Formation of Public Spheres and Islamist Movements in Malay Muslim Society of Malaysia

Yuki Shiozaki

Abstract

Muslim society originally had spheres for discussion based on Islamic logic, which are similar to a "public sphere." Such spheres were organized by *ulama* (Islamic clerics) and *tariqa* (Islamic order of mystics). Buildings established through *waqf* (religious endowment) including mosques and religious schools also provided such spheres for discussion. On the premise of the existence of plural public spheres rather than the single civil sphere advocated by Habermas, the contemporary Islamist movement could be considered as an attempt to recover the previously existing Islamic public spheres.

Contemporary Malay Muslim society has discussion arenas formed by the Islamist movement, such as *ceramah, usrah, khutbah*, the Internet, cassette tapes, and VCD. These are similar to the counter publics discussed by Nancy Fraser. In Islamic counter publics, the discursive resources of statements accumulated through Islamic logic are widely distributed. This phenomenon is also found in the modernization and popularization of the Islamist movement.

In Malaysia, the "mainstream" public sphere under control of the government, and such alternative counter publics, are intertwined. They have common terms based on Islamic logic and are connected by several channels. Therefore, the mainstream public sphere cannot ignore how counter publics based on Islamic logic influence the setting of the national political agenda. The process of so-called "Islamization" in Malaysia could be regarded as the process of mutual interaction between the mainstream public sphere and alternative counter publics. Moreover, this process is also an attempt to gradually recover functions of an Islamic social mechanism and to realize Islamic social order, such as the role of *ulama* in Muslim society and their relationship with rulers.

Keywords: public sphere, counter publics, Islamist movement, Islamization policy

1. Introduction

This paper demonstrates that in contemporary Malay Muslim society in Malaysia, the Islamist movements contribute to the creation of a public sphere that allows an open discussion arena

for the formation of public opinion. Moreover, the paper discusses how such arenas play a significant role in the attempt to restructure Islamic social order in Muslim societies, including Malaysia, which have been modernized and secularized through colonization.

After independence, many Muslim countries adopted the secularity and modernism originating in Western countries as their national policy. Thus, the forces aiming for Islamic social order, including implementation of *shari'a* (Islamic law), are usually under thorough regulation. As a result, some Islamist movements led to underground activities and even to armed struggle against governments. There are cases where oppression by secularist governments triggers so-called terrorism.[1]

As an exception among Muslim countries in Southeast Asia, political parties advocating implementation of *shari'a* are allowed to legally conduct parliamentary activities, and discourses on realizing Islamic social order are, relatively speaking, less regulated relatively. The Malaysian government has incorporated a so-called Islamization policy which seeks to reflect Islamic norms in the conduct of state administration. Despite conflicts between the government and the Islamist movement, both seek to gradually realize Islamic social order. Discourses aiming for gradual Islamization circulate in public spheres created through the Islamist movement, and thus these public spheres enable the Islamist agendas to be realized through argument.

2. The Formation of "Malaysia" as a Modern Nation-State

Malaysia consists of several states on the Malay Peninsula, the two states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo, and a federal territory. The population is about 26,640,000[2] and consists of Malays and other bumiputras (65.1%), Chinese (26.0%), and Indians (7.7%).[3] The religious population of Malaysia is represented by Islam, the majority group (60.4% of the population); Buddhism (19.2%); Christianity (9.1%); Hinduism (6.3%); and Confucianism, Taoism and other Chinese traditional religions (2.6%).[4]

Map 1 Malaysia (Source: CIA Maps)

In Malaysia, Islam has gradually spread among the local residents since the Malacca dynasty accepted the religion in the 15th century. The Malay race is basically all Muslim, and the present Malaysian Constitution stipulates that being Malay requires being Muslim.[5] Malacca was occupied by Portugal in 1511 and by the Dutch in 1641. After Britain put Penang under its control in 1786, the whole country was colonized by Britain in stages. The Malayan Union achieved independence from Britain in 1957 and became Malaysia in 1963, with the participation of Singapore and the Sabah and Sarawak states of Borneo. (Singapore later separated and became independent in 1965, partly because of racial conflicts between Chinese and Malays.) In the time of British colonial rule the migration of Chinese and Indians was necessary to develop the tin mines and agricultural plantations, and in this way the foundation of the current ethnic composition of Malaysia was built. Between the mid-1940s and the mid-1950s during the period of the independence movement, the position of Malays in society and the role of the sultan of each state as head of Islam were problematic issues. Therefore, Article 3 of the Malaysian Constitution stipulates that Islam is the religion of the Federation and that each state has a sultan as its Islamic head.

> Islam is the religion of Federation; but other religions may be practised in peace and harmony in any part of the Federation.[6]

This fact has an impact on the legitimacy of the Malaysian state from an Islamic viewpoint, and on the debate over an Islamic State.[7]

Since independence in 1957, the reins of the Malaysian government have been held by a coalition comprised of multi-ethnic parties, primarily including a Malay-based party, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO). Chronologically speaking, the ruling

coalition was the Alliance from 1956 to 1972 and has been the *Barisan Nasional* or National Front since 1972. Opposition parties include *Parti Islam SeMalaysia* (*PAS*), or Islamic Party of Malaysia, mainly comprised of Malays.[8] The ruling coalition seeks to reconcile interests among different ethnic groups and to secure co-existence without conflicts. This is the basic framework of Malaysian politics. However, the coordination between various ethnic groups has not be always been perfect. Conflict, partly due to previously existing economic gaps among ethnic groups, became more serious in 1969, causing racial riots in Kuala Lumpur. This incident resulted in the introduction of the Malay-first policy known as the New Economic Policy (NEP).

In the 1970s there arose among the Malays various movements, known collectively as the *Da'wah* movement, that sought a return to Islam and the introduction of Islam as the norm for living and society. Most notable was *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* (ABIM),[9] or the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia, which was organized by the younger generation. The Mahatir administration was installed in 1981, and then-ABIM president and future deputy prime minister (as well as financial minister), Anwar Ibrahim—ousted during the financial crisis in 1998—and other members joined UMNO. Accordingly, the government began to incorporate what is known as Islamization policy to reflect Islamic norms in the administration; it was introduced especially into education, finance, distribution and even the judiciary. As a consequence, the Islamization policy also influenced diplomacy and helped increase budgets for mosque construction, etc.[10]

1946	UMNO (United Malays National Organization) is formed.
1956	ALLIANCE's sweeping victory in the first general election.
1957	Malayan Union achieves independence.
1963	Malaysia, consisting of Malayan Union, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, is established.
1965	Singapore breaks away from Malaysia.
1969	The May 13 riots erupt in Kuala Lumpur and the parliament is suspended.
1972	*Barisan Nasional* (National Front) is organized.
1981	Prime Minister Mahatir assumes office.
1990	PAS regime is established in Kelantan state.
1998	Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is dismissed and arrested.
2003	Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi assumes office.

Table 1 Modern Malaysian chronology

Non-Malay ruling and opposition parties have been expressing concern that UMNO's gradual Islamization policy might repeatedly violate the rights of non-Muslims. Particularly, a secularist opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP), mainly consisting of Chinese, advocated a separation of religion and state and continued to oppose the transformation

of Malaysia into an Islamic state.[11] Every time trouble related to the Islamization policy occurred, there arose concerns among the Chinese and Indian parties even within the ruling coalition *Barisan Nasional*. On the other hand, the opposition party PAS, based on Malay Muslims, set up a more radical agenda, including the introduction of *shari'a* into the penal code and taxation system and the creation of an Islamic state. It began to put pressure on UMNO, with which PAS competed for support from Malay Muslim voters.[12] UMNO and PAS competed with each other over the degree of Islamic legitimacy, which consequently promoted the Islamization policy in Malaysia.

Whenever the Islamization policy and the theory of the Islamic state were opposed by the Chinese, Indians and other non-Malay peoples, UMNO emphasized the threat posed by the radical PAS, and, thereby, tried to prove that the Islamization policy of the moderate UMNO was necessary for retaining support for the government among Malay Muslims. The competition with PAS for Islamic legitimacy heightened when PAS won the state administration of Kelantan (1990) and Terengganu (1999) in general elections during the Mahatir administration. In these states, PAS presented its own policy reflecting *shari'a* in the penal code and taxation system,[13] which added pressure to questioning the Islamic legitimacy of the federal central government.

3. Muslim Society and the Public Sphere

Originally, the "public sphere" is a concept used by Jürgen Habermas, the German sociologist, to analyze an open discussion arena created by educated citizens with the objective of forming agreement as a key to the creation of a civil society in West Europe after the 18th century.

> By the 'public sphere' we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed… Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of general interest.[14]

Chart 1 Liberalistic public sphere according to Habermas

Recently, democratization and civil society in Muslim countries has been subjected to intense study in association with the foreign policies of the U.S. and other nations. In the book *Civil Islam*, a study on the formation of civil society among Islamist movements in modern Indonesia, Heffner says the following:

> In many respects, what is happening in the Muslim world resembles what the German sociologist Jurgen Habermas described some years ago as the emergence of the "public sphere" in the West. Habermas's study of eighteenth-century European society emphasized that public arenas, like coffee houses, literary clubs, journals, and "moral weeklies," helped to create an open and egalitarian culture of participation.[15]

Even if there are open discussion arenas accessible to everyone in modern Muslim society, it could never be the same as those which existed in 18th-century Western Europe, with such different backgrounds in terms of styles and participants. Heffner describes *Nahdlatul Ulama* and other Islamic groups as practitioners in the formation of public spheres in Indonesia during the democratization process after the end of the Suharto regime in 1998. There is also Talal Asad's work on criticism against government by Saudi Arabian clerics (*ulama*). This study examines a case where a social group based on Islamic norms served as a leader in the formation of public spheres. In Saudi Arabia, where the freedom of speech is

extremely suppressed, discourses circulating by way of *ulama*'s mosque sermons, cassette tapes, and other media can voice a powerful criticism of the government.[16]

Muslim society has a unique historical background of open discussion arenas. In examining the role of the public sphere in modern Muslim society, it is essential to take this historical background into account. A study by Hoexter, Eisenstadt, et al. about a historic public sphere in Muslim society[17] emphasized an aspect of the institutions, groups and systems that traditionally exist in Muslim society—such as *ulama* (Islamic clerics), *madhhab* (Islamic schools of law), and *tariqa* (Islamic order of mystics)—as an arena assuring open discussion:

> The *umma*—the community of believers—was accorded central importance in Islamic political thought. Not only were the protection and furthering of its interests but also the *umma*'s consensus (*ijma'*) on the legitimacy of the ruler as well as on details concerning the development of social and cultural norms was considered infallible. The community of believers was thus placed as the most significant group in the public sphere, and above the ruler.
>
> The *shari'a*—the sacred law, or the rules and regulations governing the lives of Muslims, derived in principal from the Qur'an and *hadith*—was developed by *fuqaha'* (jurists) and was basically an autonomous legal system, independent from the ruler's influence. Above and beyond a legal system, the *shari'a* embodied the values and norms of the social order proper to the community of believers and became its principal cultural symbol. The sacred nature of the *shari'a* is deeply entrenched in the public sentiment of Muslim societies. The sanction of the sacred law has contributed to the formation of a Muslim public opinion and endowed institutions and social groupings based on the *shari'a*—such as the *qadi*, the *mufti*, the schools of law (*madhabib*)—with a high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the ruler. It has also accorded moral authority to the '*ulama'*—the *shari'a* specialists—who have asserted the position as authorized interpreters of the *shari'a* law and custodians of the moral values underlying the ideals of social order of the *umma*.[18]

Chart 2 Traditional public sphere in Muslim society

In Malay Muslim society there have been traditional discussion arenas where discourses based on Islamic logic circulate. Even after colonization and modernization, these traditions have become one of the prototypes of the arenas for public opinion formation in contemporary Muslim society.

There are different kinds of arenas for the formation of public opinion in modern Muslim society after colonization and modernization: mass media such as television and newspapers, which are under direct control of the government and the ruling party (whether under government management or that of a large corporation); and Islamic discussion arenas which are not under control of the government. The mass media is always a propaganda organ closely related with the regime, and it seldom allows critical comments against the government, minorities' voices, and (with rare exceptions) Islamist discourses to be made public, heard, or circulated. The mass media is superficially the mainstream of society, while the traditional Islamic arenas for discussion are marginalized. Most of these various Islamic arenas—which are a prerequisite for Islamic social order and often serve as places to criticize rulers—were organized by the Islamist movements inclined toward modernism. Their incorporation of modern information and communication technologies has resulted in

popularity; so they becoming the backbone of Islamist activities. Here, 'Islamist movements' means those organized efforts to establish Islam (*shari'a*) as individual and social norms mainly in modern Muslim societies.[19] The largest of such movements in Malaysia is PAS, which advocates the establishment of an Islamic state implementing *shari'a*; other movements include a group of gradualist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as ABIM and JIM (*Jamaah Islah Malaysia*, or Malaysia Reform Association). Moreover, many people inclined toward the Islamists, such as former ABIM members, exist within the government party (UMNO). The Islamist movement, which is given very limited opportunities to speak in the mass media and whose discourses are distorted by the same, makes the most of Islamic discussion arenas in order to organize its efforts and disseminate its statements. Because of this, the Islamist movement can compete equally with the government party.

On the one hand, the government party and large businesses monopolize mass media such as newspapers, which thereby serve as their propaganda organs. On the other hand, the rival discussion arenas resemble the counter publics described by Nancy Fraser, who argues that the liberalistic public sphere elaborated by Habermas allows only educated citizens to participate in discussion; that each society has a single such sphere, which is likely to virtually exclude uneducated people and minorities; and that the public sphere is too idealistic.

> The problem is not only that Habermas idealizes the liberal public sphere but also that he fails to examine other, nonliberal, nonbourgeois, competing public spheres. Or rather, it is precisely because he fails to examine these other public spheres that he ends up idealizing the liberal public sphere.[20]

Newspapers, radio, television and other kinds of mass media in Muslim society give very few opportunities for participation. They are unlikely to reflect a majority of citizens' voices. Fraser says that there are other public arenas where people who find it hard to participate in the liberal public sphere conduct debates and form opinions in their own way. Fraser calls these public spheres counter publics or counter-public spheres:

> On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counter publics, including nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women's publics, and working-class publics. Thus there were competing publics from the start, not just in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Habermas implies.[21]

It is in these counter-public spheres that Fraser attempts to find dynamism in the formation of public opinion through open debate in society. Since the 1990s, there have been a number of case studies on counter-public spheres or alternative public spheres with regard to the non-mainstream discussion arenas consisting of minorities and marginalized people.

For instance, one could mention a study by Negt and Kluge on a working-class counter-public sphere,[22] one by Gilroy on the counter-public sphere of the African immigrant society in London and on their original method of expressing discourses by means of slang, music, and dance in carnivals, clubs and other mediums.[23]

Chart 3 Mainstream public sphere and counter-public spheres

Contemporary Muslim society, through colonization and modernization, resembles society in the West in the sense that there is mass media controlled by a centralized government and large businesses. Islamic social and political activities, too, irresistibly came under the influence of modernization—for instance, the modernization of the educational system, centralized organizations, and the utilization of newspapers, the Internet, and other media. As a result, an increasing number of Islamist movements grounded in Islamic discussion arenas take on a style of activity influenced by Western styles.[24] Modern Muslim society resembles society in the West in the sense that there are counter-public spheres for discussion which are marginalized from the exclusive mass media. Moreover, many contemporary Islamist movements promote public participation and are often proactive in creating civil society and public spheres.[25] In Southeast Asia as well, many Islamist movements generate amicable discourses about civil society and public spheres. In Malaysia,

political parties such as PAS and NGOs like ABIM and JIM insist that they should develop civil society and public spheres in Malaysian society.[26]

4. Public Spheres in Malaysia

In Malaysia, a multi-ethnic country, social, economic and political activities are undertaken either collectively by various ethnic groups or within each ethnic group's community. Although some political parties profess to be multi-ethnic, each political party usually consists of a single ethnic group as in the case of the UMNO, which consists mostly of Malays. On the other hand, the ruling coalition *Barisan Nasional* (BN, National Front) and the cabinet consist of multi-ethnic groups. Activities within each ethnic group's community are usually conducted in its own language except when English is used. Malays use Malay; Chinese use Chinese (including various dialects) and Indians use Tamil. They also speak their own native languages within their own ethnic communities. Education, too, is provided in native languages at some public schools and private schools. The mass media is no exception: there are newspapers and broadcasting in Malay, Chinese, and Tamil, respectively, as well as English-language newspapers and broadcasting available for various ethnic groups. As for public spheres as a place to form public opinion, there are multi-ethnic arenas on the one hand and single-ethnic arenas on the other hand. The present paper addresses the public spheres mainly involving Malay Muslims.

The government and the political parties participating in *Barisan Nasional* exclusively manage the mass media. Specifically, UMNO is deeply involved in the management of the Malay-language papers *Utusan* and *Berita Harian* and an English-language paper *New Straits Times* by holding these companies' stock.[27] The stations TV1 and TV2 are state run. Although there are commercial broadcasting stations such as TV3, NTV7, and 8TV, the management body of TV3 and 8TV is Media Prima,[28] which also manages *New Straits Times* and is deeply involved in the management of NTV7 as well.[29] RTM (Radio Terevisyen Malaysia) is run by the government, under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Information, while Media Prima, ASTRO, and MiTV Corporation Network Guidance are private companies.

TV station	Ownership	Establishment	Scope of audience
Terrestrial broadcasting			
TV1	RTM	1963	nationwide
TV2	RTM	1969	nationwide
TV3	Media Prima	1984	nationwide
ntv7	NTV7	1998	nationwide
8TV	Media Prima	2004	nationwide
Satellite broadcasting			
ASTRO	ASTRO	1996	Exclusive to subscribers
Internet broadcasting			
MiTV	MiTV Corporation	2005	Exclusive to subscribers
Fine TV	Network Guidance	2005	Exclusive to subscribers

Table 2 TV stations in Malaysia[30]

Since the mass media in Malaysia is under the management of the government and the ruling party as stated above, it often cleverly eliminates discourses that are critical of the government and releases contents aiming to damage the image of the opposition. Amrita Malhi made the following report on some of the TV programs during the Perlis State Assembly by-election in January 2002.

The Indera Kayangan State Assembly by-election, held in the northern peninsular state of Perlis in January 2002, was won decisively, with an increased majority, by the BN coalition. However, the victory was not without scandal. Apart from the question of busloads of possible "phantom voters" arriving on the day of the vote, a controversial television clip was screened on Malaysian national television throughout the campaign. The clip began with a frame depicting a Malay-looking woman, dressed without a scarf or veil, in a contemporary office scene. The male narrator stated in the English-language voice-over, "[they] forbid beautiful women working, ban entertainment outlets, and consider the assassination of non-Muslim government members by militant terrorists as *sandiwara* [entertainment]". The voice continued, "If this country falls into the hands of extremists and religious militants, it is not impossible that women in this country may face the same fate that befell the Afghan women". The images which follow include the then PAS president, Fadzil Noor, and other party leaders, as well as scenes of veiled Afghan women and children surrounded by the ruins of war. The footage ends with a Quranic verse from the *Surah al Baqarah* (Chapter of the Cow), "and cast yourself not

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into perdition with your own hands". The clip also contained an explicitly violent scene showing a kneeling woman, dressed in a *burqa*, being executed by a Taliban gunman, a slow-motion image that was repeated several times.

The clip, ninety seconds long, was aired repeatedly on the government television stations, RTM 1 and 2, and on RTM 3, a station owned by groups close to the government, during the prime-time nightly news bulletins throughout January 2002.[31]

In addition to the mass media control in the form of corporate management, the control by law also makes it difficult for the mass media to serve as an arena for formation of public opinion through open debates. Principal laws to control the media include the Printing Press and Publications Act of 1984, the Broadcasting Act of 1988, and the National Film Development Corporation Act of 1981.[32]

Article 13, Section 1 of the Printing Press and Publications Act provides that the Home Affairs Minister may revoke the license or permit of any printing press used for printing of any publication which is prejudicial to public order or national security. Article 13A, Section 1 provides that any decision of the Minister to refuse to grant or to revoke or to suspend a license or permit shall be final and shall not be called in question by any court on any ground whatsoever, and Article 13B provides that no person shall be given an opportunity to be heard with regard to his application for a license or permit or relating to the revocation or suspension of the license or permit granted to him under this Act.[33]

In 1987, there was a case of journalistic suppression called *Operasi Lalang,* in which more than a hundred journalists, social activists, opposition leaders, scholars, human rights activists, and social workers were arrested and some papers' licenses of publication suspended under the Printing Press and Publications Act.[34] Moreover, the Official Secret Act (OSA) and Internal Security Act (ISA), passed in 1972 and 1960 respectively, were designed to maintain security and are often used to control the media. These statutes often crack down on the opposition's newspapers. When PAS made major gains in the general election in 1999, the editor and issuer of the PAS newspaper *Harakah* were arrested on charges of inciting turbulence. *Harakah* was permitted to publish twice a month instead of twice a week.[35]

One of reasons that many Malay Muslims expect Islamic counter publics to be a place of public opinion formation is that the mass media is not capable of serving as a public sphere for debates open and accessible to everyone.

5. Islam and Public Spheres in Malaysia

The author of this article gained experience of Malay Muslim society after living for two and a half years in Kuala Lumpur, its surrounding state Selangor, and in Kelantan State in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula from 2002 to 2005. During this period, the author stayed at educational institutions including a religious school and the International Islamic University, and participated in and observed in daily religious acts in local Malay Muslim communities: the so-called five beliefs and six practices, congregational prayer at mosques on Fridays, festivals called *Hari Raya* or *Eid* in Arabic, fasting in the month *Ramadhan*, and *zakat* or almsgiving. At the same time, the author observed and participated in the Islamist movements of PAS and ABIM. Such observation reconfirmed that Islamic logic and Islamic spheres occupy a significant place in decision making and the formation of public opinion in Malay Muslim society.

In the Malay Muslim society of Malaysia in recent times, modernization and Islamization have been advancing simultaneously. The term "Islamization" is often used by researchers and the mass media to indicate different phenomena, but the meaning of Islamization can be classified into the following aims or tendencies:

1. Increase in the proportion of the Muslim population to the total population in a certain society.
2. Improvement in believers' levels of religious knowledge or religious practices in a certain Muslim society.
3. Dissemination of modern knowledge and systems that have been remade according to *shari'a.* This aim is particularly known in the context of Malaysia. Concrete attempts include the Islamization of the legal structure, of finance, of science and technology, the mass media, and other areas. "Islamization" in this sense is the fundamental philosophy of ABIM, which has been affecting the government's Islamization policy since the 1980s.
4. Incorporation of Islamic norms or implementation of *shari'a* into the national legal structure and administration system. This is the political aim of PAS.

Under British rule, the Islamization of Malay Muslim society along the lines of the second tendency listed above advanced even faster than before British rule. Improvement in religious knowledge and practices was made possible by the improvement of technology in transportation, communication, and printing introduced with colonization. Improvements in transportation, such as the use of steamboats and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, dramatically increased the numbers of pilgrims and foreign students from Southeast Asia to Mecca. Simultaneously, Middle Eastern Arabs (especially those from Hadhramaut in Yemen) immigrated to Southeast Asia.[36] A Malay-language publishing organization run by the local government was established in 1884 in Saudi Arabia, and classical writings of Islamic studies translated from Arabic to Malay were imported to Southeast Asia, re-printed in Singapore, and distributed across the region.[37] Singapore became the base of publication and distribution of books. *Al Imam* magazine was first launched in 1906 in Singapore to take

a major role in introducing to Malaysia modernized Islamic reformism, previously started by Muhammad Abduh in Egypt and other thinkers in Middle East.[38] Since then, the Islamist movement in Malaysia introduced modern technologies of printing and communications as well as modern Western methodologies of organizations and socio-political movements. The Islamic movement became popularized, implying that it mobilized the public through communication with the public.

Islamization by way of the second tendency stated above—improvement in the level of religious knowledge and religious practices involving the Muslim public—was achieved particularly through education. *Ulama*, influenced by modernized Islamic reformism, played a major role in the popularization of Islamic education. Traditionally, there had been Islamic educational facilities called *pondok*, where people focused on memorizing *Qur'an*, *hadith* and other classics. A new type of educational facility was advocated in *Al Imam* in 1906. *Madrasah al-Iqbal al-Islamiyyah* was established in 1908 to provide curriculums including geography, history, mathematics, and English as well as traditional Islamic education. Consequently, similar Islamic educational facilities of this new type were set up in various places. Improved literacy, as a result of the spread of public education, accelerated the level of Islamic knowledge among Malay Muslims, such that education became the basis of the Islamization of Malay Muslim society in the 20th century. This increase in the level of Islamic education brought about an expanded reproduction of *ulama*, who became important leaders in Islamic education as well as essential participants in the Islamist movement and in the Islamization of state administration.[39]

Ulama had a certain authority[40] in Malay Muslim society and served as administrators of *waqf*, or endowments intended for religious schools and mosques, thus playing an important role in maintaining an arena for Islamic discourses. *Waqf* means a thing of which an original owner relinquishes ownership and dedicates it to God so that it can be used for a specific purpose. In order to get involved in administration in the areas of education, the receipt and distribution of *zakat* or alms, and management of mosques, *ulama* took jobs in the state-level civil service such as the Islamic Religious Council (*Majlis Agama Islam*), Islamic Religious Affairs Department (*Jabatan Agama Islam)*, and later, the federal-level Department of Islamic Development (*Jabatan Kemajuan Islam Malaysia*: JAKIM), Prime Minister's Department, public educational institutions, the International Islamic University and other universities, and government-affiliated think tanks such as the Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia (*Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia*: IKIM). *Ulama* engaged in Islamic education became the core of the establishment of PAS in the 1950s.[41]

Waqf endowments were used for educational facilities and also for mosques, the place of worship and an important arena for Islamic discourses. *Ulama* play an important role as leaders of worship and as preachers. Every adult male is obliged to attend Friday noon congregational prayer at mosques, always combined with sermons (*khutbah*) on diverse

subjects: not only religious formalities but also on morality, family, society, community, the administration, and international issues. When the author attended Friday congregational prayers in Malaysia, the sermon moved onto criticism of the U.S. government's invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and calls for relief to the victims of the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh. Sometimes, topics expanded to criticism of governmental policies such as the penal code, the Islamic state debate, and criticism of human rights violations under the Internal Security Act, by which a suspected person may be arrested indefinitely without trial. In this manner, a mosque is not only a place of worship but also an arena where discourses based on Islamic logic are disseminated free from control by the government.[42]

In and after the 1970s there arose various movements, collectively called the *da'wah* movement, aiming at a return to Islam and the introduction of Islam as the norm for individual and social life. Islamization in the third category mentioned above was attempted through such movements. Partly because it was difficult to utilize the mass media, *da'wah* movements held regular small-group meetings called *usrah* (family) or *halaqah* (sitting in a circle), and meetings of preaching called *ceramah*, as the main means of communication. These are characterized by detailed, grass-roots responsiveness and face-to-face oral communication, a traditional part of Muslim society traditionally. They have become an alternative and counter-public sphere and occupy an important place in forming public opinion among Malay Muslims.

Usrah is a regular, small-group study session and a gathering for friendly discussion, where people learn *Qur'an* and *hadith* and read texts in accordance with the philosophy of *da'wah*. In the case of ABIM, there are various kinds of meetings: *usrah* consisting of about five neighbors and held once a week, *usrah* held once a month at a regional level, and an annual national convention. Each meeting plays a more important role than can a mailing list or print organ in transmitting and sharing between different levels within the organization. ABIM utilizes the *usrah* as the main means to expand the organization and disseminate its principles throughout society by inviting neighbors and colleagues to *usrah*. PAS and other Islamic NGOs also incorporate similar *usrah* as a core element of their activities.

During the 1970s, *da'wah* movements including ABIM took a critical attitude toward the government although PAS took part in the ruling coalition (*Barisan Nasional*) in the early 1970s. After the Mahatir administration was established in 1981, many members from ABIM, such as its president, Anwar Ibrahim, joined the government and the ruling UMNO party in 1982. During the same period, the deputy president of ABIM, Fadzil Noor, and many other persons from ABIM joined PAS. As a result, the Islamization policy was launched under the initiative of the federal central government. In the fields of education, economic policy and the legal system, Islamization of the third category, advocated by ABIM through the *da'wah* movement, began to affect policy development in the government and the ruling party. Roff points out that the Islamization led by the federal central government amounted

to centralization, federalization and institutionalization of Islamic administration.[43] The Islamization policy developed by the Mahatir administration overlapped with the Malay-first policy called *Bumiputra* policy. It aimed to promote the integration of the nation in Malay society from the position of the federal central government. Thereafter, the Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) and other administrative organs in charge of Islamic administration were drastically improved and expanded and an increasing number of people from ABIM, as well as *ulama,* began to commit themselves to the administration.[44] It was PAS that criticized through Islamic logic the gradual Islamization led by UMNO, and that radically advocated the immediate implementation of *shari'a* and the establishment of an Islamic state.

Since 1990, PAS has been competing with UMNO to win the support of Malay Muslim voters. PAS took the reigns of government in the state of Kelantan in 1990 and the state of Terengganu in 1999. Later, it suffered defeat in the 2004 general election and lost the government of Terengganu while maintaining the government of Kelantan. Under the "*ulama*-led" system (*Pimpinan Ulama*), PAS competes with UMNO in regard to arguments involving Islam legitimacy. PAS involves *ulama* as its power base and activists.

1971	ABIM is established.
1971	Islam Research Center (*Pusat Penyelidekan Islam*) is established, later expanded into the Islamic Development Department (JAKIM).
1972	Religious Affairs Department is set up in the Ministry of Education.
1981	Mahatir administration is established.
1982	Anwar Ibrahim and other persons from ABIM join UMNO.
1983	International Islamic University is established.
1983	Islamic Banking Act
1984	Malaysia Islamic Insurance Company (*Syarikat Takaful Malaysia*) is established.
1990	PAS takes power of the government of Kelantan State.
1993	Kelantan State assembly passes *Hudud* bill (*shari'a*-based statutory penal code).
1994	*Darul Arqam* is made illegal.
1998	Onset of Asian currency crisis. Anwar Ibrahim, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, is ousted. Many people involved in *da'wah* movement are arrested.
1999	PAS makes major gains in the general election. PAS establishes government of Terengganu State.
2000	Prime Minister Mahatir declares that Malaysia is an Islamic state.
2003	Abdullah administration is established and adopts "Civilizational Islam" (*Islam Hadhari*) as governmental guideline.

Table 3 Islamization-related chronology table

PAS, ABIM, *Darual Arquam* and other *da'wah* movements use *ceramah* (a sermon session) for communication. Here again, the opposition force in Malaysia has no choice but to depend on oral, face-to-face communication as it is hardly allowed to utilize the mass media.

The alternative view is that this way of communicating makes the Malay Muslim public feel more familiar with Islamist leaders. *Ceramah*—consisting of anywhere from dozens to tens of thousands of people—provide a place for people to debate and disseminate discourses based on Islamic logic and affects the shaping of public opinion. The reason why PAS can compete with the government party, which occupy the mass media, lies in the existence of such counter- and alternative public spheres.

Discourses disseminated in *ceramah* and other Islamic forums are familiar to the Malay Muslim public because they are taught in *pondok* and other religious schools and derive from the discursive resources of traditional Malay society. Such familiarity cannot be created by the mass media, which emphasize Westernized discourses, or the IKIM (*Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia:* Instititute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia), or any other government-affiliated Islamic think tanks which emphasize economy and utilitarianism. Generally, *ceramah* meet at a mosque, someone's home, a meeting hall, or in the open air, and it starts after night time prayer. People gather there to listen and to be entertained in a family setting and there are stands selling food and drinks. Farish Noor made an analysis of discourses of Nik Aziz Nik Mat—spiritual leader (*Mursyd'ul Am*) of PAS and Chief Minister of Kelantan State—describing how Nik Azia often used rich expressions with dialect, slang, humor, and daily-life-based metaphors in *ceramah*, and noting that his style succeeded in making the Malay public feel familiarity with him.[45] Nik Aziz says, for example:

Our sermon dates not from the 1940s or 1950s, but from before the Independence. It dates back to the sermon made by the Messenger and prophets long ago.[46]

Whoever you are—from the king (*raja*) of the place to Uncle Ma living a village—the only thing you should know is that you are a servant of God.[47]

A good soul teacher (*guru*) leads you to heaven, not only to office. Such a teacher is demanded in Islam.[48]

Popular preachers' *ceramah* events are recorded on various media to put on the market. Michel Foucault notes the flood of cassette tapes of sermons by Ayatollah Khomeini and other leaders and the impact thereof on the formation of public opinion at the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.[49] In modern Malaysia, cassette tapes of sermons are still distributed, but videos are more common in the market place. These days, some *ceramah* meetings are broadcast via the Internet.[50]

In this way, *ulama* and the Islamist movement transmit Islamic discourses in Islamic, alternative and counter-public spheres within the parliamentary framework of Malaysia, thereby acting as a powerful critical force and counterbalance to the government. Pressure

from the opposition and the necessity to compete against PAS for the support of Malay Muslim voters keenly motivate the government to promote the Islamization policy. Many *ulama* and people from ABIM involved in administrative organs, think tanks, and foundations of the government provide an important mechanism for the smooth advancement of Islamization. More specifically, if opposition parties such as PAS gain broader support of Malay Muslim voters with a legitimacy based on Islamic logic, Islamists in the government and the ruling parties characterize the opponent as a threat and consequently assert that their Islamization policy should be promoted. In this manner, *ulama* utilize the parliament, electoral system, and administration, and thereby continue to play their traditional role as an expert group having the authority to interpret *shari'a* and as an adviser to or a critic of the ruler. Yasushi Kosugi describes the *ulama*'s role in a community as follows:

> It should be particularly noted that the Islamic law, which regulates the entire Muslim community, is not to be constituted by a state. As discussed in Chapter 2, *ulama* having the interpreting authority as an expert group are originally private individuals and not appointed by a state. The state maneuvers them by adopting part of self-reproduced *ulama* as a social stratum and manipulating the *ulama*'s social prestige. Needless to say, the state is able to enforce what it calls "administrative rule", or the rule that corresponds to statutory law and government ordinance of a modern state, but it cannot fully ensure the legitimacy thereof unless it complies with Islamic law.[51]

Thus, in Malay Muslim society, there are two kinds of public spheres: the mainstream public sphere, such as the mass media, under the control of the government; and alternative and counter-public spheres such as arenas for Islamic debates. They influence each other to form general public opinion among Malay Muslims. *Ulama* and people from ABIM play a major role as mediators between them. UMNO has many persons from ABIM such as Anwar Ibrahim, and PAS, too, has many persons from ABIM such as the late Fadzil Noor, former president, and Hadi Awang, the current president, who form the mainstream of the party leadership. Even though they are members of different parties, they still closely communicate with each other. *Ulama* also communicate with one another irrespective of which party they belong to because they share the common system of knowledge, discursive resources, and the experience of having studied in the Middle East; there is a traditional network of *ulama*. UMNO and PAS have been competing with each other for the legitimacy in Islam and have introduced policies based on Islamic logic. As a result, Islamization has gradually spiraled forward, improving in both quality and scale.

Chart 4 Public spheres in modern Malay Muslim society

The argument about an Islamic state is one of the cases where the above mechanism has advanced Islamization. "Islamic state" means a system for implementing *shari'a* within the framework of a modern sovereign nation-state. When PAS remarkably increased its seats in the Parliament in the 1999 general election and also took the reigns of government of Terengganu State at the same time, the Mahatir administration was regarded as losing support of Malay voters in the competition with PAS for Islamic legitimacy. In response, Prime Minister Mahatir asserted in 2001 that Malaysia was already an Islamic state to display his opposition to PAS, which advocated establishment of an Islamic state. The person who had advised Prime Minister Mahatir to issue the Declaration of an Islamic State was Nakhaie Ahmad,[52] who went from ABIM to become vice president (*naib presiden*) of PAS, later joining UMNO and assuming the presidency of the government-affiliated Islamic Da'wah Foundation Malaysia (*Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia*, YADIM). Nakhaie also mapped out the original idea of Civilizational Islam (*Islam Hadhari*), which is the Abdullah administration's guideline for Islamic policies. In contrast, PAS asserted that Malaysia should not be considered to be an Islamic state because *shari'a* has not been implemented. PAS issued in 2003 the Islamic State

Document (*Dokumen Negara Islam*) as their vision of their future government.[53] In response, UMNO had no choice but to work out a policy to reinforce their legitimacy within Islam. PAS presents some Islamization policy and sometimes implements it at the state government level where they are in control. In response, UMNO introduces a counter-policy, thereby advancing Islamization in Malay Muslim society. This is a basic pattern for the advance of Islamization in Malaysia today.

At present, "Civilizational Islam" (*Islam Hadhari*),[54] the Abdullah administration's guideline for Islamic policies, emphasizes the Islamic features of the current administration because they need to compete with PAS for Islamic legitimacy. Islamization in various senses continues to be a significant issue of political dispute in Malay Muslim society, and it seems unavoidable for the government to adopt policies more or less in line with Islamization.

6. Conclusion

In Malay Muslim society, the mainstream public sphere including the government-controlled mass media and counter-public spheres represented by *usrah* and *ceramah* etc. can influence each other through *ulama* and people from ABIM, who share Islamic logic. Counter-public spheres raise issues (thereby setting the political agenda) on the basis of the legitimacy of Islamic logic. In response, the mainstream public sphere has no choice but to take the issue as an argument, due to the logical legitimacy of Islam and the pressure of popular mobilization of counter-public spheres, thereby influencing government policies.

Thus, there is a mechanism for advancing the Islamization of various systems in Malaysia: the Islamist element in the government responds to popularization of Islamist movements and to the public opinion of Malay Muslims, shaped in counter- and alternative public spheres. Based on this mechanism, *ulama* and Islamists aim to promote Islamization of Malaysian society so as to achieve governance by *shari'a*, which is their ultimate goal. *Shari'a*-based governance needs an appropriate social order as a precondition, and the traditional public spheres of Islam are part of it.

In many Muslim countries, Islamist movements aiming at *shari'a*-based governance tend to be hasty, and consequently some of them were subject to cruel suppression by governments (e.g. Egypt) or resulted in armed uprising and desperate civil war (e.g. Algeria and Tajikistan). Terrorism in the modern age has its roots partly in those armed conflicts. Compared to many Muslim countries, Malaysia can be considered to have yielded good results in Islamization through political administration, while avoiding armed conflicts and convincing many Islamists.

Even in Malaysia, there have been some cases where radical Islamist movements had some impact.[55] However, gradual Islamization has been promoted within the framework of the parliament and election system without causing civil war or mass terror. Behind such advancement of Islamization is the fact that Islamic social forces are involved not only in the

opposition, but also the government and the ruling party. *Ulama* and Islamists are committed to the shaping of public opinion in counter- and alternative public spheres of Islamic debate, in addition to the government-occupied mass media; and the fact that *ulama* and people from ABIM connect the mainstream public sphere and counter-public spheres allows Islamist objectives to be incorporated at least partially into government policies.

These mechanisms can be considered as the Islamization of modern communication, and regarded as an attempt to establish Islamic social order. Malaysia's experience and mechanisms of Islamization can serve as a helpful guide for Muslim societies carrying the risks of terrorism and civil war.

NOTES

1) Nakata, Ko. *Logic of bin Laden*. [Japanese] 2002, Tokyo: Shogakukan.
2) Jabatan Perangkaan Malaysia. *Population and Housing Census 2000, General Report of the Population and Housing Census*. 2005, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysia.
3) ibid. Statistical data of the census conducted in 2000. *Bumiputra* means indigenous people, including Malays.
4) ibid. Statistical data of the census conducted in 2000.
5) Federal Constitution of Malaysia. Article160(2)
6) Federal Constitution of Malaysia. Article3(1)
7) "An Islamic state" means a system for implementing *shari'a* within the framework of a modern sovereign nation-state. It is the common agenda in the mainstream Islamist movements in the world, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. ABIM members and people from ABIM, who have joined UMNO to promote the Islamization policies, do not deny the establishment of an Islamic state as a distant future goal, but they consider it necessary to advance gradual Islamization as preliminary steps toward it. ABIM's assertion on Islamization is influenced by the Islamization argument of Syed Muhammad Naguib Al Attas, and Islamization in this sense means recreation of modern knowledge systems in line with *shari'a* and dissemination of Islamized knowledge. Syed Muhammad Naguib Al Attas. *Islam and Secularism*. 1978, Kuala Lumpur: ABIM.
8) Funston, John. M*alay Politics in Malaysia: A Study of the United Malays National Organization and Party Islam*, 1980, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann.
   As for PAS, Nasharudin Mat Isa. *The Islamic Party of Malaysia(PAS): Ideology, Policy, Struggle and Vision Towards The New Millenium*. 2001, Kuala Lumpur: PAS; Farish Noor. *Islam Embedded: The Historical Development of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS (1951-2003)*. 2004, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute. PAS was established in 1951 under the instruction of the Religious Affairs Department of UMNO, and separated from UMNO in 1954 after the opposition Islamic force joined. Strongly nationalistic at the beginning, but reinforcing Islamist features in early 1980s, the *ulama* leadership was adopted by establishment of the *Ulama* Council (*Majlis Syura Ulama*) in 1986. The present ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state. Currently, it consists of about 800,000 members. See: Ko Nakata, "Malaysia, PAS (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) and Ulamas' Leadership" [Japanese] in

Yamaguchi University Philosophy Study, 2000, Vol. 9, pp. 17-40.

9) Established in 1971 by Anwar Ibrahim and others, the *Da'wah* movement was led by university-educated professionals aiming at Islamization and anti-secularism of Malaysian society. President Anwar Ibrahim joined UMNO in 1982 (he later became Deputy Prime Minister.) In the following year, Deputy President Fadzil Noor assumed the office of Vice President of PAS (later, President). Currently, it consists of about 60,000 members.

10) UMNO's Islamization policies do not include a ruler's obligations under *shari'a* as required by PAS, but they include preliminary steps or Islamization in the fields of education (religious education at public educational facilities), finance (Islamic banks and insurance), distribution (*halal* approval system), increase in the budget for JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia), IKIM (Institute of Islamic Understanding Malaysia), YADIM (Islamic Missionary Foundation Malaysia), establishment of Islamic University, and Islamic content in the mass media: in other words, Islamization in accordance with the ABIM program. (Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. *The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*. 2001, New York: Oxford University Press).

11) Announcement by Central Publicity Department, Democratic Action Party, August 18, 2001.

12) Shiozaki, Yuki. "*National Integration and Islamization—Preface for Special Feature*)" [Japanese] in *JAMS News* (Journal of Japan Association for Malaysian Studies), 2006, Vol. 34, pp. 24-25.
Shiozaki, Yuki. "*Development of Shari'a Judicial System in Islamization Led by the Government.*" [Japanese] In *JAMS News* (Journal of Japan Association for Malaysian Studies), 2006, Vol. 34, pp. 26-27.

13) Mohammad Hashim Kamali. *Islamic Law in Malaysia: Issues and Developments*. 2000, Kuala Lumpur: Ilmiah Press.

14) Habermas, Jürgen. *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*. Translated by Thomas Burger. 1989, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 220.

15) Heffner, Robert. *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia*. 2000, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 11.

16) Talal Asad, *Geneaalogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*. 1993, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

17) Hoexter, Miriam. & Eisenstadt, Shmuel. & Levtizion, Nehemia. eds. *The Public Sphere in Muslim Societies*. 2002, Albany: State University of New York Press.

18) ibid. p. 10.

19) Otsuka, Kazuo. *What is Islamism*. [Japanese] 2004, Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

20) Fraser, Nancy (1993) *Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy*. In *Habermas and the Public Sphere*. Edited by Craig Calhoun. 1993, Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. p. 115.

21) ibid. p. 116.

22) Negt, O & Kluge, A. *The Public Sphere and Experience*. In *October: The Second Decade 1986-1996*. 1997, Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.

23) Gilroy, Paul. *There ain't No Black in the Union Jack*. 1987, London: Routledge.

24) Kosugi, Yasushi. *The Islamic World: Heritage, Rebirth and Contemporary Dynamics*.

[Japanese] 2006, Nagoya: The University of Nagoya Press; Nakata, Ko. *Logic of bin Laden.* [Japanese]

25) Kosugi, Yasushi. *The Islamic World: Heritage, Rebirth and Contemporary Dynamics*. [Japanese] pp. 527-531.

26) Syed Ahmad Hussein. *Muslim Politics and the Discourse on Democracy*. In *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*. Edited by Francis Loh Kok Wah & Khoo Boo Teik. 2002, Richmond: Curzon Press.
   Dato' Seri Tuan Guru Haji Abdul Hadi Awang. *Sistem Pemerintahan Negara Islam*. 2003, Kuala Terengganu: Penerbitan Yayasan Islam Terengganu.

27) Zaharom Nain. *The Structure of the Media Industry:Implications for Democracy*. In *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourse and Practices*. Edited by Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo Teik. 2003, Richmond: Curzon Press.

28) http://www.mediaprima.com.my/AboutUs.asp

29) *The Edge*, June 27, 2006.

30) *The Star,* December 27, 2005.

31) Amrita Malhi. *The PAS-BN Conflict in the 1990s*. In *Malaysia Islam, Society and Politics*. Edited by Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman. 2003, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. p. 240.

32) Zaharom Nain. *The Structure of the Media Industry: Implications for Democracy*, pp. 128-130.

33) The Printing Press and Publications Act.

34) Mustafa Anuar. *Defining Democratic Discourses: The Main Stream Press*. In *Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices*. Edited by Francis Loh Kok Wah & Khoo Boo Teik. 2002, Richmond: Curzon Press, p. 149.

35) Zaharom Nain. *The Structure of the Media Industry:Implications for Democracy*, p. 141.

36) Roff, William. "Pattern of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s-1990s: Exemplars, institutions, and vectors." *Journal of Islamic Studies*. 9: 2. 1998. pp. 210-228.

37) Roff, William. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, 2nd Edn. 1994, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p. 45.

38) ibid. pp. 56-59. Roff points out that *Al Imam* is an imitation of *Al Manar* issued by Muhammad Abduh et al and articles written by Muhammad Abduh were translated and introduced in *Al Imam.*

39) Roff, William. *Pondoks, Madrasahs and the Production of 'Ulama' in Malaysia*. *Studia Islamika*. Volume 11, November 1, 2004.

40) As for the concept of the authority of *ulama* in Malay Muslim society, refer to Tawada, Yuji. *Anthropology of Malay Islam.* [Japanese] 2005, Kyoto: Nakanishiya Shuppan.

41) Roff, William. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, 2nd Edn.; Roff, William. *Pondoks, Madrasahs and the Production of 'Ulama' in Malaysia*.

42) For fear that mosques will become the place of criticism of the government, the government has been trying in these years to restrict speeches at mosques by controlling public budgets provided for mosques and monitoring sermons there. For example, *The Star* of May 19, 2004 reports that the King made a speech at the parliament that *ulama* should not criticize the government but address social issues confronting common people in their sermons. *Utusan Malaysia* of March 3, 2004 reports the statement by a UMNO executive that it is not right that mosques built at the expense of the government are used for party politics and used as

the place of criticism of the government.

43) Roff, William. "Pattern of Islamization in Malaysia, 1890s-1990s: Exemplars, institutions, and vectors."

44) Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. *The Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power*, pp. 121-126.

45) Farish Noor. *The Localization of Islamist Discourse in the Tafsir of Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat, Murshid'ul Am of PAS*. In *Malaysia Islam, Society and Politics*. Edited by Virginia Hooker and Norani Othman. 2003, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 195-235

46) Nik Aziz Nik Mat. *Kelantan: Agenda Baru Untuk Umat Islam*. 1995, Kuala Lumpur: Rangkaian Minda Publishing, p. 62.

47) Nik Aziz Nik Mat. *Tafsir Surah Hud*. 1996, Nilam Puri: Ma'ahad ad-Dakwah wal-Imamah, p. 11.

48) ibid. p. 68.

49) Foucault, Michel. *Iranian Revolt is Running on Cassette Tapes*. in *Compilation of Michael Foucault's Thinking, VII, Intelligence/Body*. [Japanese] Edited by Yasuo Kobayashi, Hidetaka Ishida, and Hisaki Matsuura. Supervised by Shigehiko Hasumi and Moriaki Watanabe. 1978, Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.

50) http://webtv.parti-pas.org/

51) Kosugi, Yasushi. *The Islamic World: Heritage, Rebirth and Contemporary Dynamics*. [Japanese] pp. 524-525.

52) Nakata, Ko. "*Authorized Theory of an Islamic State in Malaysia*" [Japanese] In *JAMS News* (Journal of Japan Association for Malaysia Studies), 2002, Vol. 24, pp. 12-17.

53) Parti Islam SeMalaysia. *Negara Islam*. 2003, Bangi: PAS.

54) Shiozaki, Yuki. "*Islam Hadhari—Guideline for Islamic Policies in Abdullah Administration.*" [Japanese] In *JAMS News* (Journal of Japan Association for Malaysian Studies), 2005, Vol. 32, pp. 33-35.

55) Nakata, Ko. "*Malay World and Islamic Regional Studies—About the Apostasy Pronouncement in the Preaching by Hadi Awang of PAS (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party).*" [Japanese] In *Islamic World*, March 2002, Vol. 58, pp. 63-75.