. These are written from a variety of perspectives.
- ⁶ See, for example, G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000; and B. Russell, *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1954. In the latter work Russell argues that a constant set of universal ethical values cannot exist because ethical standards differ depending on each person's place in the world. It is often pointed out that Islamic law is a set of ethics that covers the maximum number of things possible, while Western law is a set of ethics that covers the minimum possible. Russell clearly speaks for the latter position.
- ⁷ Motahhari, 'Ellāl-e Gerāyesh beh Madīgarī, Daftar-e Enteshārāt-e Islāmī, 1357 (1978), p. 39. Just before this passage, Motahhari severely criticizes David Hume and Bertrand Russell's reliance on empiricism as a flaw of modern Western thought. However, as I will discuss in this paper, James himself was in the end an empiricist, which led Charles Pierce to criticize him as a "simple empiricist." While this is not decisively damaging to Motahhari's assessment of James, it does appear that James was a traditional empiricist even more so than he believed.
- ⁸ Motahhari, *Moqaddameh-ye Jahanbīnī-ye Islāmi*, Enteshārāt-e Sadrā, Qom, 1358 (1979), pp. 180-195 (Mo'ajeze-ye Khatmieh). Here Motahhari is discussing the miracle of Prophet Muhammed's final moments (in other words, the Quran). While he touches upon James while doing so, the precise location of the discussion he is referring to is unclear, as can be seen by the quotation in the main text of this paper. However, he frequently mentions this idea of James, and thus even if it cannot be pinpointed, it can be generally guessed.
- ⁹ While Peirce did not receive high acclaim while alive, after his death he did as the progenitor of semiotics. See, for example, *Peirce on Signs*, ed. by James Hoops, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991.
- ¹⁰ *Varieties*, p. 3.
- ¹¹ Ibid., p. 5.
- ¹² B. Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, Routledge, 2004, p. 645.
- ¹³ *Varieties*, p. 6.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., p. 9.
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p. 13.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., p. 15.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 18.
- ¹⁸ Motahhari, 'Ellāl-e Gerāyesh, pp. 91-103. Here Motahhari discusses in detail the errors and limitations of Hume's empiricism. At the same time, we also need to bring to mind that Peirce criticized James' empiricism as being too simplistic. From my perspective, Motahhari's understanding of James is not precise in some regards.
- ¹⁹ *Varieties*, p. 20.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

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- ²¹ Ibid., p. 28.
- ²² Ibid., p. 30.
- ²³ Ibid., p. 31.
- ²⁴ Ibid., p. 38.
- ²⁵ *Dāstān-e Rāstān (Majmū'eh)*, pp. 185-348.
- ²⁶ Ibid., p. 187.
- ²⁷ Ibid., p. 185.
- ²⁸ *Dāstān-e Rāstān* (1377 [1999]), p. 7. On this page one also finds a copy of UNESCO's commendation.
- ²⁹ *Dāstān-e Rāstān (Majmū'eh)*, pp. 215-216.
- ³⁰ Ibid., pp. 251-253.
- ³¹ Ibid., pp. 211-212.
- ³² Ibid., pp. 217-226.
- ³³ Ibid., p. 310.
- ³⁴ Representative hadith literature include 'Alī (Imam), *Nahj al-Balāghah*, Bāqer Majlisī, *Bihār al-Anvār* and Qulainī, *Osūl min al-Kāfī*.
- ³⁵ *Dāstān-e Rāstān (Majmū'eh)*, p. 290.
- ³⁶ Ibid., pp. 229-230.
- ³⁷ Ibid., pp. 244-245.
- ³⁸ Ibid., pp. 275-276.
- ³⁹ Ibid., pp. 313-314.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 233-234.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 326-328.

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Editor's Postscript

We are pleased to present you with the twelfth issue of the Journal of the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (JISMOR).

The Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (CISMOR), together with the School of Theology of Doshisha University, held a workshop “Judaism and Christianity in Late Antiquity: Mutual Influence” as the fourth meeting of the project “Jews and Judaism in Japan” on September 24th, 2016. This issue contains the two public lectures delivered on the occasion.

Needless to say, each and every research fellow of CISMOR studies one of the three Abrahamic religions as his or her special field of research. At this meeting Associate Professor Etsuko Katsumata, who specializes in Judaism, and Professor Moriyoshi Murayama, who specializes in Christianity, delivered lectures and exchanged opinions on the same topic “Paul and Judaism.” Likewise, CISMOR hopes to provide its research fellows and the public with more opportunities to discuss the same topics from differing perspectives.

This issue also contains articles submitted by Professor Katsuhiro Kohara, the former director of CISMOR, and Mr. Takamitsu Shimamoto, a former professor of Osaka University.

During the past year we saw Britain's decision to leave the EU and Donald Trump's victory in the United States presidential election. “My Country First” policy seems to be the trend in many countries and Japan is no exception to this. At the age of “post-truth” politics there is even a greater need for unbiased analyses of the Abrahamic religions. We ask for your continued support for JISMOR.

March 2017

Takehito Miyake, Chief of Editorial Committee

Guidelines for Submissions

Revised on March 31, 2014

1. *JISMOR* is an online journal published annually in or around March in Japanese and English, and is made publicly accessible on the Doshisha University Academic Repository and the website of Doshisha University Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (CISMOR).
2. In principle, eligibility for contributing papers is limited to research fellows of CISMOR and individuals recommended by at least one research fellow of CISMOR.
3. Each submitted paper will be peer-reviewed, and the editorial committee will decide whether to accept it or not for publication.
4. In principle, submissions are limited to unpublished papers only. (If you intend to submit a paper that has been published before, you should obtain the permission of the relevant institution for the publication of your paper in *JISMOR*.)
5. Please send a resume of your paper (written in approximately 400 characters in Japanese or 150 words in English) via e-mail by the end of May to the address shown below. Any format is acceptable.
6. Your paper should be received by the editorial committee by the end of July.
7. Please prepare your paper both in Word format (see below) and PDF format, and submit them, as e-mail attachments.
8. To submit a paper, please use a template for Microsoft Word, which can be downloaded from the CISMOR's website. (<http://www.cismor.jp/en/publication/index.html>)
9. The paper should be written in either Japanese or English.
10. The paper should be written from left to right.
11. The paper should be 16,000 to 24,000 characters long if written in Japanese and 6,000 to 9,000 words long if written in English.

Research notes, book reviews, and research trends should be within 8,000 characters if written in Japanese and within 3,000 words if written in English.
12. The first page of the paper should include: the title of the paper; the name of the author; the organizational affiliation; an abstract (in approximately 400 characters if written in Japanese and 150 words if written in English); and five key words. If you write the paper in Japanese, please write the title, the name of the author, and the organizational affiliation in both Japanese and English.
13. Footnotes should be provided collectively at the end of the paper. No bibliography is shown, in principle.

14. If your paper includes reference to books, magazines, and/or newspapers in a European language, their names should be written in italic type, while titles of papers that may appear in your paper should be written in roman type.
15. In principle, Hebrew, Arabic, Greek, and other words from any language using a non-Roman alphabet should be transliterated into the Roman alphabet, using the same system of transliteration throughout the paper.

Specifically, in transliterating Hebrew and Greek words, please comply with the guidelines specified in Chapter 5 (p. 25 onward) of P. H. Alexander, et al., eds., *The SBL Handbook of Style: For Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical and Early Christian Studies*, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “SBL”), as much as possible. While SBL specifies two systems of transliterating Hebrew words—academic and general-purpose—you may use either one that better suits your purpose. (Use of SBL is also recommended for transliterating the words of ancient languages such as Coptic, Akkadian, and Ugaritic.)

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