What's Wrong with the "Clash of Civilizations" Theory? : Reconsidering the *Charlie Hebdo* Shooting

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On January 7, 2015, a weekly newspaper in Paris was attacked by radical Islamists, resulting in the deaths of ten people in the editorial department and two police officers. This was the bloodiest terrorism incident in France in the half-century that had passed since the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962). On the evening of the same day, many Parisians gathered to mourn, arguing that "Satire is a French tradition, and the attack on *Charlie Hebdo* constituted an attack on French culture." Buoyed by public opinion, the government strengthened measures designed to protect public order and also dispatched the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Persian Gulf as it embarked on a military effort aimed at suppressing Al Qaeda and ISIS.

The target of this attack, *Charlie Hebdo*, is a satirical publication that enjoys great popularity in France. As a result, the immediate reaction following this event was that it was "an attack on freedom of expression." Moreover, as "freedom of expression" constitutes the foundation of Western political culture, this incident was broadly interpreted as a collision between European culture and Islam. But is this perception really valid? Could it be that the standoff between Europe, where freedom of expression is taken as an absolute truth, and Islam, which does not tolerate blasphemy against its religious beliefs, is mere fallacy and was concocted merely to conceal the "Islamophobia" that serves as a backdrop to this incident? I will examine the tone of the recent *Charlie Hebdo* content below; and I invite the reader to carefully consider the issue of "liberal Europe vs. Islam" and the circumstances surrounding the rise in anti-Islamic fervor currently gripping much of Europe.

A Change of Tenor at *Charlie Hebdo*

Charlie Hebdo is a satirical newspaper born out of the civil unrest of May 1968. As foreshadowed by the fact that Herbert Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization* and similar works would go on to become bestsellers, the civil unrest of May had two diametrically opposed aspects. The first was the new left's radical opposition to the capitalist order and

lifestyle. The second was a new revolutionary opposition to Christian family norms in Europe. *Charlie Hebdo* was launched in 1970, a time of upheaval and unrest in France. With its extreme brand of political satire that disregarded taboo, *Charlie Hebdo* was popular with the generation of ’68. In particular, the weekly’s unique brand of satire seemingly never missed a chance to poke fun at successive generations of French presidents, the Pope, Le Pen and other illustrious figures. Especially noteworthy was the clearly confrontational attitude taken towards the Catholic Church over its staunch opposition to abortion in the 1970s, which often resulted in the Pope being lampooned. In 1972, the National Front was born and soon developed a platform revolving around a rejection of immigration. Offering grotesque caricatures of National Front party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, *Charlie Hebdo* was quick to sound the alarm on the far right’s rise to power. *Charlie Hebdo*, then, was born out of 1960s counterculture; and it is important to note that it can by no means be considered a right-wing publication.

However, with the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, unusual changes could be seen in the tone and tenor of the weekly’s content. One of the most profound changes was the switch from a pro-Palestinian position to a pro-America and pro-Israel point of view. Another was a newfound ridicule aimed at radical Islam, the prophet Muhammad, and the veils donned by Muslim women. These trends are thought to be the obvious result of the influence of editor-in-chief Philippe Val in the editorial department, as well as the ushering in of Caroline Fourest, renowned for being in the vanguard of the Islamophobia movement[1].

These changes could be personified as “the caricature of Muhammed.” In September of 2005, the largest Danish daily, *Jyllands-Posten*, published 12 caricatures of the Islamic prophet. Included was an image of Muhammad appearing as a terrorist, leading to criticism from within Denmark as well as from abroad. Objections were especially strong in the Middle East, where the Danish embassies were besieged by protests, and some countries even experienced extremist uprisings.

At first, the major media in Europe set forth a policy of not publishing such caricatures. However, in direct opposition to this mood of self-restraint, there was one publication that quickly reproduced this caricature: France’s *Charlie Hebdo*. Gracing the front cover of a February 2006 special edition was the headline “Muhammad overwhelmed by fundamentalists,” which appeared with a sobbing Muhammad who laments, “It is hard to be loved by idiots”. This invited a backlash from Muslim organizations, which considered it insulting. Moreover, the following month, Philippe Val, Caroline Fourest and other public figures including Salman Rushdie, Taslima

Nasreen and Bernard-Henri Levy published “Together Facing the New Totalitarianism.” This treatise argues that the doctrine of radical Islam amounts to a new form of totalitarianism comparable to Nazism and Stalinism and that it constitutes a threat to democracy.

Moreover, with the arrival of the Arab Spring, in Tunisia the Ben Ali regime collapsed, with moderate Islamic parties gaining power. In response to this a special edition of *Charlie Hebdo*, titled “Sharia Hebdo,” was published in November 2011. The drawing on the cover depicted Muhammad with the caption, “100 lashes if you don’t die laughing!”. This black joke was based on the Western stereotype of Islamic (Sharia) law as being barbaric. Following the publication of this special issue, late one night someone hurled a Molotov cocktail into the company’s building and the editorial offices were completely destroyed. However, the editorial department declared that they “would not bow down to the threats of Islamists,” and the cover of the following week’s issue featured a drawing of a Muslim man and Charlie French-kissing, accompanied by the passage “love is stronger than hate.”

There are many more such examples of caricatures of “Charlie” that basically serve to troll Muhammad. For instance, another illustration that came out at the same time as a low-budget American movie was depicting the prophet Muhammad as a sex-crazed pedophile shows Muhammad stretched out naked on a bed accompanied by the headline “The Movie That Set the Muslim World Ablaze.” Facing the camera with his rear end in the air, the Prophet asks, “My ass? So you like my ass?”. This serves as a parody of a scene from Godard’s *Contempt*, in which the French sex symbol of the time, Brigitte Bardot, utters this line. This form of humor, which no Muslim could appreciate and which regularly includes sexual innuendo designed to shock, is a staple of *Charlie Hebdo*.

Just What is the Purpose of Satire?

Within France there were repeated protests over these offensive covers but the editorial department of *Charlie Hebdo* consistently pushed back using the argument that: “Ever since the people’s revolution, political satire has been a tradition in France, and this magazine seeks to continue this tradition. Furthermore, we poke fun not only at Islam, but also at Christianity, Judaism and other religions and authorities. Therefore, this magazine is not by any means discriminatory.” However, the issue at hand requires the questioning of key contexts including who and what is involved. This is because even illustrations that could, at first glance, appear humorous might, depending on the writer’s

position and the context in which they are published, take on a totally different meaning. For example, at a time and place where Christian family values are strong and abortion and same-sex relations are forbidden, any form of satire aimed at the Pope might be interpreted as having a liberal meaning. Conversely, when the situation is such that a minority group is being persecuted, and some member of that group is depicted in a grotesque fashion and scorned, naturally there are discriminatory nuances. Anti-Semitic caricatures that were published during the Nazi occupation certainly epitomize this. In short, poking fun at someone in power by caricaturizing him or her is one thing; but when this same scorn is aimed at the socially vulnerable, it may be perceived as simply discriminatory. This is why, ever since 9/11, the caricatures of Muhammad have invited such a strong backlash.

Following the 9/11 terrorism incidents of 2001, the Central Asia and the Middle East became the setting of armed interventions in the form of the aerial bombing of Afghanistan and the Iraq War, with countless numbers of men and women caught up in this and myriad lives lost. Moreover, seen as potential terrorists, many Muslims in the U.S. and Europe have been subjected to routine discrimination and violence. Given these circumstances, when the mass media disseminates stereotypes equating Muslims with fundamentalism, quite naturally there is an increase in anti-Muslim sentiment. What's more, this is doubly true when the creator of the offending illustrations is a caricaturist who touts a relationship with *Dansk Folkeparti*, a far-right political party that adheres to an anti-Islam line of rhetoric.

In February 2006, at the time *Charlie Hebdo* began reproducing the caricatures in question, French Muslim groups brought forth litigation seeking to prohibit the sale of the magazine. At least two of the caricatures contained discriminatory images portraying Muslims as terrorists. However, France's mainstream media immediately responded by unfurling a campaign advocating "freedom of expression" and a number of politicians – including the Minister of the Interior of the time, Nicolas Sarkozy – publicly declared support for *Charlie Hebdo*. Besieged by the opposition, the Muslim groups serving as plaintiffs in the case eventually withdrew their lawsuit. Thereafter, the *Charlie* cartoonists upped the ante, becoming ever more provocative in their portrayals.

An example of this can be seen in April of last year [2014] when Boko Haram, an African Islamist terrorist group, kidnapped a group of schoolgirls and *Charlie Hebdo* responded by adorning their covers with a caricature accompanied by the headline "Boko Haram's Sex Slaves are Angry", and featuring veiled, pregnant women being kidnapped by the armed group and shrieking, "Don't touch our welfare allocations!" The

implication is that the victims of sexual violence at the hands of Boko Haram would develop a parasitic dependence on the French social security system, becoming so-called "welfare sisters." After the January [2015] terrorism incident, when doubts began to be voiced regarding the tone of *Charlie Hebdo*, an explanation was offered that, "French satire might be difficult to understand for the uninitiated reader but *Charlie Hebdo* is offering a critique of Islamic fundamentalists. It is not the intention of the magazine to fan the flames of hatred towards ordinary Muslims." However, a close examination of "Boko Haram's Sex Slaves are Angry" and other caricatures clearly reveals that the targets of *Charlie*'s attacks are not solely Islamic fundamentalists.

Based on the circumstances described above, one can't help but question whether *Charlie Hebdo* is truly continuing the tradition of poking fun at those in power. Rather it seems that, following 9/11, the magazine has simply been taking advantage of the anti-Islamic sentiment sweeping Europe by targeting a weak group – Muslims – in an effort to prop up sales. In recent years, with the spread of the Internet, France, like most other countries, has seen books and other traditional media fall out of favor, resulting in countless newspapers going bankrupt and causing all manner of hardship for those in print media.[2] *Charlie Hebdo* itself has not been immune from this turn of events, with circulation dropping precipitously in recent times. However, the February 2006 special issue featuring the reproduction of the Danish caricature resulted in sales of some 400,000 copies of the magazine. Following the Boko Haram kidnapping, the post-9/11 French press saw the threat of Islam as a way to prop up lagging sales, similar to how Japanese weeklies have used the threat of North Korea as a driver of revenue. By presenting this material in a humorous, satirical manner, *Charlie Hebdo* has managed to prop up its sagging circulation.

The Double Standard Surrounding "Freedom of Speech"

We began by taking a brief look back at the change of tenor at *Charlie Hebdo* that has occurred over the last several years. Now, based on this discussion, I'd like to examine how the terrorist attacks of January of this year were received. As I indicated at the beginning of this lecture, because this attack was on a satirical publication that was in some ways representative of France, the immediate reaction was that it was an attack on *freedom of expression*. Moreover, because *freedom of expression* is a cornerstone of Western political culture, the incident was interpreted as *a collision between Islam and European culture*. In other words, the idea was that, Europe was unconditionally committed to freedom of expression, and the Muslim world could not tolerate the

desecration of its religion. It follows, then, that the underlying events of this terrorist event would be interpreted as a "clash of cultures" between liberal Europe and Islam.

And yet, is this interpretation really appropriate? It would seem that "freedom of expression" is not an absolute in Europe. If *freedom of expression* were really inviolable, then certainly any and all statements – everything from anti-Semitic remarks to historical revisionism – would be recognized. This is because, whether we approve of such content or not, *freedom of expression* would be treated as an inalienable right. However, in actuality, there are no European countries that approve of such statements in the name of "freedom of expression." Rather, such utterances are strictly controlled as hate speech in post-war Europe, which endured the Holocaust.

For example, French laws banning groups that advocate racism were established in 1972; the opinion at the time was that discriminatory statements were not free speech, but rather "criminal acts" subject to legal action. Then, in 1990, the Gayssot Act was established, which penalized the denial that the gas chambers of Auschwitz existed as "negationism." These two laws came into existence against the backdrop of the anti-racism activities of the post-war years and the controversial historical revisionism of the 1970s.

Conversely, however, there are also other laws that were created entirely as national initiatives. An example can be seen in the enactment in 2003 of acts making desecration of the national flag/anthem a crime. Any individual found guilty of this crime must pay a fine of 7,500 Euros and may also serve up to six months in prison. This law was created as a result of mayhem that broke out at a friendly soccer match. In November 2001, an international goodwill soccer match was played between Algeria and France in Paris, the first such match between the two countries since the Algerian War of Independence. During the singing of the national anthem directly before the match, some young second-generation immigrants crowding the stadium started booing, drowning out *La Marseillaise*. In retaliation, this law was enacted under the auspices of the then Minister of the Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy.

Then, with the intent of maintaining public order, in 2014, France approved a measure making the glorification of terrorism a crime. Under this statute, glorification or affirmation of terrorism is punishable by a fine of 75,000 Euros and up to five years in prison, while circulating such content on the Internet is punishable by a fine of 100,000 Euros and up to seven years in prison. Since the attacks of January 2015, this law has been applied widely, with a variety of negative outcomes, such as students being arrested for making what are perceived as pro-terrorist comments at school. (In a two-week

period following the incident, there were 400 such arrests, with more than 180 individuals prosecuted.)

Our first conclusion moving forward, then, is that the cultural argument that the incident represents a clash between "Europe and Islam" is questionable at best. Further, in Europe *freedom of expression* is by no means unconditional; for a clear line exists between acceptable and unacceptable speech. Instead, the issue is that speech not normally sanctioned is allowed for specific groups. Put another way, there is seemingly a *double standard*. The fact that Muslim teens who boo the French national anthem are treated harshly, while *Charlie Hebdo*'s Muslim bashing has been justified under the mantle of "freedom of expression" is an extreme example of this. Thus, we cannot simply say that these caricatures represent a difference in cultural communication between Europe and the Muslim world. Such a reading is not only based on a misinterpretation of the reality of Europe but also amounts to concealing the Islamophobia that acts as a backdrop to the incident.

The Circumstances Surrounding the Rise in Islamophobia

The next question at issue that I'd like to consider is the situation surrounding the rise of Islamophobia in Europe in recent years. Following the 9/11 attacks, anti-Islamic sentiment rose not only in the U.S., but also in Europe. The headscarf controversy in France in 2003, and the caricature incident in Denmark in 2005 are two examples of this trend, with each leading to an unequivocal escalation of this state of affairs. In May of last year [2014], in the European Parliament, populist parties calling for the curtailing of immigration started to gain traction in a number of EU countries, and in three in particular – France, the UK and Denmark – they rose to the top of their political power structures, causing quite a sensation. Then, in December, an organization called PEGIDA appeared on the scene, proclaiming its opposition to "the 'Islamification' of Europe" by holding mass rallies every Monday in major cities such as Dresden. With its history of the Holocaust, in post-war Germany racism is the taboo to end all taboos, so the appearance of such large-scale calls for the expulsion of foreigners was a truly remarkable occurrence. With anti-Islamic sentiment permeating so widely, one can't help but wonder why so many ordinary citizens – not Neo-Nazis – are attracted to this type of movement.

One of the answers to this question is to see the roots of the problem in the religious antagonism between Islam and Christianity since the Crusades. I cannot dismiss this perception as mere nonsense. However, because such a culturally-based argument

amounts to objectifying "European culture" and "Islam" dichotomy and poses the risk of obscuring class, gender, ethnicity and other socio-micropolitical relations behind the twin veils of "culture" and "religion," I think it would be best to tread carefully here.

One example representative of this is most certainly Samuel P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" theory. A former Harvard professor and director of the Center for International Affairs, Huntington was an American intellectual appointed to a conservative think tank during the Cold War. In 1993, he published an article titled "Clash of Civilizations" in which he argued that, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, international disputes would henceforth take the form of conflicts between different cultures. Huntington characterized the West as holding such values as individualism, liberalism, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and the separation of church and state, and positioned Islam as the cultural antithesis to these. The problem with this theory, however, was that while Huntington attempted to define the West by such concepts, they did not actually take root until at least the latter part of the 19th or possibly even the 20th century. As the anthropologist David Graber points out, prior to the 19th century, "even if they could at some level conceive of such notions, the overwhelming number of Westerners would certainly not have accepted them."[3]

Above all, for Huntington, the important point was that *democracy* was an ideal unique to the West, and that it would largely be impossible to expand it to other cultures. However, the proactive endorsement of *democracy* by the ruling elite of the West is also a recent historical development. For the elite were initially disgusted by the idea of "rule by the masses," equating it with "mob rule." Historical moments such as socialism in the 19th century and the all-out wars of the 20th century were necessary for such elite class domination to crumble. Ignoring all of this historical detail and seeking to characterize the true nature of Western democracy as one of liberal democracy, Huntington's arguments have proven anachronistic, while also reproducing a typically Orientalist discourse which builds Europe in opposition to Islam.

However, even if we advocate for the relativity of cultural values and call for a "dialogue between cultures" in opposition to the "Clash of Civilizations" theory, this would simply be interpreted as hypostatization of culture and civilization, and then we would find ourselves in danger of repeating the same fallacy as Huntington. These types of arguments, at their best, might very well amount to little more than a virtuous form of cultural relativism. If there is one mistake, these can easily switch to a religious fundamentalism or a cultural nationalism. The idea of "Overcoming Modernity" and the "Japanese Asianism" as espoused by the former Kyoto School were similarly of this

type.

It thus seems more relevant to analyze such political events from social sciences rather than explain from the cultural differences. As such, pursuant to gaining an understanding of the increasing Islamophobia in present-day Europe, it is important to foreground the following three points. First, class disparities have increased as a result of globalization. Second, against a backdrop of employment anxiety, there is an increased call for limiting immigration. Third, the immigration issue has become increasingly politicized, corresponding with the rise of the far right.

Politicians and the Media Create a Scapegoat

From 1945 to 1975, post-war Europe experienced a period of rapid economic growth. Then the oil crisis of the 1970s ushered in a period of sluggish economic performance; and, confronted with chronic recession, there was a call led by the New Right administrations of Margaret Thatcher and others to reconsider the welfare state. Specifically, this resulted in the privatization of utilities and mass deregulation, as well as reductions in corporate and individual taxes and social welfare outlays. This spurred a restoration of capital profitability rates and increased dividend payments to investors while wages and social security payments gradually declined. Furthermore, with EU market consolidation and a monetary union, market competition was strengthened, leading to rapid deterioration in the hiring environment.

This further resulted in the rise of far-right political parties across Europe, with this trend first appearing in France. After World War II, it was widely believed that the far right had largely collapsed, but defeat in the Algerian War and the depression that followed the oil crisis helped breathe new life into the movement and it returned to the center stage of politics in France. The far right argued, “Unemployment is on the rise because immigrants are stealing jobs.” They went on to call for the deportation of three million Arab laborers in an effort to solve the nation’s unemployment problems.

For a long time after Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front came into existence in 1972, it failed to garner even 1% of the national vote. Then, beginning in the mid-1980s, it suddenly started to attract a larger share of the vote, and in seemingly the blink of an eye, it became the third largest political party in France. The turning point in all of this was the Socialist Party’s adoption of neo-liberalism in 1983. Pledging to rebuild the welfare state, François Mitterrand won the presidential election of 1981. In his third year, however, he abandoned the nationalization of key industries and Keynesian economic policies, siding with Thatcher and deciding there was no choice but to shrink the public

sector. Ever since, the National Front has increasingly attracted blue-collar workers and those disappointed by the major parties, and has seen its fortunes greatly improve on the election front. Given this state of affairs, the National Front managed to pick up 11 parliamentary seats, creating a sensation at the 1984 European Parliament, where it became symbolic of the changing political map in France.

Since the latter half of the 1980s, the three interdependent frameworks of conservatism, reform, and the far right have taken hold, with fierce battles between political parties unfolding at the ballot box. Put another way, while both conservatism and reforms have propelled neo-liberalism on the economic policy front, on the election strategy front, the "immigration problem" has been mobilized as an issue with attempts being made to take back votes from the far right. This is sometimes referred to as the "'ethnification' of the election campaign."[4] With each French election thereafter, the themes of increasing crackdowns on illegal immigration, intensifying efforts to strengthen public order, and the crisis of national identity were taken up by TV discussion programs and in other forums. There are countless examples of this phenomenon, including the first headscarf controversy of 1989, the 1993 revisions to the Nationality Act, the enactment of a provision banning headscarves in 2004, the establishment of a Minister for Immigration, Integration & National Identity in 2007, the national identity controversy of 2009, and the controversy surrounding the banning of burkas in 2011.

It is important to understand these political developments in light of the circumstances surrounding the recent increase in Islamophobia in Europe. Basically, my point of view is that rather than citing the history of religious conflict between Judeo-Christian culture and Islam since the Crusades, the major factors behind the stunning successes enjoyed by populist parties in last year's European parliamentary elections reveal more complex origins: one, the European debt crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers; two, the austerity plans that resulted from this crisis; and three, the creation of a scapegoat by politicians and the media.[5]

A New Form of Racism

Viewed in this light, I think we need to understand that the recent increases in Islamophobia in Europe cannot be considered totally unrelated to what is currently transpiring in Japan. Since the Koizumi administration took power, Japan has also seen the implementation of structural reforms such as deregulation of the labor market and the like. As a result, there has been an increase in the non-regular employment rate, with

class disparities growing ever wider and resulting in greater insecurity. However, in an effort to divert citizens' attention from these realities, the government and media have chosen to focus on the threat of North Korea, the Senkaku Islands controversy, the Takeshima dispute, and other territorial clashes in an effort to foment nationalistic sentiment. In response to this trend, at the grassroots level, groups such as the *Citizens Group That Will Not Tolerate Special Privileges for Koreans in Japan* have sprung up. These groups often instigate demonstrations aimed at ostracizing minority groups living in Japan. Tessa Morris-Suzuki penned an academic paper titled "The Globalization of Racism," which argued that the same phenomenon that has gripped Europe since the 1980s is now appearing in Japan.[6]

However, if anything is different, it is that in present-day Europe, Islamophobic statements are not necessarily considered a form of hate speech. As has already been pointed out, following World War II, a variety of laws designed to restrict hate speech were passed in Europe. Accordingly, it became difficult to utter obviously discriminatory remarks aimed at Muslims without running the risk of punishment. At this juncture, then, a new form of xenophobia that emphasized the cultural differences between Europe and Islam was born. An example of this can be seen with the "headscarf controversy," where, in the name of secular ideals and gender equality, young Muslim schoolgirls were banned from wearing the hijab in French public schools. There is also the "Islam bashing" that was justified in the name of "freedom of expression" at the time of the Danish caricature incident. As such, this is not some sort of dated ideology arguing the relative superiority or inferiority of a particular race, but rather the feature of a new type of racism that justifies discrimination and exclusion in the name of the liberal values of "separation of church and state" and "freedom of expression."[7]

After this latest terrorist incident, some 1.5 million people gathered in Paris the Sunday following the attacks (Jan. 11, 2015) to participate in a demonstration. Nationwide, some 3.7 million citizens attended similar gatherings. Many of the participants carried placards with the message "I am Charlie," casting a somber mood over the events. The demonstration against terrorism was to be expected. However, the question of whether or not to identify with the victims is a different issue altogether. This is all the more controversial as *Charlie Hebdo* has been one of the French media outlets most responsible for fanning the flames of Islamophobia following the events of 9/11. If the victims of the current incident had been members of Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front, I wonder whether the demonstrators would have carried placards with the words "I am Le Pen." However, when it comes to the question of Islam, many people utter the

words “I am Charlie” without thinking twice. That is what I think makes contemporary racism so frightening. As I stated earlier, the racism of today does not use the vocabulary of race; rather, it invokes authority in the name of such principles as “separation of church and state” and “freedom of expression.” Without an understanding of this point, we are in danger of taking seriously the argument that there is a clash of civilizations between Europe and Islam, and it becomes impossible for us to grasp the racist conditions gripping present-day Europe.

Notes

1 Providing an up-close look at the change of tenor at *Charlie Hebdo*, Olivier Cyran, who worked as a journalist at the weekly from 1992 to 2001, published the following essay in 2013. Olivier Cyran, “Is *Charlie Hebdo* racist?” (Translations by: Takeshi Kasagi, Yuichiro Kashida, Jun Sunose), *Contemporary Philosophy* March 2015 special edition, included in the general feature “The *Charlie Hebdo* Attack & the Shock of ISIS Hostage-Taking Incidents,” pp. 148-171.

2 Regarding the state of the French print media with the spread of the Internet, see the following interview of former *Le Monde* editor-in-chief and current *MediaPart* representative Edwy Plenel: “How to Revive Critical Media – An Interview with the Editor-in-Chief of *MediaPart*, France’s Internet Newspaper” (“Labor Net,” November 14, 2014 Interviewed by: Keisuke Kikuchi, Yoshiya Goto) (http://www.labornetjp.org/news/2014/1114kikuti)

3 David Graber, *La démocratie aux marges*, Editions Le bord de l'eau, 2014, p.26.

4 Alec G. Hargreaves, « De la victoire de la gauche à la percée de l'extrême droite: l'ethnicisation du jeu électoral francais », *Histoire @ Politique*, no.16 (2012), pp. 154-165.

5 Keisuke Kikuchi, “Europe at the Crossroads – the Far Right’s Gains in EU Parliamentary Elections,” in *Journal of Global Studies* (Doshisha University), Issue No. 5, March 2015, pp. 99-118.

6 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “The Globalization of Racism”, compiled by Satoshi Ukai, Hyoduk Lee, et al., included in *An Introduction to Racism Studies* (Ibunsha, 2012).

7 For more on France’s headscarf controversy, refer to the following: Keisuke Kikuchi, “The Scarf Issue Explained” in Masanori Naito & Yayo Okano, *Global Justice* (Minervashobo, 2013), pp. 168-178.