21st Century Center of Excellence Program

CISMOR International Workshop 2005

Modernization and National Identity in East Asia: Globalization and the Revival of Religion

November 5-6, 2005

Table of Contents

Director's Introduction

We send you the report of the international workshop held by the Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (CISMOR) at Doshisha University, entitled "Modernization and National Identity in East Asia: Globalization and the Revival of Religion."

East Asia has undergone rapid economic development over the past ten years and is gradually increasing its presence on the global economic stage. Spurred on by the integration of the EU and American-led globalization, the movement toward an integration of the East Asian region is gaining momentum, and the First Asian Summit was held in the last year.

Since its establishment in 2003, CISMOR has been involved in comprehensive and interdisciplinary research from the perspectives of "coexistence of civilizations" and "guaranteeing security," centering so far on the three main monotheistic religions in the U.S. and the Middle East. Our 2005 international workshop focused on East Asia, and we invited researchers from Indonesia, Malaysia, China, Korea, and the Philippines.

The modernization of Eastern Asia began as a reaction to Western imperialism, and thus, from its outset, it has been linked to nationalistic sentiment. In Europe and America, modernization has progressed alongside secularism, and this has been the case in Eastern Asia as well. Communism is the expression of a similar process.

As we move further into the 21st Century, in addition to a revival of nationalism, Eastern Asia is undergoing a search for a new identity that transcends nationalism. Counter to earlier predictions regarding the progress of modernization and secularism, the phenomenon of religious revival has become increasingly evident in Eastern Asia and has transcended national borders.

We often hear that because Eastern Asia does not have a shared civilization, religion, or history, as is the case with the EU, it is unable to form a regional community. For countless generations, however, Eastern Asia has in fact formed a multi-dimensional society and a sphere of interaction that shares numerous religions, including Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity. In this sense, Eastern Asia is an advanced region, overflowing with rich religious depth, that shares diversity and holds the potential to create an alternative or an antithesis to the globalization that espouses global homogeneity based on a material or economic logic.

In this international workshop we attempted to delineate a retrospective overview of modernization and the formation of national identity in the countries of the various speakers, and to report on the current status of the phenomena of "globalization and the revival of religion." We also attempted to exchange frank ideas and opinions regarding the future of the East Asian Region and the world at large, and to provide an outlook for a world in which diverse cultures and civilizations can coexist.

Director, Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions
Doshisha University
Koichi Mori

Invited Participants

CRUZ, Jose Maria Manaligod is the Dean of the School of Social Sciences, Ateneo de Manila University. A historian by training, his investigations have mainly been on 17th century Philippines. Among his publications is an edition of *Declaracion de la doctrina Christiana*, Juan de Oliver, OFM (+1599). He earned his A.B. from Ateneo de Manila University and his Ph.D. from Cornell University. He chairs the governing board of the Regional Centre for History and Traditions, Southeast Asian Ministers of Education (SEAMEO-CHAT) and sits on the Board of the National Historical Institute (Philippines).

GAO Shining was a chief editor of *Materials of World Religion and World Religious Cultures*, and is now Professor of Sociology of Religion at the Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. She graduated from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1988 and has been a visiting scholar at Toronto University, Canada, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and at Aarhus University, Denmark, and received a William Paton Fellowship at Birmingham University, UK. She is the author of five books including *An Exploration of New Religions* (Institute of Sino-Christian Studies, Tao Fong Shan, Hong Kong, 2001) and *Faith and Live: Christianity and Christians in Beijing* (Institute of Sino-Christian Studies at Tao Fong Shan, Hong Kong, 2005) and has written more than 40 academic papers in her field. She is also a Chinese translator of 10 famous western academic books including Love, Power and Justice by P. Tillich (in Selected Works of P.Tillich, Shanghai Joint Publishing Co., 1998) and Sociology of Religion: An Historical Introduction by Roberto Cipriani (the Press of Renmin University, 2005).

KAMARUZAMAN, Kamar Oniah is an Associate Professor in Comparative Religion at the International Islamic University of Malaysia. She obtained her B.A. in English Studies from the University of Malaya, her M.A. in Comparative Religion at Temple University, Philadelphia, USA, and her Ph.D. in Islamic Thought and Civilization at ISTAC of the International Islamic University, Malaysia. Her Ph.D. thesis deals with early Muslim scholarship on other religions and on the works and contributions of al-Biruni. Dr. Kamar Oniah is a published author and is also a social activist concentrating on interfaith dialogue and engagement for world peace. She has participated in many seminars and other interfaith programs, locally and abroad, on both academic as well as civil society platforms. She is also the pioneer of the Comparative Religion curriculum of her university, which is becoming a model for many other institutions. She believes that academic knowledge of religions should be supported by direct exposures to how these religions are translated into practice by their adherents; thus, she considers associations with the various religious communities as essential.

LAU Yee Cheung received his BA from The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and his MA and PhD (history) from the University of California, Santa Barbara in the U.S.A. He taught at the National University of Singapore before taking up a post, in 1991, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, where he is an associate professor and concurrently a member of its United College assembly of fellows. Dr. Lau's scholarly interests include China's modernization, Chinese international relations, Hakka studies, Hong Kong history and Chinese Christian history, and he has published books and articles in both Chinese and English. He has conducted research at the major archives and libraries in Guangzhou, Taipei, Nanjing, Shanghai, Beijing, Boston, and London. Dr. Lau holds visiting academic memberships at the Hakka research centers in Chengdu, Ganzhou, and Meizhou, and serves as an honorary researcher of the Alliance Bible Seminary and as the academic director for the Hakka Research Center of the Tsung Tsin Association, both in Hong Kong.

Invited Participants

LEE Jung Bae is Professor in the field of philosophy of religion at Methodist Theological Seminary. A graduate of the Methodist Theological Seminary and the theological faculty at Basel in Switzerland (1986), since 1986 he has been active in the theology of culture, indigenous theology, ecological theology and religious dialogue, as well as in many societies related to his scholarly interests. Currently he is a president of the Korean Society of Systematic Theology and of the Environmental Community of the Korean YMCA. Professor Lee is the author of *Korean Theology of Life, Pioneers of Korean Indigenous Theology, Christian Theology of Nature in the point of Dialogue between religion and Science*, and other titles. He received the Christian Press Award for Pioneers of Korean Indigenous Theology in 2003. He has been a professor at Methodist Theological Seminary since 1986.

MATSUMOTO Kenichi is a critic and writer who graduated from the Faculty of Economics at the University of Tokyo in 1968. After working at the Asahi Glass Company, Matsumoto made his debut in the literary world with "Kita Ikki in His Youth," published in 1971. Since then he has been active in the philosophy of politics, literary criticism, religion research, and many other fields related to the history of the spirit. In 1995, he was awarded the seventh Asia-Pacific Award for *Modern Asia's History of the Spirit* (Chuo Koron Shinsha). He is also the author of *Fundamentalism*. Matsumoto received the Shigeru Yoshida Award for the work "The Opening and Meiji Restoration in Japan" (*Modern Japan*, volume one, Chuo Koron Shinsha). In 2005, he received the Ryotaro Shiba Award for the five-volume *Critical Biography of Ikki Kita* (Iwanami Shoten). Matsumoto has been a professor at Reitaku University since 1994.

SHASTRI, Herman Priyaraj is an ordained minister of the Methodist Church (1983) and currently General Secretary of the Council of Churches of Malaysia. He is also Executive Secretary of the Christian Federation of Malaysia. He received his Bachelor of Divinity from Trinity Theological College Singapore (1978); Doctor of Theology (Missiology) from University of Heidelberg, Germany (1989); and was visiting Professor at Pro Unione in Rome and Pacific School of Religion in Berkeley, U.S.A. in 2001. An authority on ecumenism in Asia, he has attended various local and international conferences, presenting papers and contributing articles. He serves on numerous committees, including the Interfaith Commission Steering Committee, the Malaysian Consultative Council of Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism, and as a member of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches; he is also a Standing Commission member of Faith and Order as well as of the Asia Regional Group.

SOLIHIN, Sohirin Mohammad is a Muslim scholar who was educated in the Middle East and the West. He earned his Ph.D. from the department of Theology, University of Birmingham. He is the author of *Copts and Muslims in Egypt: Study on Harmony and Hostility*, published by the Islamic Foundation, England; and *Islam and Politics: Emergence of Reform Movement in Indonesia*, published by International Islamic University Press, 2005, Malaysia. He has contributed articles such as "Islam and Theory of Government: Views of Mohammad Natsir," Muslim Educational Quarterly, Cambridge, Vol. 3&4, 2003; "Hakimiyyah as Appeared in Fi Úilal al-Qur'an: Views of Sayyid Qutb," Journal of Islam in Asia, Vol. 2, No.1, 2005; "Amin Rais: His Vision about Da'wah," Islamic Quarterly, London, Vol. 48, Issue 2, 2004. At international seminars Dr. Solihin has presented papers such as "Jihad between Comprehension and Misconception: Roots of Religious Extremism in Indonesia," International Congress Organized by International Association History of Religion (IAHR), from 23–29 March, 2005, Tokyo, Japan. Currently he serves as assistant professor at the department of Qur'an and Sunnah Studies, International Islamic University of Malaysia, and his research presently focuses on Islam and fundamentalism in Southeast Asia.

(Alphabetical Order)

SUH Jeong Min is a professor of Church History, College of Theology, Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea. After he graduated from Yonsei University (M.A., 1988) he moved to Kyoto, Japan for two years and studied at the Institute for the Study of Humanities and Social Science, College of Theology, Doshisha University as a researcher, finally receiving his Ph.D. degree at Yonsei University in 1999. For 10 years (1980-1989) he contributed to the production of a Christian Encyclopedia (Seoul: Christian Literature Press) as a chief editor. He was Academic Dean of the College of Theology at Yonsei University from 2003 to 2005. He has published over 130 articles and 30 books, including *Story of Underwood Families* (Seoul: Sallim, 2005), *Korea Church History* (Seoul: Sallim, 2003), *A Study of relationship between Christianity in Korea and Japan* (The Christian Literature Society of Korea, 2002), and *The Japanese Christian Church's Understanding of Korea under the Japanese Reign* (Seoul: Hanul Academy, 2000). He received the Annual Scholar Award twice (2003, 2004) from Yonsei University, and one of his books, *Chai-Chung-Wan (The Royal Corean Hospital) and Early Christians in Korea* (Seoul: Yonsei Univ. Press, 2003) is chosen this year as "the best scholarly book" by the National Academy of Sciences, Republic of Korea. Now, he is a president of the Research Institute for Korean Church History.

YUSANTO, Muhammad Ismail was born in Yogyakarta in 1962. He holds an engineering degree (1988) in Geological Technology from the Faculty of Technology, Universitas Gadjah Mada. After graduating he studied Islam at the Pondok Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) Ulil Albaab, Bogor until 1991. He also holds a Masters in Management (2000) from the STIE (School of Economics) Jakarta. He is married with two children. He is currently the president director of SEM (Shar'iah Economy & Management) Institute, Jakarta, Chairman of the Hamfara School of Islamic Economics, and lecturer in the Faculty of Shariah at UIN (State Islamic University) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. He has also authored *Manajemen Strategis: Perspektif Syariah* (Strategic Management: a Shariah Perspective), Khayrul Bayan, 2003, *Menggagas Pendidikan Islami* (Creating Islamic Education), al-Adzhar Press, 2004, and other works. He was invited by Australian National University (ANU) at Canberra to present his paper at the international conference on Islam in Southeast Asia (September, 2004) and has extensive experiences giving Islamic preaching abroad, ie. Singapore (1997, 2001), Malaysia (1996, 1997, 2001), Japan (2002), USA (2004) and Australia (2004).

WADI (ibn Adduk), Julkipli Miluhon is College Secretary and former Head of Research Division of the Institute of Islamic Studies, University of the Philippines, Diliman. His research interests are generally in the field of Islamic Studies and political science. He has written on Islamic diplomacy, regional security, conflict resolution, political Islam, insurgencies in Southeast Asia, Philippine foreign relations in the Muslim World, the Bangsamoro Struggle, Mindanao nationalism, Muslim-Christian dialogue, and Islamic spirituality.

Modernization and National Identity in East Asia: Globalization and the Revival of Religion

Program

Nov. 5 (Sat.)

10:00-12:00 Session 1

Location: Hardy Hall (Kanbai-kan, Doshisha University)

"The Crisis of National Identity and the Role of Religions in East Asia"

Chair: MORI Koichi (Doshisha University)

Presentations:

1.1 KAMARUZAMAN, Kamar Oniah (International Islamic University, Malaysia)
"Globalization in Balance: The Role and Position of Religion"
1.2 MATSUMOTO Kenichi (Reitaku University)
"Japanese National Identity and the Asian Common House"
1.3 LAU Yee Cheung (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
"Retrospect and Prospect of China's Modernization: In Search of a New Identity"

Commentators/Respondents

1.4 SUH Jeong Min (Yonsei University)
1.5 MURATA Koji (Doshisha University)

-Discussion-

12:00-14:30 **Lunch**
Move to Neesima Kaikan

14:30-17:30 Session 2

Location: Neesima Kaikan

"The Crisis of National Identity and the Role of Religions in Northeast Asia"

Chair: ECHIGOYA Akira (Doshisha University)

Presentations:

2.1 GAO Shining (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
"National Identity and Religions in Today's China"
2.2 SUH Jeong Min (Yonsei University)
"The Path to be Followed by Korean Christianity in the Face of the Emergence of "Neo-Nationalism""

Commentators/Respondents

2.3 SHASTRI, Hermen Priyaraj (Council of Churches of Malaysia)
2.4 ASANO Ryo (Doshisha University)

-Discussion-

Evening Reception
(Neesima Kaikan)

Nov. 6 (Sun.)

9:30-12:30 Session 3

Location: Neesima Kaikan

"The Crisis of National Identity and the Role of Religions in Southeast Asia"

Chair: NAKATA Hassan Ko (Doshisha University)

Presentations:

3.1 SHASTRI, Herman Priyaraj (Council of Churches of Malaysia)
"Globalization and the Revival of Religion in Malaysia"
3.2 YUSANTO, Muhammad Ismail (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia)
"Islamic Revival and the Political Campaign of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: A Direct Challenge to Modernization and Globalization"
3.3 WADI (ibn Adduk), **Julkipli Miluhon** (University of the Philippines)
"Philippine Islam, Modernization, and Globalization"

Commentators/Respondents

3.4 LAU Yee Cheung (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)
3.5 YAMAMOTO Hiroyuki (National Museum of Ethnology)

-Discussion-

12:00-14:30 Lunch

14:30-17:30 Session 4

Location: Neesima Kaikan

"Religion and the Future of East Asia"

Chair: KOHARA Katsuhiro (Doshisha University)

Presentations:

4.1 SOLIHIN, Sohirin Mohammad (International Islamic University, Malaysia)
"East Asia and Challenges of Globalization: The Role of Monotheistic Religion in Maintaining Values and Identity"
4.2 LEE Jung Bae (Methodist Theological Seminary)
"A Proposal for the Role of East Asian Religious Culture in Alternative Globalization: A Perspective from Korean Christianity"
4.3 CRUZ, Jose Maria Manaligod (Ateneo de Manila University)
"Religion and the Sense of the Nation: The Case of the Philippines"

Commentators/Respondents

4.4 GAO Shining (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
4.5 USUKI Akira (Japan Women's University)

-Discussion-

Nov. 7 (Mon.)

Excursion

2005 Activity Report

2005 Activity Report

April 2-3, 2005	**Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)** Location: Kanbaikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. **"On the Islamic Regime of Iran: Twenty-six Years after the Revolution" (Round-table Talk)**
April 12-July 12, 2005	**Intensive Language Course (English, first semester)**
April 26, 2005	**Research Project 5 (Co-existence with Other Religions in Islam—Tradition and Response to the Contemporary World)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Kazuki Shimomura (Japanese Embassy in Syria) **"General Outlook on Islam in Syria in Modern Times"**
May 19, 2005	**Lecture, open for the public** Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Hasan Abu Nimah (The Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies in Amman) **"Interfaith Dialogue in the Middle East"**
May 21, 2005	**Research Group 2: American Global Strategy and the Monotheistic World, 2005-1** Location: Tokyo office, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Fumiaki Kubo (The Univ. of Tokyo) **"Religious Conservatives in the Republican Conservative Coalition: Cooperation, and Some Tensions"** Speaker 2: Koji Murata (Doshisha Univ.) **"The Second-term Bush Administration and the U.S.-Japan Relationship"** Commentator 1: Usuki Akira (National Museum of Ethnology) Commentator 2: Toshihiro Nakayama (The Japan Institute of International Affairs)
May 27, 2005	**Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. **"On the Orientation and Plans for 2005"**
May 28, 2005	**Research Group 1: Reexamination of Monotheism and Polytheism: Towards A New Dialogue of Civilization, 2005-1** Location: Kanbaikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Isaiah Teshima (Osaka Sangyo Univ.) **"The Turning Point in Rabbinic Judaism: The Destruction of the Temple and its Effects on the Political Theologies of the Sages"** Speaker 2: Hiroshi Ichikawa (The Univ. of Tokyo) **"The Hierarchy of Authority and the Interpretation of Scripture in Modern Judaism in Relation to the Modern State and Democracy"** Commentator 1: Hassan Ko Nakata (Doshisha Univ.) Commentator 2: Katsuhiro Kohara (Doshisha Univ.)
June 18, 2005	**Lecture, open for the public** Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Yoshiko Oda (Kansai Univ.) **"Religiosity in Islam: Comparison with the Japanese View of Religion"** Commentator: Takehito Miyake (Doshisha Univ.)
June 25, 27, 30, 2005	**Intensive Language Course (Arabic, first semester)**

June 25, 2005	**Research Group 2: American Global Strategy and the Monotheistic World, 2005-2** Location: Shiseikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Koji Igarashi (Asahi Shimbun) **"UN Reform in the U.S. Unipolar System"** Speaker 2: Ryo Asano (Doshisha Univ.) **"China and Multilateralism"** Commentator 1: Koji Murata (Doshisha Univ.) Commentator 2: Naofumi Miyasaka (National Defense Academy in Japan)
July 8, 2005	**Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Shintaro Yoshimura (Hiroshima Univ.) **"Some Aspects of the 9th Presidential Election in Iran, 2005: The Gap between Expectation and Reality"**
July 9, 2005	**Research Group 2: American Global Strategy and the Monotheistic World, 2005-3** Location: Tokyo Office, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Kinichi Yoshihara (Asian Forum Japan) **"An Eye on American Politics: The Meaning of the Conservative Revolution for the Republican Party and the Congress"** Speaker 2: Toshihiro Nakayama (The Japan Institute of International Affairs) **"The U.S. Democratic Party and the Election of 2008: Rebuilding the Party Infrastructure"** Commentator 1: Koichi Mori (Doshisha Univ.) Commentator 2: Hisayoshi Ina (Nihon Keizai Shimbun)
July 23, 2005	**Research Group 1: Reexamination of Monotheism and Polytheism: Towards A New Dialogue of Civilization, 2005-2** Location: Tokyo Office, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Takashi Kato (Chiba University) **"A Typology of the Christian World from the Viewpoint of the Comparative Study of Civilizations"** Speaker 2: Ritsu Ishikawa (Doshisha Univ.) **"The Possibility of Canonical Interpretation: the Canon as a Jar of Clay"** Commentator 1: Nobuhiro Nakamura (Doshisha Women's College of Liberal Arts) Commentator 2: Akira Echigoya (Doshisha Univ.)
July 25, 2005	**Research Project 1 (Religious Policy in Europe)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Masanori Miyazawa (Emeritus professor, Doshisha Women's College of Liberal Arts) **"The Japanese Debate on the Jews and Israel"**
July 29, 2005	**Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Kenji Tomita (Doshisha Univ.) **"Muhammad Khatami, 'Golge insan dar kame ajadhaye doulat'"**
July 30, 2005	**Lecture, open for the public** Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Nasser Saghafi-Ameri (Expert on Regional and International Security) **"Iran's Nuclear Program and the Non-proliferation Issue Analyzed by an Iranian Diplomatic Expert"**
August 1-15, 2005	**Summer Training Program in Malaysia**
August 2-11, 2005	**Summer Training Program in Israel**

2005 Activity Report

2005 Activity Report

August 16-28, 2005	**Summer Training Program in Syria**
September 8, 2005	**Research Group 1: Reexamination of Monotheism and Polytheism: Towards A New Dialogue of Civilization, 2005-3** Location: Shiseikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Issam Mohamed (Alneelain Univ.) Speaker 2: Yoji Takeoka (Emeritus professor, Nagoya Univ.) **"The Sudan's Contemporary Conflict"**
September 29, 2005	**Lecture, open for the public** Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Menahem Ben-Sasson (Hebrew Univ.) **"The Cairo Genizah: A Window to a Millennium of Jewish History and Culture"**
October 4, 2005-January 17, 2006	**Intensive Language Course (English, second semester)**
October 6, 2005	**Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Takamitsu Shimamoto (Osaka Univ. of Foreign Studies) **"Western Reasoning and Islamic Reasoning (preliminary research): The Case of B. Russell and M. Motahhari"**
October 15, 2005	**Research Group 2: American Global Strategy and the Monotheistic World, 2005-4** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Naofumi Miyasaka (National Defense Academy in Japan) **"The London Bombings and U.S/European Counter-terrorism Policy: An International Security Perspective"** Speaker 2: Hassan Ko Nakata (Doshisha Univ.) **"The Failure of Liberal Democracy: Focusing on the Ban on the Islamic Liberation Party"** Commentator 1: Taku Ishikawa (Toyo Eiwa University) Commentator 2: Koichi Mori (Doshisha Univ.)
October 22, 2005	**Research Group 1: Reexamination of Monotheism and Polytheism: Towards A New Dialogue of Civilization, 2005-4** **Lecture, open for the public** Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Kazuko Shiojiri (Univ. of Tsukuba) **"'Jihad' in the Interpretation of the Qu'ran"** Commentator 1: Junya Shinohe (Doshisha Univ.) **Research Meeting** Location: Kanbaikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Commentator 2: Hassan Ko Nakata (Doshisha Univ.) **"Jihad and 'Islamic World'"**
October 28, 2005	**Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Kenji Tomita (Doshisha Univ.) **"Liberalism and Khomeini's View on Justice"**
November 5-7, 2005	**CISMOR International Workshop 2005** **"Modernization and National Identity in East Asia: Globalization and the Revival of Religion"** Location: Kanbaikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ.; Neesima Kaikan

November 8, 2005	**Research Project 5 (Co-existence with Other Religions in Islam - Tradition and Response to the Contemporary World)** Location: National Museum of Ethnology Session I: Prospects and Problems of the Southern Philippines after the Peace Agreement in 1996 Speaker 1: Rufa Guiam (Mindanao State Univ., General Santos City) **"Bringing the Margins to the Mainstream: The Role of Bangsamoro Women in the Peace Process in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)"** Speaker 2: Marites Vitug (Newsbreak Magazine) **"The End of the Road? Prospects of Peace Agreement with the MILF"** Commentator: Miichi Ken (Embassy of Japan in Singapore) Session II: Islamic Studies and Islam Movement in Southeast Asia Speaker 1: Solihin Mohammad (Malaysia International Islamic Univ.) **"Tradition and Contemporaneity in Islamic Studies in South East Asia"** Speaker 2: Ismail Yusanto (Indonesia National Islamic Univ.) **"Diversity of Islamic Movements in South East Asia"** Commentator: Kobayashi Yasuko (Nanzan Univ.)
November 18-29, 2005	**Students' Exchange Program for Promoting Mutual Understanding Between Malaysia and Japan: Training for Exposure to Japanese Culture**
November 22, 2005	**Research Project 1 (Religious Policy in Europe)** Location: Neiseikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Michel Mohr (Non-regular employees lecturer, Doshisha Univ.) **"Religious Responses to the Collapse of Europe in the Early 20th Century: The Case of Franz Rosenzweig and the Star of Redemption"**
December 3, 2005	**Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Kenji Tomita (Doshisha Univ.) **Book Review, Shintaro Yoshimura,** *Modern History of Iran and the International Relations of the Middle East* Speaker 2: Shintaro Yoshimura (Hiroshima Univ.) **"Reconsidering the History of the Iran-Afghanistan 'Relationship', 1901–1941"**
December 6, 2005	**Research Project 4 (Images of Non-Muslim Religions in Middle Eastern Textbooks and their Implications)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Mohammed Boudoudou (Mohammed V Univ.) **"Islam, Immigration, European Integration"** Speaker 2: Elmostafa Rezrazi (Asia-Arab Media Research Project) **"Religious Education and Cultural Acceptance of the Other"**
December 10, 2005	**The 1st CISMOR Conference on Jewish Studies 2005** **"Jewish Studies in Current Academic Research in Japan"** Location: Kanbaikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ.
December 13, 2005	**The Special Issue of JISMOR (English version) was published.**
December 17, 2005	**Lecture, open for the public** Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Yuriko Yamanaka (National Museum of Ethnology) **"The Allegory of the Two Horns: Alexander the Great as a Sacred Figure in West Asia"**

2005 Activity Report

December 28-29, 2005	**CISMOR & Shaikh Ahmad Kuftaro Foundation International Symposium** **"Islam and Muslims in Non-Muslim Countries"** Location: Shaikh Ahmad Kuftaro Foundation
January 11, 2006	**Research Project 1 (Religious Policy in Europe)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Eric Ottenheijm (Univ. of Utrecht) **"Dialogue for Heaven's Sake: Historical and Theological Axes of Christian-Jewish Relations in the Netherlands"**
January 14, 2006	**Lecture, open for the public** Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Eric Ottenheijm (Univ. of Utrecht) **"Dialogue for Heaven's Sake: Historical and Theological Axes of Christian-Jewish Relations in the Netherlands"** Commentator: Michel Mohr (Non-regular employee lecturer, Doshisha Univ.)
January 21, 2006	**Research Group 1+2, Joint Seminar** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker 1: Yasushi Kosugi (Kyoto Univ.) **"Islamic Democracy: Its Ideals, Experience, and Prospects"** Speaker 2: Jun Furuya (Hokkaido Univ.) **"The Changing Interface between Politics and Religion in the American Founding Idea"** Speaker 3: Kenji Kanno (Tokyo Metropolitan Univ.) **"The French Republic and the Jews: A Touchstone of the 'Laicite'"** Commentator 1: Kenji Tomita (Doshisha Univ.) Commentator 2: Koichi Mori (Doshisha Univ.)
February 13-14, 16-17, 2006	**Intensive Language Course (Hebrew)**
February 25, 2006	**Lecture, open for the public** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Mohammed Bin Hasaan Azzir (The Arabic Islamic Institute in Tokyo) **"Efforts of the Arabic Islamic Institute in Teaching Arabic Language for 24 Years, and E-learning"** Commentator: Samir Nouh (Doshisha Univ.)
February 26-March 1, 2006	**Intensive Language Course (Arabic, second semester)**
February 28, 2006	**The Special Issue of JISMOR (Japanese version) was published.**
February 28, 2006	**The second issue of JISMOR was published.**
March 1, 2006	**Research Project 1 (Religious Policy in Europe)** Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ. Speaker: Mari Nomura (Kanazawa Univ.) **"Assimilation and Identity among Vienna's Jews"**
March 4, 2006	**CISMOR & International Islam University Malaysia International Symposium** **"Salvation and Messianic Movements in Monotheistic Religions: Contemporary Implications"** Location: Pan Pacific Hotel, Kuala Lumpur

March 11, 2006

Research Project 6 (Historical Development of Europe Islam)
Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ.
Speaker: Kosuke Shimizu (Kyushu Univ.)
"'Turkish History' and the Turks"
Commentator: Fumiko Sawae (Research Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science(PD))

March 15, 2006

Symposium, open for the public
"Recommendations for Monotheism from Japanese Religions"
Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ.
Speaker: Tetsuo Yamaori (Emeritus professor, International Research Center for Japanese Studies)
Panelist: Koichi Mori (Doshisha Univ.)
Isaiah Teshima (Doshisha Univ.)
Tetsuo Yamaori

March 17, 2006

Workshop
"The Search for David and Solomon: A Current Archaeological Perspective"
Location: Neiseikan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ.
Speaker: Amihai Mazar (Hebrew Univ.)

March 18, 2006

Lecture, open for the public
Location: Chapel in the Divinity Hall, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ.
Speaker: Amihai Mazar (Hebrew Univ.)
"What Can Archaeology Contribute to the Question of the Historicity of the Bible?"

March 24, 2006

Research Project 2 (Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam)
Location: Fusokan, Imadegawa Campus, Doshisha Univ.
Speaker: Asuka Nakamura (Doshisha Univ.)
"Current Tendency of Thought on Ashurah: Ostad Mesbah Yazdi, Azarakhshi-ye digar az Asman-e Karbara"

March 31, 2006

The Report from the 1st CISMOR Conference on Jewish Studies 2005 was published.

CISMOR
International Workshop
2005

November 5 (Sat.)

Session 1

"The Crisis of National Identity and the Role of Religions in East Asia"

Globalization in Balance: The Role and Position of Religion

International Islamic University Malaysia KAMARUZAMAN, Kamar Oniah

The Issue

It is a fact that human history is not static and can never be static. Rather, it progresses on and on, changing through various modalities and accumulating various moods as it moves along with the advance of time, with intersections and interchanges here and there which usher in the inevitable periods of change. Today we have come, once again, to one such intersection, entering a period of transition that moves us from the state of what was into the state of what will be; we disembark from the old world order and embark on a new one, a world order now popularly termed 'globalization' and 'globalism'—with globalization being the mechanism and globalism being its ideology.

As a mechanism, globalization is certainly not a new phenomenon in world history. In the past, it was identified as universalization, internationalization, or, simply put, the learning and sharing among civilizations. Indeed, it is in the very nature of civilizations to learn from, and share with, each other if they are to grow and prosper, and certainly all world civilizations have done so; otherwise they would not have attained the status which this designation implies. Seen from this perspective, globalization looks natural and innocent enough, like another natural development or a sequence of history, as it were. Yet, there is something in the nature of globalism and globalization that does not seem quite right, and which causes concern to the sensitive and the perceptive among us. This is because globalization is a specially devised mechanism or instrument for the purposes and agendas of globalism.

Globalization and Globalism in Perspective

Globalism, as an ideology, has pan-nationalism as its philosophical base in that it upholds a utopian concept of one-state governance for the whole planet. It means that, ultimately, all nations and national governments will be part of one super-state and will succumb to, and be subjected to one super-government, and will be ruled and dominated by this one super-government. And of course, today the super-government for this super-state is none other than the government of the United States of America. At the back of it all, and as matters now stand, globalism is in fact a subtle politico-economic strategy to promote and sustain the USA as the world's one and only supreme superpower. It is nothing more than a new form of colonialism—colonizing the whole world en bloc—with the USA (at this point of time) as the colonial master and the rest as colonies, subdued beneath her dominance. This is why globalism is rejected and globalization, as the instrument or mechanism for globalism, is likewise suspected.

Thus, globalization, as it now stands, does not actually carry the old spirit of learning and sharing, as did the processes of universalization and internationalization in the past; rather, it actually tends to "gobble up" every other culture and civilization, thus inevitably leveling them out almost into non-entities, or remodeling them into the form and color of its own desire and design. In short, globalization and globalism do not allow space for others to be "the other"; instead, all ought to be "ours."

We can see this fact reflected in recent and current world political events, to wit, the U.S. government's unilateral decisions and actions against Iraq, and her maneuverings over the United Nations against Afghanistan, and now, just as abstrusely, and perhaps even more blatantly, her directives to the Middle Eastern governments to adopt democracy or else prepare for the consequences. With China too, the U.S. dabbles here and there in her affairs, using varieties of arm-twisting tactics, warnings, and threats. Likewise, it is made to seem that every other country is wrong to possess and develop nuclear power except the United States of America, since every other nation and every other people are looked upon as quite irresponsible, even terrorist-minded and violence-prone —that is, of course, everybody but the USA and her super-sister, the European Union.

Yet if one is to take Hurricane Katrina as the litmus test on what being civilized and responsible is all about, then the U.S. fails miserably indeed. It is horrifying to see that a nation so advanced in technology, so sophisticated in lifestyle and so pompous in political prowess could succumb to so low an act as raping, rampaging and looting in times of tragedy and tribulation. If this is the type of order that the "central government of the world" can concoct, surely this is a far cry from being impressive and dependable, let alone exemplary. And not just what took place at the site of the hurricane's havoc, for the hullabaloo surrounding the handling of the crisis also leaves much to be desired. Thus, Hurricane Katrina brought to light the ugly truth and realities about the USA: that it is like a drum, with lots of noise coming from a hollow inside, lots of cosmetics hiding the ugly inside, superficial sophistication covering up a barbaric undersurface, form without substance, so to speak.

At the level of the economy, this globalization philosophy is conspicuously reflected in the operations and mechanisms of the multi-national corporations and conglomerates of the super-rich nations vis-à-vis the poor people of the underdeveloped countries. So we see, for example, how the less developed countries are at the mercy of these super-rich business enterprises and we witness how the poor people of these poor countries are struggling frantically, almost futilely, against the powerful and insensitive clutches of these corporations and conglomerates. Yet, it is strange and ironic indeed that globalization was actually initiated upon a somewhat innocent ground, with good intentions and even an almost noble mission, inasmuch as globalization was devised as an economic mechanism for putting the world back on sound economic track in the aftermath of the two World Wars. The intent was to promote the open, laissez-faire economy of free competition and capitalistic markets and enterprises, in the hope that economies would recover more quickly, and so help one and all get back on their feet.

But of course, this was nothing more than a well-meaning economic utopia, since free competition is not, and can never be fair competition because the stark truth is that the poor cannot compete with the rich, the weak cannot compete with the strong, as the sheep cannot compete with the lion; in fact, the sheep actually stand helpless before the lion. Inevitably, therefore, this system leads to the exploitation of the poor—the poor got poorer, the rich got richer, and the result is that today, a handful of the richest people on this planet earn more than the total sum of the rest of the world's inhabitants. This, in short, is a gross injustice, the exploitation of the rest of the world by the rich and powerful. Indeed, today this situation has come to full bloom, and we see reactions against it across the globe in that the big powers, both governments and corporate, cannot meet due to the demonstrations and rally protests carried out against them.

At the socio-cultural level, globalization is so active that its effects are widespread and conspicuous, obvious to one and all. Across the globe, we see a new sort of culture springing up, a culture that is neither local, nor reflective of any one particular civilization, religion, or tradition. If anything, it is a culture of the sensational—a culture that pitches itself on sensations and near-hysterical entertainments, a culture devoid of higher ideals and noble aspirations, a culture of high profile living that goes to support a culture of high wastage and consumerism, of greed and sensuality. This new global culture of the sensational rides upon the latest state-of-the art communication and media technology, the Internet boom, plus the all-time favorite form of leisure across the globe—television and films, the small screen and the big screen, so to say. Thus, we see some of our youths and segments of our society looking neither like Easterners nor like Westerners, but just Orientals in the latest Western gimmicks, sporting Hollywood mannerism and television lifestyles, even mimicking and adopting such destructive practices as gangsterism, drug abuse, and socio-familial conflict. For the East, with its high sensitivity to social values and morality, to tradition and religious life, this new phenomenon is hard to digest, to say the least. In all this we see our values eroded away, disappearing, being replaced by a new cultural face that does not sit well with our eastern, oriental sentiments, values, and worldviews. Thus, we feel challenged and concerned, at times even downright sick about the changing look of our social landscape.

Since cultures are normally rooted in religions and are the manifestations and expressions of religious worldviews, values, and sentiments, we also read these new social developments not only as onslaughts and threats upon our culture and cultural identity, but also as intrusions into and the erosion of our religious attachments and values. This is because the obvious external is, by and large, reflective of the abstract internal, so to speak. Moreover, since religions and cultures are the pillars of civilizations, then this new development is rattling our Eastern civilizations as well. And since civilization is the foundation for nations and national identity, therefore this new global culture also poses threats to our national identity and integrity. Thus, we do have genuine reasons to be suspicious about globalization, to say the least; we feel threatened by it on many fronts: religion, culture, politics, and economy. Still, globalization is the order of the day. It cannot be stopped. What we can do is prepare ourselves for its onslaughts, and handle it wisely as it comes against us in the various modes and moods that it presents.

The Oriental Identity

Looking at the nations of East Asia (Japan, China, Korea), together with those of continental and insular Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia), it is true that these nations are incredibly diverse. There are so many different ethnicities, religions, cultures, languages, histories, political ideologies, and economic systems that, as some say, it is impossible to lump together all the East Asian nations into one group, or under one common banner, let alone into one structure for all. But, they are not necessarily divided. If we look deep enough beneath all these apparent differences, we will notice a common trait running deep below the diversified surface phenomena which binds these nations of the Far East together. This is "the oriental persona" or the oriental personality, worldview, and value system. Indeed, this oriental persona is manifested in the mannerisms and conduct of the people of East Asia, and is felt and sensed in any of the East Asian countries. Thus, upon first encounter, people from other regions of the world will be quite perplexed and some-

what confused about how to react with people from the East—or, the Orientals—finding them mystifying, so to speak. In contrast, people of the West are very different from those of the Far East in worldview and mannerism.

For some reason or other, and despite the assortment of ethnicities, religions, cultures, and languages of the East Asian nations, the people of this region in general, and by norm, possess the oriental persona, the oriental outlook, sentiment, and mannerisms. A Japanese may not have the features of a Filipino, a Thai, or a Malay, nor speak a common language; he or she may have a different religion, but still, there is something in their mannerisms and conduct that links them together: graceful and gracious, soft-spoken, politely attentive and accommodating to others, tolerant, patient, and perseverant in temperament. The oriental persona also reflects its own particular ethics, value systems, and moral consciousness; it is tradition- and custom bound, religiously obvious and active, more introvert than extrovert, self-conscious with a mellow dignity, gentle and subdued in mannerism, and subtle in expression, among other things. These are traits that differ somewhat from the persona of people of other regions. In symbolic form, this oriental persona is reflected in the figure of the sages of the East, i.e., a person stooping slightly, indicating the heavy load of knowledge and wisdom that he carries on his back: loaded with wisdom but stooped in humbleness, and seemingly unobtrusive in appearance. It is also reflected in the figure of the *Chung-tzu*—noble and chivalrous, helpful and accommodative in conduct and mannerism. By contrast, the heroic figure of the West is that of the "superman"; though just as noble and chivalrous, he is also mighty and powerful, highly prominent and conspicuous.

The oriental persona is also normally attached to, and is supportive of, traditions, norms, customs, and culture, foremost of which is a deep sense of respect and reverence for parents, teachers, elders, and authorities; these are translated into and manifest in filial and familial attachment, teacher reverence, and communal spirit and sentiment, a spirit of togetherness and common identity, of fraternity and loyalty, as captured in the Confucian *hsiao* ('relationships'). It is these very characteristics that help to inculcate a strong sense of kinship and boundedness in oriental communities and societies, which in turn promote and sustain communal living and sharing, and which progress into nationalistic loyalty and national identity. Communal living also generates a communal worldview and value system, which, in turn, guides and sustains the continuity of the community and communal life—thus a spiral chain reaction of one into the other.

Being thus founded upon the spirit of loyalty and deep respect for authority, the national identity and nationalistic feeling inculcated and imbedded in the oriental persona is bound to develop into, and will incline to support, an authority-centered worldview, which tends to be more feudalistic than liberal in nature. Hence, it is understandable why in the Orient, the overall socio-political atmosphere is more supportive of, and polarized around, central socio-political figures, be they kings, presidents, prophets or sages, rather than of the liberal, representative and collective type of authority. In other words, the preference for the oriental persona is to entrust authority unto individuals rather than unto collective representation. Along this same rationality, then, religions and traditions in the East, because of their focused central authority, command greater respect and obedience, and are given more concern and attention than social or political ideologies, and are also far more effective for social order and management than laws and legislation. This is because religions and traditions, like feudalism, possess a central authority rather than a collective authority, as commanded by Western socio-political ideologies.

Religion and Globalization

Religion is thus a serious business indeed in the East, and it is not just a personal matter but is also a communal, social, and national matter. As noted earlier, religions in fact are the roots of the eastern national cultures and civilizations, and consequently, form the foundations of national identity and integrity. Because people of the East take religions seriously, they will go all out to defend, sustain, and even promote religions and religious interests. Governments have even been brought down by religious sentiments and religious movements. Hence, there is always weariness and suspicion about onslaughts, like the ones reflected in the effects of globalization, that threaten the position of religion and religious values and culture. When globalization manifests itself so obviously and prominently at the socio-cultural level, this is interpreted as assaults against religions and traditions and, accordingly, the socio-cultural transformations that take place are viewed as the manifestations and the intrusions of religious-free values, which dislocate and dilute religious commitment and identity. Therefore it is not surprising that the first confrontation against globalization in the East is taken up at the level of religion and religious movements, which, on the one hand, are set to defend religion, religious values and religious culture, and on the other hand, to maintain independence from Western dominance and hegemony—in particular, that of the USA.

It is also a fact that with the Orientals, religions are not just a matter of the spirit and the heart, and there is no hard and fast dichotomy of the sacred and the profane in Eastern civilizations. In the East, religion and life are one and the same, so much so that in some religions, such as Taoism and Shinto, it is quite difficult for the adherents to explain their religions to outsiders. To my mind, this is not because these religions do not have formal, structured, or elaborate theologies, doctrines and

dogmas, rites and rituals, or perhaps even standard scriptures, as compared to other world religions. Rather, it is because their adherents live and regard their religions as the normal daily routine, and so do not look at religion as a particular entity on its own that warrants specific attention or explanation. I am told, interestingly enough, that in antiquity, the Chinese did not even have a specific term for religion but that it was part and parcel of the word *chia*, which means "teachings." It was only much later that the word *chiao* ('religion'), which is derived from *chia*, came into being, when foreign religions entered China and caused the Chinese to distinguish these foreign "ways of life" (i.e., foreign *chiao*) from theirs.

This non-dichotomized concept of the spiritual and the temporal is especially manifested in the ethics of the oriental religions and, likewise, the ethics of the oriental persona. All Eastern ethics are religious ethics, even the humanism and altruism of Confucianism which sees the human heart as a microcosm of the Macrocosm (*Ti'en*, 'Heaven') and thus, Heaven's will reflected in the human heart; even governments enjoy their status as governments only because they received the blessings of Heaven, with the Emperor then acknowledged as the Mandate of Heaven. The same is true too as regard the Buddhist ethics which are not only for the good of the person, but are even more essential for the well-being of others—thus the special sacrifice of the *Boddhisatvas* who refrain from entering Nirvana in order to assist others. The Chinese, in sustaining the traditional Chinese religion as well as assimilating Taoism, Mahayana Buddhism, and Confucianism, therefore underscore the fact of a non-dichotomized and all-inclusive worldview, taking life and religion as one and the same, not even as two faces of the same coin, but all on one face, as it were. So, if their lives are to be disoriented by globalization, they are bound to react sooner or later, in one way or another.

The same is true with regard to other religions too, especially Islam. In the case of Islam, the reactions against globalization and globalism are already out and obvious; they even take on political tones and appear in political statements. This is because, in Islam, the dichotomy between worldly life and spiritual life is even more pronouncedly negated. In Islam, religion is a holistic, comprehensive, and complete way of life which, as reflected in its *shari'ah*, envelopes not just ethics but every system and every aspect of life, personal as well as social. Therefore nothing in Islam is outside the ambit of the religion and religious concern, be this spiritual, intellectual, or material. Therefore, ethics for Muslims can never be anything but religious ethics, and are indeed the manifestations of religious values and reflect the religiosity of the person and the community. Because of this perception, Muslims are seriously, if not especially, affected by the transformation brought about by globalization, not to mention by globalism itself; and they are now reacting and responding seriously to these forces.

However, even in the case of Christianity with its doctrine of secularism, some believers, such as Christians of the East, though still adhering steadfastly to this doctrine, do also manifest religion in their daily conduct of life and thus do not reflect an all out dichotomy between the spiritual and the temporal. Chinese Christians, for instance, still diligently observe family attachment and respect for parents, teachers, and authority, and are apparently more oriental in persona than occidental. This oriental persona is also obvious among the Filipinos, said to be the staunchest Catholics in the world, who successfully wed Christianity with oriental values and so reflect a persona that is Christian yet oriental at one and the same time.

But why is globalization so negative in regard to religious and national identities? If globalization stems from the West, and the West is the crucible for Christianity, why should globalization be such a challenge to all that is religious? This is because although coming from the West, globalization is not a child of western religion or western religious sentiments, but is actually a secular offspring. In fact, globalization is so secular that it is actually anti-religion, and if one is to read into it deeply, it actually resonates of the warfare between science and religion and reflects the triumphs and conquest of religion by science, the domination of the secular over the religious. As such, the products of globalization are anti-religious: at the level of culture, it is the culture of the sensations or the flesh, and at the level of economics, it propagates inequity, exploitation, and gross injustice contradictory to the spirit of religious values and teachings. Thus, though born in the West, there is nothing Christian or even religious in globalization and globalism; they are agendas of sheer greed and domination.

Responding to Globalization and Globalism

Therefore, since ethics, in the East, is basically religion in action, the adoption of the new culture (the culture of the sensations, as it were) brought about by globalization affects the religiosity of the communities of the East. And since religions are the backbone for both the civilization and the national identity of the nations of the Orient, these two are likewise affected and challenged, and thus nations and communities of the East respond and react negatively to the process of globalization. As regards the political aspect, globalism, with its pan-nationalistic philosophy, is in fact even more of a threat to the East since in this political ideology no nation is actually a free suzerainty—all, willingly or unwillingly, will have to succumb to a central super-authority. It thus eventually means the loss of self-rule and freedom of governance.

Although globalization and globalism are threats to religions and religious values, they are not the only threats and challenges confronting us in our contemporary situation. More menacing and severe are direct and structured violence, the incessant bloodbaths and oppressions across the globe—whether politically motivated or economically initiated—and random gang violence and insane killings. Never a day passes before our eyes that killings and carnage, in one form or another, are not aired on the television screens, not to mention the shows that glamorize brutality and sadism and that sensationalize violence and aggression. Indeed, man has fallen far, far below his honorable status as "the image of God" (Christianity), "the co-partners" and "stewards of God" (Judaism), the "vicegerents of God" (Islam), "the crown of God's creations" (Sikhism), "the microcosm of the Macrocosm" (Confucianism), to list some of the accolades which religions bestow upon man, to become what he is now: sheer brutes and psychopathic maniacs of devilish demeanor, condoning, even indulging and relishing in such inhumane tastes and misconduct.

One may read all these atrocities as reflecting the triumph and success of the bad and evil. But to my mind, they actually reflect the failures of the good—the failures of the religious and the conscientious to construct peace and well-being on this planet, to sustain decent and dignified living environments for one and all, human as well as the non-human. Something has gone seriously wrong with us, and part of it, in my view, is because the good and the religious seem to have somewhat misconstrued what it means to be good. In a sense, for many people being good means being goody-goody; it means to be nice and meek, to be obliging, submissive and non-active, to be passive, favoring omission rather than action. There seems to be a belief, a myth—somewhat misplaced, to my way of thinking—that to be spiritual is to be docile, to be receptive of things as they come, to accept the inevitable graciously, as it were. There also seems to be a belief that to be actively involved in society in order to fight injustice and to help sustain peace and well-being seems tantamount to jeopardizing or diluting one's spirituality. Thus the good chooses to be silent and passive whilst the bad chooses to be loud and active; the former prefer omission and submissiveness, whereas the latter are proactive and assertive.

Yet such a passive attitude does not stem from the proper teachings of religions, since all religions favor active participation to promote justice and the good. The venerable Dalai Lama, for instance, proclaimed in his address at the Parliament of World Religion, Cape Town 2000, that "You change yourself through meditation, but you change the world through good deeds." Likewise, in the Declaration of Vatican Council II in 1965, the Nostra Aetate, a significant clause was put which urges the Catholics "to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom." Likewise, Islam's standing injunction is for the Muslims to enjoin what is good and prohibit what is evil. Confucian ethics, too, promote humanism and altruism, and regards education as an instrument for building up a good, progressive society. Sikhism also equates the spiritual with the social.

Thus, in view of all these guidelines and directives, there is no reason why the religious, the spiritual, and the pious should choose to remain passive in the midst of all the rampant atrocities worldwide, adopting "the culture of the mosquitoes," whimpering in the dark, irritating but ineffective, without dignity and worth. Religions, in effect, should develop the conscience, and a well-developed religious conscience is ever sensitive and affected by pains and sufferings, by injustice and misconduct. Thus people of religion should come up front stage, with full dignity and sway, to do their bit to return peace and well-being to this ailing world—for if we do not, who else will do it? This task can be undertaken through numerous ways and means as guided or even enunciated by the various religions. In fact, not only should people of religion pull their acts together, but also people of conscience, whether they profess a certain faith or not, should also do their bit for world peace. This should be carried out in an organized manner, not sporadic and isolated, because cumulative effort and structured actions are far more effective. With the world globalized, so to speak, this task should also be easier to manage since the very mechanisms of globalization can be harnessed to promote an alternative world order, one which has conscience and kindness, justice and equity as its essence, like the *jen* ('benevolence') of Confucianism.

To begin with, it is necessary that a significant segment of the world population understands just how serious the situation is, and is made ready to want change and to work for an alternative world order. To this effect, conscientious leaders of society, be they religious, political, social, or economic leaders, as well as the media, should play major roles in effecting change and calling for an alternative world order, before we wipe each other off the surface of this earth. Everyone has a role to play and each, be he or she a leader or a follower, is a significant actor in the initiatives for change. National politicians can promote and propagate national identity and loyalty, whilst economic leaders should find alternative ways to uplift national economies so that nations can be independent from the superpower's grip. Likewise, in the fields of culture and aesthetics, more of the national culture and color should be promoted so that the society can appreciate and turn to local entertainments. The mass media too—print, visual, and electronic—certainly have a major role to play in helping to initiate, promote, and sustain change, to inculcate loyalty and pride in national

identity, to promote appreciation for national culture and values, to sensationalize the religious and the moral instead of the immoral and the brutal. Such was how changes had taken place in the past; the Renaissance, the Reformation, the revolutions, etc., and the changing status of world civilizations, all started with the masses' consciousness and their desire for change. With desire came the willpower and then followed the actual struggle for change. Thus was change effected, and thus can it be effected again.

Needless to say, scholars and academicians, especially, should take the lead roles in effecting change, outlining the proper guidance for change and envisioning an alternative world order. The people need to be convinced and be assured of a workable alternative, otherwise they will be nervous about changing and will suspect all attempts at change, and so reject the proposed alternative out of the fear that the envisioned alternative world order would lead to further chaos and disorder, deeper injustice and harsher oppressions—in short, a worse situation than the present one. Thus, scholars and religious leaders should perform their work sincerely, wisely, and diligently if they are to succeed in convincing, and subsequently, in leading society to accept and to walk into a new world order. It is only then that religious values and moral order could be sustained and promoted in the communities, and accordingly, in the nations too. Since religions are not boundary-bound, so to speak, religious calls and visions can transcend all forms of barriers and divides—national, racial, political, economic, geographical, gender, age, etc.—and thus, are able to reach out to a worldwide audience.

However, despite this note of optimism, we have to acknowledge the fact that in the West, for many, religion has become so estranged from their life and concern as to be non-existent. Worse still, for others, religion is looked upon with suspicion and even in fear due to events in history, and more so due to the contemporary insanities and atrocities that are shouted out in the name of religion. Thus, for us to bring religion back into the interest of the world population, and thenceforth, to initiate the bringing back of religious values into the life and the mainstream affairs of the global society (particularly the secular fanatics of the West), we will first have to revive and boost up the status of religion in the eyes of these people, to lift religion up from the dismal position that it now commands in the sentiments of society. Religions should therefore be put into contemporary context, made relevant, applicable, suitable and effective to this twenty-first century audience. To do so, religion should be able to address and attend to contemporary needs and situations. It should be able and effective in helping to solve contemporary issues and problems. It must contribute in all affairs of society, not just in matters related to the spiritual and the psyche, but in all dimensions of individual and social life—if not in form and structure, then at least in spirit and discipline. This actually means that scholars and leaders of religions should be effective in their roles as guides and leaders to the people. In order to do so, scholars and leaders of religion should also review their position and role vis-à-vis society.

Indeed, for far too long, leaders and scholars of religion have been barely effective at promoting peace and social order in society. It is not that we do not care, but that we have not made our work and contribution as effective as they should be. Thus, it is time that we now take our role seriously and review the ways we perform our tasks. The founders of religion, prophets and sages of old, had been effective. To my mind, the main difference lies in the fact that these great leaders had worked together with the people, had combined scholarship and leadership as true guides to life. In contrast, nowadays, we scholars and leaders of religions work above the heads and beyond the interests of the people. On the one hand, scholars are so caught up with thoughts and dogmas, so entangled with the complexities and the disputes of scholarship, whilst on the other hand, religious leaders are so caught up in leadership intricacies and snobberies and in hierarchical formalities and structures; in the end, both groups stand detached and aloof from the masses. But in the case of the prophets and sages of old, their languages were simple, their ideas were simple, their directions and directives were clear and pragmatic; they were approachable and easy-going people. Therefore, they could reach out effectively and thus led their communities successfully, since they were part and parcel of their people's hearts and lives. Unfortunately, scholars and leaders of religion today are so distant and estranged from the masses. We expect people to understand and appreciate us—but as people "up there," not as one of them.

To my mind, if scholarship is only meant for scholars and only attends to the interests of the elites, then its function will only be to enlarge the archives, meant and appreciated only by the bookworms, literally and metaphorically speaking. If scholars, in particular scholars of religion, are to be effective against globalism, then we have no choice but to come down to join the crowd and to become part and parcel of the mechanism for change. This means, to be part and parcel of the masses' struggle, to live to the spirit of the *Boddhisattvas* of Buddhism, or the *Chung-tzu* of Confucianism, or the Vicegerents of Islam, or the Co-partners and Stewards of Judaism, or the Image of God of Christianity, or the Crown of Creation of Sikhism. It means to live for the world, human and non-human alike. In short, we should ourselves become agents of change and guides to an alternative world order.

Closing Remarks

As closing remarks, since globalization is a product of the West, people of the East therefore find it difficult to relate to it, and since globalization spreads Western culture, systems and taste, the East therefore has to brace itself against these intrusions so that its own oriental persona and oriental lifestyles will not be wiped out. To address the issues of globalism and globalization, scholars have not only to be perceptive, but should also be sincere and active, to equip ourselves with the credibility to be effective in our roles. We should also move from a position of just talking to that of doing, from that of directing to that of participating and performing. In short, scholars and leaders of religion should belong to society, should be in the midst of the activities of social life, and should be part of the society, not above and beyond it.

Japanese National Identity and the Asian Common House

Reitaku University MATSUMOTO Kenichi

1. The Modern Character of Nationalism

Since the end of the world-bisecting Cold War in 1989, globalization has advanced, especially in the fields of economics, finance, and information, uniting the world. Meanwhile, as if in resistance, there has been a worldwide upsurge in nationalism.

Movements stridently asserting dominion, nationhood, and sovereignty—those three pillars of the modern state—are, in fact, gathering strength all over the world. The resistance of the EU and China to America's unilateral domination, the issue of displaced people within the EU, East Asian disputes over territory and resources between Japan, China and Korea: these are just a few of the undeniable examples of heightening nationalism that are now so prevalent.

However, if we see this as the rise of nationalism, it could be argued that the current situation resembles the blossoming and collision of nationalistic states that took place before the world was divided in two, and, broadly speaking, before the Russian revolution had led to the emergence of the Soviet Union: in other words, things now stand rather as they did in the run-up to the First World War. This what I call "the phenomenon of historical recursion."

In fact, when giving reasons for his decision to support American activities in Iraq and to dispatch the Self Defence Forces to that country, Japan's Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, cited the Japan-US alliance and Japan's own national interest. This is uncannily similar to the rationale given 90 years earlier by Shigenobu Okuma for Japan's entry into the First World War: at the time, the Okuma cabinet stated that, bearing in mind the British-Japanese alliance, Japan was going to enter the war as an ally of Britain, for the sake of Japan's own national interest.

So, if we dismiss the current rise in nationalism as historical recursion, we will probably not be able to do justice to the modern character of nationalism. For a start, let us consider the "Renunciation of War" under Article 9 of Japan's current constitution (also known as the "pacifist constitution"). When the countries of the West, shocked at the horrific excesses of the First World War, formulated the Kellog-Briand Pact in 1928, Japan was one of the signatories. Having signed the pact, however, Japan was the first to break it in the Mukden Incident of 1931. As a result, following its defeat in the Second World War, Japan was punitively compelled to declare the "Renunciation of War" set out in Article 1 of the Kellog-Briand Pact.

What prompted Japan to make the mistake of invading Manchuria was the fact that, as the last country to join in the "territory game" characterizing the military strategy of nationalism around the world in the run-up to the First World War, Japan was also the most obsessive player. What I refer to here as the "territory game" is the imperialist strategy based on the idea that in order to develop, a nation must possess a good deal of territory and acquire large quantities of resources.

The "territory game" is based on military power, so Japan, having been made to renounce force of arms in 1945, was obliged to switch over to the "wealth game," which revolves around economic power. What I refer to here as the "wealth game" is a strategy based on the idea that what a nation needs in order to develop is healthy industry and flourishing trade. The Newly Industrializing Nations (NIEs), or the East Asian Tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—along with Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia, which followed hot on their heels, and China and Vietnam, whose economic development got under way in the 1990s, are all leading

players of the "wealth game." Furthermore, the preamble to the Chinese constitution, amended in 1993, includes among the nation's stated objectives the creation of a "powerful and prosperous" China, a phrase strongly reminiscent of the "wealth and military strength" that was the avowed aim of Meiji Japan. This explains why elements of the "territory game" survive so strongly.

Be that as it may, since the end of the Cold War, the Asian countries which achieved economic growth by playing the "wealth game" have been involved in globalization, especially in finance and information: this suggests that international interdependencies can only grow stronger. When anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out in China in April this year, the Chinese government, having dismissed the unrest as "not China's fault," and having insisted that the Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the historical interpretation of the war were "Japan's responsibility," was nevertheless obliged to quell the anti-Japanese demonstrations by reminding the populace that 3.5 million Chinese citizens were currently employed by Japanese-owned companies based in China.

On September 3rd of this year, however, a grand gathering hosted by the Chinese government was held in Beijing to mark the "60th Anti-Japanese War Anniversary." This is an indication that modern nationalism has switched its focus to what I call the "identity game." In other words, it amounts to an assertion that today's developed China was created by a war of resistance against Japan, spearheaded by the Communist Party.

Let us consider the implications of this assertion. It was made because, for countries all over the world, and particularly the Asian countries, whose economic interdependence is particularly strong, the clear-cut assertion of national identity is seen as essential for survival in a globalizing world.

Consider the islets of Takeshima/Dokdo, which are the subject of a territorial dispute between South Korea and Japan. This dispute is not really about territory or economic resources (i.e. wealth): it is a question of historical interpretation, which lies at the root of ethnic identity. South Korea's claim to these islets is tied up with its wish to deny the miserable episode of having been a protectorate of Japan under the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty of 1905. What is at stake here is ethnic pride.

In these times, we might well ask what has become of the pride of the Japanese nation. The answer is that Japanese nationalism is now being called into question. Indeed, in order to restore its national pride, Japan too is being called upon to rebuild its national identity.

2. The Rebuilding of National Identity

Just now, I used the phrase "rebuild national identity." As I mentioned earlier, national identity is nation's own definition of itself, which means that it is nothing more or less than the essence of a modern nation. Searching for a turn of phrase that encapsulates the concept of the "essence of a nation," I find that "national polity" (*kokutai*) springs to mind. Whatever the case may be in other countries, however, in Japan, this expression is now loaded with negative associations because of its identification with the pre-war imperial regime. Asked to define Japan's national polity, most people would reply "the imperial state." For that reason, I shall continue to avoid that wording, and use the phrase "national identity" instead.

Let us consider the rebuilding of this national identity. If you asked me how nations go about rebuilding their national identity in today's world, I could show you several different methods.

First, the easiest method, and the one most widely used at present, is to create an "enemy" outside one's own country. For nations comprised of many different ethnicities, cultures and religions, along with diverse structural elements, this method is particularly convenient.

In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), the American author Samuel P. Huntington did in fact posit that, following the dismantling of the Cold War paradigm, it has become essential for countries to establish a national identity: he also argued that this is easily done, and that domestic unification can be achieved simply by creating an external enemy. I call this argument the "Huntington Trap." Many countries are now caught in the Huntington Trap, all busily creating their own external "enemy." Among the consequences of this is the global proliferation of conflict that has followed the dismantling of the Cold War paradigm, and the rise, in many regions, of the type of nationalism that makes enemies out of other nations.

The strategy of creating an enemy in order to establish a national identity is, in a sense, an American peculiarity, or to put it more strongly, an American pathology. This is because America was made up of immigrants from all nations, which makes it difficult to establish an identity internally. At its best, this strategy amounts to nothing more than championing the cause of liberal democracy, the ethos of Western European civilization.

Despite its universality, however, the ethos of liberal democracy is abstract, and cannot easily be conveyed to peoples whose culture, history, and way of life differ from that of the West. For all its universality, it does not lend itself to ready communication. So America sets up "enemies" of liberal democracy, and asserts its resolve to defeat them.

Islamic civilization, which is antagonistic to the modern Western European civilization based on liberal democracy, has been set up by Huntington as an "enemy" of liberal democracy-espousing America. Having fallen into the Huntington Trap, President Bush attacked Afghanistan and then Iraq, and is now trying to set up Iran as an enemy.

A contrasting approach to the quest for national identity can be seen in the case of France. A country with a long history, France shares parts of that history with the Roman Empire, and much of its religious history is common to other Christian Western European countries. Consequently, France is seeking its cultural uniqueness, or in other words, its national identity, through its own national language. In the march of globalization, however, the French language has begun to lose its *lingua franca* status to English, and even within the EU, the number of people learning French is decreasing (although, interestingly, the number of people learning German is increasing). Nevertheless, France's desperate efforts to find its national identity in its language are surely plain enough for all to see.

With just as long a history, the countries of Asia have much in common in terms of religion and culture: Chinese characters, Confucianism, and Buddhism being obvious examples. These countries are now starting to rebuild their national identity by rewriting recent history. I have already discussed this in my article "East Asian Countries Begin to Rewrite History" (*Chuo Koron*, September 2001), so I shall not repeat myself here.

I would, however, like to make a remark about Japan's recent history, which, I feel, bears repetition. The remark is this: our country's recent history contains mistakes, but only when our historical interpretation admits that mistakes were made will it enable future generations of young Japanese people to feel enough courage and pride to say, as a nation, "we recognize that we made mistakes, and we can live them down." This is the point at which I differ from the members of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform. This is why, despite being repeatedly invited to join the Society by the (eight) founder members, I declined to do so.

3. The Mistakes in Japan's Recent Past

Let us try to pinpoint exactly where things began to go wrong in Japan's recent history. Unless we acknowledge our mistakes, there is precious little chance that the Asian countries who experienced Japan's aggression will ever advance shoulder to shoulder with Japan towards a new vision of Asia. That new vision of Asia will, of course, also necessitate some soul-searching on the part of China. China's national polity is based on its traditional perception of itself as the center of the world. In cultural terms, too, the country's self-image is that of a flourishing global hub. In view of this, China's long-standing refusal to see itself as one of the countries of Asia is arguably overdue for some critical self-scrutiny. Unless some historical soul-searching is carried out on these lines, the Chinese nation's confidence in its own greatness will tip over into hegemonism, which will be seen as a threat not only by America but also by China's Asian neighbors.

Be that as it may, we cannot set about rebuilding Japan's national identity until we have identified Japan's recent historical mistakes. In my view, the crucial juncture was the "21 Demands" made of China by Japan in 1915. The "21 Demands" were inextricably linked with Japan's entry into the First World War, and clearly signified Japan's shift towards imperialism and intention to commit imperialistic aggression towards China.

As I mentioned earlier, giving reasons for the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq two years ago, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi cited the Japan-US alliance and Japan's own national interests. This closely mirrored the rationale for Japan's entry into the First World War. As noted, it was that, bearing in mind the British-Japanese alliance, Japan was going to enter the war as an ally of Britain for the sake of Japan's own national interest, and was articulated 90 years ago, in 1914, by Prime Minister Shigenobu Okuma, who enjoyed strong popular support, much like our current Prime Minister.

Then, two months or so after declaring war on Germany, Japan invaded Qingdao (then a major German naval base) on November 7th, 1914. This led to the "21 Demands," behind which lay Japan's plans for the following year's colonization of Qingdao and the rest of Shandong Province. At this point I would like to quote my own words from an interview entitled "Japan Must Design a New Vision of Asia" in the *Asahi Shimbun*, dated May 26, 2005:

> With the "21 Demands" of 1915, Japanese nationalism took on a new, aggressive character. That was when Japan committed the decisive error of invading China. This was followed by a backlash in the form of the May Fourth Movement. Nationalism is the self-assertion of a people, but nationalism that strongly asserts vested national interests sows the seeds of future problems.

An extremely sensitive reaction to the Chinese nationalism symbolized by the May Fourth Movement was evinced by the Japanese nationalist Kita Ikki, who has been the subject of my own research for the last 40 years. In his words, "Japan shoots an arrow at the sun, and the heavens are outraged" (*Unofficial History of the Chinese Revolution*).

These words are probably enough in themselves to lay Kita Ikki open to criticism as a Japanese fascist, and as the thinker who opened the door to Japan's militaristic fascism. He himself was the greatest critic of Prime Minister Shigenobu Okuma, who led the way to the invasion of China. What I am driving at here is that the current Koizumi cabinet may be committing the same mistake as the Okuma cabinet (and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Takaaki Kato).

At any rate, after issuing the "21 Demands," Japan went on to play the "territory game" in earnest. In the aforementioned *Asahi Shimbun* interview, this is what I said about the consequences of that action:

> Then Japan went on with the "territory game" until its defeat in 1945. After that, the country reduced its military might and entered the "wealth game." At the time of the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, it began to dawn on us that Japan was now on a par with the West, and we turned our gaze away from Asia in non-economic matters. Safe in the knowledge that Japan now had a pacifist constitution, and would not be invading any other country, and that we would not have to relive history, we allowed a blank spot to grow within our nation's historical awareness.

The subtitle used for the interview was "The Blank Spot in Japan's Historical Awareness," which is a reference to that phrase. What is most indispensable to Japan as it goes about the rebuilding of its national identity following the dismantling of the Cold War paradigm is a realization of where it went wrong in its recent history, or in other words, a clear, complete historical awareness.

Of course, Japan's reaching historical awareness of the fact that, in the "21 Demands," it had set its feet on the path to imperialistic invasion, coincided with the adoption of a pacifist constitution after the war by way of atonement. The Renunciation of War in Article 9, or in other words, the passage "…the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes," amounts to an expression of this. The Renunciation of War clause is something we must retain forever.

However, after the dismantling of the Cold War paradigm (and especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 2001), America has shifted towards "America Firstism." As a result, the other nations of the world now feel a need to adopt a strategy along the lines of "every man for himself." This principle has spread beyond the military sphere, so that security, economy, finance, currency, and even language and culture, have become things that a nation must protect through its own efforts. Consequently, nationalistic disputes between nations now seem to be springing up all over the world.

Japan must now clearly assert its resolve to "look out for itself," and must explicitly state, in the constitution that sets out its national ideology, that the Self Defense Forces exist for the purpose of self-defense. As it stands, our current constitution makes no mention of the existence of military troops. What does not exist, however, cannot be controlled by the state.

The reason why I am so insistent about the need for historical awareness and constitutional reform in the rebuilding of Japan's national identity, is that a nation's "constitution" (*kenpo*) is the very "body of the nation." Clearly stating our intention to "look out for ourselves," and making the existence of the Self-Defense Forces explicit in our constitution is also necessary from the point of view of making a clean break from the pre-war paradigm, in which imperialism was synonymous with the "national polity" (*kokutai*). Under the Cold War paradigm, Japan was protected by America, and now that this paradigm has collapsed, this is surely an essential task.

4. The Asian Common House

Almost simultaneously with the dismantling (in 1989) of the Cold War paradigm under which Japan had been protected by America, the Asian countries put on a remarkable burst of economic growth, from the late 1980s onward. Predictions that the 21st century would be the "era of Asia" spouted on every side. At that time, I was writing my essay *The Asian Century is Yet to Come* (*RONZA*, July 1995).

The gist of this essay is as follows. The Asian countries only established their nation-states very recently. Therefore, these nation-states are in conflict among themselves, each becoming increasingly nationalistic. Consequently, antagonisms and conflicts around territory, national interest, and sovereignty are prone to occur. Unlike Europe (later the EU), however, the Asian countries lack a system under which they can jointly discuss and carry out arbitration regarding these antagonisms, and forge new relationships. As became clear in 1993, when China amended its constitution to proclaim the creation of a "powerful and prosperous China" (echoing the "wealth and military strength" that was the avowed aim of Meiji Japan) as one of its national objectives, Asia still desperately needs its countries to grow and develop by competing amongst themselves. Therefore, until the Asian countries create an institution within which they can negotiate their relationships, help one another, and draft some new intra-Asian rules, it will remain the case that "the Asian century is yet to come."

In 1995-1996, for example, the economies of the Asian countries were still weak, and there was a risk that, if inward investment from the West and Japan were suspended, the countries could run short of the funds needed to sustain economic development. Japan there-

fore proposed the creation of a common Asian Fund in order to forestall this risk. However, despite IMF backing, the proposal was shot down by America, which expressed the opinion that it was not a good idea for Asia to have a fund all of its own.

About six months or so after the Asian Fund scheme was nixed, the day after Hong Kong reverted to Chinese jurisdiction on July 1, 1997, the currencies of the Asian countries started to decline sharply in value, starting with the Thai baht, followed by the South Korean won, the Malaysian ringgit, the Indonesian rupee and so on. At a stroke, Asia entered a currency crisis, and hurtled into economic instability. This was caused by the simultaneous withdrawal of short-term Western funds—mainly hedge funds based on Jewish capital—from the Asian countries. Thailand and Indonesia have yet to recover from this blow.

Moreover, although, since the end of the Second World War, the economic development of Japan and the other Asian countries has been consistently underpinned by trade with America, since the late 1990s, intra-Asian trade has overtaken it in scale. The growing importance of intra-Asian economic relationships has raised interest in the future direction of intra-Asian political and diplomatic relations, and also in the question of what kind of relationships Japan will go on to build within Asia. By exclusively emphasizing the Japan-US alliance, however, the Koizumi administration has created the impression that Japan is rather passively following America, even in its participation in the Iraq War. In other words, Koizumi has made it look as if Japan is disregarding its relationship with Asia.

At best, the Asian diplomacy in which the Koizumi administration is now engaged consists of concluding individual Free Trade Agreements with Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and other Asian countries, which does not amount to the kind of strategy that would rebuild relationships with Asia. Nevertheless, if this continues, Japan may get taken in by some sort of mirage of an emerging "East Asian Community." We are now in an era of globalization characterized by growing nationalism and a preoccupation with the "rebuilding of national identity": this is precisely why this kind of nationalism must be repressed, why inter-state mediation must be engineered, and why Asia must pursue institutions and a common system whereby intra-Asian relationships transcending nationalism can be forged.

In short, it is precisely because the rebuilding of national identity is now essential that we need to establish a "new vision of Asia" transcending national identity. I began thinking along these lines while pursuing the idea of "Asian solidarity." It is, in my view, necessary to establish what I shall call an "Asian Common House" as a foundation for political and economic relationships: in other words, a permanent institution wherein various issues shared by the Asian countries can be considered together and addressed in a coordinated way. This would enable a shared Asian consideration and resolution of, for example, natural disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami which took place last December (2004). Of course, at the time, national leaders temporarily gathered together to arrange international aid, but immediately afterwards, the countries were acting separately again, and inevitably things ended up without the Asian countries sharing the preliminary knowledge and systems that would be useful in the event of another similar large-scale disaster. However, if the Asian Common House were instituted on a permanent basis, Asia would then be able to share its disaster knowledge and create a shared support system.

5. Asian Religious Coexistence

Asia has a long history of sharing and interchange. There is much, in terms of culture and values, that Japan shares not only with China and Korea, but also with India. In the Asian Common House, this common ground could form a starting point for the discussion of problems.

In my *Asahi Shimbun* interview, I touched on Sun Yat-sen's "Pan-Asianism" speech of 1924, in which he asked whether Japan was going to become the watchdog on the path to Western hegemonism, or a station along the "kingly way" of the East, and urged Japan to reconsider its imperialist policy. I suggested that talks should be held on joint sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, whose ownership is currently disputed by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and other countries.

What would happen, I wonder, if we were to consider the "Asian Common House" with reference to the issue of religious coexistence, which is very pertinent to the theme of this international symposium?

Since the 1991 Gulf War, and especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the antagonism between Islam and Christianity, and monotheistic absolutism and intolerance in general, have become a worldwide problem. However, I recall my earlier comment that the setting up of Islamic civilization as the enemy of modern Western civilization as typified by America, the way Huntington did in his *Clash of Civilizations*, could be regarded as a modern historical pathology that has spread around the world. I suggest that Asian history and wisdom might help to resolve the aporia of religious antagonism.

On Hirado Island in Nagasaki-ken, Kyushu, there is a shrine known as Konpira-jinja, where people pray for safe voyages and prosperity in commerce. This derives from the Hindu custom of offering prayers for safe navigation of the Ganges river, and was transmitted to Japan

through the worship of Kumbhira, the crocodile god of the Ganges.

Within the grounds of this small shrine lies the birthplace of Zheng Chenggong, the son of Zheng Zhilong, originally a merchant and pirate of Fujian in Jangnian, China, who married Tagawa Matsu, a Japanese woman of Kawachiura, 400 years ago. Zheng Chenggong is the Chinese national hero, later designated a loyal servant of the Ming Dynasty, who fought in Taiwan for the restoration of the Ming Dynasty. After his death (before which Tagawa Matsu had killed herself, having been attacked by the Ching army), the people of Hirado worshiped Zheng Chenggong as a god at this shrine. The deities worshiped at Konpira shrine, alongside Konpira-sama, the Hindu crocodile deity turned Japanese god, are the Buddhist deity Kannon, Maso-sama, a goddess of the seafaring people of Fujian and Taiwan, and Zheng Chenggong. This could be seen as an archetypal example of the syncretism of polytheistic Japan. Incidentally, on a low hill behind Konpira shrine soars the steeple of St. Francis Xavier's Church, said to be the oldest Catholic church in Japan. Whether it sparked any religious antagonism in Hirado 400-odd years ago is unknown, but it has certainly failed to do so over the last 150 years.

This form of syncretism is not confined to Japan, however. Quanzhou, in Fujian, China, whence Marco Polo returned to the West, has its own Great Mosque, known by several names including Quingjing Mosque (the "Mosque of Purity," deriving from the fact that "purity" is a basic tenet of Islam). Again, there is no mention of any religious conflict regarding these sites.

Another example is found in Taiwan, in the form of the Lungshan Temple in Taipei: this is the country's oldest sacred building, analogous to Asakusa Temple in Japan. Besides being a Buddhist temple, it is also a Confucian shrine and a Taoist temple (honoring Guan Yu); the aforementioned deity Maso-sama is also worshiped there. This too is evidence of the secular character taken on by the folk religions of East Asia.

Yet the phenomenon is not confined to East Asia either. In India, there are several sites where a Hindu temple and a Muslim mosque have been built side by side within the same grounds. In Asia, religious coexistence has a long history, and in some cases, it has taken on aspects of syncretism.

This brings to mind a relevant anecdote. In the wake of the simultaneous terrorist attacks that took place in America on September 11, 2001, the international symposium "Civilizational Dialogue with Islam" was held in Tokyo. I chaired one of the sessions. In the course of this symposium, an Islamic theologian from Indonesia said something very interesting. He reminded us that in February 2001, the Taliban administration of Afghanistan (a government consisting of Islamic theology students) had destroyed the ancient Buddhist statues known as the Bamian Buddhas. He also pointed out, however, that it was Muslims like himself who restored the Mahayana Buddhist monument of Borobodur in Indonesia, who had it listed as a World Heritage Site, and who continue to maintain it. Muslims, he insisted, are not suppressors of other religions: the destruction of the Bamian Buddhas was no more than a pathological phenomenon peculiar to a case in which Islamic fundamentalists had joined forces with terrorists.

In fact, under the state apparatus of the countries concerned, the Islam which has taken root in Malaysia, Indonesia, and other Southeast Asian nations has become somewhat secularized and ritualized as part of the fabric of everyday life. In those countries, Islam coexists with Buddhism and Hinduism, and while Christianity also has a presence, religious conflict tends not to arise. This tradition of the peaceful coexistence of religions has deep roots in Southeast Asia. It is my belief that, if the wisdom and the systems inherent in the religions, history, and cultures of Asia could be discussed within the Asian Common House, the aporia of worldwide religious antagonism could surely be resolved.

Retrospect and Prospect of China's Modernization: In Search of a New Identity[1]

The Chinese University of Hong Kong LAU Yee-Cheung

1. China's Modernization: Retrospect and Prospect

China began its long search for wealth and strength in the early 19th century in the face of ever-deepening internal crises and increasing external threats. Redoubled endeavors for reform and modernization were exerted since then, only to be stalled time and again by social upheavals, political turmoil, and wars.

Before the mid-19th century when its door was forced open by Western warships and guns, China considered itself the center of the world order, surrounded by various tribute-paying states accepting Chinese "suzerainty."[2] Since its defeats by Western powers in two wars in two decades (1840-1860), China began to adapt itself to the modern practice of international relations on the basis of equality, which has proven to be a strenuous and painful process indeed. China then began to search for a new identity in the world, as it transformed from a universal state to a member of the family of nations.[3]

The subsequent nine decades since 1861 saw China on a long path to converging with the modern world, with attempts at modernization in economic, political, social, educational, diplomatic, and other realms. However, the endeavors had failed to bring China wealth and strength, the goal dreamed of by generations of its people. With the founding of the People's Republic in October 1949, China tried another route to modernization by adopting both the former Soviet Union's model and its own version of socialism. But neither of these brought China the desired goal. In December 1978, China decided to embark on yet another route to modernization, when market economy with Chinese characteristics blending socialism with capitalism was put into practice.[4] For about three decades, China has enjoyed substantial economic growth at an enviable rate, and has good reasons to anticipate this trend's continuation in the years ahead.

Looking in retrospect, China, and the lives of its people, experienced drastic changes for better and for worse during the last one and a half centuries. Both China and the world experienced tremendous changes during this period of time, especially in the post-World War Two era. The world has even seemed to shrink due to ever-innovative telecommunications know-how and ever-newborn technology, and our Earth is now referred to as a global village. Furthermore, due to the increasing volume of bilateral and multilateral trade, and especially, the far-reaching influences of transnational conglomerates including the food chains like MacDonald's and theme parks like Disneyland, the Age of Globalization seems to have dawned. How has China fared in this ever-changing and seemingly shrinking world? To what extent has globalization affected its people's lives in general and their religious beliefs in particular? How has it shaped its national identity?

Given China's geographical vastness, regional diversity, and population size as reflected in the acute differences between its coastal areas, the hinterland and the frontier region including Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, one would be wise to exercise caution when evaluating the effects which the global economy has had on various parts of China and its people. For instance, people who live in metropolises like Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Beijing include those enjoying conveniences and luxuries of a modern society. However, many others, who dwell in rural and hilly regions, are still struggling to make ends meet. Indeed, globalization means very different things to different people as a widening economic gap emerges in China.

The strategy of China's modernization launched by Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues in 1979 was "to let one part of the Chinese people get rich first." Now that it has been close to three decades since China implemented this policy, it is faced with a critical task: to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor. Besides this, other impending issues—including the privatization of national enterprises and land transactions in rural areas—must be dealt with before the situation gets beyond control.[5] The party and government officials, in collusion with private entrepreneurs, allegedly pocketed tremendous wealth rightly belonging to the people during the process of privatization.

2. National Identity and the Revival of Christianity

Chinese religious freedom had been circumscribed since 1950, and during the "Anti-Rightists Campaign" (1957) and the "Cultural Revolution" (1966-1976), it was practically eliminated. After the "Cultural Revolution" ended and especially since Deng Xiaoping and his colleagues implemented the policy of "reform and opening" in 1978, a new era witnessing return of religious freedom has been ushered in. During the past two and a half decades, China has experienced the revival of Christian beliefs among its people.

Table 1: Christian Population in China as of September 1997 and 2004[6]

Province/City	1997 (Lower Estimate)	1997 (Higher Estimate)	2004
Anhui	1,180,000	1,200,000	1,572,000
Beijing	20,000	30,000	39,300
Chongqing			300,000
Fujian	640,000	900,000	1,179,000
Gansu	69,000	200,000	262,000
Guangdong	160,000	200,000	262,000
Guangxi	80,000	90,000	117,900
Guizhou	170,000	300,000	393,000
Hainan	10,000	30,000	39,300
Hebei	?	200,000	262,000
Heilongjiang	300,000	400,000	524,000
Henan	2,000,000	3,500,000	4,585,000
Hubei	50,000	100,000	131,000
Hunan	60,000	?	78,600
Inner Mongolia	50,000	100,000	131,000
Jiangsu	900,000	1,200,000	1,572,000
Jiangxi	200,000	300,000	393,000
Jilin	200,000	?	262,000
Liaoning	323,000	?	423,130
Ningxia	5,000	50,000	65,500
Qinghai	30,000	?	39,300
Shaanxi	350,000	?	458,500
Shandong	600,000	900,000	1,179,000
Shanghai	127,000	?	166,370
Shanxi	80,000	100,000	131,000
Sichuan	200,000	400,000	524,000
Tianjin	15,000	?	19,650
Tibet	?	?	?
Xinjiang	30,000	100,000	131,000
Yunnan	750,000	900,000	1,179,000
Zhejiang	1,260,000	1,400,000	1,834,000
Total	9,859,000	13,705,000	18,017, 750

Table 2: Growth of the Number of Christians in the Province of Jiangsu[8]

Year	1985	1988	1989	1991	1995	2004
Number of Christians	125,000	250,000	400,000	640,000	900,000	1,572,000

The current figure of Chinese Protestant Christians, according to one estimate, is about 20 million, or less than 2% of the total population.[7] The increase in the number of Christians in the province of Jiangsu is given here as an example of the Christian revival in China.

The previous decades of religious suppression together with the emerging "three crises of confidence, faith, and beliefs" at the end of the "Cultural Revolution" partly explain the subsequent dawning of the Christian revival. The Chinese people began searching for the spiritual meaning of their lives, not only for a better livelihood.

Following is an illustration of the phenomenon of Christian revival drawn from my personal encounters with fellow Chinese Christians. During my travels in China for academic conferences and scholarly research visits in the past decade as well as exchanges with local Christian Churches, I attended services with local Christians on Sundays in Jiangsu, Shanghai, Heilongjiang, Beijing,

Table 3: Some Facts and Figures on the Church in China[9]

Year	1997	1999
Protestant Christians	10 - 14 million	Above 15 million
Percentage of Women	70%	?
Churches	12,000	16,000
Meeting Points	25,000	32,000
Clergy	1,500	2,600*
Other Full-Time Church Workers	16,500	?
Theological Training Centers	17	18
Seminary Graduates (since 1980)	2,700	3,800
Provincial CCs and TSPMs	27	29*
Bibles distributed (since 1980)	20 million	25 million
Bible Distribution Centers	56	?
Hymnals distributed (since 1980)	8 million	Above 10 million
Subscriptions to the church magazine *Tian Feng*	120,000	Above 100,000

Guangdong, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Jiangxi, and Henan. The services, without exception, were packed with worshippers including those seated indoors and others leaning against windows outside the congregation halls. Every time, I was moved by fellow Christians' steadfast faith in God. I was also greatly impressed by their friendliness and natural warmth toward visitors,[10] and always recall vividly these scenes of services packed with devoted believers.

In June of 2000, I met the pastor of a church in Shaanxi who impressed me as a devout a truly faithful worker of God. He worked on his farmland for a living and rode bicycles for hours to and from the church. Wherever I went during the past decade I sensed ferventness permeating Christian circles, signaling a revival of Christianity.

During Christmas time in 2005, I visited Christian churches in Henan together with a group of brothers and sisters from my home church in Hong Kong. Throughout the visit, I noticed a considerable degree of religious ferventness among the local Christians. For instance, the congregation hall was packed with worshippers during the Christmas celebrations. A two-year training course has been offered for volunteer church workers. Course participants arose early each day for morning prayers from six to seven o'clock. We joined them one morning, and were moved by their faithfulness and devotion.[11]

One of the churches, the largest one we visited during the trip, was rebuilt by the congregation members themselves using their bare hands, laying bricks one by one. Situated at the outskirt of the city, it took eight months to rebuild. Dedicated in December 2005, it has a seating capacity of eight hundred, and we were told that the congregation hall was packed with worshippers during the Christmas celebrations. We arrived at this church in the afternoon on the Christmas Day, so we did not see the morning celebrations. About 50 members of the church stayed behind, due to an electricity outage. We sat in the front of the congregation hall singing hymns and sharing. The story of their rebuilding the church was touching indeed. The person who made a presentation on the building process also mentioned one thing that had occurred during the reconstruction. To fill a trench as part of the groundwork for the new church, they collected sand and mud from the nearby highway roadwork without having first cleared this with the transport authorities concerned. Later on, they realized that God would not be pleased with this. They subsequently contacted the authorities with an apology and a sum of money as payment for the sand and mud collected. The authorities were impressed, and in so doing, a good witness to God was performed.

Today the Chinese government has realized that religions, Christianity included, could contribute to national progress.[12] After almost three decades of modernization under the "reform and opening policy" since 1978, China is now facing serious social and environmental issues, partly due to materialistic pursuits by the people. Knowing that things could get beyond control, the government seems aware of the contributions religions could make to rebuilding moral and social values across the country, thus creating an environment for its healthy development. Chinese Christians have proven to be caring of other people's needs; they are both patriotic and God-loving. They are considered a positive force for the rise of a better and more caring society, thus elevating all aspects of national development.[13]

Another of my personal encounters also confirms the above observation. While visiting a senior professor and long-time friend in Guangzhou, one of his students, who is himself a high-ranking professor, told me that China needed religion. He believed that religions teach people about moral values and social obligations to one

another. China, in my view, is now at a crossroads in its search for a new national identity, and I tend to think that Christianity will play a quite significant role in the shaping of this new identity in the decades ahead.

3. A Church in Guangdong

A Christian church in Guangdong used to be a center of evangelism from the 1920s to the 1940s. There, an American missionary pastor and two of his local coworkers formed a team of evangelists. They spread the Christian gospel up and down the river in their vicinity. Though robbers and bandits roared about the region, they dedicated themselves to evangelization work without fear and built a church and an orphanage for blind girls in the village. The pastor and his wife, with six children,[14] continued mission work there until 1935 when, due to his illness, they departed for the United States.

Their sixth child, born in Hong Kong, grew up to become a missionary himself. He had wanted to go to China as a missionary upon graduating from the seminary in the United States in 1953. Instead, he and his wife spent thirty-one years as missionaries in the Caribbean. Upon their retirement, they were sent to Hong Kong by their mission society in 1989, to be missionaries there for what was originally decided to be one year.[15]

Very soon, the son-pastor and his wife journeyed to his childhood place and reunited with his former neighbors, including those girls who attended the school for the blind and fellow Christians in the village where he, his parents, and siblings lived in the 1920s and 1930s. During the subsequent decade, they made frequent trips there, staying for months and even one time for a whole year living in the same village.

Exchange visits were made to their church by members of a church in Hong Kong, which the missionary couple visited for Sunday worship and considered their home church while living in Hong Kong. They were asked by the local religious affairs chief whether they wanted the church restored. With support from Christian brothers and sisters in Hong Kong and elsewhere, the village church and school, used as a fertilizer plant and a chicken hatching farm from 1949 until the early 1990s, underwent renovation. In 1996, the church was restored to its original use as a place for worshipping God.

Subsequently, churches in other villages and the city itself were renovated and a new one was built. One renovation opened for worship in 1998 and another rebuilt in 2000, and two years later, a new church was built on an empty lot. The culmination of the work was the construction of a new church at the heart of the city. On the dedication day of this new church, it was packed with worshippers.

The reasons why the missionary couple was able to accomplish the above deeds are manifold. Firstly, they have a genuine heart for China and its people. Secondly, a lot of groundwork in the form of community services had been done before they were invited to help with the church work there. When they first went back, they kept a low profile and tended to the social needs of the people in the village. They assisted in introducing fresh water and electricity to the villagers' homes. They also helped build a road and a school for the village. The people and officials were thankful for their good work, having uplifted the local people from the difficulties of their daily lives. Consequently, they won the trust and respect of the people and the officials, including those in charge of religions affairs. Furthermore, the son-pastor was pronounced a "son of the soil" by the chief official of the city's religions affairs, a reference to his ties with the land ever since he was a baby in the 1920s. The rapport between the couple and the local people was excellent, partly due to the couple's discreetness and low-key approach to their work there. They exercised caution about what to say and what not to, heeding closely the people's and government's sensibilities and the Chinese sense of pride.

As congregations grow, there is an urgent need for more pastors and evangelists for pastoral work. Young and steadfast Christians, both male and female, have been sent to seminary for training, and upon completion of their studies they return home to serve fellow Christians. To the American missionary couple, the past decade of work turned out to be a gratifying sequel to their career in the Caribbean, both of them immensely blessed by God.

Their work in China carries on, still in close collaboration with the Hong Kong church. They visited churches in the provinces of Henan and Hubei in the summer of 2004 and again in the fall 2005, and were warmly received by the people wherever they went. He was invited to share at the revival meetings when they pay visits there. Again, this is due to the same reasons given above: their genuine hearts for the Chinese people, and their due respect for their hosts in regard to all they do and say while present as guests in China.

4. Concluding Remarks

China today is undergoing rapid changes in many areas. As it becomes more open to the outside world, its development in the years and decades ahead, economic and otherwise, will be more intertwined with global trends. As to the religious aspect of its people's life, China has in the past two decades experienced a certain degree of revival. To what extent this religious revival would affect China's search for a new identity in the new world remains a subject of great interest.

During the past decade, the Christian revival also appeared in the urban areas. More educated and younger people have become Christians, and some of them openly addressed social issues from a Christian perspective. Indeed, Christian revival has arrived at a critical juncture in China: there is increasing need for quality pastoral care and the development of a quality seminary for the purpose of theological training.

The above development, I believe, will in the long run bring itself to bear on the shaping of national identity in China in the decades ahead. China's modernization has also reached a critical juncture: a sustainable level of development has become an increasingly important concern for national growth. As the society becomes more open, more people would like to search for meaning in their lives, and eventually more of them will turn to religion for an answer.

———Notes———

1 The author is grateful to Professor Kiven Choy, Rev. Thomas Chi-wah Chow, Rev. Dr. David Crane and Dr. Elaine Crane for their generous help given to the writing of this paper.

2 Suzerainty is used in the loosest sense of the term, for China did not actually rule the nominally vassal states. It only required them to send tributes in three, five, or ten year intervals. China would always come to their rescue on request. John King Fairbank (ed.) (1968) *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

3 Immanuel C. Y. Hsu (1959) *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

4 Deng Xiaoping (1985) *Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press), quoted from Immanuel C. Y. Hsu (2000) *The Rise of Modern China* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press), chapter 37.

5 The episode in the months of the second half of 2005 about the unsuccessful attempts by elected representatives of villagers in the Taishi 太石 Village of Panyu 番禺 District, Guangzhou, Guangdong to strip their villagers committee's chairman of his office in accordance with the Villagers Committee Organizational Law for alleged misconduct and financial fraud relating to village land transactions, is a case in point. Refer, for instance to, http://literature.mblogger.cn/sb001/posts/167601.aspx

6 The 1997 figures were quoted from the Amity News Service, http://64.77.88.87/ANS/Articles/ans96/ans96.4/96_4_spe.htm Those of 2004 are from Amity News Service: China Church: Church Statistics, Updated October 28, 2005. http://www.amitynewsservice.org/page.php?page=1230. I am indebted to Professor Kiven Choy of the Alliance Bible Seminary for providing the source information.

7 This is according to the view of Professor Kiven Choy, Alliance Bible Seminary, given on October 5, 2005. There were 12 million Catholics as of the year 2000, about 1% of the population. http://www.hsstudyc.org.hk/chinesehsscweb/c-chinafacts.htm

8 The figure was given according to the Religious Affairs Bureau of Jiangsu Province. Amity News Service, http://64.77.88.87/ANS/Articles/ans96/ans96.4/96_4_spe.htm, September 1997. "In Jiangsu, the number of Christians has grown sevenfold in just ten years! But these figures are not representative for the whole of China. Even within Jiangsu, the growth of Christianity has been uneven. Similarly, while churches are growing fast in provinces such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui and Henan, there is much less or even no church growth in other areas." http://64.77.88.87/ANS/Articles/ans96/ans96.4/96_4_spe.htm, September 1997. Amity News Service: China Church: Church Statistics, updated October 28, 2005.

9 Quoted from the Amity News Service, which compiled the above facts and figures on the Protestant Church in China. "These are all estimates based on reports presented to the Sixth National Christian Council in January 1997 and from other sources: http://64.77.88.87/ANS/Articles/Extra%20Articles/facts.htm, November 5, 1997." The source for the 1999 figures, except those with an *: China Christian Three-self Patriotic Movement Committee & China Christian Council (中國基督教三自愛國運動委員會、中國基督教協會) (?) *Special Issue for Celebration Congress for the 50th Anniversary of the China Christian Three-self Patriotic Movement*《中國基督教三自愛國運動五十周年愛慶祝大會專輯 (Shanghai (?): China Christian Three-self Patriotic Movement Committee & China Christian Council (中國基督教三自愛國運動委員會、中國基督教協會), 2000), pp.19-20. The numbers of clergy and provincial Christian Councils (CCs) and Three-self Patriotic Movement Committees (TSPMs) were quoted from Amity News Service, updated January 2, 2006. The author is grateful to Professor YING Fuk Tsang of The Chinese University of Hong Kong for providing source information about the Christian population in 1999.

10 The congregations also impressed me with their love and care for others. For instance, after the service in a Ganzhou church was concluded, a member of the congregation told me a delegate from Hong Kong attending the 19th World Hakka Congregation held in Ganzhou in November 2004 came down with serious illness. She proposed praying for the delegate and visiting him in the hospital.

11 A Hong Kong pastor was greatly impressed with Christians' dedication to learning God's Word. They tend their flocks on a "part-time" basis, and they earned their living by cultivating land and other work. The congregation there also expressed ferventness for the Christian faith. Interview with the pastor in Hong Kong on September 17, 2005. The author is also aware that professionals, including medical doctors and nurses from a hospital in a northeastern province, also show keen interest in the Christian belief.

12 Kiven Choy, "The progress of Chinese religious policy(2): religious policy in the Jiang Zemin's era," 蔡少琪〈中國宗教政策的演進(二):江澤民時期的宗教政策〉,October2005; also see http://dwtzb.cpu.edu.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=300.

13 Ibid.

14 The pastor first did mission work in Swatow (Shantou) for three years before they had to return to the United States when their eldest child came down with malaria. Upon their second mission journey to China, the child was left behind on a doctor's advice, to be cared for by relatives. They didn't see him again until the family left China in 1935.

The family once fled to Hong Kong in 1925 for safety reasons; the sixth was born there the following year. This was disclosed to the author by the elder pastor's son and daughter-in-law during an interview conducted in Hong Kong on October 5, 2005.

15 *Ibid*.

Comment · Discussion · Session 1

Chair: MORI Koichi, Doshisha University

(Chair) I would now like to invite comments from two of our colleagues: first, Professor Suh Jeong Min of Yonsei University of the Republic of Korea, please.

Yonsei University

SUH Jeong Min

Thank you very much, Professor Mori. I am very pleased to have this opportunity to comment. I would like to start with some more general remarks. The nations that we have been discussing, Japan, Korea, China, and those in Southeast Asia, clearly differ from each other in terms of their historical background and the relationship you find between culture and religion in these countries. I think that this fact alone is enough to make us wonder if it is possible at all to set up a common framework to discuss problems concerning the relationship between ethnicity and religion.

It is possible, however, for us to try to find solutions together to the problems relating to the historical challenges and present situation of each nation, by understanding each other's idiosyncrasies and the place of religion in each ethnic community. Since the modern era, the world has evolved with the West as its center, and at the same time, Westernized Christianity has spread and been accepted in Asia. The different processes by which different Asian countries accept and react to Christianity as an exclusive, monotheist, Western religion can be comparatively analyzed to examine the historical, cultural and religious differences among these countries.

Now I would like to ask some questions about the presented papers. I have two questions about Professor Kamaruzaman's paper. My first question concerns the commonality in the notion of diversity existing among Korea, China, Japan, and Southeast Asian countries. That is to say, do you think that an orientalization centering on the oriental persona, or Orient-centered globalization, is possible? Don't you think that this can be likened to Occident-centered or America-centered globalization? My second question is whether or not overcoming globalization and globalism means annihilating America-centered globalization through the maintenance and reinforcement of ethnicism? Or can it be rather likened to a new globalization centering on the Asian Persona?

I also have three questions about Professor Matsumoto's paper. My first question concerns the territory, wealth, and identity games. Professor Matsumoto explains that they can be geographically divided, but I would like to ask if they can also, under certain circumstances, occur simultaneously. Secondly, I would like to ask if building the Asian Common House means in fact overcoming the ethnicism of the Asian nations and developing an Asian community into a bloc distinguishable from the European community and America. Aren't there some similarities between this notion and the symbolic objectives of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone of the past? Thirdly, in the Asian Common House concept, religion would be taken to represent pluralism. In this case, what would monotheist religions, and in particular Christianity, need to do in order to adapt to such a pluralist Asian religious and societal environment?

Finally, I would like to ask two questions about Professor Lau's paper. First, would it be possible appropriately to explain the relative concept of modernization when we define it as the pursuit of wealth and power, even with China's case as the main example? Would it be possible to explain developments in China since 1949, including the Communist Revolution and Soviet-inspired ideologies, as attempts towards modernization? Secondly, while we can view China's foreign policies since Deng Xiaoping as its globalizing process, isn't it after all tantamount to Westernization—the importation of foreign-born systems, ideas, and religions, and their liberalization? Professor Lau points to the recent revival of Christianity in China and says that the greater religious freedom, material wealth, and globalization essentially mean the same thing, linking them with possible solutions to socioeconomic problems such as the growing gap between the rich and the poor within the country. In this context, then, what would be the religious and ideological problems facing China?

These are my comments and questions. Thank you very much.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Suh. Now I would like to invite Professor Murata to comment.

Doshisha University
MURATA Koji

Thank you. I would like to thank Professor Kamaruzaman for her very perceptive views on globalization, pointing out many problems relating to globalization, with which I fully agree, although I do have some reservations on several points.

First of all, globalization is often said to be Americanization. Yet, at the same time we must admit the fact that American society itself has been rapidly globalizing as well: even today, 900,000 immigrants arrive in the United States each year, and many foreign students also go to the United States. It is said that whites will no longer be the racial majority in America by the mid-21st century. In this manner, globalization has been progressing in American society as well.

There is no doubt that globalization is a cause of great inequality among people. At the same time, Asian countries and communities have also known various forms of inequality, poverty, and oppression. I think that our criticism of globalization would end up being somewhat shallow if we did it without self-reflection on how much or how little independent effort we have made to mitigate inequality, poverty, and other problems in our own countries, irrespective of globalization.

Also, the tsunami disaster in Indonesia and Hurricane Katrina in the United States were compared, and the question was raised as to whether the catastrophic aftermath of Hurricane Katrina could in any way serve as an example. Indeed, it was a truly tragic sight to witness. On the other hand, we should not forget that it was the American Navy, the Australian Navy, and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces that immediately arrived at affected areas for rescue and relief activities following the Sumatra Bay tsunami in December 2004, and this effort was also a product of globalization. Needless to say, globalization has its light and shadow, good and bad sides, and we cannot take only the good side. It is thus necessary to have a balanced view of globalization, taking into consideration both good and bad.

Professor Matsumoto pointed out that the United States had taken the "America First" policy, particularly since 9/11, and that this position had resulted in greater need for self defense in other countries. I think this is true to some extent. By this I mean that in this rapidly globalizing international community, whether the United States comes first or second is a question of secondary importance; for, in reality, the security affairs of the United States superpower affect all parts of the world in some way. I think that the boosting of its defense will never lead to the U.S. forsaking the defense of many other countries.

Professor Matsumoto has proposed the very interesting concept of an Asian Common House, but I did not quite understand through what process this could be built. If the Asian Common House were to be similar to the EU in form, how could a well-balanced coexistence be achieved within the Asian Common House between China, with its overwhelming cultural, military, and economic dominance, and the rest of us? Would that be an Asian miniature of the American hegemony in the context of ongoing globalization? I would like to ask for Professor Matsumoto's response to this question.

International relations in postwar Asia are characterized by the successive occurrence of decolonization, bipolarization under the Cold War paradigm, and globalization. Europe, by contrast, did not undergo the problem of decolonization. In the Middle East and Africa, globalization arrived much later. The peculiarity of the Asian experience is the almost simultaneous occurrence of these three movements. Now the Cold War factor is no longer in the picture, but problems relating to decolonization still linger, overlapping with the problems of rapid globalization. I think that this is where the difficulty of today's Asian international relations lies.

When World War II ended, there were only some 50 sovereign states in the world. Today, however, the number has gone up to about 200, that is, a four-fold increase. Yet more surprising is the number of NGOs. At the end of World War II, there were only about 500 internationally active NGOs, but today there are over 40,000 of them, an 80-fold increase. These transnational NGOs also include some irresponsible and dangerous ones, but the expansion is still remarkable. How we support transnational activities by NGOs, and whether we manage to form and maintain an open civic society capable of accepting and nurturing NGOs, are questions that are far more important than the question of national identity. I think that a very important future challenge is figuring out how we can forge NGO activities, as well as transnational interaction among NGOs and open civic societies, into our new open identity beyond Asia, beyond the notion of the nation-state and beyond Asian regionalism. Thank you very much for your attention.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Murata.

Discussion

(Chair) I am pleased that a wide range of questions have been raised by the three speakers and the two commentators. Since we have another 25 minutes for discussion, I would like to invite the three presenters to respond to the questions and comments which were individually addressed; if not all of them, at least with regard to the themes which you wish to develop further. Specifically, let us follow the order of the presentations: Professor Kamaruzaman, Professor Matsumoto, and Professor Lau. Now, Professor Kamaruzaman, please.

(Kamarzaman) Thank you very much for the comments. If you look at my paper, the very title of my paper is "Globalization in Balance: The Role and Position of Religion." Also I did mention that the issue is not globalization but globalism. Globalization is just a mechanism. There is nothing wrong with the TV but what you put on the TV, the programs that you air. There is no way we can check globalization. We have come to the stage of another change in human history. Human history changes in stages and we are now changing yet again. This process of change takes place in human history now and again, and now we are again at the transition period, as I call it. We have come to another inter-junction, another interchange in human history.

We have to change, and the change we are embarking upon now is globalization. Globalization is a mechanism. It is not the problem. But globalization, if translated in the context of globalism—that is the problem. Globalization, as I said earlier, has already taken place in history, and that was not a problem: in the form of internationalization, in the form of sharing with each other, that is not the problem.

As I said, it is not just the negative part that we look at. The problems that we have in this world today are not so much the problems of what America does to us, but more of what we fail to do for ourselves. This is our problem also. If you recall, I said earlier that the problems, the violence that we have in this world, are not so much a reflection of the triumph of the evil and the bad, but the failures of the good and the conscientious to affect goodness in society. The evil will always do evil deeds—it is in their nature. And by "evil" I do not mean America at all. I mean "evil" in general, certainly not referring to America in particular.

Evils happen not just in America. Evils and bad things happen in every community without exception. Every community, without exception, has saints and scoundrels, the good as well as the bad. We can all share the good part, but why should we share the bad part? Bad people are bad even for their own families. So as we look into globalization, we are also transporting evils and problems across the globe, thus projecting the problems into a global dimension.

Now, because time is running out… I have talked about the diversity of the Far East region, the different identities that we have. Yes, and if you come to Malaysia, we also have so many different identities and races. But this has never been a problem. The problem is when you do not allow space for people to become what they want to be. The world is made up of different people and all these differences should be celebrated. We should acknowledge that there are differences. To ignore differences is a big problem because we will become insensitive to others.

Problems will arise if we are not allowed to be what we are and when things are interpreted wrongly for us. For example, the bombing of Iraq started with a vision that there were weapons of mass destruction. The whole world was convinced that there were weapons of mass destruction. But this was just an illusion and now nobody talks about weapons of mass destruction. Now we are convinced to look at the people who are fighting to free their country as evil people, and the people who come to attack as the saviors of the people.

Now, who interprets this? And we are convinced by this. This is one of the examples that I mention of how globalization can change us to start looking at black as white. Why are we not given space to explain to ourselves that this is black? The power of globalized vision is not equal for everybody. If globalization allows us to have equal opportunity to define ourselves this is beautiful, because then we are given space to be what we are.

I did mention the oriental persona, and I said that despite our differences, there is something that binds us together because I am looking for a common identity, and that identity, I concluded, lies in us being oriental; thus the oriental persona. You may be a Christian, you may be a Muslim, but an oriental Christian or and oriental Muslim is different from a Western Christian or a Middle Eastern Muslim despite the fact of our religions. In terms of upholding the religion, upholding the laws and the regulations, we are Christians or Muslim but we are still oriental in orientation.

I have given a few characteristics, which I have no time to elaborate now, of what I define as the oriental personality. The oriental personality is subdued, conscious of other people, etc. For example, although Christians acknowledge and adopt secularism, to the oriental Christian, this secularism is interpreted within an oriental understanding. And so we have a Filipino Christian being closer to our identity than a Western Christian. Because other than being a Christian, the Filipino Christian is also an oriental.

I think I will end here in respect of other people's time. So I am talking about a balance. We should ride on globalization to benefit the whole world. We cannot stop globalization. Taking the opportunity of globalization, we should do our bit, and we should not just complain about other people doing negative things through it. We complain about people doing something negative, but we ourselves are not doing anything. This I think is the tragedy, our not doing anything positive—not globalization. Thank you very much.

(Chair) Professor Murata spoke of the light and shadow of globalization, and Professor Kamaruzaman also said that the positive and negative aspects of globalization should be recognized as such. Unfortunately we do not have enough time to discuss and identify this light and shadow, and so we have a subject for further work.

Now, may I ask Professor Matsumoto to comment?

(Matsumoto) I would like to attempt a single reply to the several questions that have been addressed to me, by combining them into one. The Wealth Game corresponds to the strategy that post-war Japan adopted by renouncing war and minimizing military spending while building a solid industrial foundation and revitalizing trade so as to develop the country. As a result, Japan started making rapid economic progress in the 1960s, achieving remarkable development without spending on national defense or waging wars of aggression to expand its territory.

Observing this Japanese experience in the 1960s to the 1970s, its Asian neighbors, particularly those that later came to be known as Four Dragons or NIES—namely Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong—followed the example and also made great progress, not by seeking territorial expansion but by developing their industry and activating trade through obtaining inexpensive resources and low-interest loans. Likewise, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand also made their own economic progress. During the 1980s it used to be said that the 21st century would be an Asian century. Today, the latest countries to follow the trend are China and India. In this way, the Wealth Game has been continuing ever since.

Today, however, this has resulted in a major problem. As I understand it, the competition for greater wealth has caused confrontation or friction between countries in such a way as to reinforce their nationalism. I have proposed the Asian Common House as a possible approach to mitigating this confrontation among countries vying for limited natural resources or resulting from intensified nationalism. I think that the proposal should not be judged solely in consideration of the fact that it is proposed by a Japanese.

Professor Suh expressed his concern that a certain similarity may be found between the Asian Common House and the pre-war Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone. In this regard, I would rather say that globalism is much more similar to the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone. In other words, this prewar concept embodied the notion of *Hakko ichiu*—all walks of life under one roof—the idea that unifying the world under the Emperor would make everyone rich and happy. The United States has promoted globalism in this sense, and I even think that a very good Japanese translation of American-led globalism would be *Hakko ichiu*.

In any case, almost all Asian countries started developing economically in the 1980s, and it was said that the 21st century would be an Asian century. As for me, however, I wrote a paper entitled "*Asia no seiki wa mada konai*" (The Asian century is yet to come) in 1995. The gist of the paper was the difficulties with which Asia was still struggling. Take, for example, the currency crisis that assaulted many Asian countries after Hong Kong's return to Chinese rule. By that time, Japan had already proposed a structure that could be called the Asian Fund, because Asian countries were running the risk of a currency crisis due to the way they were managing their economic development; that is, relying on easy money which was mostly arriving from hedge funds and could abruptly stop coming in, in just three months or so. A currency crisis would be inevitable if the supply of funds stopped suddenly. So around the end of 1996, Japan suggested that the Asian economies should consider establishing an Asian Fund which pooled the members' funds.

This proposal did not materialize because Americans were opposed to such a structure not including the United States. They said there was no need for such an Asia-only group, since the IMF (International Monetary Fund) already existed. In reality, however, since the day following Hong Kong's reversion to China on July 1, 1997, hedge funds withdrew their money, pushing all Asian countries down into currency crises and economic unrest.

Now, the IMF arrived, offering funds. Yet the organization would do this by applying the same criteria to all countries, regardless of their political system, economic situation, or cultural background. The IMF demanded a one-third personnel layoff here and restructuring there in exchange for loans. In this way, the currency crises turned into unemployment and job unrest. In the case of Korea, the IMF-imposed one-third job cut gave birth to the expression "IMF unemployment."

At present, Americans are more cooperative or tolerant about creating an Asian Fund, having undergone what they had to experience during the Asian currency crisis and coming to understand that it may be wrong to treat everything by the IMF standards while ignor-

ing Asian political, economic, and cultural backgrounds. This is how I see the present situation.

At the same time, the United States intensified its promotion of freedom and democracy in line with globalization. To Asian countries, these are relatively new concepts, and they and the whole world are expected to ride with this movement joyfully. Francis Fukuyama says that liberal democracy, a modern notion conceived in Europe and practiced in America, is the best and last notion and that, because of this, world history will end there. Fukuyama's rather arbitrary conclusion is that history will end at the point where all countries have obtained freedom and democracy.

This American model can be rephrased as "a country should obtain freedom and democracy, and then it can achieve economic development." In Asia, however, there are communist countries, countries under one-party political dominance, and so forth. Even among the four NIES, which I mentioned earlier, there are those that are considered as authoritarian regimes. The Americans would say that an authoritarian dictatorial regime (whether Confucian or traditional) controls the country's development. This is sometimes referred to as "development dictatorship," but it has achieved economic development. I have some statistics indicating these countries' economic development, as a result of which the average per capita annual income is just over 10,000 dollars, or 1.2 million yen. Once people come to enjoy this level of economic affluence, they inevitably want freedom and democracy next. An example of this movement that occurred prematurely would be the Tiananmen Square incident. This 1989 movement for freedom and democracy before economic development was suppressed. Now, sixteen years later, the economically developed China needs free competition to obtain freedom of occupational choice, greater freedom for individuals, and for thought. As Professor Lau said earlier, they even want religious freedom. Things develop in the reverse order of the American model. I think that in the Asian development model, people begin to obtain freedom and democracy in accordance with their country's institution or culture, as a result of economic development.

I think that it is very important to deeply contemplate the historical background and the present situation of these countries which have achieved economic development in this manner. Then we may come to the realization that, as a way to adequately handle manifestations of their nationalism, coordinate their national interests, and dissolve their confrontations, the Asian Common House may be effective—a permanent organization for the pursuit of a common Asian identity, a truly united Asian community.

When we have this notion of Asian community, we can see clearly what is problematic about the preamble extolling wealth and military strength which China has had in its constitution since 1993: the Chinese state aims at building wealth and military strength, just as Japan did at the time of the Meiji Restoration and Korea did in the 1960s. In other words, while many Asian countries which have achieved economic development have not built up their military power, there is concern that China's military reinforcement may lead to the armed annexation of Taiwan. The Chinese authorities explain that the current military buildup is not necessarily targeted at Taiwan. Yet, the United States is concerned that China's wealth and military strength might lead to Chinese hegemony in Asia. So I think that questions such as what China's true intentions are in this regard, and where the growing Chinese dominance in Asia will go, can be more effectively addressed within the framework of the Asian Common House.

I did not mention this example earlier, but the Take Island issue has become a major conflict between Korea and Japan at the moment. To settle this problem, Japan has suggested that it be brought to The Hague, the International Court of Justice, but Korea has refused. In the ICJ, cases are judged under international law and so Japan will be in an advantageous position, since we have been claiming territorial rights to the island since 1905, while Korea, having been colonized by Japan, cannot make the same claim. Korea started claiming the island only in the 1960s. The 100-year-old Japanese claim is very likely to win over the 40-year-old Korean claim in the simple framework of international law, which subscribes to the logic of the nation-state and nationalism, for it encompasses individual states. By this approach, a confrontation would be inevitable between the two countries.

Nevertheless, when we come to think of it, before these claims were first made there had been a period of six hundred years during which the island belonged neither to Japan nor to the Korea of the Li dynasty, but was rather in common ownership and use. During this long period, one island was shared by two nations without much trouble, perhaps with some minor problems. So, conflicts may be treated as Asian issues within the framework of shared Asian experience and history and discussed in the Asian Common House.

A similar approach can be applied to the problem of Spratly (Nansha) Island. In the case of Spratly Island, eight countries including Malaysia, China, the Philippines and Vietnam dispute their territorial rights. Do you think that it is a good idea to bring this case to The Hague? Wouldn't you rather think that there must be a way to find a solution within some notion of common territory, beyond the logic of nation-state, and drawing wisdom from long and common Asian history

and experience? Yet, in order to do that, we must have come to a common understanding about Asian history and Asian culture, built upon the interactions of Asian peoples. I am of the opinion that such discussions can be achieved through the Asian Common House. The existing concepts of Asian community are simplistically tied to economic issues.

(Chair) Professor Matsumoto, since our time is limited, I would like to ask you to move on and share your view on the role that religion can play in building the Asian Common House.

(Matsumoto) As I referred to it very briefly earlier and in my concept paper as well, we have the historical fact that Asia has known almost no religious war. The introduction of Christianity into Asia was not aggressive, as its monotheistic aspect was somewhat weakened. This may be putting it in a misleading way; perhaps I should say that Christianity arrived in Asia with its masculine side softened by the feminine side, most typically represented by Marian devotion, which is more in tune with the Asian tradition that reveres Mother Nature and women's birthing and nurturing power.

In Japan, for example, clandestine Christians had their "Maria Kannon," a statue of Mary holding Jesus and bearing a cross on the back, disguised as a statue of the Buddhist Goddess of Mercy, and this is how Christianity spread. Taiwan has also known something similar. In Malaysia, Christianity was introduced as Catholicism with a strong element of Marian devotion. So in Asia, it is as if Christianity had two figures of worship, Christ the judge and Mary the merciful, its monotheism less imposing if not being rendered totally polytheistic. I think that further discussions will allow us to understand the origins in Asia of the commonality of the means by which Christianity was spread there.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Matsumoto. Now, Professor Lau, please.

(Lau) Thank you Professor Suh for your comments and questions. Though China has been a latecomer to modernization, its experiences would certainly illustrate the concept. With the almost two centuries of China's endeavors to modernize, the lessons learned throughout the period could also benefit other countries aiming at modernization. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese government redoubled its efforts to modernize the country. A considerable amount of work on infrastructure, communications, transportation, and heavy industry was undertaken by the government in the first decade. During the subsequent two decades, nevertheless, social turmoil resulting from the Cultural Revolution and other political campaigns disrupted these endeavors severely. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, China again embarked upon modernization. However, the subsequent imbalanced development during this process has created new social and economic problems in the country. All of these experiments, including those modeled after the former Soviet Union since 1949, would enrich as well as illustrate the concept of modernization.

Economic disparity has certainly posed a problem for the country. It has resulted partly from the almost two decades of rapid economic growth and, at the same time, minimal political reform since 1989. Organizations with a religious background have been performing good services that in the long run would help to close the economic gap among the Chinese people, and their work has won appreciation from the people and government officials. For instance, one of these organizations, based in Hong Kong, has been making contributions to children's education in the hinterland and rural areas in south China by building and upgrading school premises. In central China, there is a primary school for both Han Chinese and Muslim children which has invited the Christian church to help with its extension project, so that sufficient classrooms could be built to accommodate pupils. As Christianity preaches love and benevolence among mankind, its further revival in China with more and more people converted to the faith would serve the country and its people well. People who are better off would be generous enough to share their wealth with those less fortunate. This may partly explain why a senior academic told me that China needed religion.

(Chair) Professor Lau, I would like to ask you a question even though we are a little behind schedule. You have just said that the Christian population has been increasing remarkably in China since Deng Xiaoping's reform, but what about other religions? Are they also experiencing revival?

(Lau) Thank you Professor Mori. In addition to Christianity, there have occurred varying degrees of revival in other religions, too. Besides, popular religion has also made a return since the reform policy was launched in 1978. In my view, the fact that the Chinese government called for Chinese Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Taoists to play a constructive role in the process of nation-building, just as much as non-believers, reflects the extent of the general religious revival in China.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Lau. Today, we have had speakers representing Japan, China, and Malaysia in this open symposium. Unfortunately we did not have the opportunity to listen to the representatives from Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

I believe that this open symposium has allowed us to arrive at a common understanding about the need to

clarify problems relating to globalization—that is, its light and its shadow sides, where these problems are found. In this regard, the need to redefine our national identity has also been pointed out. This has been presented as the need to recognize the Oriental Persona by Professor Kamaruzaman, and in the form of a proposal for the Asian Common House by Professor Matsumoto, although we could not go into detailed discussions on these subjects today due to the time limit.

On what basis can we in Asia build a truly unified community? In the face of Western-led globalization, what suggestions can we make from Asia? How can Asian countries build a common house together without vying for hegemony? We have more work and challenges ahead of us before we will be able to answer these questions.

I regret that our time is not sufficient to allow more thorough discussions, but I hope that today's session has provided a very significant opportunity for our future reflections on Asia. I would like you all to join me in thanking our three speakers and two commentators again with some generous applause (applause).

This concludes today's open symposium. Thank you very much for your attention.

CISMOR
International Workshop
2005

November 5 (Sat.)

Session 2

"The Crisis of National Identity and the Role of Religions in Northeast Asia"

National Identity and Religions in Today's China

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences GAO Shining
Renmin University of China HE Guanghu

I. National Consciousness, Modernization, and Christianity

As everybody knows, national consciousness emerged with the shift of traditional society to modern society. A modern society could be characterized, first of all, by its modern sciences and technology, modern educational and medical systems, modern press and mass media, modern ideas and institutions, and then, rule by law, democracy, an economic system based on free market principles, and so on. In China, nearly all the elements which were necessary for a modern society emerged with Christianity's arrival and spread. That is to say, in the late 19th century, after some previous rises and declines, Christianity spread throughout China and became one of the main actors opening the prelude to the modernization of Chinese society.

Of course, Christianity came to China just for the purpose of spreading itself. But as an effect of its missionary cause, it urged China to begin its transformation into a modern society. Numerous historical facts support this claim.

Firstly, and for the first time in history, the Christian missionaries introduced Western sciences and technology to the Chinese in a systematic way. For example, at the transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasties, Jesuits represented by Matteo Ricci translated into Chinese and pressed 155 books on mathematics and various natural sciences.[1] And around the turn from the 19th to the 20th century, British missionary John Fryer alone translated 139 books on topics of science and technology during his stay of thirty years in China.[2] In fact, translation and publication of Western works in modern sciences and technologies had been a major enterprise of the missionaries in China, which introduced the first knowledge of these fields to the Chinese people.

Secondly, it is with the schools set up by Christian churches that modern education appeared in China. Before the year 1900 the churches set up 1,100 schools, and by 1920, they had established 7,382 schools of various levels as well as fourteen universities.[3] And as a matter of historical fact, there was no modern educational system in China until the appearance of schools run by the Christian churches.

Thirdly, the establishment of modern medical services and institutions in China, including the training of professionals, the founding of hospitals, the propagating of the idea of public health and so on, was closely related to the activities of the missionaries. For example, by 1920, missionary organizations had set up 800 or more hospitals[4] and, up until the year 1949, hospitals run by churches amounted to as many as 70 percent of the hospitals in China.[5]

Fourthly, the establishment of a modern press enterprise in China was the result of active introduction and participation by the Christian missionaries. From the 1840s to 1890s, the Protestant missionary institutions published seventy various newspapers and magazines in Chinese and in English, making up 95 percent of the total press in China. By 1935, there were sixty-nine publishing institutions set up by Protestant organizations.[6]

Fifthly, the modern lifestyle and customs, including the weekly work-day system, monogamy, even the abolition of women's feet-binding and so on, were related to the activity and propagation of missionaries and, ultimately, the influence of the Bible.

Lastly, modernization requires such modern ideas and institutions as democracy, legal equality, rule by law, separation and restriction of political powers, administrative efficiency, and so on. And in China, the introducing, propagating, popularizing, and practicing of all these were also related to the activities of the missionaries. On the one hand, many talented intellectuals who graduated from the church schools played important roles in spreading these ideas and institutions in China, and contributed greatly to Chinese modernization. On the other hand, the most influential reformers and revolutionaries, such as Hong Xiuquan, Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, and Sun Yasen (among many others), were deeply influenced by Christian missionaries.

In summary, in the beginning stage of the transformation of China from a traditional society to a modern one, Christianity played an active role in introducing modernization into China.

While the modernization of China began with the arrival of Christianity, the national consciousness of the Chinese people emerged and grew quickly in resisting the Western powers at nearly the same time. And quite ironically, the direct and first focus of resistance and attack was Christianity itself, the introducer of modernization and the new ideas. The most striking outcomes

of these actions were the more than 400 violent anti-Christian events launched by some local officials and literati in the late 19th century, and the Anti-Christian Movement initiated by some students and scholars in the early 20th century. It is true that the rulers of Ming and Qing assumed a tolerant attitude towards Christianity, and a number of Western missionaries (e.g. Ferdinand Verbiest and Johann Adam Schall von Bell) were respected by some Chinese emperors (e.g. Shunzhi and Kangxi) and a few literati; indeed, some of the latter, and many more common people, converted to Christianity. Nevertheless, in the eyes of most Chinese people with strong national consciousness, Christianity was, after all, a thoroughly foreign religion shipped in from the West. It was called *yang jiao* ("shipped religion" or "foreign religion") and branded a "cultural invader." Owing to such judgments, the national identity of Chinese Christians was oppugned: they were called "pseudo-foreign devils" (*jia yang gui zi*) as, for most Chinese, these people believed in Christianity just because they were lured by money, or were desperate about problems like severe diseases, or relied on foreigners for something, or needed some other help from the churches. Furthermore, in those years of rising nationalism, Chinese Christians were even thought by many countrymen to be traitors to their families and country. Since Christians looked down upon ancestor worship, they were even forbidden to take part in their families' sacrificial rituals, a very serious discarding of traditional society. We can say that the situation created a threat to the national identity of Chinese Christians.

In that situation, Christians had to consider their identity in the following order: first, as Chinese, then as Christians, and so, Chinese Christians. This is understandable. For having chosen to be a Christian, they should have expected to answer such a question from people outside the church: "As a Chinese, why did you choose to become a Christian?" And they would have had to stress that they were still Chinese and did not betray their fatherland, and to try their best to show that a Christian identity was not contrary to a Chinese identity. In those days, their Christian faith cost Chinese Christians a lot—in some cases, even their lives.

More than a hundred years have passed since that time. The history of Christianity in China has been full of frustrations, but the situation of Chinese society has changed greatly in recent years. Christianity as a whole is a legal religion with millions of believers. With the "reform and opening up" of China and with the efforts of some Chinese scholars of religious studies, the label "*yang jiao*" began to be erased; meanwhile, the understanding of Christianity among non-Christians has become more and more objective and sympathetic. Generally speaking, Christians do not feel as much pressure as before and the identity question has become less maze-like and disturbing for Chinese Christians. They think that they are Chinese as well as Christian and the two identities are not opposed; they are integrated, with no concern about which one is primary. That is to say, Chinese Christians understand the two identities as operating in different dimensions: they think they should abide by law of the state and fulfill their responsibility as Chinese citizens, while at the same time they think they should preach the gospel of God as Christians.

II. The Transnationalist Spirit of Religions and Their Influence

As everybody also knows, today's China is a society with Marxism and historical materialism as the official ideology. The greater part of the Chinese people has no clear religious consciousness, not to speak of a clear religious identity. On the other hand, however, with China's rapid development and economic growth in recent years, the national consciousness and the sense of national identity, even a kind of national pride, have been rising in the Chinese, especially among the younger generation. We readily see manifestations of nationalism in politics, economy, culture, and other areas of social life in China, even in the religious institutions. However, and on the other hand, we cannot forget that the religious spirit still exerts some influence upon millions of people in China today. And if understood rightly, the religious spirit behind the various religious institutions has, though to varying degrees according to the different religions, certainly been cultivating a kind of transnationalism, rather than simply nationalism.

1. Buddhism

Even illiterate Chinese Buddhists in remote rural areas know that Buddhism originated in India rather than in China. So, no matter how much stress is put on the Chinese transformation of Buddhism by many scholars,[7] unlike many other things Buddhism itself could not possibly cause in the common people such an arrogant attitude as claiming that China is Number One in everything.

Although some scholars and Buddhists are proud of the fact that the Vietnamese, Koreans, and Japanese learned their Buddhism from China, it is unlikely that this could lead to nationalist exclusivism or chauvinism. For they often have to point out, rightly or not, that Buddhism—in contrast with Christianity and Islam—spread in a peaceful way. Furthermore, they have to acknowledge that China's Theravada Buddhism in Yunnan Province was learned from Burma, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. So the frequent recollections of pleasant histories actually function to cultivate friendly and even closer feelings toward those nations. Therefore, in striking contrast to the deep-rooted antagonism toward Japan that is very common among the Chinese, one sees many friendly exchanges of visits between the Chinese and Japanese in Buddhist circles and studies, beginning even

before the China-Japan diplomatic relationship was normalizeded.[8] As for Chinese attitudes towards the Tibetan culture, one can also feel a great difference between those of Buddhists and of non-Buddhists.

In the final analysis, the Buddhist negation of this-worldly things does logically mean that nationalism, even the nation itself, is void and therefore unworthy of commitment. As one of the most influential Chinese monks in the last decades, Master Yinshun said: "The Buddhist morality is based on the rock of *prajna*, the selfless wisdom, which is not to behave exclusively for the benefits of myself, my family, my temple, my country or my nation, but to treat everything from the perspective of the whole human race and all living things."[9] After all, only this proposal, the transnationalist appeal, could embody the Mahayana Buddhist spirit of *maitrya* and *karuna*—having love and compassion for all the living, and being always ready to offer happiness to all people and to save them from suffering.

2. Christianity

Christianity may be the most powerful religion in today's China for its institutional character, even though it is not as deep-rooted and widespread as Chinese Buddhism.[10] And it has not completely got rid of its label of "*yang jiao*" (foreign religion) after nearly one century's efforts on the part of Chinese Christian leaders and intellectuals to tear it away.[11] On the other hand, the conversion to and acceptance of a "foreign religion" clearly do signify that many people think of something more important than nationalistic distinctions.

Whereas the Christian elite has invested so much attention and energy in the development of so-called "indigenous theology"[12] and a Chinese form of Christianity, the common people, especially educated young people, have been attracted to Christianity precisely because of its foreign forms: they prefer the churches in occidental styles, the Western oil paintings and icons, the music of J.S. Bach, and the Christian thought expressed by Western writers and thinkers.[13] The reason is simple: in this way, Christianity offers them not only a new religious alternative in their spiritual lives, but also a new and wider transnationalist horizon in their esthetic and intellectual lives.

Looking only at the surface of things, one might conclude that Christianity in China has become quite nationalistic. The very names of the national organizations of Catholics and of Protestants in China,[14] as well as the utterances of their leaders, do undoubtedly give people such an impression. However, if we take into account the whole experience of the Chinese Christians, their political, economic, and cultural situation in the last century, we would reach a different conclusion, and might recall a line of the American poet Henry W. Longfellow: "Things are not what they seem."[15] They seem that way just because they have to seem that way; otherwise they might not be there at all. So, is it not a paradox if we say that the more nationalist the national Christian organizations seem, the more transnationalistic common Christian individuals are? Perhaps the more nationalist utterances about Christianity just signify the sharper consciousness of its transnationalist spirit. After all, Chinese Catholics are aware of Roman authority over all Catholics throughout the world, and the Chinese Christians know that their faith is never "of, by, and for" any single nation, that their Lord is over all the nations.

3. Islam

In China, Islam is quite distinctive in being held by ten minority ethnic groups, which have a total population of 18 million people.[16] Most of them populate the northwest provinces, including Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and Yunnan, a southwest province. Among them, the Hui people also live in many other provinces and big cities, including Shanghai and Beijing. The Hui and three other small Muslim ethnic groups use Chinese characters (*Han Zi*) as their written language, and the Hui do not even have an oral language of their own, but speak the Chinese language. So, Islamic belief is nearly the only difference between the Hui and Han peoples. Such a situation has brought about some ambiguity in relation to nationalism and Islam in China. Following are some characteristic aspects of this situation.

Firstly, for some ethnic groups, especially the Uygur people in Xinjiang, Islam could be a justification for their nationalistic resistance to the nationalism of the Han, on the one hand, and an encouragement of their transnationalist link with the crescent zone nations from Central Asia to Turkey, on the other. In their separatist activities, they have made use of Islam in such a double way.

Secondly, for the Han people, Islam as it is associated with the nationalism of, for example, the Uygur, could be a stimulus to their own nationalism or chauvinism (in Chinese, *Da Han Zu Zhu Yi*). And at the same time, Islam among the Hui, and in their neighborhoods in big cities, though not so apparent, may be a catalyst for their transnationalist attitude towards the alien Muslim nations. In fact, with respect to the social function of Islam, one discerns some subtle differences between the opinions of Han people in the northwest area, and Han in the rest of China.[17]

Finally, the conflicts and terrorism related to fundamentalist Islam outside China have also helped bring about some ambiguous or confusing sentiments. On the one hand, this results from the government's condemnation of terrorism in its occasional official statements and the attitude of the mass media in their reports of terrorist events. On the other hand, some scholars' interpretations

in favor of Islam have functioned to improve a transnationalist consciousness in the common mind.[18]

4. Confucianism and Taoism

As an established religion, Confucianism went off the stage of Chinese history with the Qing Dynasty, after 1911.[19] However, as the most deeply rooted and widespread religion supported by governments for thousands of years, it still has a profound influence upon the Chinese mentality and spiritual life.[20] Some professors referred to as contemporary neo-Confucianists at universities in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States have done much to restore the influence,[21] as have many mainland scholars in the field of Chinese culture studies and some patriarchs in rural areas who are leading the restoration of ancestor worship and other clan activities.

As for Taoism as an institutional religion, it has never recovered from its decline since one century ago, though it is sanctioned as one of the five legal religions in China. However, as a strong element in many folk beliefs, and as a religious philosophy attractive to many intellectuals, Taoism remains a spiritual power for the Chinese, with no less influence than Confucianism.[22]

When their native Chinese origins and typically Chinese character are stressed,[23] the two religions could help enhance the Chinese nationalism. On the other hand, however, they share between them at least three factors which could be potential seeds of transnationalism for the Chinese.

The first factor is the Confucian idea of "one family under heaven." From the teaching of Yan Yuan, a famous disciple of Confucius in the 5th century BCE who said that "all the peoples are brethren,"[24] to the ideal about the "Great Harmony" or "Great Union" of Kang Youwei, a most influential Confucian thinker at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, one can find numerous arguments in support of the idea that is sometimes designated as "cosmopolitanism."[25]

The second factor is the Taoist distaste for patriarchs, rulers, and nations, and all their conventions. Lao Zi, the first Taoist philosopher, esteemed as Taoist religion's founder, criticized the institutions of nations as an outcome of man's fall from the great Tao.[26] And Zhuang Zi, who was the most splendid Taoist writer and revered as a Taoist immortal, eloquently argued for the equality and unification of all the things in the world, including of course states or nations.[27]

The last, but not the least significant factor is the belief, and the arguments, of many contemporary Confucianists and Taoists that the two religions' doctrines, philosophies, and practices have universal value.[28] The spread of their works has begun to have some remarkable effects on the common people; thus, when they find, for example, that the national flag of the Republic of Korea has a design similar to the Taoist emblem, or that a few western philosophers[29] and physicists praise Confucian wisdom or Taoist insights, or even that Kung fu or Qigong is spreading in the West, the common Chinese people feel some kind of pride. At the same time, however, they possibly also feel a kind of admiration, or even a sense of shame, when they find that some other nations (e.g. the Koreans and the Japanese) maintain so well, and such great quantities of, important Chinese antiquities lost to themselves for a long time. So might they pay more attention to the universal elements of religions, rather than the particularities that relate them to certain nations.

All these factors, then, and potentially others, would help to cultivate some kind of cross-ethnic or transnational consciousness among the Chinese people.

III. The Limitation of the Influence of Religions on Society

In China today, there are just five religions sanctioned by the government as legal religions. They are Buddhism, Taoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and Islam. However, their influence, including the influence of transnationalism on Chinese society, is limited just because of their religious nature. Of course, the limitation comes from the special political and cultural situations of the religions in China, and from their marginal and minority status in Chinese society. Another important reason is that most religious believers live in undeveloped rural areas; many of them are old, female, and less educated, and have little influence on the orientation of the society.

First of all, let us examine the special political situation as viewed from the experience of all the religions in China in the past fifty years. With Marxism as the official ideology, religion is regarded not only as a private belief but also as a social and political matter. The relationship between polity and church in China can be characterized by the fact that the government administers religions and that changes in the polity determine the fate of religion.

From 1949 to 1956, the focus of the government's work in religious affairs was to make Chinese religions rid themselves of the control of "foreign imperialism" and drive the "counter-revolutionary powers" out of all religions. After 1957, with the Anti-Rightist Campaign and so-called "class struggle" throughout China, all the religions were criticized and seriously attacked as spiritual "opium" serving the "reactionary ruling class," and all religious believers were looked down upon as "backward elements" in the society. In 1958, Mao Zedong called on the Chinese "to break with traditional ownership radically and to break with traditional ideas radically," giving a powerful and authoritative justification

for the wiping out of religions. Then in the early 1960s, the criticism of religions was extended to attacks upon common believers in the campaign for "socialist education." Some believers were forced to criticize themselves as reactionary and their own beliefs as deceitful. Meanwhile, many churches and temples were damaged and destroyed, and all the religious books were burnt. The "criticism" climaxed with the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution, during which many priests and believers were denounced as "demons and monsters" and forced to parade through the streets to be exposed to the public wearing paper caps, forced to do manual labor, sent to prison and even to death.[30] All the religious places were closed and turned to schools, factories, storehouses and other institutions. All religious activities were banned. In that situation, nobody dared to admit that he/she was a believer, and congregations were scattered or forced underground. Thus, one could say that China was a country without religions then, for at that unique historical moment religions not only exited from the social stage in China, but they disappeared throughout the country.

After the reforms and opening-up in the early 1980s, the Chinese government commenced the "policy for religious freedom" and believers resumed their religious life. In recent years, the Chinese government put forward a policy for "leading religions to adapt to socialism," understood as requiring religions to adapt to the social system in China. That is to say, all the religions in China are in some kind of guided position.

In this condition, all religions participate in the social development of China to some extent, just because they exist. So we can say that their involvement is passive and must be led and controlled by the government. Besides this, the government's policy about religion stipulates that all religious activities can be held only within "religious places" or limited to churches, temples, mosques, and so on. In this way they can hardly influence the society outside. And in China, religious education is excluded from compulsory educational institutions at all levels except for the religious schools sanctioned by the government, so schoolchildren learn hardly anything about religion. Also, the masses hear almost nothing about religions in the mass media, which are all controlled by the government. Thus, religions cannot extend their influence to the whole of society. In such a situation, of course, they have only a limited function and influence in Chinese society.

Next, let us examine the social and cultural situation. In connection with this, we ascertain another factor helping to explain the limited influence of religions in Chinese society. Although Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism once had a vast and deep influence on the culture of China, they have been in a great decline since the Ming and Qing dynasties. In the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, they were brought into discredit. Nowadays, nearly all the Chinese people do not regard Confucianism as a religion, and its influence is mainly limited to scholarly circles. Today some scholars are making efforts to revive Confucianism, but they face the neglect of the masses even though they receive powerful support from the authorities. Buddhism is one of two religions developing most quickly after the 1980s and, to a great extent, its influence spreads mainly among the grassroots classes. Especially in the countryside, some Buddhist rituals, taboos, festivals, and so on have been transformed into folk customs, yet some Buddhist monks are preoccupied with political status or a kind of commercial orientation. In any case, since Buddhism has a stronger characteristic of other-worldliness, it has quite limited effects on modern Chinese society. As for Taoism as a religion, it has been in decline for centuries since the Qing dynasty. And even during the great revival period for religions (mainly Buddhism and Christianity) beginning from the 1980s, Taoism has developed very slowly. There is no doubt that, as a religion, Taoism's influence on today's China is the smallest of all the five legal religions. As for Islam, because of its distinctive relationship to nationality, its influence is limited mainly to the ten ethnic minorities who are Muslim.

Christianity (including both Protestantism and Catholicism), the other religion developing most quickly after the 1980s, still has to resolve the problem of how to adapt itself to Chinese culture. Christianity is so different from traditional Chinese culture—at least in its symbolism—that there is a degree of conflict between the two systems. The famous "Chinese rites controversy" is just an example of this. We can trace the reasons for the conflict to the following three divergences of ideas. Firstly, the Christian notion of a personal God and its doctrines of the creation, sin, and of atonement are strange, even vague to Chinese culture. Secondly, the Christian idea that "all human beings are equal before God" is different from the Confucian tradition that one should treat people according to one's different relations with them. Thirdly, Christian theism differs fundamentally from Chinese Buddhist and Taoist polytheism. Now, there are more than 5.3 million Catholics and 20 million Protestants in China, but compared with the whole population, Christians form just a minority. And, their religious identity is still half-open. So, their influence upon Chinese society, and their effect on the forming of a consciousness of a new identity, remains very limited.

Apart from causes on the side of polity, culture, and society, we can find other causes on the side of the Chinese religions themselves for their limited influence on society. The first one is their isolation. Most Chinese believers live in the poor and undeveloped rural areas. Many of them know very little about the outside world. For them, believing in religion is about such utilitarian

purposes as a safer living or warding off poverty, diseases, floods, droughts, and other disasters. Just a very small minority of them are so optimistic as to dream of getting rich. Compared with the people in the cities, they lack a modern mentality, and in fact, they have not yet entered the modern era, let alone exerted any influence on the modern society. The second cause is the conservativeness of Chinese religions. For example, a great majority of Chinese Christians have been greatly influenced by fundamentalism since the 1920s. Nearly every kind of liberal Christian thought has been unfamiliar and unacceptable to them. Their fundamentalist tendency hinders them from taking positive action or even having a proactive attitude in society. This is to some degree responsible for making Chinese Christianity a cultural enclave; otherwise, Christianity could have made a much greater contribution to Chinese society.

Finally, we think we should examine in this context the function of another kind of religion in today's China. This is the so-called folk religions or popular religions, which have also developed very quickly since the 1980s. By folk religions, I mean the various beliefs rooted in the life of grassroots classes in Chinese society. Although they have never formed the mainstream of Chinese religions, they have had an even longer history and greater influence upon Chinese society than the five religions discussed so far.

Folk religions have very complex sets of gods, inheriting some features from primitive polytheisms and ancient myths. They place emphasis on the transition or turn from life to death, stressing predetermination, retribution, and reactions between this world and the world after death. Also, they concern themselves much more with the utilitarian welfare of this-worldly life.

Folk religions had long been criticized as "feudal superstitions" by many Chinese intellectuals since the beginning of the 20th century. They suffered very severe attacks after the 1950s and, with all the other religions, became a target of annihilation during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and '70s. From the 1980s, they began to revive during the process of opening up Chinese society. Especially in the countryside they are quite popular, having become the main spiritual life for many people of the lower classes. However, almost nobody thinks that folk religions could function as a positive factor in the modernization of China. As for our topic of national identity, we have to say that Chinese folk religions could help strengthen some sense of Chinese national identity, while they could do nothing to cultivate any kind of transnationalism among the Chinese. This is just because they often have distinctively local characteristics and quite narrow orientation. Therefore, it is hardly imaginable that they could have any active or positive effects on the formation of a consciousness of new identity.

In conclusion, we have to say the following: 1) Owing to their special situation, all the religions in today's China could exert very limited influence on the forming of a new consciousness of East Asian identity; 2) Owing to the universal elements in their doctrines, all the five legal religions in China have some ideas that could help cultivate elements of transnationalism, which should be first step toward raising a new consciousness; 3) Owing to its doctrine of radical and universal love and its experience of coming to terms with Chinese nationalism, Christianity could possibly do much to cultivate transnationalism in China.

———Notes———

1 Cf. Zhou Xiefan: *Christianity in China*, Commercial Press, 1991, p. 70.
2 Cf. Gu Changsheng: *The Missionaries and the Modern China*, Shanghai People's Press, 1995, p. 458.
3 Cf. He Guanghu: Christianity and Modernization in China, in *Scholars* No.8, Jiangsu People's Press, 1995.
4 Cf. *Christianity in China*.
5 Cf. The Basic Knowledge about Chinese Christianity, ed. by Zhuo Xinping, Religious Cultural Press, 1999, p. 80.
6 ibid. pp. 82–83.
7 Nearly every Chinese scholar in the field of Buddhist studies concludes that Hindu Buddhism has been transformed into so called "Chinese Buddhism" after it entered China. Cf. among the innumerable works, Ren Jiyu, ed., *Zhongguo Fojiao Shi* (A History of Chinese Buddhism), 4 volumes, Beijing, since 1983.
8 The Buddhist leaders and scholars from the two countries meet regularly for bilateral conferences. For example, our Institute and the World Daily in Japan have co-organized the "Chinese-Japanese Symposium on Buddhism" every two years since the 1980s.
9 Yinshun, Buddha in the Human World, pp. 318, 319. Quoted from Deng Zimei, "Science and Technology—From a Buddhist Perspective," in He Guanghu & Xu Zhiwei eds., *Duihua: Ru Shi Dao yu Jidujiao* (Dialogue: Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism and Christianity), Vol. II, Zhongguo Sheke Wenxian Chubanshe, 2001.
10 As the fastest developing religions, Christianity has grown in membership at a marvelous rate for the last two decades (looking just at Protestants, from less than one million to twenty million and more!), and Buddhism has built and rebuilt numerous temples though no formal statistics about its believers are available. Cf. Ying, Fuk Tsang, "The Development of Christianity in China: In Perspective of Social Classes" (Presented to the "Christianity and the 21st Century" conference, Beijing, September 19–21, 2001); Chen, Cunfu, "Secularization, De-secularization and the Religions in Today's China" (Presented at the above-mentioned conference).
11 See the works of L. C. Wu, T. F. Liu and others in the early 20th century, the works of T. C. Chao, F. Y. Xie and others at mid-century, and the works of K. H. Ting, W. F. Wang and others in the late 20th century.
12 The phrase was the ideal of the Christian intellectuals mentioned above, and has become a commonplace among

Christian leaders today.

13 In fact, many of the scholars who are nowadays active in the field of Christian studies approached it through their studies of Western literature, art, history, philosophy, and so on.

14 The names of the only national organizations of both Catholics and Protestants include the word "patriotism"! This is of course a product of the special political situation in China.

15 Longfellow, H. W., "Praise of Life."

16 Cf. Qin Huibing, "Chinese Islam and Social Harmony," presented to the "International Symposium on Religion and Peace," Sept. 14–16, Beijing, co-organized by the Institute of World Religions, CASS, and the Catholic University of Sacred Heart in Milan, Italy.

17 It will be interesting and significant, in connection with this question, to compare the articles concerning Islam in *Xinjiang Shehui Kexue* (Social Sciences in Xinjiang, published by Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Urumqi) with those in *Shijie Zongjiao Yanjiu* (Study of World Religions), published by the Institute of World Religions, CASS, Beijing.

18 Cf. Wu Yungui's articles in the recent issues of *Shijie Zongjiao Yanjiu* and in No. 3, 2000, of *Zhongguo Zongjiao* (Religions in China), published by the State Bureau for Religious Affairs, Beijing.

19 Cf. Li Shen, *Zhongguo Rujiao Shi* (A History of Confucian Religion), Vol. II, Shanghai People's Press, 2000.

20 Cf. He Guanghu, "Zhongguo Zongjiao Gaige Lungang" (A Thesis on the Reformation of Chinese Religions), in *Dong Fang* (Oriental), No.4, 1994, Beijing. An English version appeared in *Inter-Religio*, No. 1, 1995, Hong Kong.

21 Among others are such outstanding scholars as Mou Zongsan, Tang Jun-yi, Xu Fu-guan, Liu Shu-hsien, and Tu Weiming. The most significant of what they have contributed to humanities scholars in mainland China, I think, is the recognition of the religiousness (in the words of Tu Weiming) of Confucianism.

22 Cf. Ren Jiyu, ed., *Zhongguo Daojiao Shi* (A History of Taoist Religion), Shanghai, 1992, and Lu Guolong, *Daojiao Zhexue* (A Taoist Philosophy), Beijing, 1998.

23 This is just what most Chinese scholars in this field have been doing.

24 *The Analects of Confucius*, chapter entitled "Yan Yuan."

25 Cf. Sheng Hong, "Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism," in *Wei Wan Shi Kai Tai Ping* (Create Peace for All Generations), Beijing, 1999.

26 *The Book of Lao Zi*, Chapter 18.

27 *The Book of Zhuang Zi*, chapter on the Equality of Things.

28 Cf. the works of the scholars mentioned in note 19, and those of Chen Gu-ying, Tang Yi-jie, Pang Pu, and others.

29 From Voltaire to Heidegger.

30 According to an investigation into 140 clergymen in Tianjin, Henan and Fujian during the Cultural Revolution, 37 percent were sent to prison. Cf. *Sociology of Religion*, China Social Science Documentation Press, 2000, p. 360.

The Path to be Followed by Korean Christianity in the Face of the Emergence of "Neo-Nationalism"

Yonsei University SUH Jeong-Min

Introduction: The Situation in Korea and "Neo-Nationalism"

In Korea, the emergence of "modern nationalism" coincided with the rise of the crisis of national community and identity. Korea's modern nationalistic movement was initiated by the urgent need to recover and maintain a sense of national identity, which had been lost since the annexation of Korea by Japan. This background distinguishes Korea's modern nationalism from conventional forms of nationalism that place primary emphasis on the ideas of "pro-nation," "ethno-centrism," "national interests," and eventually "national superiority" over other nations. To be more specific, Korea's modern nationalism was underlain by anti-Japanese sentiment in a specific historical context, and, accordingly, could hardly be associated with the exclusiveness and sense of superiority over other nations which are typically seen in more aggressive and offensive nationalistic movements. In the case of Korea, therefore, modern nationalistic movements were triggered by a concern over the survival of the national community, and were resistive and defensive in nature.

As a result of this particularity, Korea's modern nationalism weakened, at least in South Korea, for a certain period of time after 1945 when Korea was "liberated" from the domination of the Empire of Japan and experienced civil war and the division of the nation. Instead, anti-communist thought prevailed in Korea, stemming from the confrontation of right- and left-wing ideologies. During this period, and the period between the 1960s and the 1970s when "nationalism" was given a renewed emphasis, Korean nationalism was mainly focused on the conflict with Japan, finding a solution to the historical problems between the two nations and a review of the historical records. The issues of reconciliation between South and North Korea and national reunification were never discussed in the context of nationalism. Instead, Korea aimed to achieve these goals by promoting the superiority of the regime to exert ideo-

logical control over the other side. If someone relied on nationalism as a means to put an end to the division of the nation and realize reunification, that attitude could be interpreted as abandoning ideological legitimacy, and in an extreme case, such a person could be condemned for having turned to the left-wing ideology. After all, Korea during those days gave higher priority to anti-communism than to nationalism, and nationalism was considered only in terms of the Korea-Japan relationship, the historical experience and solution to the problems between the two nations, and the repeatedly raised issue of Japanese perceptions of history. In this sense, we may say that anti-Japanese nationalism had remained the only nationalistic sentiment that prevailed in Korea for a considerably long period of time.

More recently, however, Korea has seen a drastic change in the perception of national identity. Specifically, the agreement reached at the South-North summit in 2000 on voluntary reconciliation and reunification marked the beginning of the age of South-North rapprochement and cooperation, and gave rise to a new type of nationalism. This means that the stage is now set for nationalism to play a central role in the efforts to put an end to national division and to realize reunification. In other words, enough momentum has been generated to facilitate mutual recognition of the extreme importance of restoring national identity by promoting nationalism as a means of putting an end to national division and achieving national reunification. I refer to this sentiment as Korean "neo-nationalism," to distinguish it from the traditional anti-Japanese nationalism. Today, neo-nationalism, which is different from conventional anti-Japanese nationalism in terms of both its nature and its objectives, is arising throughout the Korean peninsula, especially in South Korea.

1. Historical Background of the Formation of the Korean Nationalist Church

It is a historical fact that missionary Christianity in the modern age was closely connected with Western imperialism. It is no exaggeration to say that most parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the regions known as the third world, share a similar experience with regard to missionary Christianity. But Korea is an exception. While Western missionary movements constituted part of the imperialistic aggression by the United States and other Western nations, the colonization of Korea was undertaken mostly by Japan. As discussed earlier, Korea's national sentiment and nationalistic movements in the modern age were underlain by anti-Japanese nationalism. Due to this particularity, Christianity in Korea played the unique role of arousing modern nationalism and provided a spiritual backing for the nationalistic movement, which marks a sharp contrast to the experiences of other third world nations that accepted missionary Christianity. The introduction of missionary Christianity, coupled with various other factors, led to the establishment of Korean nationalist Christianity. This means that for modern Korea, the acceptance of missionary Christianity did not conflict with, nor did it contradict, the formation of nationalism. In fact, many Korean Christians played leading roles in anti-Japanese movements, and a close combination of Christianity and nationalism was seen nationwide in Korea. In those days, Korea had little reason to reject Christianity or other Western thought as long as it could be associated with anti-Japanese nationalism. Due to this unique background, Korea became an exceptional country where nationalism was smoothly combined with Christianity, in spite of the nature of Christianity as the representative monotheistic religion characterized by its exclusivity and even by its emphasis on the superiority of Western civilization.

Because of the social situation of those days, the Korean nationalist church could not avoid being involved in political movements. In this sense, the National Church was separate from ideological or cultural aspects of Christianity. It is noteworthy that the so-called Korean Christian movements that took place in those days could not become the mainstream movements of Korea's Christian society and did not attract much public attention.

2. Achievements of the Korean Nationalist Church

"Believing in Christianity means saving the country, and saving the country means believing in Christianity." This statement was made by Korean Christians in the early days of the introduction of missionary Christianity. Undoubtedly, this kind of statement was not made in any other Asian country that experienced the introduction of missionary Christianity.

These Korean Christians led the independence movements in the name of Christianity. Their activities include not only peaceful protest demonstrations and non-violent resistance movements, such as the March First Movement, but also more extremist behavior such as the assassination of the former Japanese prime minister by Ahn Jung-geun. In fact, it is difficult to enumerate all of the achievements made by Korean Christians in the independence movements carried out continuously throughout the period of the annexation and occupation by the Empire of Japan. However, the national movements of Korean Christians were not limited to these aggressive ones.

In the last days of Japan's reign in Korea, Korean Christians stood against the Japanese government when it attempted to force Korean people to worship at shrines and accept the ideas of Japanese Christianity. By sticking to their own beliefs, these Korean Christians resisted the Japanese occupation in their own way. Chu Gichol (one of the Korean pastors at that time) and other Korean

Christians who were involved in the resistance activities for religious reasons did not necessarily have a direct connection with Korea's anti-Japanese nationalism. Rather, the majority of them took a non-political or non-nationalistic stance, and their actions were underlain solely by their conservative beliefs. Still, they did take action to resist the Japanese national policies and objectives regardless of the specific nature of their beliefs and ideology, and for this reason, their activities could be considered together with anti-Japanese nationalistic movements. We must pay attention to the background of the era. Apart from the different motivations of these movements, we can justifiably define Korean Christianity up to 1945 as the "National Church."

3. Left- and Right-Wing Ideologies and the Development of Korean Christianity

Korean Christianity was largely affected by "8/15" and the division of the nation. The Christian doctrine imposed by the Empire of Japan in its last days became the mainstream of South Korea's Christianity, which led to the loss of the identity of the Korean National Church. This phenomenon was seen in every aspect of Korean society after Korea won independence from Japan. The anti-Japanese nationalism was replaced by an anti-communist ideology, and against such a historical backdrop, anti-nationalistic behavior was not seen as being seriously problematic. Even those who had maintained a pro-Japan stance during the occupation by the Empire of Japan were forgiven only if they were anti-communist. During the 1920s, Korean Christianity developed a highly hostile attitude toward communism. Christians in North Korea and South Korea experienced harsh persecution by communist administrations after the division of the nation and during the Korean War. Indeed, it seemed impossible for Christianity and communism to coexist in Korea. Communists made clear their intention to eradicate Christianity, while Christians considered it the will of heaven that they should fight communism and even prepared themselves to die for this purpose. Through this process, Korean Christianity was losing the nature of the National Church and instead emerged as an "Anti-communist Church." During this period, Korean Christianity was bitterly criticized for having been the cause of the division of the nation, instead of playing a leading role in contributing to national reunification. Aside from a small number of progressive theologians who resisted this movement, the Korean Christian society in those days shared the views of the Rhee Syngman administration and the military dictatorial government that followed in terms of the future direction of national society and priority issues, which constituted the mixing of politics and religion.

4. Development of an Ahistorical Mindset in Korean Christianity

In the wake of "8/15" and the Korean War, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, a new, intensive religious movement emerged within Korean Christian society. To sum up, it was a religious movement focusing on personal salvation and worldly happiness. I may say this movement was underlain by the traditional folk beliefs of Korea, especially shamanism, and was accelerated by the tense situations created by the division of the nation and the Korean War. Inevitably, this movement placed less importance on the values of "nation," "community," and "social justice," and was more focused on the salvation of personal souls and relief from individual worldly sufferings, thus leading to the development of an ahistorical mindset. Korean Christian society during this period could be characterized by such keywords as: ahistorical mindset; individualism; egoism of the individual churches; and also the movement of praying to receive the blessing of the Holy Spirit. These characteristics were seen across all Christian sects and across all theological issues. In those days, very little attention was paid to social issues; national and ideological matters were considered less serious and the values of national society were excluded from religious activities. In this religious movement, Korea's own cultural and social backgrounds, which were supposed to constitute the identity of the Korean people, were almost neglected. Rather, they just put emphasis on "worldwide Christianity," focusing solely on the Holy Spirit and the Universal Church. This movement highlighted the religious and cultural aspects of Korean society rather than political issues, and emphasized the characteristics of Christianity as an exclusive, monotheistic religion. As a result, there emerged a serious gap between the Korean people and other ethnic groups, and between Korean values and "Asian" values. In reality, the main Christian bodies in Korea avoided playing a positive role in addressing domestic problems, such as the South-North conflict, the dictatorial administration, and social inequality. Only a small number of progressive theological groups dealt with these problems and managed to maintain the tradition of the prophetic activities of Korean Christianity. Under these circumstances, the fundamental question that was asked was how Korean Christianity could responsibly raise the social issues to be considered in building up a sense of national identity, not how it would prioritize these social issues.

Conclusion: Korean Christianity and its Role in National Reunification

Today, almost all sects of Korean Christianity seem to pursue selfish interests, focusing on personal worldly happiness only. While young people of some conservative Christian sects have launched new religious awakening movements, they have not yet become the mainstream of Korean Christian society. Whether Korean

Christian society can play a leading role in national society as it proudly did in its earlier days depends on how it will address the newly arising national issues.

The single most important issue for Korea to address today is national reunification. Clearly, reunification requires reconciliation between the North and the South, and a situation in which people are not living under the political or economic control of opposed sides. In this sense, renewed importance should be given to the value of nationalism, and it is of critical significance that national homogeneity be achieved anew through nationalism. The value of nationalism is even greater than that of the anti-Japanese nationalism which Korean society, and Korean Christian society, experienced in the past. Once I defined this emerging nationalism "neo-nationalism." Importantly, neo-nationalism is not limited to a political nationalism focused on the restoration of the nation's sovereign rights and the solution to past problems; rather, it pursues the restoration of "national identity," which requires consideration of a broader range of cultural and ideological issues as well. In terms of neo-nationalism, Korean Christianity is expected to address the following three tasks.

Firstly, Korean Christianity should depart from its individualistic, ahistorical stance, and should act as a prophet responsible for the well-being of national society.

Secondly, Korean Christianity should explore the path it needs to follow as a new national church, not sticking to the "pro-nation" mindset (in a political sense) that the conventional Korean nationalist church advocated, but taking into consideration its cultural, ideological, and religious backgrounds as well. This process also requires theological discussion in order to determine how the conflict both between the worldwide universality of Christianity and the specific values of Asia or Korea, on the one hand, and between the plural religious sentiment now prevailing in society and the exclusivity of Christianity as a monotheistic religion, on the other, can be overcome in order to teach and spread Christianity.

Thirdly, Korean Christianity should have a definite action plan specifying what kind of advice it can offer and what role it can play in facilitating the reunification of the nation. This plan would include ideas on how Christianity can join the efforts to realize a vision of national reconciliation and cooperation based on neo-nationalism. At the same time, in-depth discussion should take place to define the role of Korea in Asia after national reunification is achieved, as well as the appropriate ideological direction for building up national identity and for fostering cooperative ties with certain regions or with the world.

Comment · Discussion · Session 2

Chair: ECHIGOYA Akira, Doshisha University

(Chair) I would like to thank Professor Gao for her detailed explanation of the present situation surrounding Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Confucianism, and Taoism in China. Professor Gao has emphasized the concept of trans-nationalism and concluded her presentation with the observation that, judging from the political, socio-cultural, and religious situations in China, religion would not necessarily have a major impact on the formation of the country's new national identity. We will come back to this later and invite comments from the floor.

My thanks also go to Professor Suh, whose presentation showed us that the propagation of Christianity in Korea differs considerably from that of other countries, in that Christianity has spread in Korea pretty much in line with the nation's anti-Japanese movement and, since the end of World War II, with the anti-Communist movement. Professor Suh also pointed to the strong anti-historicist tendency of Korean Christianity between the 1960s and the 1970s, citing at the end of his presentation three major challenges with regard to the role that Christianity should play in the process of national reunification.

Now I would like to invite comments from two of our colleagues: first from the Reverend Shastri of the Council of Churches of Malaysia, please.

Council of Churches of Malaysia

SHASTRI, Hermen Priyaraj

Thank you. Let me first thank the presenters for their very insightful treatment of the religious landscape in the context of China and Korea, and how that impacts upon nationalist identity within those countries and, most especially, how it also connects with the globalizing forces in our world today. It is very clear that these are two different contexts, as the Chairman had just some moments ago shared with us.

In the case of China, you have a strict separation between state and religion. In the case of Korea, because of the national situation, the historical situation of colonialism, and of a divided Korea, space was found within the national processes for Christians to be involved. So we are talking about two different but very interesting situations in Asia.

It is very clear in the case of China that every aspect of the individual and collective life of the people is guided by an all-powerful state apparatus. It is the state that seeks to give shape to national identity. It is the state that interprets the historical processes the country goes through. It is the state that seeks to forge a marriage between socialism and capitalism. In this context and as the presentation made clear to us, it seems to me that, just as the presenter had drawn this conclusion, there is only a limited impact of religious communities or religious life on the national situation.

Therefore, the question arises as to how much we can talk about a revival of religions in China. Is it truly a revival, or is it in this instance the reestablishment of religious beliefs and traditional religious communities that long have been suppressed by the state? So are we talking about a rerouting of these communities who have long been suppressed, or is this a form of revivalism or a reawakening?

The second point that I would like to put before the floor, which may take our discussion a bit further, is also the question of secular national identity that is promoted by the state. The question here arises: to what extent does modern religiosity inform and challenge these purely secular notions of Chinese life and democracy? It is very interesting that the presenter of the paper on China also mentions the attraction of the younger generation to Christianity. We also heard this morning of the expansion of Christianity in terms of numbers and in terms of interest in that religion. How much of this runs parallel to the nation-building processes of the country? Or, is it like a counterculture that is operating at the grassroots level? At this level, it is very interesting to note that many of the modern trappings of Christianity are Western-prone and linked to religious movements that have emanated from the West. Therefore, these links with the West, with Western conservatism, Western evangelicalism, Western right-wing positions in politics and so on, are affecting the people in the churches.

In the case of Korea, it is a completely different situation, one which is also very interesting. But of course, not given enough treatment is the question of patriotism. I think the presenter did a good job speaking about the total identification of nationalism in the country with the historical process and also now about the commitment to national reunification. But does this patriotism also reflect ideas of a new Korea, and if so, in what sense would Christianity play a role in that new Korea?

It is very interesting to note that, in the Korean experience, again there has been a great expansion of Christianity. Many young people are attracted to this. So does the marking of this attraction reveal a globalized religion? When I use this expression in the context of Korea, it is very interesting because the Korean church with its internal expansion has also committed itself to an external expansion. It has become one of the most active missionary churches in the country and in the world. It sends out missionaries to many countries and many of these missionary engagements follow a 19th-century missionary paradigm of promoting sort of a very traditional, very domineering, very elusive Christianity in recipient cultures. So it is interesting to see how this is an aspect of the modern trappings of a globalized religion in the case of Christianity.

One thing that was missing in both presenters, and about which I would be interested to know more, would be the place of interfaith relations. Certainly the title of your presentations did not include this, but we are talking about national identity in a globalized scenario where religious plurality is something that exists, something that people assert for the purpose of maintaining their identity. What is the situation with regard to this issue of interfaith relations? Is there a coming together of religious communities? Is there competition within the various religious communities? How does the state respond to interfaith alliances for the sake of influencing political participation and decision-making in the country? Thank you.

(Chair) Thank you very much. Now, Professor Asano from Doshisha University, please.

Doshisha Univeristy
ASANO Ryo

(Asano) Thank you very much. I understand that this session's two presenters and the three people who have given comments before me are all specialists in religious affairs. I am, however, from a totally different field: security. So the terms I am more used to using are submarines, aircraft carriers, and combat planes. I believe that I have been invited to this session because of Professor Mori's thoughtful anticipation that my remarks would deal more with the State than religion, which would hopefully lead to some relevant discussions.

I have just mentioned the State, and I think I can come up with three keywords for this symposium as a whole: State, religion, and identity. I have noticed a link between these keywords while reading the papers of the

morning session, which I was unfortunately unable to attend, and while listening to the two excellent presentations we have just had. That is to say, it has been believed for some time that, when there is a State, assuming its undeniable presence, there must always be some people who make it the basis of their identity. But is this really so? In my opinion, the State is a creation, a product, and so State-based identity can be extremely ambiguous. This is particularly so in the case of China. In the early 20th century, China knew a period of particularly active revolutions. At the time, one revolutionist said that the Chinese should establish a state in order to have a strong army. This is the complete opposite of the usual way of thinking because, to put it rather simplistically, armed forces exist for the State. Yet in the case of China, the logic that had emerged from actual experience was that the concept of the State was necessary so that officers and solders working on the front would want to fight a good war and survive.

When we think along this line, we inevitably come to the basic question as to whether the State, as we define it today, has always existed. I should not linger on this question now since this alone could take up a full symposium. For example, "China" as we know it today has not always existed. Nowadays we say that the concept of "China" came into being in the early 20th century and that revolutions progressed with this concept.

In retrospect, the socialist revolution succeeded and established its regime in mainland China. However, it is said that political resources had to be concentrated during that revolutionary period; that Christianity, pragmatism, anarchism, and many other schools of thought were mobilized, and that socialism was one of those that won out in the end. Christianity was another one and was quite present in the Nationalist Party, to be sure, but it did not have determinant power.

There are two reasons for the victory of socialism. First, the socialists had a very solid organization. Second, they obtained substantial external assistance in the form of weapons and equipment. Unfortunately, the Christian Church did not provide Chinese revolutionists with weapons. Very ironically, Christianity did not spread in China because it offered very little worldly merit—or at least, this is how materialists like me would think!

In the case of the Korean Peninsula the situation was not exactly the same, but Christianity there has also represented a countercurrent force. Very simplistically speaking, Christianity and socialism in Northeast Asia have coexisted as countercurrent forces. I hear that Korean socialists are often Christians as well. This has also been the case at Doshisha University and in Kyoto, and I suppose that people who are here today know very well that this phenomenon has existed all over Japan, and not just in Kyoto.

In other words, to put it very simplistically again, socialism and Christianity have been used as tools for national unification. Along this line of thought, China, however ancient it may be as a civilization, is extremely new as a nation-state, and in fact, its national unification has not yet progressed very far. In the late 18th century, the Qing dynasty achieved its largest geographical extension, which roughly corresponds to the present Chinese territory. It has been only 200 years or so since then, and this is too short a period to complete national unification. As was mentioned in one of the earlier presentations, an active separatist movement is still continuing in the Xinjiang-Uygur. So China's national unification has not yet been completed.

It is therefore possible to say that China is still on its way to national unification. In this process, national identity can be very complex. The notion of national identity in Northeast Asia is, after all, considerably artificial and young. We inevitably come to the realization that old cultures do not necessarily mean old states existing since ancient times.

We should also be aware that this case may not be limited to Asia and that the same can be said about Europe as well. By "this case" I mean state formation while leaving national identity in ambiguity. Another good example of this would be Russia. Some of you may be opposed to including Russia in Europe, but please bear with me for the discussion's sake.

With regard to national unification, I believe that there is a major difference between Europe and Northeast Asia. In Europe, the concept of nation-state emerged as a result of religious wars, a lesson from the Thirty Years' War. It is said that in those days, the Europeans demonstrated significantly milder nationalistic sentiments than religious ones. So nationalistic wars rarely occurred back then and began to appear only around the time of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. We can say that, from this time forward, the nature of the State changed.

Then, assuming that movements towards national unification emerge in Napoleonic, French Revolution-like times, and with the nationalism in Northeast Asia being rather aggressive at the moment as it is in Korea and in China, it can be said that Northeast Asia is still in its youth in terms of national unification. Therefore, national identity has not stabilized anywhere within the region, which is prone to international conflicts. National identity is in fact nurtured through such conflicts. The more confrontational one nation's international relations are, the more vigorous its national identity becomes. I think that this somewhat paradoxical phenomenon is still continuing today.

I would like to touch on the case of North and South Korea, although this may be a digression from the main theme. We heard the expression "new ethnicism" in one of the presentations. The presenter suggested the possibility that the two Koreas would be reunified on the grounds of a new ethnicism and in an attempt to find their new place in the international community. As for me, I do not think that ethnicity would always be given priority in this manner. This is simply obvious from the example of the relationship between China and Taiwan. If nationalism were ever to go out of control on both sides of the Straits, a war would already have taken place there, with no consideration of economics. This is not the case, however. In addition, even if the new ethnicism were to be embraced, it would still take some time for the Korean reunification to materialize.

We have known a global cold war and local cold wars. The global US-Soviet cold war and the local US-China confrontation were dissolved, so why is there still confrontation on the Korean Peninsula? This question cannot be answered solely on the basis of ethnicism. For a considerably long time, both North and South Korea benefited from the global and local cold wars. We cannot deny that, even in the face of the dissolving local cold wars, the momentum that has maintained the two benefactors, the two political institutions, is too strong to disappear quickly.

Another thing that we should take into account is that South Korea must have taken notice of the very high cost of the German reunification. The Korean Peninsula situation has not changed probably in part because South Korea has decided that the way it is now is better than were the German example to be followed. Therefore the very noble idea of "new ethnicism" may not be so appealing in view of the economic dimension of reunification costs.

I hope you will pardon me for not asking any questions but just giving my comments. I was very much touched by the two presentations, one by a Chinese scholar and the other by a Korean scholar. I went to China last month and visited the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Renmin University, where Professor Gao's husband works. When I was a student, I had a Korean professor as my academic advisor. So you can imagine how I found the presentations and their presenters very familiar to me. I have also been to Malaysia twice. Anywhere I go in the world, people always take me for a local and ask me for directions. In Kuala Lumpur, this happened four times. Such episodes make you wonder about your identity, don't they? So I am very grateful that I am included here, despite my identity crisis. This concludes my remarks. Thank you very much.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Asano. Let us now take a short break, after which we will ask the presenters to respond to the questions and remarks we have just had from the two commentators, and invite other questions and comments from the floor. (...)

Now, let us resume our session. I would like to ask Professor Gao and Professor Suh to respond to the questions and comments by the two commentators. Professor Gao, would you start, please?

(Gao) I do not know whether I catch the question or not, but anyhow I will say something more about the religions in China. As everybody knows, from 1949, there were political movements one after another and all the religions were criticized. During the Cultural Revolution, they were not only criticized but, I should say, there was a blow to the body and many priests and believers were sent to their deaths. This is a fact.

As to the relationship between the different religious groups in China, I should say that, in my opinion, they do not pay more attention to it because the most important thing for the different religious leaders is how their own religions can successfully exist.

Of course, the leaders of the five religions are members in the People's Congress and Political Consultative Conference at all levels. But they just discuss general ideas about the nation and the big issues, and make their suggestions. They have no more opportunity to dialogue with each other.

But anyhow, I should say some things have changed a little because I know, for example, that some Christian seminaries in Beijing have planned to invite Buddhists to give lectures to them. And in some Buddhist universities, they recently planned to invite some Christian scholars to speak about what Christianity is. So I think this is a good beginning.

In my paper, I mentioned that many people are attracted to Christianity, especially the young generation. Why? For what reasons? Just for the Western style, or something else? From 2002 to 2003, I spent the whole year doing some investigations in Beijing and I wrote a book, the title of which is 'Christianity and the Christians in Beijing Today' which will be published in Hong Kong. I brought a question to my interviewees, asking many people, especially young people and educated people, "Why have you become Christians?" I got different answers. Generally speaking, most people answered that they just sought a spiritual life. I think this is progress, and yet the people in the city are different from the people in the countryside.

I did some investigations in the countryside many years ago. The country folk said: "Why did I become

a Christian? Because I have no money. I have no medical care. My children could not go to school. I need some gods to bless me." I said, "But why do you choose Christianity? You can choose Buddhism or another religion." They answered, "Yes, you are right; it is because, believing in Christianity, you do not worry about money. You need less money. But if you believe in Buddhism, you will go to temples, and you will spend a lot of money."

So the reason is very simple. Of course, some young people like the things coming from the West. This is true. If you visit China—especially Beijing at Christmas—you can see many things, many celebrations of Christmas, which have nothing to do with Christianity, nothing to do with Christian belief but only with Western life, Western style. I think that, in China's situation, this is reasonable because we just opened our gate to the world and the young people, especially educated people when they first go to the university, come in contact with the books, Western books, the books of Western thought. So they are interested in them. They are attracted to the books.

Then there is the music—for example, Bach. They like it very much. Many people find their way to the Christian groups in this manner, and I wrote something about this in my book. In China, since the great change occurred and life became unstable, you might become very rich tomorrow or you could be very poor tomorrow. You can see that life is uncertain; so many things are uncertain. And so some people say, "I will look for something certain," and of course what they mean is religion.

Generally speaking the young people are doubtful. They'd like to think about today's China. It seems that they are standing at a crossroad and they do not know which direction to go. For example, at Ren Min University of China, many students do not study religion or philosophy. They just study sciences. But they want to know what religion is. My husband is teaching philosophy of religion and Christian thought there. His lectures are welcomed by most of the students from the different departments. Many students want to ask questions about things such as belief and life. If he spends two hours in the lecture, he may spend another two hours answering questions afterwards.

So, from this phenomenon we can see that many young people are eager for the spiritual life. Just now I said that in the countryside, the people are poor. They have no way out. They just choose to believe. This is one way. But on the other hand, I should say the situation is that the Chinese people are just very eager for the spiritual life because after the Cultural Revolution, what we believed before was questioned. So the people want to know what is right in their life. So this is very important.

If you go to China and visit Beijing, for example, and visit a church there, you can see many things that are encouraging to us. This morning, Prof. Lau showed us some pictures. Of course, every church is full of people, every church. I spent one year going into every church in Beijing, but in the biggest city in China, we just have five churches. So we have a big, big crowd.

In my paper today, although I did not read this part, I mention folk religions. In fact, the most rapidly developing of the religions are the folk religions. But as everybody knows, before 1980, the folk religions were regarded as superstition. They had no room to play. But ever since the opening and reform of China, all the folk religious beliefs have developed very, very quickly. Folk religions' influence on Christianity—to speak only of Christianity—is very strong. Sometimes, in the countryside, something of this can be seen in the rituals where you find many things happening not as Christianity, but as folk religions.

So this is a problem and many churches mention that they are worried about these things. But in my opinion, this is natural. I think this is natural in China because most of the Chinese people are believers of folk religions. So I think this is the natural position from which Christianity can begin taking its steps in Chinese society, which means: it would recognize the facts, and then it could make progress.

But I do not think that the folk religions can play an active role in modernization or in the new consciousness. Instead, I think, sometimes, they are a block. Folk religions are an obstacle to modernization, even to the progress of China. And significantly, most religious believers live in the countryside; even among Chinese Christians, 80% are in the countryside. This is a big number that we need to remember, and it is not easy to change the mindset. So when looking at the Chinese situation, we should bear in mind the difference between the Christians in the city and in the countryside. Thank you.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Gao, for your explanations about the inter-faith relationship, the young Chinese people's attraction to Christianity and its possible reasons, the Chinese government's attitude toward religions, and folk religion, which is mentioned in the handout but was not covered in the presentation due to the time limit.

Now, Professor Suh, please.

(Suh) I would like to start by thanking the two commentators for their comments. I believe that the Reverend Shastri's first question is about similarities and differences between Korean Christianity, which has developed in a unique manner against a particular histor-

ical background characterized by patriotism, and global Christianity; and between the characteristics of Korean Christianity, which is sending out many missionaries all over the world today as was done in the traditional 19th-century missionary movement, and those of universal Christianity. In my opinion, Christianity in all countries and all parts of the world, and not just in Korea, has, to varying degrees, both local characteristics and elements of universality.

In my presentation today, I have emphasized the historical experience undergone in common by Korean Christians and Koreans at large, rather than the religious and theological characteristics of Korean Christianity. I hoped to express that the special historical process experienced by both Koreans and Korean Christians has greatly impacted on the presence of Christianity in today's Korea.

I would say that Christianity in Korea, as compared to other Asian countries, is characterized by its relatively conservative position, one that is more in line with the Western Christian tradition. I think this is a reflection of the high societal, political, and religious expectations that the Korean Christians have had of the West, and the United States in particular, since the beginning. This is, as I said earlier, deeply related to Korea's special historical experience of colonization by Japan. Consequently, today's Korean Christians began to take a great interest in worldwide missionary work, as did the United States of the 19th to 20th centuries, dispatching missionaries all over the world to propagate Christianity, although the two situations may be quite different in theological terms. In my presentation, I tried to explain in particular that the identity and the historical position of Korean Christianity, as illustrated by such developments, will all change in the future.

The Reverend Shastri's other question concerns how Korean Christianity views other religions—that is, an issue of inter-faith relationship. In fact, I think Professor Lee, who will speak in tomorrow's session, is more qualified to speak about this issue than I am. Briefly, just as Korean Christianity tends to be conservative on the whole, in theological principle it supports interfaith dialogues, while in actual practice it take an extremely exclusionist attitude toward other religions.

So far the questions have been relatively easy to handle, but now I must try to respond to Professor Asano's question with a heavy heart. I do not think that ethnicism is a good, ideal ideology. I think we can count in the history of mankind more harm than admirable achievements resulting from ethnicism. Korea represents a somewhat different case. Ethnicism has been embraced as a beautiful ideology for two reasons. First, the Koreans shared the sentiment that ethnicism was the best, strongest ideological tool to restore our sovereignty under Japanese rule. It was not a perfect approach, but it was expected to be about the best in the face of the reality of one nation divided in two amid ferocious ideological confrontation.

I used the term "new ethnicism" to express the ideology needed to achieve Korean reunification today, distinguishing it from the anti-Japanese nationalism that was needed and nurtured at a point in history in order to achieve independence from Japan. Just like this old ethnicism, the new ethnicism has no long-lasting value.

I think I have naturally moved into Professor Asano's second question, which is about the significance of reunification for South Korea, despite its enormous economic cost. The general sentiment shared by Koreans is that we must strive for reunification, at any price. We believe that once we achieve this goal, Koreans can move forward in a new direction. I believe that it is the duty of the Korean church and Korean Christianity to respond to this earnest wish of the people.

Thank you for your attention.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Suh, for your responses to the questions about the characteristics of Korean Christianity, its relationship with other religions, ethnicism, and the economic cost of reunification.

Discussion

(Chair) Since we have about one hour, I would welcome questions and comments from the floor. If you wish to speak, please press the microphone button and identify yourself.

(Solihin) Thank you very much Mr. Chairman for giving me the time for getting more clarification on certain issues regarding the religious life, especially in China. Prof. Gao Shining, throughout your presentation, I was really fascinated to hear about the development of Christianity in China, which has enriched my understanding. My limited knowledge about China derives from my association with the Chinese communities in any part of the world where I have come across them.

In Malaysia, for instance, the Chinese represent 40% of the whole population and I have found those Chinese people to be very strongly committed to their own religions. And at the same time, in Indonesia, I find these days that Chinese religions are well responded to by their people, and that certain religious festivals have now become official. If we look to Europe in the same period, we also find that Chinese adhere very strictly to their own religions.

Now, looking at current phenomena, I think that Marxism these days has lost the market everywhere. On the issue of globalization, I am talking about globalization's positive aspects, not the negative aspects. Of course I do not subscribe to globalism because, to my understanding, globalism becomes the new religion at the same time. But, for me, globalization can be used as a positive means for convincing people into genuine religiosity.

On the one hand, the policy of the Chinese government toward religion worries me. But at the same time, the Chinese are very strict with their religion. So, is only one of the religions genuinely accepted by the Chinese government? This is one issue.

On aspects of the other religions in China, you mentioned that there are 18 million Muslims in China, if I am not mistaken. But the information that I heard from my Muslim friends, and also from Muslim students at the university in which I am lecturing, is that there is no official census being done by the government at the moment and that some claim that the Muslim population in China even exceeds more than 50 million. That is what they said: 50 million.

So if the reality of the situation is such that the government keeps putting pressure on Christianity and other religions, then perhaps my suggestion would be this: is there any way that the religious leaders might form a sort of a council of religions across different denominations? Such a council of religions then becomes an effective tool toward the end to persuade the government. Because whatever it is, it sounds to me like, on the individual level, some members of the government do not officially subscribe to Christianity and nowadays reject Christianity because of the matter of their jobs—that is, while still performing their governmental jobs—though some might think that, after retirement, they could consider Christianity.

At the same time, I think that most of the religious leaders are very serious. I think this is part of the task of religious leaders: they try to convince people that religion is in no way detrimental to the national interest. Interestingly, what my Muslim colleagues from China told me is that the Muslim population there successfully convinced the government of this, so that some religious activities have been facilitated by the government. This means that perhaps now religious people—whatever religion they belong to—if they can demonstrate this role positively to the government, they can become effective agents of promoting the national interest.

Do you think that you cannot convince the upper class leaderships of the Chinese in order that religion is officially accepted? It is really such a pity to hear from you that when Christians wanted to celebrate Christmas, the electricity malfunctioned in the Beijing church.

This is why there is this need for continuous effort on the part of the religious leaders. In addition to that, in my understanding perhaps, and this is based on my humble experience as well, these religious councils, when really approved by all the religious leaders, become an instrument to convince the leadership of the government. Thank you very much.

(Chair) This question has been asked by Dr. Solihin from the International Islamic University of Malaysia. Professor Gao, would you like to respond, please?

(Gao) As for the number, I should say that there are some different figures; 18 million is not my number, but comes from the official statistics. Regarding Christians, for example, in my paper I mentioned a figure of 20 million, but the number comes from the official Christian organizations. In my opinion, this number does not include the believers among the family churches. On the other hand, someone thinks that there are 70 million Christians in the whole of China, but I think this number is too big. I believe the real figure may be between 20 million and 70 million. Thank you.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Gao. The Chinese government adopts different attitudes toward different religions.

Are there any other questions or comments? Yes, Professor Kohara, do you have a question? Please.

(Kohara) Kohara of Doshisha University. I would like to ask Professor Gao a very simple question. Professor Gao said earlier that her recent book was published in Hong Kong but not in mainland China. I think it is unlikely that Professor Gao criticizes the Chinese government in her book. In that case, there must be very severe governmental censorship. Or does this mean that any books on Christianity, regardless of what they actually say, are not published in mainland China?

I have another question for the two presenters. This is related to the theme of the overall workshop. When we discuss religious revival in East Asia, we can link it with several keywords, and so far we have heard modernization, nationalism, and the like. In the Middle East, Europe, and North America, on the other hand, religious revival is inseparable from the issue of secularization. I wonder if this has not been the case in Korea or in China: hasn't the question of secularization emerged at all? In religious studies, religious revival and secularization are twin topics that are treated always in a pair. In East Asia, on the other hand, religious revival seems to be very often examined in connection with nationalism.

Now, please allow me to explain the background to my question and why I ask such a question. First I would

like to give a brief description of the Japanese situation, since there is no presenter from Japan in this session. Japan's modernization as a state was modeled on the European state, which is a secular state. Having visited Europe, the Japanese political leaders and intellectuals of the Meiji era decided that Japan should be a secular state, in which religion and State would be separated. As it turned out, Japan did not succeed in becoming a totally secular state; rather, it failed completely. That is to say, State Shinto and Shintoist nationalism appeared later, turning Japan into an extremely religious state. In this sense, we can say that Japan reinforced State Shinto in the process of building its nationalism, while at the same time embracing a transnationalist policy under the slogan of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone, as it was known in those days. Needless to say, this transnational orientation caused devastating damage to other Asian countries.

These nationalist and transnational movements of modern Japan are closely related to Japan's failure in secularization, and constitute a subject which cannot be avoided when we examine today's Japan. So I am interested in the issue of secularism in Korea and China.

(Chair) First of all, Professor Gao, could you respond to the question regarding Christian publications in China, please?

(Gao) For most Christians I met, they do not think of nationalism or transnationalism. In fact, they just want to spread the Gospel to the whole people, to everybody. I asked many believers or Christians with doctorates or masters degrees, "Do you think of the relationship between your belief and modernization and globalization?" or something like that. And they said, they never think of it.

But I should say, a few Christian scholars, young scholars, do think about these things. Of course they do not agree with nationalism, extreme nationalism. For example, some young people take an arrogant attitude towards Japan, against Japanese food and goods. And a few young Christian scholars were worried about this irrational phenomena and criticized it.

(Suh) Professor Kohara, thank you for your question. To be exact, when Christianity started to take on importance in Korea, this had nothing to do with the State, because the Korean situation was characterized by the separation of nation and State. Christian missionaries arriving in Korea from the United States believed in the separation of Church and State and in evangelism. That was the American style, which was slightly modified when accepted by the Koreans, creating as a result a peculiar environment in which their sense of nation and Christian faith were combined to take action with regard to problems of the State.

As for the Korean situation since 1945, which has been marked by the division of the Korean Peninsula and the Korean War, South Korea has been predominantly Christian. For example, in the government of President Rhee Syng-man, about 40 percent of the country's high-ranking political leaders and officials were Christians. The question was actually raised whether or not Christianity was the state religion. It was a peculiar way of running the country, not quite the same as how the clear separation of Church and State would be practiced. At about the same time, the relationship between progressive theologians and the military regime was somewhat confrontational. So, in this manner, the Korean experience, how Korea has accepted Christianity and brought it into the political realm, is quite different from that of other Asian countries, Europe, and the United States. I think that the situation is so complicated that it has not been fully analyzed yet in the theological context.

(Chair) Professor Kohara, any further questions on this subject?

(Kohara) No, thank you.

(Chair) Professor Matsumoto, would you like to speak? Please, go ahead.

(Matsumoto) My name is Kenichi Matsumoto. First of all, I would like to ask Professor Suh a question about the status of Christianity in Korea. I am given to understand that Christianity has spread remarkably in Korea, covering almost 40 percent of the population, because of its linkage with Korean nationalism. The figure I have today is 20 million Christians in Korea, which is one-third or 33 percent of the country's population. Meanwhile, according to Professor Gao, China has at least 20 million Christians, about 1.5 percent of the Chinese population of 1.3 billion. For your information, in Japan, official Christians—that is, baptized Christians belonging to a parish or church organization—amount to about 1.2 million people, barely one percent of the Japanese population. Compared to these last figures, one percent in Japan and 1.5 percent in China (with a minimum figure of 20 million, although I am not so sure if this is really true), Korea's 33 percent is indeed overwhelming.

I understand, as a reasonable explanation, the situation that has been described as the background to this expansion, about the anti-Japanese nationalism and later the anti-Communist nationalism pushing Christianity into the status of quasi-state religion. However, I find it difficult to understand fully how Christianity has attained that status, or how so many Koreans have completely turned to Christianity and away from more nationalist movements that emphasize Eastern scholarship, religions, and morality, as exemplified by the Eastern Studies movement that occurred when Christianity and Western cul-

ture were first introduced into Korea. Knowing this historical fact, I wonder if the anti-Japanese and anti-Communist movements really suffice to explain the Christian expansion in Korea. So that is my question for Professor Suh.

I also have a question for Professor Gao. I taught in China for a year, in 1983. China was then just at the beginning of its modernization, following the Cultural Revolution, which had ended not so far in the past. I used to see everywhere in China posters with State-imposed slogans telling people to preserve Chinese spiritual culture and to guard against the contamination of materialism. Now, about 20 years later, Professor Gao has said that there are those who seek a spiritual life, out of psychological unrest, among today's Chinese youth. I would like to know if the spiritual culture, which the government was telling the people to protect, had already been lost completely somewhere along the way. Can we say that today's Chinese youth are feeling unstable, realizing that traditional spiritual life, traditional moral values and such have been lost, and that, as a result, as many as 20 to 70 million Chinese have turned to Christianity in search of spirituality?

(Suh) Thank you for your question. First of all, let me correct the figure. I am not sure where Professor Matsumoto found that 33 percent, but Korean scholars today agree on about 25 percent. The percentages of Christians in the total population are about one percent in Japan, 1.5 percent in China, and at least 25 percent in Korea. Conservative ministers in Korea would exclaim at these figures, "This is God's work!"

In the liberated Korea of 1945, however, Christians accounted for only about 4.5 percent. So Korean historians and scholars of Korean church history today agree that nationalism only partially explains this explosion in the Korean Christian population. The number of Korean Christians increased particularly during the country's economic development from the 1940s to the 1980s, and during another period of economic development, under President Park Chung Hee's administration, which brought together capitalism and Christianity.

Another factor likely to explain the increase is obviously the Korean War. During this war, Koreans in both northern and southern parts of the Peninsula underwent some change in personal principles. We experienced serious life-or-death hardships and problems in daily life, and many individuals went through a major spiritual change. Studies by some religious scholars revealed that more than 50 percent of Koreans underwent religious conversion during the Korean War, and many of them embraced Christianity, which offered realistic hope to people. So I think that a number of dynamic factors within Korean history have combined to direct many Koreans towards Christianity. I should just add that between 20 percent and about 25 percent of today's Korean Christians were converted, not during the Japanese rule, but after 1945-1950—that is, during the Korean War—and from the 1960s to the 1970s.

(Gao) Thank you for your question. As you know, as for the spiritual life, of course in China things have changed greatly. I mentioned this in one of my articles. There are four steps involved in the search for some ideals and the spirit. After the Cultural Revolution we lost our belief, which was communism. At that time the people wondered, "What should we keep?"

But at the end of the 1980s, things changed a little. At that time there appeared an article with the title, "Why is the road in the future more and more narrow?" This article triggered a broad discussion in the whole country and many of the young people joined in the discussion, saying that there was no future, no hope. Anyhow there were a lot of young people who paid more attention to these kinds of questions.

Nevertheless, things changed a lot in the 1990s, especially at the end of the '90s, because the economy at that time developed quickly and people got rich. Materialism developed very quickly and the people—I should say, especially young people—often thought, "How can I get the best? What can make me happy?" and they often thought of themselves. This is the third step.

The fourth step, I think, is seen at the beginning of the new century, when it seems that many young people return to the original point. They just think, "We have many material things, we are very rich in material things, but we are very poor in spirit. We are not very happy." Many people asked this question: "Why, when we get rich, do we think we are unhappy?" So in this way, the question is brought into discussion again: What is the most important thing for human life?

I have noticed a certain phenomenon: when people get rich, when we do not worry about food and about clothes, we have enough room to think of our heart, to think of our spiritual life. I think this is the space for all the religions to play their roles.

The following summarizes part of my article mentioned above. As we look back at the last twenty years of reformation and openness, we can say that the majority of common Chinese people underwent a spiritual change generally, which may be divided into four stages:

1. The late seventies to the early eighties. Due to the disappointment of their original ideals, there was an experience of crisis in faith, confidence, and trust. There was nationwide discussion over the ques-

tion, 'Why is the path of life getting more and more narrow?' This reflected a widespread sense of disappointment, confusion, and search for meaning in the lives of young people.

2. The mid- to the late eighties. There began a period of reflection combined with criticism of the past. There was a renewed search for the ideals of truth, goodness, and beauty. A minority of people even tried to revive a sense of the sacred, to seek a higher spirit.

3. The nineties. The wave of openness in market economies created a new trend to "put all eyes on money." Many became richer than rich, while poor in spirit.

4. The turn of the century. This was a period of self-centeredness. Most people, especially the younger generation of only-child-born, were generally only concerned about themselves: "my feelings, my needs, my personal gain." Their life goals became more practical, worldlier. The new value system, especially for young people, has become making as much money as possible, enjoying life as much as possible, following the latest trends, and satisfying ones needs.

Thank you.

(Chair) Are there any other questions or comments?

(Seth) I would like to make a comment. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a comment.

(Chair) Yes, please.

(Seth) Thank you. We have listened with great interest to a wide variety of views expressed on religion and the intersection of religion and politics. We have listened to concepts of Western missionaries, we have listened to ideas about interfaith connections and we have also listened to the situation in China with great interest. May I just offer a few observations on this question of Western missionaries and Christianity?

I think we often forget that Asia has been the cradle of all the great world religions, including Christianity. Please let us not forget that Jesus Christ was an Asian. He did not speak French. He spoke Aramaic, and Professor Cohen sitting next to me will tell you that Aramaic is a Semitic language which has its origins in present day Israel and Palestine. Likewise, the great Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, and Sikh traditions of the Indian subcontinent, the Confucian/Taoist traditions of Chinese civilization, and of course the Shinto traditions of this country—these were all born in Asia.

The first Christians were Asians, long before the missionaries went to Europe. St. Thomas, the Apostle, came to the southern state of India, Kerala. The Syrian Christian community of Kerala today traces its decent to St. Thomas, the Apostle. Do not forget that Christianity came to Norway, the home of very strong evangelical missionaries, 1,000 years after it came to India. So Europe became Christian much later because it was basically pagan. There were no well-developed religions in Europe.

America became Christian because the white men moved there. The native Indian religions are very Asian. If you read the speech of Chief Seattle in the 19th century when he was asked to sell land, his views are very Asian. They are Hindu, Buddhist, and Shinto. "How can I sell land when land is my mother? When the river is my brother? When the deer and the birds are my mother and father?" So Christianity went to America for very different historical reasons.

Having said that, let me also say that of the three great world religions, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, Buddhism is the oldest. It is 2,500 years old and as Professor Gao said, it is now recognized as a Chinese religion. This is because as the Chinese ambassador to America, Hu Shih, said in 1945, "India conquered and dominated China for 20 centuries without ever sending a soldier across her borders." That is why the Chinese can now believe that Buddhism is a Chinese religion.

We heard this morning about the common Asian home, the common Asian house. It was Buddhism, before Christianity and Islam, that first created a common Asian home. Our professor from Malaysia was talking about Alberuni, the great Arab traveler, and Ibn Batuta, the other great Arab traveler. But before them, from your country Professor Gao—my pronunciation may be all wrong, but we call him Fahiyan and before him, Hiuen Tsang.

In the sixth century A.D., these great Chinese travelers and pilgrims came to my country and they translated great Sanskrit and Buddhist stories and scriptures and took them back to China. People from Japan in turn came to China, scholars like Kobo Daishi in the 12th century. Kobo Daishi is from Kyushu in Kagawa. They came and they met Indian pilgrims and scholars in China.

Later, as I said, Ibn Batuta and Alberuni from what is now the Middle East came to India. So there was, from Afghanistan and beyond, up to Japan, the creation of an Asian consciousness over the last 2,000 years. So as to the idea of a common Asian home, Professor Matsumoto mentioned Okakura Tenshin as very likely being a man who believed in the Asian consciousness.

So did Rabindranath Tagore, who visited many countries of the world and of Asia, including China and Japan, and who also saw this universality in mankind, this basic humanism which runs through all of us. This idea of a common Asian home I think is something that is not beyond the realm of possibility. It is something that every Asian can truly aspire to reach.

If I may, on the interfaith problem which Professor Shastri mentioned, like his country, we are involved in interfaith dialogues every day because India is a country of virtually every faith in the world. India is ruled today by three people, the three most powerful people in India. The President, Abdul Kalam, is a low caste Hindu convert to Islam. Therefore, he is a double minority belonging to the lowest caste and a Muslim. Now the Muslims are a minority of 140 million in India, so it is a large minority.

The Prime Minister is a Sikh, the people who wear turbans and who grow beards, and a religion that was born out of a confluence between the Hindu/Buddhist tradition and Islam. His people number 25 million in a country of 1.1 billion people. So what is that? Two percent? He is the Prime Minister.

And who is the leader of the coalition which governs India and to which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh belongs? She is a lady named Sonia Gandhi. And who is Sonia Gandhi? She is an Italian-born lady, a Roman Catholic from the Christian community numbering again 25 million, about two percent. And she is the most powerful person in our country, an Italian-born Roman Catholic.

So India experiences this interfaith dialogue on a daily basis. The whole process of the governance of a country like ours, as indeed a country like Malaysia, involves an interfaith dialogue. We are a United Nations in microcosm. Every Indian currency note carries seventeen languages on it. In China, I saw six. In our country, seventeen languages on every currency note. So we are a minor United Nations.

But back to current day problems. So what in fact is Indian identity? What is our national identity? If you look at it, it is a very confused situation. If you were to look at Buddhism and the contemporary message that it carries for us today, it is extremely modern. What does it say? That conflict never leads to progress or happiness. Every individual is responsible for his or her own destiny. It is very egalitarian because it says that every man or woman has the capacity to attain spiritual fulfillment and therefore, unlike the Confucian, every man and woman is worthy of equal respect. These are the tenets of Buddhism, of the Hindu/Buddhist tradition, which made it have such a universal appeal that from Central Asia through Southeast Asia through China up to Japan, it was a pervasive cultural and civilizational influence which has a very modern message. Thank you.

(Chair) Thank you very much. Are there any comments on Professor Seth's observations? Yes, a question? Yes, please.

(Ichikawa) Thank you. My name is Ichikawa. I would like to ask a question of the two presenters concerning one of the key terms we have had in this afternoon's session, "the role of religion." Some people have already asked questions regarding this subject, so pardon me if my question has an overlap with the previous ones.

When we contemplate the role of religion, we can think of its role in coping with individual inner problems, such as personal happiness and spirituality. Recently in Europe, the way religion is appropriated in this manner is referred to as the "privatization of religion." I think that this is certainly one role of religion.

Another role of religion has existed since olden times. Religion offers a value system upon which man sets out to fulfill societal duties, sometime even at the risk of his own life, in order to obtain and protect justice and freedom, for example, and to make offerings and sacrifices for his community or for humanity as a whole, instead of just himself.

Listening to Professor Gao, I felt that the interest that today's Chinese people take in religion can be considered a manifestation of the individual appropriation or privatization of religion. Thinking along this line and recognizing something in common between religion and the recent rise in Chinese nationalism, as attested by non-religious, anti-Japanese movements, I wonder if these activities play any part in developing a national identity or if they are simply a transitional phenomenon.

I also have a question for Professor Suh. Professor Suh spoke of the role of Christianity being linked with nationalism. In this process, which aspect of Christianity was emphasized? The Christian faith is also about risking one's life for freedom, not for individual happiness. I believe that offering oneself for the sake of freedom has been an issue in Christianity to which more importance has often been attached than love and justice. I have the impression, however, that the focus of Christian faith has been shifting toward personal happiness since the end of World War Two and amid the anti-Communist ideology in Korea. I would like to know what aspects of Christianity will be emphasized in the future if the new ethnicism that Professor Suh has suggested were to make progress.

(Suh) Thank you for your question. I think that the starting point of the question is that there are two roles of

religion and Christianity, and I agree with that. Between the two roles, one concerning personal happiness and the other about social duties, I think we can say that the second role was predominant during the first years of the Korean Christian Church. Then, the 1960s and 1970s passed, and now that Christianity has become a majority religion in the country, I think that its role relating to personal happiness is more emphasized in today's Korean Christian life. I think that people tend to expect more from an individualized, internalized Christianity so that they may attain individual spiritual peace and grace.

At the same time, however, I believe that there have been those who maintained their theological position that Christianity must fulfill this or that community function, although such people might have represented a minority in Korean Christian history. Korea still has many societal, national, and ideological problems to solve, including the issue of reunification, which is a major challenge for the nation. So the view that the Korean Christian church should more actively work on its social duties has been growing stronger amongst today's theologians, historians, and progressive Christians, as I mentioned in my presentation.

(Chair) Professor Ichikawa, could you repeat your question for Professor Gao, please?

(Ichikawa) My question is also related to what Professor Matsumoto said in the morning session about the precondition for an East Asian community being Japan's repentance for its errors in the Pacific War. I think that nationalism can have as strong an impact as religion on people, in that it can determine their future direction, how they live and think.

It is clear in our memory that the Chinese suffered from Japanese atrocities in the war just as the Koreans did as a result of the Japanese invasion. I would like to know if this recollection is playing any role in the forming and maintaining of the Chinese national identity today.

(Gao) This question might be beyond my paper. But anyway, I think if nationalism is carried out radically, it will become another religion. Of course, in today's China, many people have an arrogant attitude towards Japan and Japanese. Personally, I can understand this feeling, but I do not agree with the thinking and the actions.

I think history is history—which cannot be changed—but the important thing is that we should learn some lessons from history. The second is that we should keep the friendship. We should not forget the past, while at the same time we should keep the peace with other nations. This is more important than just remembering the past. This is my personal opinion. Of course, if most people hold this attitude, we can make some contributions to the peace of the world.

Since I thought that maybe somebody would ask me this question, I brought this newspaper, *Wen Xue Bao*, which is a very important newspaper in Shanghai. In it there is an article which says, "Besides Yasukuni Jinja, Chinese people should know more about Japan," and also, "Compared with the Japanese people, Chinese people know less about Japan, especially Japanese culture." So I think this is another voice. We should pay more attention to it. This is the first time that the newspaper is allowed to publish another voice. In the universities, many students have just one voice. They do not forget our past, do not forget our suffering from the Japanese. But they just think one side of these issues. And some intellectuals and scholars persist in this attitude. Just a few people take the different opinions seriously, but these opinions should be brought out. I think this is a new phenomenon in our country. Thank you.

(Chair) We are already past the scheduled closing time, but we can have just one more person if he or she really wishes to speak. Yes, please.

(Wadi) I do not know if this is a comment or a question, but I would like to follow up the point raised by our professor from India, Professor Aftab Seth. I think he raised essentially a question of irony. Why is it that, in Asia, we seemed to be surprised with the increase of the number of conversions to Christianity or maybe Islam when, in fact, this Asia is the cradle of Christianity, Islam, etc. Why are we quite surprised by this?

When you look at Europe for instance, or the West, there is this observation that religion is beginning to be less appreciated. For instance, churches are closing, very few students are going to the seminary, etc. In other words, can we simply attribute the popularity of religion to a spiritual vacuum affecting Asian people, like that mentioned in China, etc? Or perhaps, can we attribute it to certain external factors, such that, in the transition from the 20th to the 21st century, at a time when religion is beginning to be less appreciated in the West, they are trying to bring it here to Asia? At the time, Asia does not experience what the West had experienced, such as the decreased influence of the church and so on. Anyway, I do not know if this is comment or a question, but it just popped into my mind.

(Chair) Thank you very much. We are pleased to have heard a variety of opinions from a number of people, and we have learned a lot about the situations in China and Korea; going further than the scope of our session on certain points, and we might have digressed a little bit as well. I would like to thank again our two presenters and our commentators. Thank you very much. (applause).

CISMOR
International Workshop
2005

November 6 (Sun.)

Session 3

"The Crisis of National Identity and the Role of Religions in Southeast Asia"

Globalization and the Revival of Religions in Malaysia

Council of Churches of Malaysia SHASTRI, Hermen Priyaraj

I want to begin by expressing my thanks to Professor Koichi Mori, and the Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (CISMOR) of Doshisha University, for the invitation extended to me to participate in this important and timely workshop which bears the theme, "Modernization and National Identity in East Asia: Globalization and the Revival of Religion." I am confident that the deliberations of this workshop will offer us crucial insights on issues affecting Asian countries and on how religious communities are responding to rapid changes in an increasingly globalized world.

The political, economic, technological and social forces that seem to bind the world's nations into an increasingly interdependent whole are what gives globalization its name.

Although these processes had been emerging under the guise of internationalism in the Cold War era, it was only during the decade of the 1990s, at the demise of communist hegemony, that globalization became the dominant feature of the new world order. In essence, globalization can be defined "as the increase and intensification of interactions across state borders that involve all states and societies in a complex system of mutual interdependence, which as a result profoundly changes the role of nation-states and communities, as well as the traditional patterns of social and cultural life" (Kenrad Raiser, "For a Culture of Life," Geneva: WCC Publications, p. 3).

Captions such as *the global cultural bazaar*, *the global shopping mall*, *the global financial network*, and *the global workplace*, have been used to describe the ubiquitous dimensions of globalization's reach into every nation. For example, the *global cultural bazaar* promotes the notion of uniform cultural values and products across the world. It influences billions of people, shaping their goals and homogenizing their identities, values, and lifestyles primarily towards a consumer culture, through the incessant stimulation of material wants. The unprecedented increase in global trade, the buying and selling of goods and services among countries has also created *a global supermarket*. The *cultural bazaar* and *shopping mall* intersect through the vehicle of advertising, as the media has become a powerful tool controlled by a few global media barons who promote views biased toward the capitalist West. Even *the global financial market* has created new opportunities to search for quick profits. Driven by transnational finance, commerce, and investment, with component production centers that transcend national boundaries, transnational companies are able to amass billions of dollars in a short span of time. The increasing mobility of jobs has created global workplaces, which in turn has boosted international labour migration. Globalization, aided and abetted by the removal of national controls over cross-border financial flows and the computer revolution, has resulted in short-term capital entering and exiting markets at lightning speed. Because this capital is as massive as it is volatile, it is capable of wreaking havoc upon national economies that may not have the mechanisms to deal with it. All these prove the fact the globalization has become an all-encompassing and all-pervasive reality that shapes modern life. It is the sole social reality of the collective life of people and nations in our time, so potent and full of contradictions in terms of understanding human development that it presses upon everyone to come to terms with its opportunities and dangers.

The impact of globalization on religion and religious communities are hotly debated in academic circles. Are the religions losing out, remaining only as remnants of a pre-modern society as the thesis of secularization would have it? Would religious communities be able to withstand the homogenizing trends of globalization and would their cherished particular spiritual traditions eventually lose their vigor and vitality? Are the new religious movements manifestations of a search for spiritual meaning that can counter the negative effects of globalization?

Just as globalization imposes a "universalism" based on a materialistic view of life, the revitalization or revival of religion shows that it can also be said that globalization has contributed to people reasserting their religious identities within the context of a marketplace of competing spiritualities and worldviews. The mobility of people and religious identities from the South to the North and from the North to the South, the 'growing' religious fundamentalism, the increasing instances of violence in the name of religion and the proliferation of new religious movements—all have contributed to new awareness of religious plurality as a global reality.

In the long term, religions can only meet the challenge of globalization by countering it with an ethically more responsible face based on moral and spiritual values that redefine the true purpose of life on earth, and offer an

attentive worldview that is not based on greed, violence, and exploitation of people and the earth. The internalization of alternative religious and ethical values within the consciousness of the individual and the community is what seems to be driving the new religious movements of our time.

There are two levels at which religions can check the negative aspects of globalization and play an effective role. One is at the level of nurturing local religious communities with a spiritual resilience to the negative values promoted by globalization. Such communities should promote "Divine Ethics" that emphasize the dignity of human beings, the need to work for justice and peace, and the responsibility to protect God's earth.

In a truly God-conscious society, a significant segment of the citizenry would act against injustices and iniquities, uphold freedom and equality, and maintain harmony and equilibrium between individual and community and between community and environment. They would do this out of a deep awareness and understanding of their position as God's representatives on earth. A God-conscious individual is therefore also one who not only comprehends but also fulfils one's responsibility towards one's fellow human beings, and to the whole of the created world, out of a sincere commitment to justice and compassion arising from a profound love for God. Such individuals and such societies constitute the real antidote to the ill effects of globalization.

At another level, there need to be global efforts for religion to "civilize" globalization. For example, precisely to counter the "clash of civilizations" of Samuel Huntington, religious leaders related to the Parliament of World Religions managed to influence the United Nations to enlist the help of world religions in envisioning a world based on justice and peace for all. The United Nations took the bold step of declaring the year 2001 as the year for the "Dialogue of Civilizations." This move has given renewed prominence to the efforts of inter-religious dialogue and social action as a religious response to some of the challenges of globalization. Such "globalization of solidarity" is taking the form of effective global action against terrorism and world hunger, and for peace in the world.

The World Council of Churches with its decision to proclaim the "Ecumenical Decade to Overcome Violence (2001–2010)" carries the same spirit, and seeks to work with local church communities and people of other faiths around the world to move from being mere spectators of violence to becoming active agents in working for peace and reconciliation in the world.

Who are the agents to achieve such change towards overcoming violence? All the world's religions should and can become key players. Inter-religious dialogue for peace and justice in the world opens ways of resolving and transforming communal and religious conflicts. It is important to strengthen the ability of the adherents of different religions to accept, respect, and affirm their differences—not as mutually exclusive of, but as enriching and complimenting each other.

Inter-religious coexistence and dialogue is not something new in Asia, least of all in Malaysia. For ages religions have interacted, sometimes in peace and sometimes in war, and the many years of co-existence between religious communities have helped to shape national identities within a framework of plurality. Let us look at the example of Malaysia. Does the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic and religious groups offer an example worthy of emulation by other nations?

In the case of Malaysia, religion, ethnicity, and traditional culture are markers of social identity. The catchphrase used to promote Malaysia as a viable tourist destination, "Malaysia: truly Asia," is not without some truth. Malays, Chinese, Indians, and Indigenous communities ground their social identities and political loyalties to ethnic affiliation and religion. The government, since its independence in 1957, comprises an alliance of several political parties, each of which is ethnically based and each appealing to specifically ethnic constituencies.

The conjunction of ethnicity and religion in Malaysia dichotomizes the religious sphere into a Muslim and non-Muslim domain within a political context where 60 percent are Muslims and 40 percent represent the non-Muslims. The former is principally a Malay domain, since all Malays are Muslims by birth as clearly defined by a constitutional provision; they enjoy special privileges in the country. On the other hand, for the Chinese, Indians, and Indigenous communities, the connection between ethnic identity and religious affiliation is less rigid, as there exists a fluidity of movement among non-Malay ethnic groups to cross over to religions like Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Sikhism, Taoism, and Baha'i. Despite the relative looseness of the association between ethnicity and religion in the non-Muslim field, there is a clear sense of solidarity among non-Malays that they are together significant minorities in the country vis-à-vis a Muslim majority and Malay-led government.

Religious revival in Malaysia, within all the major religious communities, reveals two common traits. On the one hand, each religious community seeks to protect its own interests within a multi-faith context. On the other hand, there are emerging networks of inter-religious solidarity, where, due to abuse of power, corruption in high places, and the westernization of lifestyles affecting the young, calls of concern for joint action in dealing with such challenges are clearly evident, so as

to protect and strengthen religions' role in society. Both the government and civil society promote and hold inter-faith dialogues and social action.

Due to the brevity of time, I want to look only at one aspect of the revitalization of religions in Malaysia—that is, from the point of view of inter-religious dialogue.

First, a little about the context. When Malaysia achieved its independence in 1957, the country adopted a secular constitution with a provision that Islam will remain the official religion of the Federation (Article 3 of the Federal Constitution). In current academic discourse, the meaning of the word "official" is still being discussed. The Constitution also guarantees freedom of religion for all citizens in Article 11.

From the 1970s, in reaction to the rapid compartmentalization of life brought about by development and modernization, a growing interest in the endeavour to re-establish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, and Islamic laws in the lives of Muslims in the country was witnessed. It began with fringe groups agitating for change, which very quickly attracted a mass following and, in certain respects, began to reveal political ambitions. The state, in order to secure the support of its Malay electorate, began to institute pro-Islamic policies to strengthen its credibility. Signs of Islamic revival began to appear everywhere, from attire to dietary rules, to construction of mosques and to the formation of Islamic Banks.

In reaction, the non-Muslim communities, viewing the preponderance of Islamic values and symbols in national life, found strength and resilience for their own religious communities by the closing of ranks, rapid institutionalization of their national bodies, and frequent public pronouncements related to national issues. Non-Muslim religious communities have also come together in a show of strength with the formation, in 1983, of the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism. In another instance, the Christian Federation of Malaysia, formed in 1985, brought together Catholics and Protestants from mainstream and evangelical churches. Although Muslim institutions and groups never saw the need to be part of such inter-faith initiatives, that is now slowly changing—especially after the September 11, 2001 event.

Although the dichotomy between Malays and others in politics and communal life remains, Malaysians of all faiths live, interact, share, and participate peacefully and congenially in scores of everyday encounters, on a daily basis.

The current Prime Minister of Malaysia, who took office in 2003, has been consistent in formulating policies that promote and intensify peaceful coexistence through moderation in religion, and seek common ground for concerted action for justice and peace based on universally accepted religious values. However, this can only come about if the Muslim community in Malaysia adopts a stance of openness, and moves away from a political culture that seeks to maintain racial and religious differences among Malaysians.

In a recent effort of civil society and faith-based groups, a national conference on the "Initiative towards the Formation of the Interfaith Commission of Malaysia" was held on 24–25 February, 2005. The conference adopted a proposal draft bill for the government to consider implementing. The official response from the Prime Minister was to put it on hold.

The Interfaith Commission offers the country a chance to break away from the mould of the politicisation of religious differences and embrace a more conciliatory and consultative approach to the promotion of peace, harmony, and unity in the country.

In a sense, to counter the challenge of globalization, one should discard the narrow and exclusive concept of religion which often confines virtue and goodness to one's own kind. Even more important, like in the context of Malaysia, religious communities should become less exclusive and more pluralistic in outlook. It is as if social reality itself is forcing us to get rid of our exclusive attitudes and develop a universal orientation to our religion, which will be more accommodating of "the other." Indeed, one gets the feeling that each and every society is slowly, often painfully beginning to realize what "humanity as a single family" means. Perhaps this is the path that nations must take for a universal community founded upon our common humanity to emerge: to envision a world where diversity is celebrated, the dignity of persons is upheld, justice for all is ensured, and peace overrides other alternatives leading to violent action. It is a community that globalization will never be able to achieve.

When such a universal community of different religions and peoples bound by their common humanity becomes a reality, we will understand what the World Council of Churches "Decade to Overcome Violence" has been out to achieve to achieve: "Seeking ways to create a global culture of mutual respect and peace which will provide a model to those who bear responsibility for governance at all levels of society."

Islamic Revival and the Political Campaign of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: A Direct Challenge to Modernization and Globalization

Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia YUSANTO, Muhammad Ismail

Imperialism: A Core Problem

Liberalization, modernization and globalization are diplomatic or tactical words, which cover a singular meaning—i.e., imperialism. Imperialism is the policy, practice or advocacy of extending or imposing the power, dominion, and will of one nation on another, thereby subjecting it to exploitation.[1] Imperialism or colonialism (*isti'mariyah*) is an inherent method of capitalistic ideology to spread its global influence, which may be manifested in the form of political, military, economic, or cultural domination.

The 19th and 20th century colonization or territorial occupation of the Islamic World by the Western powers is a blatant form of imperialism—i.e. military conquest followed by exploitation of natural resources.[2] The cessation of militaristic imperialism, which came to an end in 1945 at the conclusion of World War II, had brought hope that imperialism itself would end once and for all. However, under the new term of "modernization," imperialistic machinations have put up an impressive, yet deceptive façade whereby the dominant political and economic pressures of the old masters are imposed upon their former colonies, largely Muslim states which appeared to have just won their independence. Modernisation, also known as "developmental policy,"[3] is in reality a set of post-World War II policies of the Western powers designed to maintain their grip on their former subjects.[4]

By the 1980s, after almost half a century had passed since the colonies either gained or were granted independence, modernisation had failed to improve the quality of life in much of the "third world." Poverty, poor development, and exploitation of natural resources by developed nations are evident and patent. In our time, industrialized nations, which comprise a mere 26% of the global population, command no less than 78% of total productivity, dominate over 81% of international trade, 70% of fertilizer production, and 87% of arms and ammunition. Meanwhile, the remaining 74% of the world population, comprising Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has to be content with one fifth of total world production.[5]

Even when confronted with these stark realities, imperialistic nations do not bother to stop or even pause their ongoing practices. On the contrary, they have continued with this exploitative effort to exert world domination, a natural tendency of capitalistic ideology which is based on greed. Moreover, in the mid-1980s, these nations launched a new initiative termed "globalization," which aimed to maintain their political and economic hegemony.

The globalization initiative, which stresses privatization, non-state intervention in economic policy, and absolute reliance on the "free-market," emerged with the advent of neoliberalism in the United States and the United Kingdom under President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher, respectively. Since then, globalization has been imposed on third world countries through international institutions such as the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank.[6]

Does globalization aim to increase prosperity? The answer is an empathic "Yes." It has certainly meant prosperity for the Western nations and has indeed reached an unprecedented level. On the other hand, the third world countries remain to live under the poverty line. According to a 1999 UNDP report, one-fifth of world population consumed 86% of goods and services while the remaining population, comprising the world's poor, consumed less than one percent.[7]

Therefore, modernization and globalization are empty slogans that do not contribute positively to a better world, and, especially, tend to diminish living conditions in the Islamic World. Furthermore, imperialistic nations are the sole benefactors in their efforts to exert unchallenged control over the world. This fact was shown more clearly at the end of the Cold War (or, the fall of the Soviet Union) when the United States emerged unchallenged as sole superpower. Moreover, U.S. supremacy was recently manifest in the unilateral exercises of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism agenda after the 9/11 tragedy, including war in Iraq and Afghanistan and the establishment of the USA PATRIOT Act.

In short, modernization, globalization, and more recently, the war against terror (i.e. the global war on terrorism), have fused into a single agenda: imposition of the imperialistic policies of Western capitalist nations on other nations, especially those of the Islamic World.

Imperialism and the Identity Issue

Western imperialism in all means or forms has generated a great deal of misery that is impossible to ignore in the history of mankind.[8] The exploitation of natural

resources or the humanitarian crises of the Iraq War, which began with the U.S. invasion in March, 2003,[9] are just two examples.

In addition, imperialism has caused major crises of identity in different communities across the world.[10] For example, the crisis of identity in the Muslim community is epitomised by secularization. In addition to the political, military, and economic domination that generally characterises imperialism, secularization has pushed for the separation of the Muslim community (*ummah*) from its Islamic values, norms, and rules. The secularized Muslim *ummah* does not have a choice but to live in a societal milieu endorsing capitalism, political opportunism, materialistic education, Western amoralistic and hedonistic culture, and syncretic religionism. These alien societal characteristics have led to Western ideological domination of the Muslim *ummah*.[11]

Moreover, Western-led secularism has also begun to permeate the Muslim way of thinking. The Muslim *ummah* has been an object of aggressive promotion of secular ideas, such as religious pluralism, democracy, the free market, human rights, interfaith dialogue, and feminism.[12] When Muslims are receptive to and supportive of such ideas, they will offer no resistance to further dissemination of Western culture.

Therefore, imperialism, which carries secularism with it, has forced the Muslim *ummah* to assume an unnatural identity, an identity that emanates from values, norms, and rules that are alien to Islam. The complete separation of Islamic values from the society as prescribed by secularism has aggravated further crises. Furthermore, under such a system Muslims lose sight of the Islamic creed, which demands total manifestation in all facets of life. Due to the secular mentality, the Islamic creed does not manifest itself in reality, but only in people's hearts and minds or during occasional individual moments at times of weddings, births, deaths, ritual practices, or the celebration of religious holidays. These selective and personal manifestations of the Islamic creed are clearly corrupt and manipulative schemes, taking away the proper position and function of Islam, which was revealed by ALLAH as a complete and comprehensive system to regulate human affairs. The Muslim community's collective loss or transformation of identity and character to values other than Islam (such as secular or capitalist) is inevitable when the process of secularization is complete. As a result, the honor of the Muslim community, which arises from its adherence to Islam as indicated in the Qur'an, will diminish accordingly.

It is apparent to Hizbut Tahrir that the identity crisis that plagues the Muslim *ummah* as a result of modernization and globalization is not an identity crisis in the sense of a nation-state identity. Rather, the crisis is over the identity of the Muslims as a single, unified, and indivisible *ummah*, instead of a nation-state.[13]

When examined under normative and historical perspectives, the Muslim *ummah* is a single *ummah* that is bound by Islamic values (*aqeedah* and *shari'ah*, creed and law). Muslims across the globe are supposed to live under the single and unified administration of the Khilafah Islamiyyah, instead of being scattered into fifty plus nation-states. The Muslim *ummah* is prohibited from being fragmented into shallow or narrow identities (tribalistic, ethnic, and so on) espousing nationalistic and patriotic sentiments. Thus, Hizbut Tahrir rejects nationalism and patriotism for both normative and empirical reasons.[14]

Launching from this point of view, Hizbut Tahrir also criticizes the inaccurate response from some elements of the Indonesian Muslim community who, in the face of the steady current of modernization, invoke the phrase *kearifan local* ("local wisdom"). This term is narrow, vague, and has no meaning,[15] other than being a fatalistic attitude and a kind of impotency. Instead, the Muslim community must deal with the identity crisis with decisive, articulate, and intelligent responses.

Hizbut Tahrir's View on Modernization and Globalization

Hizbut Tahrir was founded in Al Quds (Jerusalem) in 1953 by Shaykh Taqiyuddin an Nabhani (1908–1977), may ALLAH be pleased with him: a pious and honorable man, a thinker and writer, a statesman and politician, and a judge at the Shariah Court of Appeals in Al Quds.[16] Under Nabhani's and subsequent leadership, Hizbut Tahrir has been striving and expanding its influence to no less than 40 countries and millions of members and supporters in five major continents. In 1980, Hizbut Tahrir came to Indonesia, and went public in 2000 by sponsoring an international event "the Islamic Caliphate Congress" in Jakarta, and assumed the name "Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia."

So what is the main criticism that Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) raises against modernization? HTI is against the fact that modernization is deliberate social engineering, which seeks to transform a traditional society into a modern society using a Western paradigm.[17] Although social scientists have described modernization as merely a manifestation of an inquisitive spirit, anyone with an enlightened mind will perceive that modernization is, in essence, a secularization process.[18]

The advent of the western Renaissance was fueled by the rise of the capitalistic ideology with a secularist creed at its core. This new credo was reflected in a popular rejection of the combined Church and royal authority that had ruled Europe from the 5th to the 15th century.[19] Therefore, the revival of the West was intimately characterized by rejecting religious authority. Although

Chrisitianity proved to be incompatible with modernization, the blanket rejection of all religions is unfair. Islam is not Christianity. In fact, Islam served as an inspiration and a platform for an advanced civilization that spanned no less than 700 years in the Muslim world, known as the Golden Age of Islam.

Thus, secularism must be rejected because it is a thought that is alien to Islam and has no connection whatsoever with the history of the Muslim *ummah*. Secularism is typically a local Western experience that is not universal in nature and therefore cannot be forced or imposed on an Islamic world that differs from its Western counterpart in so many of its characteristics. Th. Sumartana, an Indonesian and a Christian thinker, has stated frankly:

> What had taken place in the West in term of the relationship between Religion and the State has been a local feature, limited, and non-universal. Moreover, the resulting principles cannot be taken as a magic bullet to cure a complicated relationship between Religion and State in other parts of the World.[20]

However, the rejection of modernization does not mean the rejection of science and technology. The pursuit and mastery of diverse fields of science, such as medicine, engineering, mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, agriculture, industry, transportation, telecommunications, oceanography, geography, and so on, is inherently encouraged as long as they benefit and improve the welfare of mankind. These scientific fields are universal and value-free, and the Muslim community is allowed to adopt and apply them as long as they do not contradict the Islamic creed (*aqeedah*) and rules (*shari'ah*).[21]

Thus, HTI rejects modernization because of its secular agenda and implications for Indonesia, seeking as it does to extend western neo-imperialistic ambitions that had begun in the middle of the 20th century. As a response, HTI has promoted the application of Shariah. In 2002, concomitant with the annual General Meeting of the Peoples Consultative Assembly, HTI promoted "Save Indonesia with Shariah." The objective of this campaign is to save Indonesia from the pit of multidimensional crises with a comprehensive application of the Shariah at all levels of the society.

HTI's evaluation is that political, economic, social, and cultural crises are not caused merely by economic or political factors, but are rooted in the application of a secularistic system that is not based on the Shariah. From the Islamic point of view, transgression of the Shariah will lead to *fasad* (chaos, corruption). Accordingly, the multidimensional crisis is *fasad* due to the application of a secular system that does not seek solutions from the Shariah.

Besides the application of a non-Islamic system, HTI contends that Indonesia's multidimensional crises are caused by an untrustworthy leadership which was not held accountable to the Shariah. As to the issue of leadership, HTI sponsored a long march in Jakarta on September 11, 2004 that attracted 10,000 participants. Its theme was "Reject Secular Leadership and Uphold the Shariah and Khilafah."

HTI has also taken a firm stance on the issue of globalization. HTI views globalization as another form of Western imperialism, which specifically targets the Muslim *ummah*. Globalization cannot be understood with naivete. Globalization is not simply a process unifiying different regions of the world into a big village by means of the extraordinary achievements of telecommunications and information technology. Moreover, globalization represents not merely the integration of local economies into an international economy by removal of all sorts of tariffs or other trade restrictions. Globalization, in essence, is an act of universalizing capitalistic ideology, with local economies being the main target of neo-liberal principles imposed by international institutions such as the IMF, WTO, and World Bank. These institutions have been established to facilitate all efforts to dominate and exploit weak nation-states. It had been expected that the world would embrace capitalistic ideology without any meaningful resistance. After all, capitalism is the historical victor, having defeated communism in 1991. But HTI rejects all kinds of neo-liberal economic agendas, since they are part and parcel of Western imperialism.

Globalization and liberalization entered Indonesia with the signing of an LOI (Letter of Intent) in 1998 by then-President Suharto of Indonesia and M. Camdessus, an IMF representative, following a monetary crisis that had swept the country. Some conditions that are mentioned in the LOI include removal of state subsidies, privatization, and liberalization. Some of those conditions, such as the removal of fertiliser and fuel subsidies, have now been implemented, leading to price increases for two critical commodities that hit the people hardest. In conjunction with the liberalization of the energy sector through the Energy Act 2001, which abolishes the monopoly of the state oil and gas company PERTAMINA by 2005, the removal of the fuel subsidy was followed by the entry of foreign energy companies. Therefore, IMF's invisible hands and its partners have exploited Indonesia's natural resources with both ease and legitimacy. Is there any other term to better describe this phenomenon than neo-colonization or economic imperialism?

Another example of the proliferation of neoliberalization in the Indonesian economy is the Water Resource Act 2004. This Act outlines many points that open the way to the privatization of water, effectively transform-

ing water from a public property into a commercial commodity. Therefore, HTI, along with other Muslim components within Forum Umat Islam (FUI), sponsored a public debate and massive demonstration in Jakarta on April 29, 2005 rejecting the liberalization of water through the Water Resource Act. FUI issued a statement that this Act must be rejected and replaced with regulation that conforms to Islamic Shariah, which protects the people by providing access to water as their basic need and regulates water distribution with justice.

HTI has paid extremely close attention to the liberalization manoeuvers by global capitalists on soft targets such as the management of natural resources. Recent liberalization moves have taken place in the Cepu oil and gas fields. In the public seminar by IAGI (Association of Indonesian Geologists) to which HTI was invited, the recent extension of the government's contract with Exxon-Mobile has been discussed and found to be questionable. The contract extends Exxon's right to exploit an estimated 1.3 million barrels of gas in the Cepu area which was supposed to have ended in 2010. Moreover, Exxon will acquire additional stock options and profit sharing. The seminar found that the decision to extend the contract was strange because it has neither technical nor historical merits. The only plausible explanation is the mounting pressure by the Bush regime supported by its business cronies in Indonesia. This is globalization, seeking to exploit the economic value of natural resources.

Conclusion: Give Islam a Chance!

In short, colonialization, modernization, and globalization are one capitalist agenda, which does not necessarily seek to improve the welfare of other nations. The failure to improve the quality of life in general is a natural consequence of capital owners reaping profits at the expense of exploiting their fellow human beings.

Therefore, capitalism fails to improve the global condition. Though signs of its weaknesses have begun to emerge, capitalism remains influential enough to exploit and to intimidate the Islamic World—as shown by the American version of the War on Terror. But obviously, the world has become fed up with blatant exploitation.

On the other hand, remnants of socialism, preserved in museums since the 1990s, remain in countries such as Cuba and North Korea. Nevertheless, even in those countries, socialism has transformed slowly toward capitalism.

Thus, Islam is humanity's last hope. It is time to give Islam a chance. In a matter of time, like it or not, Islam will eventually re-emerge as an alternative to capitalism. The Muslim *ummah* cannot be pressured any longer by an alien ideology that seeks to separate Islam from life. It is no longer possible for the Muslim *ummah* to drop its obligation to manifest Islam as the natural world order. At this critical juncture, Hizbut Tahrir challenges capitalism to step aside voluntarily and withdraw from its current position, or wait for Islam to subdue it at later time, *insha ALLAH*—God Willing. "He it is who has sent His Messenger with guidance and the religion of Truth that will dominate other ways of life though the polytheists hate it." (S. A. Maududi, *The Meaning of the Qur'an*, As-Saff [61]: 9)

———Notes———

1 Hizbut Tahrir, *Mafahim Siyasiyah li Hizb al-Tahrir*, (Undisclosed publisher: Hizbut Tahrir, 2005), p. 9.
2 Western Imperialism on Muslim states is discussed by Nur El-Ibrahimiy, *Catur Politik Imperialis di Negara-Negara Islam/Imperialist political manuevers in Islamic States*, (Bandung: N.V. Alma'arif, 1955).
3 Detailed elaboration on post-World War II modernization in developing countries can be seen in Harold Crouch, *Political Development and Modernization*, (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1982).
4 Hasyim Wahid et al, *Deception of Global Capitalism in Indonesian History*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), p. 16.
5 A dramatic description of the failed development in third world countries is shown by Rudolf H. Strahmn, *Poverty in Third world countries: Failure of Developmental Programmes in Developing Countries* (*Warum Sie So Arm Sind*), translated by Rudy Bagindo, (Jakarta: Pustaka Cidesindo, 1999). Also see Arief Budiman, "Developmental Crises" in *Developmental Theory of Third World Countries*, (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1996), pp. 113–120. Also see critiques on development and globalization by Mansour Fakih, *Incoherence of Developmental Theory and Globalization* (Yogyakarta: INSIST Press dan Pustaka Pelajar, 2001).
6 Budi Winarno, *Globlalization: Manifestation of Neoimperialism: State's Roles in Development* (Yogyakarta: Tajidu Press, 2004), pp. 95–98. Also see Ivan A. Hadar, *Debt, Poverty, and Globalization* (Yogyakarta: Lapera Pustaka Utama, 2004); Bonnie Setiawan, *Questioning Globalization,* (Jakarta: INFID & IGJ, 2001).
7 International Forum on Globalization. 2003. *Globalizationing Poverty and Economical Gap* (*Does Globalization Help The Poor?*), translated by A. Widyasmara dan AB Widyanta, (Yogyakata: Cindelaras Pustaka Rakyat Cerdas. 2003).
8 World War I (1914–1918) killed no less than 21 million people, while World War II (1939–1945) claimed 35,513,877 victims with 8,543,515 dead. On the sixth day after the atomic bombs decimated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 210,000 to 240,000 people had died, in addition to the wounded and victims with lifelong disabilities (see Abul Hasan Ali An-Nadwi, *Madza Khasira Al-Alam bi-inhithath Al-Muslimin*, New York: IIFSO, 1986).
9 As noted by Johan Galtung, the 2003 U.S. military invasion of Iraq is the 69th invasion since 1945 and the 238th since the first American war against the Muslim population who resided in what is now Libya by Thomas Jefferson. Since 1945, various U.S. interventions in numerous nations have killed 12 to 16 million and more than 6 million people have been killed by the CIA. (Suparman dan Sobirin Malian, *Grand Ideas in American Intellectual History*, (Yogyakarta:

UII Press, 2003), p x.

10 In addition to the Muslim community, other religious communities such as Catholics, Protestant Christians, Jews, and Buddhists have also protested against the impact of global secular domination as a fallout of imperialism. Lebih lanjut lihat, Peter L. Berger (Ed.), *Kebangkitan Agama Menantang Politik Dunia* (*The Desecularization of The World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*), translated by Hasibul Khoir, (Yogyakarta: Arruzz, 2003).

11 Hizbut Tahrir, *Mafahim Siyasiyah li Hizb al-Tahrir*, (undisclosed publisher: Hizbut Tahrir, 2005), pp. 10–11.

12 See comprehensive analyses and critiques of western thought by Hizbut Tahrir in Abdul Qadim Zallum, *Democracy a Kufr system: Haraam to Adopt, to Apply, and to Propagate* (*Ad-Dimuqrathiyah Nizham Kufur Yahrumu aklhdzuha aw Tathbiquha wa Al-Da'watu Ilaiha*), translated by M. Shiddiq Al-Jawi, (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2001). Also see Hizbut Tahrir, *Al-Hamlah al-Amirikiyah li Al-Qadha` 'ala Al-Islam*, (Undisclosed publisher: Hizbut Tahrir, 1996); Abdul Qadim Zallum*, Dangerous Perceptions to Attack Islam and to Strengthen Western Civilization* (*Mafahim Khathirah li Dharb Al-Islam wa Tarkiz Al-Hadharah Al-Gharbiyah*), translated by M. Shiddiq Al-Jawi, (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 1998).

13 Hizbut Tahrir distinguishes '*ummah*' from "nation." Ummah is a collection of people that is bound by a unique way or system of life (*majmuu'ah al-naas tarbuthuhum thariqah mu'ayyanah fi -al-'aisy*). On the other hand, 'nation' (*al-sya'b*) is a collection of people who live in a land and originated from the same descendancy or lineage. (*majmu'ah al-nas alladzina min ashlin wahidin ya'isyuuna ma'an*). See Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *At-Tafkir*, (Undisclosed publisher: Hizbut Tahrir, 1973), p. 109.

14 Also refer to scathing criticism by Hizbut Tahrir on nationalistic and patriotic sentiments in Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *Nizham al-Islam*, (Undisclosed publisher: Hizbut Tahrir, 2001), pp. 22–23; also see Hizbut Tahrir, *Muslim Charter* (*Mitsaaq Al-Ummah*), translated by Abu Afif dan M. Maghfur, (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 1997). In *Muslim Charter*, Hizbut Tahrir condemns categorically the notion of nationalism and refers to it as "… evil bond and destructive discrimination. Islam denies and prohibits this kind of bond. Nationalistic thought has been propagated by the West in Muslim lands, resulting in the fragmentation of Islamic unity and creation of pseudo-independent Muslim statelets. The danger of nationalism is to destroy the Muslim *ummah* and the Islamic Caliphate. …Therefore, nationalistic propaganda is a grave sin and a blatant crime. Moreover, to crush nationalism and its propaganda is a religious duty that carries the same level of obligation as jihad" (Hizbut Tahrir, *Muslim Charter*, pp. 19–21).

15 For instance, see Saifullah Yusuf, "Rekonstruksi Tradisi dan Kearifan Lokal untuk membangun Demokrasi Indonesia," Imam Subkhan (Ed.), *Siasat Gerakan Kota Jalan Untuk Masyarakat Baru*, (Yogyakarta: LABDA, 2003), pp. 61–62. Also see Zakiyuddin Baidhawy dan Mutohharun Jinan (Ed.), *Religion and local cultural pluralism*, (Surakarta: PSB PS UMS, 2003).

16 Hizbut Tahrir, *Understanding Hizbut Tahrir* (*Hizbut Tahrir*), translated by Abu Afif and Nurkhalish, (Bogor: Pustaka Thariqul Izzah, 2002), p. 34.

17 Harold Crouch, *Political development and Modernization* (Jakarta: Yayasan Perkhidmatan, 1982), pp. 12–21.

18 *Ibid*, p. 13.

19 Taqiyuddin An-Nabhani, *The System of Islam* (*Nizham al-Islam*), (Undisclosed publisher: Hizbut Tahrir, 2001), pp. 27–28.

20 Th. Sumartana, in a foreword of Robert Audi, *Religion and secular mindset in a liberal society* (Yogyakarta: UII Press, 2002), p. xiv.

21 Abdul Qadim Zallum, *Democracy a Kufr system: Haraam to Adopt, to Apply, and to Propagate* (*Ad-Dimuqrathiyah Nizham Kufur Yahrumu aklhdzuha aw Tathbiquha wa Al-Da'watu Ilaiha*), pp. 40–41.

Philippine Islam and Globalization: An Exploratory Essay

University of the Philippines WADI (ibn Adduk), Julkipli Miluhon

This paper explores certain issues having to do with contemporary Islam in the Philippines and certain aspects of globalization. It also examines the intersection of language and politics among the Moros, an ethno-linguistic group in Southern Philippines. It underscores the way language is represented and *re-presented* and made to play a part in the struggle for power and history. Finally, it also discusses the Moro struggle and its subsequent configuration and implications.

As has been observed, Philippine Islam is entering a new phase. For quite some time, it has evolved from an essentialist mold of the *salafiyah* strand of Islamic thought, even, sociologically speaking, as it continuously veers away from the traditional and indigenous garb of Southeast Asian Islam and strikes an exceedingly active posture in the pursuit of political struggle and liberation. As a consequence, it inevitably adds a new layer of tensions vis-a-vis the State, despite the backdrop of the generally diverse and plural character of Islam in the Philippines.

It is contended that while this development is mainly triggered by the need for social reform in the Muslim community, due to the context of the unresolved Moro

struggle for self-determination the quest for reform is inevitably made to clash head on with the State and its interests. Moreover, the tension is magnified as the accumulating and continuing rush of modernization, postmodern influence, and globalization redefine the traditional mold of state construction and nation-building, a trend particularly evident in the Moro South.

Such a development is certainly the product of many factors, which are unique to the configuration and dynamics of Islam in the Philippines as it evolves a new "persona" due largely to its rather unique form of development—that is, independent from and outside of the Philippine State, and in light of the latter's failure to "integrate" Philippine Muslims into the mainstream body politic.

Moreover, this new form takes on a character beyond the traditional domain of Islam in Southeast Asia because the dominating structure of the nation-state system and political arrangements in the region leave many minorities, cultural communities, and indigenous peoples in limbo. Many of them are forced to take an ambivalent position vis-à-vis both the state and their community. This leaves them with limited options even as they become vulnerable to the sway of outside forces and influences. While others allowed themselves to be integrated into an otherwise new and imposed political and economic system, many minorities were forced to assert their rights and identity, for the most part due to the wide disparity and asymmetry of their traditions, interests, and aspirations from those of the respective national states. It is therefore no coincidence that the appropriation of Islam by Muslims in the Philippines heavily reflects this latter development; it is because of the depth and continuity of the Moro struggle, its resilience, tenacity, and ability to adopt a new mode of political struggle and a new form of social engagement.

The characteristics of Islam in the Philippines have always been closely associated with the pattern and historical development of Islam in Southeast Asia, which has long been determined by historical affinity, geographical propinquity, relative cultural homogeneity, commercial relations and trade, people-to-people interaction, and so on. However, with but a few exceptions, while the rest of the Malay world was generally successful in de-colonizing their respective homelands, the Moros were not. Their struggle was subsequently buttressed by an unkind and cruel vicissitude of history mostly beyond their control, even as they were left practically alone defending the last frontier of Islam in Southeast Asia.

This happened at a time when Moro society had been substantially left behind by the new paradigm of development, in particular that new phase of economic integration captured by today's buzzword, globalization. According to Professor Ali Mazrui, director of the Institute of Global Cultural Studies and member of the Faculty of Humanities at the State University of New York, globalization "consists of processes that lead toward global interdependence and the increasing rapidity of exchange across vast distance." In this regard, no society, not even the Mindanao, is spared from globalization—the effects of which may take positive and negative forms.

On the positive side are the facilitative effects produced by global communications, transportation, and economic transactions across the world. In terms of development and trade, traditional barriers are torn down, paving the way to economic integration as the world economy is opened to practically all players in both developed and developing countries. This means that while each country has a role to play, it must be able to recognize and know how to develop its capabilities and to effectively advance its competitive edge. On the other hand, the negative effect of globalization is that it can become an instrument of hegemony by powerful countries as they concentrate power and impose their will on small nations. In this instance, the global market can be dictated by powerful countries and become an instrument to dominate developing ones.

There is no denying that globalization elicits tremendous impacts on many societies, albeit in varying degrees. The homogenizing power of globalization induces change in social systems and puts pressure on cultural, religious, and linguistic tradition. In most cases, it forces communities to open up to external influences, which may broaden, supplement, threaten, and even supplant prevailing tradition, norm, and practice. Types of society and forms of cultural practice, including religious tradition, determine the degree to which globalization can effect change by de-localizing culture and imposing supra-territorial influences which are generally foreign to local community. So, it can be said that the impact of globalization is partly dependent on the degree of foreign influences and partly on the degree of social malleability, the ability of local institutions to cope with global change. Clearly, one society may be more vulnerable than another.

The form of social changes triggered by globalization varies from one society to another, considering the fact that there are societies which are either hard or easy to crack due to varying circumstances of geography, history, colonial experience, economic development, religion, culture, and so on. Yet, with rapidly "changing temporal and spatial contours of human activity" brought about by new economic production, communications, transportation, and technological revolution, no society is invincible against globalization. Obviously, what transpires most clearly are the various human

responses, ranging from acceptance with open arms to careful selection, utter suspicion, even outright rejection and political struggle to contain global influence. How a society copes either positively or negatively with social change is thus crucial to understanding globalization and its impact.

Broadly speaking, where institution, socio-political and economic structure, and value system have been honed by the tradition of Western liberalism, democracy, capitalism, the free market, freedom of speech, and human rights, society is expected to experience a relatively smooth interface with the changes imposed by globalization. After all, the latter is generally understood as an offshoot or ramification of the above-mentioned Western tradition. In contrast, where social, political, and economic structure remain feudal, where the fundamental institutions and economic system remain unreformed, the impact of globalization can be problematic as there are no appropriate structures, mechanisms, or properly crafted safety valves to ease its impact on people. Globalization may thus heighten social tensions related to ethnic and political consciousness, and even promote exclusivity and aggravation between members of a social group or against others. More particularly, it can trigger the emergence of language politics, which are new, controversial, and oftentimes, politically loaded.

Generally, language politics are oral and written communications which describe the interaction of people with social institutions, power, culture, politics, influence, and so on. In a sense, they are neutral categories used to describe and to understand human activities and social processes. They generally transpire in relational terms: that is, through vertical and horizontal degrees of social interaction. Thus, language politics that grew in the context of a center-periphery relationship may be different from the language that evolves between one ethnic group and another.

The depth and the breadth of language politics are directly related to a people's psychology and understanding of their society and their politics. A people's colonial experience and their struggle for power and identity may also reinforce it. Usually, language politics surface powerfully during crises in which antagonists proffer varied descriptions, distortions, and propaganda against each other. Finally, despite the fact that language politics can sometime border on half-truth, double meaning, and stereotype, they can be accepted and imprinted on people's psychology, customs, and arts for long periods of time, especially after they are legitimized by power, media, culture, religion, and so on.

As globalization heightens it impact, language, being in the front line of cultural identification and the primary instrument used by people to relate with others, can take on new *motif* and genre, new meaning, and new consequence as it is interlaced with social problems and people's interests. Language is transformed from being an objective instrument of communication into a scheme of politics, ideology, and power. Where conflict and power relations between antagonistic groups are asymmetrical, say, in the relationship of the State vis-à-vis a minority, language politics may carry certain meanings that characterize the extent of social distance, cultural polarity, and political difference.

As State or group (or any entity for that matter) limit, protect, and advance their interests to the detriment of others, language is not far from becoming an instrument of representation and image-making, a portrayal whose facts and purported truths can possibly border on untruths, myths, and lies. "It needs to be made clear," Edward Said pointed out, "about cultural discourse and exchange within a culture that what is commonly circulated by it is not 'truth' but representations." Said further states:

> It hardly needs to be demonstrated again that language itself is a highly organized and encoded system, which employs many devices to express, indicate, exchange message and information, represent, and so forth. In any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a re-presence, or a representation.

The State, being the reservoir of the interests of dominant groups, can succumb to the use of the language of representation and can even employ propaganda masquerading as scholarship and objective research—as seen in texts of literature, history, and other social sciences. Amid this mass of materials, "the things to look at," Said suggests, "are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, *not* the correctness of representation nor its fidelity to some great original." As a form of language politics, the language of representation is therefore a rather subjective mode of defining an image of the other in pursuit of one's aims, interests, and orientation. The effectiveness of such an enterprise is logically dependent on power, control, and resources. In contrast, in cases where power and resources are relatively subdued, language politics may carry certain *motifs* that are equally controversial, pungent, and radical.

Language politics can thus be situated in the context of identity formation and partly also in the discourse of language representation. As the Philippines identifies herself with the dominant discourse of politics, including the rhetoric of the global war on terrorism, the Moro community—particular the militant quarter of it—is emboldened to identify further with the political thought and rhetoric in the Islamic world. Hence, apart from asserting distance from the Philippines and its culture

and symbolism, the Moro rhetoric also creates some distance from their own indigenous tradition through the Islamization and Arabization of their language. Instead of reifying Moro history and the exploits of their heroes, they end up identifying with Islamic personalities that do not have any relation with their culture and tradition, except by virtue of their faith. This widens not only the wedge between Filipino and Moros, but also between Moros and their indigenous culture and tradition.

Globalization, in a sense, represents a double-edged sword in the language politics of the Philippines. With the rapid flow of information, communications, transportation, trade, and commerce, it has facilitated the promotion of the English language as the idiom of media communications. On the other hand, the same global phenomenon has also promoted Islam and other Muslim-related concerns. What makes the role of globalization different is the degree of impacts. While the majority of Filipinos at least have the government to address as an institution the challenge of globalization—even if with minimal success—the Muslim community has to contend with it on the level of their own institutions and tradition.

Language politics are ubiquitous in many societies. For its part, Philippine Islamic history is punctuated by intervals of language politics due largely to the Moros' long political engagement with the influence, over a wide stretch of time, of various civilizations responsible for shaping their worldview and enriching their political discourse and rhetoric. Reinforcing this is their epic engagement against colonial powers and post-colonial governments since the integration of Mindanao and Sulu into the wider sphere of geo-politics and the international economy.

Hence, critical stages of Moro history reveal significant forms of language politics associated with issues of colonialism, nation-states, and liberation struggle. These include ideologies, labels, stereotypes, and euphemisms, as well as the rhetoric of terrorism. An example would be how Moros were labeled through time under such euphemistic rubrics as *piratica*, "pagans," the "non-Christian tribe," a "cultural community" or "Muslim minority," "Muslim Filipinos," "Filipino Muslims," "Philippine Muslims," fundamentalists, terrorists, and so on.

It is undeniable that Moro languages have essentially remained fragmented as there are many ethno-linguistic groups comprising the mostly Islamized people in Mindanao and Sulu. Although there are instances of "linguistic influence" on one group by another, it is Tagalog (a language that originated in the Philippine North) that has become a homogenizing language which ties together, at least linguistically, the various Moro ethnic groups. While a host of State apparatuses play a crucial part in the promotion of Tagalog as the dominant language in Moro areas, recently it is the media that plays a very influential role in the proliferation of Tagalog in these areas.

The use of Tagalog among Moro ethnic groups has played both positive and negative roles in shaping their identity. From the perspective of the State, the continued familiarization with Tagalog among the Moros would signify improving Philippine attraction toward the Moros until their full integration into the Philippine body politic. From the perspective of some Moros, however, the increasing influence of Tagalog weakens their identity formation, which is not healthy at a time when the government is sending mixed signals on the matter of their struggle for self-determination. As such, this heightens Moros' identification with a different basis of identity formation, like Islam as a religion. Hence, Arabic, the language of Islam, serves as an equally potent force for the homogenization of the Moro as political and cultural community. Despite the ambivalence of the government with respect to promoting Islamic knowledge and the Arabic language, the Moros have established a wide range of institutions (e.g, madrasa, mosques, dawah centers) among themselves. As Islam and Arabic language become a source of identity distinct from the State's project of continuing Filipinization through the promotion of Tagalog in Moro areas, language becomes a terrain of contestation, effecting thereby new rhetoric, political discourse, labels, and meanings in the politics of identity formation in the Philippines.

Recently, globalization resurrected a new form of language politics amid heightening international, cultural, and state hegemony vis-à-vis resurgent ethno-nationalism and politicized Islam sweeping across the Muslim world, which happened to have gained distinct political mooring and ideological grounding in the Philippine South. Never in the history of the Moro struggle had discourse on *jihad*, on the one hand, and international terrorism on the other, gained much ascendancy in Philippine-Muslim debate. The resuscitation of such contentious discourses—their content and representation—have crystallized the extent of conflict beyond guns and bullets. Undeniably, while language politics is also shown in Moro internal relations, it is the broader rhetoric of Moro nationalism and struggle against the Philippine colonial state and global hegemony that predominantly gains currency as the crisis worsens in Moroland.

Any discussion about Moro nationalism and its impact on Philippine politics must inevitably be framed in relation to the historical transformation of Moro colonial struggle, including the critical period in the formation of Moro nationalism coinciding with the receding power of Spain and the subsequent rise of *Pax Americana* in the 19th century. This period elicited a new historical conjuncture and subsequently defined the political trajec-

tory of Moro society, which was eclipsed by competing imperial powers. It consequently triggered the break-up of the old social order and paved the way to the transformation of the Moro colonial war, which led eventually to the struggle for identity and liberation decades later. Although the transformation was long and bitter, it nonetheless ushered in a new form of engagement in Muslim society that coursed through various phases.

As the transformation process developed in time, certain historical events intersected and overlapped as other issues carried over in other phases. These included: defense of sultanates and Moro fiefdoms; sporadic resistance during the Moro-American war; demand for assimilation and political tutelage in the United States; and, Filipinization in Moroland. Soon the transformation gave way to the birth of Muslim secessionism and Islamic fundamentalism in the southern Philippines. Since much has already been written about the former, this essay would rather delineate Moro secessionism and fundamentalism in the context of Philippine Muslim experience.

It must be said that secessionism and fundamentalism are not mutually exclusive, but nor does the presence of one necessarily mean the existence of the other. Both phenomena belong to different political constructs with relatively different natures, characteristics, orientations, and objectives. Theoretically, secessionism is the logical consequence of ethno-nationalist resurgence that aims to forge a distinct political identity by carving out a separate state and government. It is driven by different claims of history, political identity, territoriality, and political right, including the right to self-determination. Islamic fundamentalism, on the other hand, is supposedly an apolitical construction that aims to appropriate basic tenets of Islam in one's spiritual life. However, with increasing problems, threats, and challenges in the Muslim world since the 20th century, Islam is harnessed not only as a source of spirituality but also as an ideology that may operate independent from secession.

Unlike secessionism, Islamic fundamentalism as an ideology can be used to address social and moral disorder, and involve the re-ordering of society in accordance with Islamic political tenets. It is often directed to combating social forces, including governments perceived to be responsible for the crises. Moreover, Islamic fundamentalism, being shaped by a distinct orientation other than history, political right, or nationalism, espouses a supra-ideology and transnational struggle whose basic assertion strikes at the foundations and edifice of nation-states and the international system. While Islamic fundamentalism may assert certain historical claims, the ideological construction is defined not by specific ethnic and national objectives or the political rights of a particular Muslim polity. It is driven instead by the need to appropriate or to re-appropriate a pan-Islamic order, as in the case of the Islamic caliphate. Thus, secessionism is one thing while fundamentalism is another, and a secessionist may not necessarily be a fundamentalist or *vice versa*.

Despite this caricature, however, given a certain historical conjuncture a secessionist can also be a fundamentalist, as in the case of contemporary movements behind the Moro struggle in the southern Philippines—particularly the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and, to much greater degree, the Abu Sayyaf. Lately, secessionism and fundamentalism represent two wings of the Moro struggle. Their conjunction, I would argue, is of recent origin. It is framed by specific historical circumstances, particularly the contest between the Philippine government's claim of sovereignty and the Moro movements' struggle for control over Mindanao and Sulu. More specifically, the fundamentalist strand of the Moro struggle is nurtured by an erratic peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro movements, coupled with the failure of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to punctuate the "Mindanao conflict" with full and complete ideological and strategic victory over the Moro movements.

The Islamic fundamentalist angle became a viable option when the Moro struggle, originally following a secessionist line, dragged on indefinitely and reached a dead-end with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The split of the MNLF in 1978 and the harnessing of Islamic political doctrine by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the early '80s, and the Abu Sayyaf's *jihad fi sabilillah* in 1990 which included the forging of linkage with transnational Islamic movements, became a matter of course. The linkage with transnational movements happened because Moro movements had long-established relations with the international Islamic community. Recently, these relations were conducted at a time when the Muslim world, particularly the Middle East, has been plagued by the rivalry between Arab nationalism and pan-Islam. While the first animated Moro nationalists in the 1950s and '60s, the latter had its impact on the Moro youth from the late '70s onward. The influence of pan-Islam got its way quite easily amid widespread disenchantment with the MNLF leadership and increasing military atrocities in Mindanao and Sulu, thus emboldening militants with fundamentalist orientation in their pursuit of the Moro struggle.

In a sense, their linkage with the transnational Islamic movements operates on a *quid pro quo* basis. As the latter need to spread their influence from the Middle East to other regions including Southeast Asia and the Philippines, Moro movements, on their part, need them too to strengthen their regional network and foreign support. Undeniably, what makes the phenomenon of fundamentalism problematic today is the propensity

of Islamist groups to use unconventional methods of struggle—referred to by world convention as 'terrorism' while Muslim radicals, rightly or wrongly, call it *jihad*.

Ironically, the use of the word terrorism as a label against Moro rebels benefited the Philippine armed forces in dealing with the secessionist threat. Especially identified with political Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism evokes fear and undresses any form of legitimacy in the rebels' cause. In the words of Edward Said, fundamentalism and terrorism "are fearful images that lack discriminate contents or definition, but they signify moral power and approval for whosoever uses them, moral defensiveness and criminalization for whomever they designate."

However, the preponderant use of the word terrorism poses a dilemma for the Philippine government. First, declaring all Moro rebels like the MILF as terrorists would mean closing the door of peace talks in Mindanao. Second, if the MILF were declared a terrorist organization, the relationship between the Philippine government and previously labeled insurgent groups would become extremely antithetical and purely belligerent. By then, it would deny rebels even limited space, leaving them no alternative but to wage war and unleash more terror. Certainly, the consequence of this are disadvantageous to both the short-term and long-term interests of the country. Third, it would make it hard for the government to maneuver for some political approach to addressing the problem, including the holding of peace talks, which the government must inevitably resort to for pragmatic and strategic purposes. The government has to resort to peace talks because the secessionist problem cannot be solved through a military approach.

In sum, it can be said that the current landscape of Philippine Islam has been generally mediated by globalization, thus defining a new terrain of identity politics in the southern Philippines. It has also elicited a new form of language politics, which is a continuing phenomenon in the history of the Moros and their struggle—as vividly shown by the eclipse of secessionism and fundamentalism amid the global war on terror.

Comment · Discussion · Session 3

Chair: NAKATA Hassan Ko, Doshisha University

(Chair) Now we are going to ask Prof. Lau and Prof. Yamamoto for their comments and would like to go on to free discussion after their questions are answered.

Prof. Lau, please.

The Chinese University of Hong Kong

LAU Yee Cheung

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today we have heard papers proposing alternatives to globalization as we know it. According to Reverend Dr. Shastri, Muslims, constituting a 60 percent of majority in Malaysia, have since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks become more interested in interfaith initiatives. It is certainly a good sign and the right direction forward for achieving harmony among people of various ethnicities and religious beliefs in Malaysia. On the other hand, the Moros in the Mindanao region of the Philippines, who number about five million, a minority in the country, have been waging a secession movement. Professor Wadi in his paper proposed reconciliation as the way forward in resolving the thorny issues of his country. Both papers called for conciliatory alternatives as the solution to ethnic and religious differences by promoting interfaith dialogue.

Mr. Yusanto's paper also proposed an alternative to globalization, though different from the above. In it he pointed out that liberalization, modernization, globalization, and the war against terror have been used by the West as means to implement neo-imperialism since World War Two. He also drew our attention to issues of human rights, democracy, and interfaith dialogue, which he considered aspects of secularization that should, therefore, be avoided.

Mr. Yusanto cherishes the Golden Age of Islamic Civilization. Indeed, as one of the three heirs of the classical Greco-Roman civilization, Islam had made an admirable contribution to the birth of modern civilization. Mr. Yusanto proposed constructing a single ummah of Muslims across the globe, similar to the unified caliphate centuries ago. I am interested in how this would be achieved. In addition, his proposal also reminded me of the Confucian saying that "all are brothers within the four seas" and Christ's teaching along the same lines. Mr. Yusanto's proposal, therefore, addressed a key issue of this workshop: to come up with an alternative to globalization.

To battle against chaos, corruption, and the multidimensional crisis—political, social, cultural, economic—resulting from secularization, Mr. Yusanto pointed to the "Save Indonesia with Shariah" campaign "to save Indonesia from the pit of multidimensional crises with a comprehensive application of the Shariah at all levels of society." Also, Mr. Yusanto mentioned a long march of 10,000 participants sponsored by the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Liberation Party Indonesia; I thank Mr. Yusanto for explaining its meaning to me) on September 11, 2004, calling for the rejection of secular leadership and upholding the Shariah and the caliphate. Again, I would be interested in learning how these goals would be achieved.

The Renaissance, though critical of unhealthy developments in the Roman Catholic Church, was not "the blanket rejection of all religions," as Mr. Yusanto would suggest. The Renaissance humanist philosopher Erasmus was described, in reference to his influence on the subsequent Reformation, as "the one who laid the egg that Martin Luther hatched into a chicken."

To conclude, I understand Mr. Yusanto's rationale behind his critical view of globalization and other development since the end of World War Two. However, I think Islam can work together with Christianity and other faiths in Asia for the common good of the people all over the world.

Two of the afternoon's papers also called for interfaith dialogue among various religions throughout Asia. Asians, regardless of their respective religions and cultural heritage, can work hand in hand for a sensible and feasible alternative to globalization. This view I share with fellow participants of the workshop ready to work in close collaboration with one another on the basis of our common Asian heritage for an alternative to globalization. This is a noble contribution of the workshop, and for it I pay tribute to Professor Koichi Mori and his staff at CISMOR.

(Chair) Thank you very much. Now, Prof. Yamamoto, please go ahead with your comments.

National Museum of Ethnology

YAMAMOTO Hiroyuki

Thank you very much for your introduction. I work for the National Museum of Ethnology and my studies focus on the nationalism and ethnicities in the Southeast Asian region. From this perspective, I would like to make some comments and ask some questions.

First of all, I would like to briefly discuss two points on how we can look at Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the point of view of nationalism.

The first point is that nationalism plays an important role in all of these three countries. A common characteristic shared by the three countries is that their establishment as nation-states originated in their respective periods of colonial rule. While there were kingdoms prior to the colonial period, these countries were founded through the process of colonization, in which the separate kingdoms were combined into one state that contained a great diversity of people. Through their colonial experience, the diverse people developed a sense of community united by a common destiny, which eventually led to the establishment of the present nation-states. In this way, nationalism played a very important role in forming the basis of the national foundation of the three countries. Of course, nationalism has both good and bad sides; it is precisely due to nationalism's significance that some people are pushed aside onto the periphery. With this fact taken into account, it can be said that nationalism plays a significant role in these three countries.

The second point is that although it is true that national consciousness has developed in the three countries, this does not mean that the different people in these countries have also come to share a single common ethnicity. Rather, the societies are multi-ethnic, consisting of plural ethnicities. Moreover, the societies are not only multi-ethnic, but are also characterized by the fact that each ethnic group is linked with the same ethnic group or religious group outside the country. In Malaysia, for example, there are Malays, Chinese, and Indians, who are respectively considered as the separate descendants of Islamic, Chinese, and Indian civilizations. Since the different ethnic groups in Malaysia are all connected with the societies outside the country, the Malaysians are always conscious of the world outside. They are conscious of how they are regarded in the world at large.

For these reasons, it can be said that nationalism in the three countries has the following two characteristics. First, with regard to the domestic situation, their task is to figure out ways to unite the diverse people within the country and to construct a unified society through integration. Second, with regard to the world outside the country, they have this desire to have themselves justly recognized in the international world.

On the basis of this understanding, I have listened, with great interest, to the reports on the relationships between national identity and religion in the respective countries presented by the three speakers. Now I would like to put some questions to each of the speakers.

First of all, I was greatly intrigued by the report presented by Reverend Dr. Shastri, which, in my understanding, argued as follows. Strengthening the role of religion in a society can be considered as a way of rejecting globalization. In doing so, in Malaysia, according to the presentation, instead of different religions vying against one another to strengthen their respective influence, they have sought to promote interfaith dialogue to enhance the overall religious influence in society and, in due course, to increase the respective influence of individual religions. I also found it very indicative that while various religions other than Islam joined hands at first in response to the revival of Islam, this later developed into a general partnership of all religions that also included Islam.

On the basis of this understanding, though this is probably not directly relevant to the presentation today, I would like to ask two questions as an extension. One concerns the issue of institutions. Given that much has been said since yesterday about various transnational movements, how would this intriguing approach of promoting dialogue among different religions in Malaysia be applied to the relationships beyond the national borders? We have listened to a report on the problems among different religions in the Philippines. I would like to ask for your opinion on whether you think it is possible to apply this approach to countries other than Malaysia.

The other question concerns the practical aspect. In Sabah and Sarawak in Eastern Malaysia, there are both Muslims and Christians within a single ethnic group. There one witnesses cases of families comprised of both Muslim and Christian members, yet maintaining their family ties. I would like to ask if you have any thoughts about how the existence of such multidimensional religious situations in Sabah and Sarawak, both of which are parts of Malaysia, have influenced the situation of religions in the country as a whole and contributed to the national identity of Malaysians.

Next, for Mr. Yusanto, your comment that "Hizbut Tahrir, or the Liberation Party, rejects nationalism" was very startling, and I am puzzled, as an advocate of nationalism serving as the foundation of Indonesia as a nation-state, as to how I should interpret what you have said. On the other hand, you mentioned in your presentation the slogan of the Liberation Party, which was "Save Indonesia with Sharia." This slogan sounds rather like the intention is to strengthen the framework of Indonesia as a nation.

And this is how I interpreted what you mentioned in your presentation. Nationalism, according to Mr. Yusanto's point of view, meant secularist nationalism, which is something to be rejected. However, it does not mean that the national identity of Indonesia must also be rejected. Am I correct on this? This is my question. And, in relation to this, I would also like to ask how the non-Muslim people are regarded in the national principle of the Liberation Party. Another point which also concerns transnationalism, and on which I would like to ask Mr. Yusanto for his opinion, is this: how are the principles of the Liberation Party applied beyond the borders of Indonesia?

Finally, with regard to the presentation by Professor Wadi, honestly, I don't have much to say because of the gravity of the topics discussed. But I think I gained a little more knowledge in relation to a question I have had, so I would like to comment on that. While the Arabic language has played a very important role in interpreting the Islamic creeds, historically in Southeast Asia the ideas and teachings of the Islamic religion were translated into Malaysian and then accepted by the Indonesian and Malaysian people. My question, then, is: How are we to interpret the fact that the people of Moro are so intent on readopting the Arabic language instead of Malaysian in their attempts to strengthen Islam? According to Professor Wadi, the Moros do not think that the framework of ASEAN is effective, since they have been deprived of assistance from the Muslims in other countries due to the ASEAN principle of mutual noninterference among the nations. If the fact that the Moros are trying to strengthen Islam through the Arabic language and not Malaysian may be interpreted to signify their suspicion toward the ASEAN framework, I think I may have a better understanding of the situation, but at the same time, I find it a little regrettable as well.

So my question is, is it not possible for the Moros in Southeast Asia to find their place within the region somehow, and see some hope there? I would like to see some kind of orientation toward a hopeful future.

(Chair) Thank you very much Professor Yamamoto. Before we go on to free discussion, I would like to have the speakers answer the questions posed by the commentators. Although I have various matters I wish to discuss here, I think I shall refrain from making any comments today, since my position is very close to that of Mr. Yusanto.

I therefore would like to be allowed to ask about only one point. Professor Wadi said, "the Moros in the Philippines are losing the Southeast Asian characteristics they have had, as a result of being integrated into the civil nation-state of the Philippines as a minority group." Furthermore, in his comment, Dr. Yamamoto said, "the ethnicity of minority groups within Southeast Asia is characterized by the fact that it is found not only in their own country, but also in their linkages with the same ethnic or religious groups, such as Chinese, Islamic, Indian, and Western civilizations outside their country, and that it has the feature of finding its orientation within that overall framework."

So the question I have for Reverend Dr. Shastri is what this position within Southeast Asia means to the Christian civilization or to Dr. Shastri himself, who is affiliated with the Indian civilization. And to Mr. Yusanto, my question is, given the context of Indonesia as well as that of ummah, or the entire Islamic world, is there a space for Southeast Asia to fit in as another medium?

Now we will ask the speakers to answer the questions from the commentators and myself, before we go on to free discussion.

In the order of presentation, we shall ask Dr. Shastri to answer the questions first, then Mr. Yusanto and Professor Wadi. Please go ahead.

(Shastri) Thank you Professor Lau for the comments that you have made. One of the questions you raised is in regard to the reasons for the intensification of interfaith relations, especially in relation to September 11, 2001, and perhaps also the idea whether there is a shift in thinking among the Muslim majority in Malaysia.

Yes, I think there is a clear shift in thinking among a good majority of Islamic scholars and activists in Malaysia as a result of September 11. But this is not to be understood as a way of imposing Islamic ideas more fervently in public discourse; rather, the rhetoric emanating from the West in the aftermath of September 11 is, to some extent, propagating a false image of Islam. Therefore, groups in Malaysia and our partners in dialogue are more open to discussion about understandings of many sometimes perhaps sensitive issues in order to be a corrective to numerous ideas about Islam that are being promoted in the world media, such as stereotypes broadcast on television programs or in the newspapers. This is to be seen as a positive development.

Now, turning to one or two questions that were raised by Professor Yamamoto. It is true: I think the point that is to be made, and you have made it as you began your question, is that many of the countries in Asia are young countries. Malaysia this year will only be 48 years old, and that is not long, in terms of nation-states, for the forging of a national identity.

At the time when these countries became independent and when Malaysia became independent, there was already a given context, and that context was a diverse one. It is within this giveness, within this context of diversity, that we have to seek the substance and the meaning of national integration, of what it means to be a nation. In Malaysia, the path that has been taken is one whereby diversity should not be diminished; in fact, diversity should be harnessed to a sharing of power, to a consensual mode of operation and relationship with each other, and to the forging of a common vision for all people within the country. That is the path.

So your observation is right, and the point that I want to make in regard to Malaysia up to the present day is that diversity is something which is emphasized. It makes for an interesting anecdote or model that can challenge the negative effects of globalization, because globalization tends to want to homogenize cultures. In our country, this diversity is celebrated.

As to the role of religion within this diversity, the reality as it is made known to us in the context in which we live is that much of this ethnic identity is closely connected to religion. In Malaysia, although we can say that the 40 percent of the population who are non-Muslim can move from one religion to the other, this is not without its problems. This is because ethnicity and the cultures from which the people emanate are also tied in closely to a long religious history. So Indians would have an Indian Hindu civilization; Chinese would have a Chinese Confucianist/Taoist/Buddhist civilization. They may become Christian; yet becoming Christian poses a dilemma for the Christians, for a person like me. Would I then be a Western Christian, or would I be an Asian Christian? And if I am an Asian Christian, what would that mean? What are elements that I can draw upon? How do I give expression to that faith without distancing myself from the richness of Asian cultures?

So this is the issue. It seems, in interfaith dialogue, that what happens is that the basis available within us as people is our resource not to dialogue dogma against dogma, but to dialogue sharing a common life together which to a faith commitment can enhance collective spirit. In other words, being a committed Christian, being a committed Hindu, being a committed Buddhist, does not in any way mean that we therefore cannot live together. In fact, by being that and by being the cultures that we represent, we are able to move forward.

So you raised this question about the transnational aspect, this going beyond borders. I would say that, in the case of the ethnic communities, their identities move beyond just Malaysia and embrace the whole of Asia, which is a richness of diversity, of ethnic communities, and of religions.

Now, as to the case of Sabah and Sarawak which you have raised, I think there again it is a very interesting experiment. I say this because these two states only joined Malaysia in 1963, and that is much later. So they are even younger in terms of what is already a difficult national integration experiment in the country. Of course there are weaknesses and strengths, but it seems that it is working inasmuch as even the ethnic communities in these two states are able to organize themselves politically to envision a future for their people, and to articulate this in the

public sphere and in the highest levels of government. So you would have representatives from these ethnic communities participating in the government.

What you have—and this is of course very peculiar to a situation like Malaysia—is a government made up of a coalition of thirteen different parties. In this coalition everybody brings their interests to the table and, as much as possible, to a consensual mode of operation in order to resolve the problems in the country.

So the diversity in Sabah and Sarawak is not diminished. There is not an imposition of federal laws that would tend to colonize these two states. You might remember from the recent past that there was also some resistance stemming from the fear that these two states would be colonized by West Malaysia, but that has fizzled out because of this participation space that is given to all. And then there was your question…

(Chair) Let me repeat the question, though you have answered it to a great extent in your answer to Professor Yamamoto. Are there Asian or Southeast Asian characteristics to this Malaysian or Christian context? I mean in one's identity. Would you please give your view on this again? That is, is there such a thing as Asian Christianity or Southeast Asian Christianity found between Malaysian Christianity and general Christianity in the world as a whole?

(Shastri) Does an East Asian Christianity exist? I think this is a question that in what we would call "ecumenical circles" is constantly discussed. What we talk about is not East Asian but rather Asian Christianity, because there are elements that are common to all Asians.

One of the points that was made yesterday is that the major religions of the world are born in Asia, and that Asians have a long, centuries-old history of living together. They have experimented in many ways, they have evolved societies in many ways, but it has not led to the destruction of many of the societies. One of the destructive forces has been colonization when it promoted a divide and rule policy in Asian countries.

So there is trans-border solidarity. To give you a very concrete example: if you take this interfaith posture of Christian initiatives, we work very closely with regional Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist groups to forge an Asian solidarity for the issues that concern the Asian people. There has been a strengthening of this and I think it would be further enhanced through the effects of globalization.

(Yusanto) Thank you very much Professor Lau and Professor Yamamoto for your valuable comments. Professor Lau, in my view, my paper is not radical or, as you said, a strong stand. I just tried to make a frank statement. As I see it, this kind of statement—rather than a vague or soft statement—will help us to understand what is going on. But anyway, I appreciate your comments.

Now I would like to answer your questions. The first point is about many ideas—human rights, democracy, etc.—that in my paper I said was secularistic thought. About human rights, yes, Islam is a religion giving much respect to human rights: the right to live, the right to get justice and fair treatment, the right to have wealth, to get a better education, et cetera.

But in my view, human rights have now become something without an exact value measurement. For instance, adultery has been understood as the right to express sexual desire. In Indonesia, prostitution has been replaced with another term, "commercial sex worker." I think this is wrong because, according to the Islamic perspective, adultery is forbidden and should be punished. Adultery is not a right to express sexual desire. Yes, we have a right to express sexual desire, but it should be expressed in the right way—according to Islamic law, through marriage. So we understand that thought about human rights nowadays is merely secularistic thought that escapes or is separate from Islamic values.

Regarding democracy, there is a critical point: it is about sovereignty, and who it belongs to. Sovereignty is the right to enact laws. Does sovereignty belongs to people, or to God, to Sharia? According to the Islamic perspective, sovereignty belongs to God, to Sharia. Meanwhile, like democracy where power belongs to people, in Islam leaders are elected by people to implement God's sovereignty or Sharia sovereignty, not people's sovereignty. That is why Sharia in this context is not an option, but an obligation. Thus, from this explanation it is very clear that those ideas (democracy, human rights, etc.) mentioned in my paper are really secularistic notions.

The second question is about whether the Islamic caliphate, unity, and the Muslim ummah are a feasible solution. We should, I think, distinguish between utopia and great difficulty. Yes, we realize that to make a Muslim ummah unified is very, very difficult, but I think it is not a utopia because we have evidence in the Qur'an and Hadiths as well as historical experience.

There are two constraints. The first is an internal constraint, while the second is an external constraint. The external constraint comes from a big country or superpower, a current superpower, as to whether it lets us decide what we should do. That is a big question.

The second is the internal constraint, which is the popular awareness of the Muslim ummah. It is very interesting to look at the Islamic awareness in Indonesia. When

we campaigned on the concept of the caliphate in the 1980s, many, many Muslim leaders in Indonesia refused it and, as Professor Lau said, it was at that time utopian. But now there are many important changes. After the United States invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, Muslim leaders in Indonesia realized that the Muslim ummah should have greater power to protect us, to protect the Muslim ummah itself, to protect Muslim lands from such an invasion. How could we get this kind of power? The realization of the caliphate concept came to be more relevant. Now many Muslim leaders in Indonesia realize that the Islamic caliphate concept is not utopian, but is obligatory.

The next question is about the campaign of "Save Indonesia with Sharia," and just now Professor Lau asked me to give an example. You know that, maybe like other Muslim countries, we are facing many, many problems. One problem is an amoral culture: pornography and fornication. We are now pursuing anti-pornography legislation in Indonesia. But the difficulty of this process has to do with what is considered the definition of pornography. If we go back to Sharia, I think we could easily get the definition of this term. This is an example of how "Save Indonesia with Sharia" could be implemented in the context of reducing pornography.

Another would be about bank usury. I think all religions, including Christianity, are against bank usury. If we read the Bible or even ancient philosophers like Plato or Aristotle, they are also against bank usury. But the problem now is that it has become the pillar of the monetary system. This usurious banking system contributed as the main factor of the monetary crisis, not only in Indonesia but also in other parts of the world.

If we go back to Sharia, I think we get a clear explanation about this problem, and also the solution. So now we have promoted a Sharia banking system and are enacting a bank Sharia Act. But it will take time to make the Sharia banking system become the main system in Indonesia because, as you know, like other countries we still use a conventional or usurious banking system.

Another example of "Save Indonesia with Sharia" involves natural resource management. As just mentioned in my paper, we are now undergoing the process of liberalization in natural resource management, meaning that global capitalists are entering Indonesia to exploit the natural resources of the country. According to Sharia, the natural resources belong to the people. So the government or the state should manage natural resources and the results or the outcome should flow back to the people, not to private or multinational enterprises as is the case with the oil and gas liberalization I discussed.

If we are talking about a way out together, looking for a common way out, I think that, firstly, we should recognize our common enemy. I said that the capitalist ideology should become an enemy, because with its ambition to exploit natural and human resources, it brings the world into a chaotic condition like we see nowadays.

Do we agree with the awful United States invasion of Iraq, for instance? What is the spirit that belongs to the United States when it decides to invade Afghanistan and Iraq? The spirit of Christianity, the Catholic sprit? Or what spirit? I think it is the capitalist spirit. Do we agree with this invasion? I think not. So yes, we should conduct good dialogue, but we should also realize that something happened in the world and operates to make this world worse. I think we have insufficient dialogue in forums that pay attention to what is going on in reality.

OK, now I turn to Professor Yamamoto. Just now Professor Yamamoto asked me whether "Save Indonesia with Sharia" has been difficult in Indonesia. I said, yes. From 1970 to 1990, the campaign to implement Sharia was indeed very difficult. It was even considered criminal in the Suharto era. But there are big changes now. Not only Hizbut Tahrir, but most, even all of the Muslim organizations now demand Sharia implementation. Let me give you an example. At the Indonesian Muslim Ummah Congress in March, 2005, the main decision was to demand implementation of Sharia as the primary solution of the state's and the society's problems.

How about the non-Muslim position? I think we have no problem with non-Muslims, because Islam has long, long historical experience with how to regulate a pluralistic society. During the Prophet Mohammad's time in Medina the city was pluralistic. Also, during the time of the central Islamic caliphate in Baghdad, the caliphate too was pluralistic and Egypt was pluralistic as well. So we have no problems with a pluralistic society.

In Islamic society, non-Muslims will be protected by Islam and will be given their rights to express their religions in church; other places of worship will also be protected. Even in war conditions we do not have permission to destroy these kinds of worshipping places. Imam Ali, the fourth Caliph, said that the blood of non-Muslims is as our blood, their wealth is as our wealth. This means that we have no permission to kill them without reason, and we also do not permit killing them to steal their wealth. So, once more, I think there is no problem with the position of non-Muslims within Muslim society.

The last question is about national identity. I think, yes, in the current situation, the Islamic world is divided into many, many nation-states. But I think this situation is not a static position or a static situation. It is a dynamic situation, because nation-states are a new concept for the Islamic world. Nation-states existed in the Islamic world after the completion of the First and

Second World Wars. Before that time, there were no such states. I think it is also possible that in the future, there will be unity between those states when political willingness and also increasing awareness of the necessity to be unified exists, like what we see in Europe now with the European Union.

So I think that national identity is a dynamic situation and a dynamic value, and will always be a process. Maybe in future times we will see something changing and we should be ready to accept this changing each other. Conceptually, as far as it does not contradict Islamic Sharia, Muslim people are able to continue with their primordialistic identity as reflected in things such as modes of dress, architecture, kinds of food, etc. If we visit different Muslim countries, for instance, we will discover many, many differences, all special and unique. Thank you very much.

(Wadi) I think the questions raised by Professor Yamamoto and Professor Nakata are very much related, so I will just lump them together.

If you noticed, I did not use the term loss; I spoke in terms of a new layer added into the persona when we used the term yesterday in relation to the characteristics of Islam in the Philippines. I think this is a natural recourse of people who would like to find a kind of justification for the protection of identity, and this is reflected in the popularity, for instance, of Islamic discourse and Arabic language among the Muslims in the Philippines.

In other words, as the national language, in fact, English and Tagalog become in a sense the dominant language. Instead of just accepting this, Muslims felt that their identity, their ethnic languages were also being affected. So they find another language—the language of Islam, Arabic—to strengthen part of this search for identity. My worry is that they do not go back to the protection and the security of the indigenous languages. Because what we notice is that, among the Muslims in the Philippines, the Moros, there are at least 13 ethnolinguistic groups, each with its respective language. And yet they find commonalities in Islam, in Arabic, thereby forgetting in fact the security or protection of their respective languages.

In other words, there is this so-called Islamicization or Arabization of their languages. In my view, as Muslims this is OK with them, but in the long term this will also affect their indigenous languages. And this is the pattern in the Philippines as far as dimensions of identity politics are concerned.

This trend, in the sense of looking for some allies beyond Southeast Asia, I think is dictated by the fact that, on the one hand, there is a global Islamic resurgence. On the other hand, as I said earlier, there is the entrenchment of the idea of nation-states among Southeast Asian countries. These states became quite protective of their sovereignty, to the extent that respect for the national territories of other countries became the priority rather than, in a sense, the idea of Islamic solidarity among Muslims in Southeast Asia.

So in our view, the idea of the so-called ummah or Islamic solidarity is really mediated or affected by the notion of national sovereignty. That is why, when Muslims, particularly Muslim movements, find barely any support from their neighbors, they go beyond Southeast Asia to the Middle East. That is why for instance the conflict in Mindanao has been mediated by the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which is based in Saudi Arabia, but not by ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

This is because the priority of ASEAN is really regional unity. Therefore, the question of what place minorities have in these regional organizations is misplaced from the start because the members are really states, not minorities. That is why we feel that, in this arrangement, the minorities are pushed further against the wall and are left alone to respond to the challenge of nation-states, modernization, and later on, globalization.

Now because of this situation, there is this sense of ambivalence about whether ASEAN can address conflicts like that in Mindanao. The situation becomes the justification for big powers to come in and fill the gap. This is the reason why Mindanao is presently declared as the second front in the war on terror by the United States, thereby affecting the regional security arrangement in the area. In other words, if ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, takes the concerns of minorities as a priority, then the big powers should not have been justified in coming in and use the situation to advance their geostrategic interests in the area.

In my survey of the insurgencies in Southeast Asia where I compared the case of the Pattani in Thailand and the Aceh in Indonesia, I noticed that there is less involvement by the United States both in southern Thailand and in the Aceh province. There is less involvement. I am not saying there is no involvement; there is just less involvement. But now, especially after September 11, there is a radical and dramatic interest in Mindanao on the part of the United States. You must have heard of the continuous ongoing military exercises carried out jointly between the United States and the Philippines.

The justifications given for these exercises are two. First is the alleged influx of Jamaat-e-Islami and so-called al-Qaeda elements into the Philippines, in alleged collaboration with some radical groups in the country.

In other words, the war on terror is now justified on the basis of some of these alleged linkages. The other reason is the so-called "China stress," although this is not really highlighted. But it appears that the war on international terrorism is being used as a justification for the United States to come into Southeast Asia, using Mindanao as the launching ground for its geopolitical and economic hegemony in the area.

In my view, in the long term, this will affect regional security in the region. For instance, lately the United States has declared it has 70 spies just in the Philippines. This was four or five months ago, announced by no less than the United States Embassy. This number is in fact bigger than the so-called terrorist groups in the area. Why such a big number of spies? Why such continuing military exercises, as if there is an external threat to the Philippines by some countries in the region, when there is no threat at all? Why? Because the war on terror and the so-called presence of so-called terrorist networks in the Philippines is being used as a justification for big power interests to spread in the area. This is partly I think due to the ambivalence of countries concerned in the region to address problems like the longstanding problem of the Moros.

I can understand this ambivalence, because one notices that there are also irritants between and among states, particularly between, say, Malaysia and the Philippines due to historic claims to Sabah; this is clearly one of the causes of irritation in the RP-Malaysian relationship. And that is why Malaysia's involvement in the Mindanao conflict is also ambivalent. It is engaged in the peace process, sending monitoring teams. But once the situation is resolved or at least neutralized, Malaysia still also maintains a certain degree of ambivalence as to whether or not these Muslim separatist movements in the Philippines may be able to have their homeland, which in turn will affect the question of the Sabah claim.

This explains why, despite the supposed principles of Islamic solidarity—say, in the Charter of the Organization of Islamic Conference—or even why, for instance, although the Islamic presence is quite strong in Southeast Asia, the support still is not forthcoming because of these geopolitical realities.

These are factors that have to be considered in the discussion as to the place of the minorities, like Muslims in the Philippines, in the larger context of Southeast Asia. I think I will limit my answer to those points. Maybe there are still some questions that the other participants would like to ask. Thank you very much.

Discussion

(Chair) Thank you very much.

Now let us go on to free question and answer time. Does anyone have any questions or opinions? Professor Mori, please.

(Mori) I have one question each for Professor Wadi and Mr. Yusanto.

I would like to ask Professor Wadi about the goal of realizing the caliphate, which Mr. Yusanto has talked about. What do you think about this, Professor Wadi, from the Moro point of view? Mr. Yusanto mentioned that the aim of realizing the caliphate or ummah is gradually coming to be shared by various Islamic groups in Indonesia. It seems to me that how and by what means one realizes this goal is a big problem, and I would like to ask if there is also agreement among various Islamic groups in Indonesia on the means and methods of realizing the caliphate. More specifically, I would like to ask if there is agreement on realizing this goal even if it necessitates resorting to some kind of violence.

(Chair) All right. Now I see three people raising hands. First, let us hear the question from Professor Kohara, and after the speaker answers these questions, we will go on to the questions from Professor Miichi and then from Dr. Solihin. Please start.

(Kohara) I would like to ask some questions to Dr. Shastri and Mr. Yusanto.

As Dr. Shastri mentioned, I think that the interfaith dialogue in Malaysia is very unique even when compared with other interfaith dialogues taking place in different countries, because in other countries, the government rarely plays a leading role in coordinating such dialogue.

So what I would like to ask is, who is it that feels the necessity of such dialogue most strongly? Is it the minority religions, including Christians, that feel this necessity most strongly? Or is it the government? How about the Muslims? During the break, another participant told me that the Muslims are reluctant to come to the table of dialogue despite the government's call for their participation. I would therefore like to ask who it is that most strongly feels the necessity of these interfaith dialogues.

Next is my question for Mr. Yusanto. You pointed out that the common adversary for the Islamic ummah is capitalism. I find this point very interesting. Many people feel that capitalism is not working very well. But to what extent is this perception of Islam being the possible alternative to capitalism shared among the people?

How about in Indonesia, for example? Also, since replacing capitalism is not something that can be accomplished by a single country, the movement naturally needs to be transnational, or else, regional. In that case, how concretely do the Muslims in East Asia and Southeast Asia perceive this idea of Islam taking over capitalism? I imagine that the movement also takes root in the traditional Islamic position against charging interest. I would like to know the specific ideas, if any exist, for alternatives to capitalism.

(Chair) Now then, we will ask Professor Wadi for his answer, then Mr. Yusanto, and then Dr. Shastri.

(Wadi) I would like to answer the concern raised by Professor Koichi Mori about the Moros' perspectives on the proposal for the establishment of a caliphate. My view is that the caliphate as a theory, as a concept, has already in a sense inspired Muslims in many parts of the world, and this would include Muslims in the Philippines.

However, as to the mode or manner of its implementation or establishment, I think there is a wide variation of ways to implement the vision of a caliphate. I think that, in the case of the Muslims in the Philippines, it has not yet reached the stage of envisioning the establishment of a caliphate. If we mean by the caliphate something that is reflective of the Umayyad Dynasty or the Abbasid Dynasty or the Ottoman Empire, it has not been envisioned that way.

Remember that the level of the Moros' identity formation is still in fact below our lower level of state-building. If I may make certain categories, maybe we can say that nation-building is the first process. The second process would be state-building; this is when you already have the infrastructure of government, the elements of state, etc. Then you have regional arrangements, another level. And maybe if you followed the presentation of my brother from Indonesia on the caliphate, this is higher than even a regional arrangement, because this will encompass practically the entire Islamic world.

But in the case of the Moros, they are still early in the process of forging a nation. Perhaps in the future they will be able to form a more cohesive, collective national identity and translate it into a state. In other words, they are still in the first stage; they have not gone beyond the process of state-building. That is, they are calling first for the establishment of a sort of nation, then possibly a state, while the vision of the caliphate is already proposing the dissolution of nation-states. This is a contradiction.

However, what do you mean by caliphate? Is it a process or a vision? Is it a strategy, or is it an end in itself? In my view, if the idea of caliphate is a process of building Islamic solidarity, I think the Moros in the Philippines can associate at least theoretically with that idea, the process of building a global ummah, if you may call it that. But if it is already the building of a particular institution—meaning, it becomes an end in itself—I think there is a certain degree of difficulty or apprehension on the part of the Moros, because they are still in the lower stage of their identity formation.

Still, we cannot deny the fact that certain quarters in the Moros communities or the Muslim communities in the Philippines may be able to forge what I might call linkages with other Muslim communities in the region, or even outside of Southeast Asia, to make the vision of caliphate gradually be implemented—even if it will not address immediately their desire of coming up with their own state.

That is my view of what in a sense is the harmony between the perspectives of Muslims or the Moros in the Philippines and in the region with the caliphate, yet also this seeming contradiction as far as this idea of caliphate is concerned. Thank you.

(Chair) Mr. Yusanto, your turn please.

(Yusanto) Thank you very much Professor Mori and Professor Kohara. The specific means by which a caliphate is to be to established is the consensus of Muslim leaders or Muslim organizations.

First of all, we have a big problem in Indonesia. That is, this caliphate concept is quite strange to most Muslims in Indonesia. Because you know that we have no historical experience—except maybe in parts of Indonesia, like Aceh or West Sumatra—of having relations to the Islamic caliphate of the past.

The most important thing that we have to do in Indonesia is to increase the people's political awareness, particularly about the Islamic caliphate concept. Sometimes I find a funny expression from the people when I talk in specific forums about this concept. People sometimes confuse it with *khilafiah*. How do you call it in English? "Dispute," *khilafiah*.

Khilafiah is quite similar to *khilafah*, but it has a very, very different meaning. *Khilafiah* is dispute, and *khilafah* is the Islamic political system. Sometimes people even confuse it with the name of the former women minister, Khofifah Indarparawansa.

So our specific means are how to increase the people's political awareness, particularly among leaders of Islamic organizations. *Alhamdulillah*, now we have had much progress, if we compare it with the past, the 1980s for instance. I have got confirmation from the Muslim

leaders in Indonesia that most of them agree with this concept of the Islamic caliphate, but there are differences as to method.

There are two methods or means. The first is through political effort or political means, and second is through the people or through the ummah. I think both methods compliment each other. Both methods need social infrastructure, mainly Islamic political awareness, about the Muslim ummah in Indonesia. What we do now aims to increase Islamic personality through cultivating cadres, through preaching the ummah in many, many forums, seminars, public discussions or Friday prayers, etc., and also through printed materials, leaflets, and magazines. *Al Islam*, a weekly leaflet issued every Friday, is distributed in all parts of Indonesia, more or less 700,000 copies every week.

Important also is not only how to increase the people's awareness among the ummah, but additionally among people sharing power—for instance, the military. Several months ago, I had a small discussion with a former military commander, General Riyamizard Riyacudu, about this concept. Basically he agreed and stated that Indonesia needs *Al-Qur'an* (the Qur'an) and Sunnah (*al Hadits*); that is how he said it.

So I think in the previous session I said that we are facing two constraints, internal and external. If external powers let us make our own decisions, I think we will make big progress in the future, due to our intensive explanation to the ummah of the need for the political system of the Islamic caliphate, et cetera.

But the problem is whether external powers, Western countries especially, will let us make political decisions. Let me give an example: in Algeria, you know that Front Islamique du Salut, the Islamic party in Algeria, won the first round of general elections there, with 86 percent of the vote. But what went on after that? This result was canceled and FIS has been banned up until now. I think this is unfair, so that is why I said that democracy sometimes only gives opportunity to secular parties but not to Islamic parties, just as occurred in Algeria. So the question is very important, whether or not the Western countries will really let us make our own decisions, to make our own political system.

The next question is from Prof. Kohara about the common enemy, capitalists. The Islamic alternative is not acquisitive desire. I think it is not acquisitive desire because it came from the Islamic perspective. All of you, whoever, could propose an alternative of capitalism. Time will give us the opportunity and also the proof whether our alternative is suitable to the world, to the people, for solving many problems. We need good laws to regulate our human and public affairs—not merely in private affairs but also in public life—in terms of the economic, political, social, educational dimensions. According to Islamic creed, we believe that Islamic law as revealed by God will bring us to a good society with good laws, and will provide us justice, prosperity, and also a good living. I think it is important to explain to the people how badly the capitalist system or capitalist ideology has exploited natural resources, exploited other nations and human beings to fulfill its ambitions, like what we see in many, many countries.

Let us see what is going on in Venezuela. I do not think this is related to the religion of Christianity, but there is a very interesting conflict between Bush and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. If I am not mistaken, one is a Christian and the other is a Catholic. So I doubt that this conflict started from the Christianity of Catholics, but rather, how Hugo Chavez protects his country from the U.S. capitalistic ambitions.

So humanity hopes. I think human beings in the world are now looking forward to alternative systems that could bring the world to a better way of living. I think that is enough said.

(Chair) Now Dr. Shastri, your turn please.

(Shastri) Thank you for the question. I think it is really accepted by all that when we talk about dialogue, we are talking about a way of life that operates at many levels and affects human beings at many levels. There is a dialogue of neighbors, there is a dialogue of persons who work in an office space and dialogue in schools when the society is diverse. But when we talk about an interfaith dialogue, it is an institutionalized form. It does not negate that which is already going on.

The institutionalized form of interfaith dialogue is important when there are misconceptions; so it is to address misconceptions. How far the issues will come out into the open to address these misconceptions depends on the context. Some issues may be very sensitive, some not. But the reality of interfaith dialogue as an institution helping to address misconceptions of the various religious communities is an important one. The assumption is that that there are avenues for that. And of course there may be. Much of the energy relating to prejudice and misconceptions in religions goes into the political channel, and that is often useful because politicians can use it to gain some kind of legitimacy in representing their constituency. In a case like Malaysia, there are also issues that are automatically classified as sensitive, because they can be used politically and add to a misconception that has not yet been clarified.

In the experience of the minorities in Malaysia, we are discovering that this is one area that has to be strength-

ened. There needs to be friendships forged between religious leaders so that they act as a counter to a political reality, and that they can discuss things which they feel are important. Some of it may relate to interreligious relations, some of it can be positions taken together or by different parties of that interfaith context on matters of public policy.

So you raise the question: Who has the greatest need? Of course, the minorities have the greatest need. But I must yet put a curb on that comment, because in Malaysia, as you have seen, the identity of a person does not just relate to ethnicity, it also relates to religion. In a political discourse which has some religious bearing, it can be discussed in the government. In Malaysia, as diverse as it is in this present administration, there are five Cabinet ministers who are Christian. The Christian population of Malaysia is 9 percent, but there are five.

So there are some things to be resolved that are discussed within the Cabinet, or, if it is a sensitive matter, directly with the Prime Minister, because there are Christians, there are Buddhists, there are Hindus in government who may be representing ethnic constituencies, but yet because they are politicians sitting in the places where decisions are made, they are allowed to do that.

Now the only point is, and I would only just give part answer because my sister is here and she could then give the other side, is the question you raised about why Muslims are not coming to the table. I think we have to distinguish between a political reality and the social reality. I think social reality in Malaysia is such that because we affirm the different levels of coexistence, there is always dialogue. I can talk to my sister there, there are various visits we make, there are many festivals we celebrate with each other. Whether that is effective dialogue or not effective dialogue is another, separate issue.

Then you talk about Islam and its participation, and this is where we have to understand the context in which we find ourselves in Malaysia. As far as the Muslims are concerned, politics and religion are one. The government representatives who are Muslim take that same position and they would at points be seen to represent a Muslim position.

There are institutions in the country that are state-sponsored, organized by the government, with an Islamic agenda either to educate or to regularize Islamic universities and so on and so forth. In these instances, when the other minority groups go and engage in dialogue, they have to ask themselves, "Are we dialoguing with the government or with Islam?" This is where the difficulty is. Because as far as the state is concerned, they say the dialogue is already taking place in the coalition. The political parties are such that you represent race and you represent religion. So if there is already dialogue in the highest body of decision-making in the government, then there is no reason for another level. That is one answer.

What we in the experience of the interfaith movement in Malaysia are wanting to promote is that it is not a question only of rights, of civil liberties, or of Christian rights or Hindu rights or Muslim rights or Buddhist rights. Those things, important as they are, have to be worked on and political solutions need to be found so that we can continue to live together peacefully as neighbors. But there is a component which is essential in forging Malaysian identity and integration, and that is the friendship and the trust between peoples and these ideas that because I am a devout, pious, committed person of faith—Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian—it does not necessarily follow that there will be conflict, or that there must be conflict.

There are enough spiritual resources within each religious tradition which, when harnessed, can lead to a peaceful loving relationship with others. That is a difficult process but it is a necessary process, and this is where, at the end of my paper, I said we had this initiative where we said that there needs to be some form of redress, not just on a political level, but redress on an interfaith level. That category is missing in our country.

So not every issue has to be politicized, and this is where we are appealing to the government and to the official Islamic groups, some of which have the status of government agencies. Unless we have an interfaith commission where all kinds of issues may be discussed and not only political solutions sought, but other ways of resolving what maybe in some respects goes beyond politics—like, say, how close a temple and a mosque should be to each other—such things you cannot regulate and say thirty meters or fifty meters or something. You have to work it out in a different way that takes into consideration the area, takes into consideration the state, and takes into consideration the sensibilities of the people in that area; there are all kinds of other factors.

It is these kinds of issues where it is so crucial, this idea. And of course, why the Muslims are not yet fully integrated, I think, sister, you must answer that from the perspective of Islam.

(Chair) We are already past the scheduled time, so Professor Miichi and Dr. Solihin, could you please briefly make your comments?

(Miichi) Thank you very much. Since we don't have much time, I will narrow down my point and ask some questions to Mr. Yusanto.

My first question is on the Islamic banks. I think Mr. Yusanto has made comments that were very supportive of the idea. But when I look at the situation in Indonesia as well as in Europe and the United States, the banks that have an Islamic bank or those with a Shariah division are no different from the conventional banks. It is nothing more than the conventional existing banks setting up a Shariah division and it does not seem that the Islamic banks are being established as a system that competes against, or serves as an alternative to, the capitalist system.

If I may put it very bluntly, there may have been a slight change in the relationship between the bank and the customers, but what the bank actually performs are economic operations that comply with the present system of international capitalism. The Islamic system that was introduced does not seem to be adequately competing against the capitalist system.

My second question is on the management of natural resources. Indonesia is very rich in oil and gas. Mr. Yusanto said that natural resources belong to the people, yet multinational companies exploit them. Furthermore, he also specifically mentioned the implementation of a policy for removing the monopoly of Pertamina, a national company.

I am personally against such policies intended to remove the monopoly of national corporations. Furthermore, since Vice President Jusuf Kalla and the other familiar politicians have also expressed the view that the people should be in charge of managing natural resources, I don't think Mr. Yusanto's opinion is all that radical. But the decision to eliminate the monopoly of the national company Pertamina has been made by the Indonesians themselves, as a result of democratization. There hasn't been any international pressure with regard to this issue.

The reason I am against the removal of monopoly by Pertamina is because such a move has weakened the international negotiability of the company, which, in turn, has made the sales of natural gas inefficient. Some politicians claim "natural gas should be reserved for domestic demand since a price rise is deemed inevitable due to the fuel shortage in Indonesia." Such a view is emotional and unrealistic, because there is little demand for natural gas in Indonesia. Natural gas is unusable unless there are plants to use it. Therefore, Indonesia cannot but sell the gas in the international market. Unless the gas is sold, it does not bring any benefit for the people of Indonesia.

What happened after the removal of the Pertamina monopoly was not greater exploitation by the international corporations. Rather, what happened was that Indonesia became incapable of selling its natural gas in the international market. Europe, the U.S., and Japan are now purchasing natural gas from China and other countries instead. In this sense, there is this reality that the removal of the Pertamina monopoly, which was an outcome of democratization, does not seem to have brought about any benefit for the people of Indonesia themselves.

When you look at some specific examples—while there are of course various kinds of exploitation taking place such as those mentioned by Mr. Yusanto—but when you take up the cases written in this paper, I don't think it is accurate.

(Chair) I am afraid we don't have enough time to have Mr. Yusanto answer the questions. I hope you have time to confer with him during the lunch break perhaps.

Finally, Dr. Solihin, could you please make a brief comment?

(Solihin) Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. In fact, I am quite impatient waiting for my chance to give my opinion. But anyway, thank you very much for giving me the chance to express my views regarding this very important topic. In fact, for my humble participation in the workshop, this is the most interesting one that I have heard up to this moment.

Of course I will just give general comments. On the first part as regarding the issue of globalization, in fact, globalization has taken or has absorbed the maximum energy among scholars dealing with that issue. Throughout all the papers from yesterday until today, I have been seeing that the issue of globalization has been regarded as a source of catastrophe.

In fact, I was thinking to hear a balance of views with regard to globalization. Yet we have heard since yesterday, when all the presenters expressed their ideas about globalization, they always relate it with the West or America, considering the West as the political entity and America at the same time as the political entity.

I think, being scholars, we have to deal in a very fair manner. Regarding America, we cannot see America per se as only its political context. We have also to see the cultural America. At the same time, when we look at the West, we should not see only the political West, but rather, perhaps we can see it as the cultural West.

The issue of globalization is being used as a political instrument, especially by America, and mainly in relation to its leadership. I am sure that, because our topic of concern here is the diversity of religions as they cope with the challenge of globalization, perhaps it would be fair to consider as well that while globalization is being directed by America at the Third World in particular, it

also faces resistance among religious groups in America itself. In this case, to my understanding, especially among Muslim scholars when the issue of secularization is addressed, secularization is closely related to globalization and westernization. But this does not mean that secularization does not affect other religions.

I heard from one of these two presenters who talked about secularization that it is as if only Muslims are being affected by the issue of secularization. Yet, the religion of the Christians faces the same thing, if I am not mistaken, this problem secularization. Because of this, I think, we have to seek the appropriate forum in which the different religious groups can share together, can work together, to encounter the issue of secularization.

Does this mean that secularization from the Islamic perspective is also different than secularization from the non-Islamic perspective? That is the thing we have to deal with. Or perhaps, this is my understanding as well, perhaps I can appeal especially to CISMOR for future workshops, because there aren't so many institutions which encourage religious dialogue or interfaith dialogue.

But in many cases, especially in those which are always being sponsored officially that use the umbrella of the United Nations, institutions have so many platforms for this dialogue yet, to my understanding, they never involve any political leaders; it is as if whatever interfaith dialogues were done in the past were mainly only congresses of scholars. And toward the end, in their official capacity, the scholars only issued their recommendations, then to be given to certain groups, especially perhaps groups in America, perhaps addressed to the American people. So to my understanding perhaps this is the important thing: in interfaith dialogue in the future, whatever it is—like workshops such as this one, perhaps—it will be more effective if we consider trying to bring one of the political leaders of a certain country.

I will give you an example, like Mr. Bush. To my understanding, Mr. Bush has been seen as the culprit by both Muslims and, even, by Christians themselves in America. But at the same time, he repeatedly declares himself as a Christian fundamentalist, and in many cases, he also uses this term. When he wanted to make the decision to invade Iraq, he used this one word, the word "crusade," which caused much criticism from many different groups and different religious scholars. Because of this, interfaith dialogue in the future, whether at the regional level or the global level, will be more effective if it is attended by the political leaders of different parts of the world.

OK. I am going to share certain issues about Indonesia, being an Indonesian. But my Indonesian commitment is not really that strong, like Mr. Yusanto's perhaps. I have been away from the country for many, many years. However, I keep on observing and following the situation, especially in the post-Suharto regime in which there is openness of democracy and so on and so forth. Of course, different religious groups try to express themselves with openness, and a quite interesting thing perhaps is the concept which has been brought up by Mr. Yusanto, that of the caliphate.

I am just discussing the concept of caliphate from the scholarly point of view, not from the political point of view. If you look at the concept of the caliphate, it is not necessarily of the political level. But the fact that, at this time, many young groups of Indonesians enthusiastically discuss the caliphate at the political level does not mean they are not right; they have the right and they may be right, but perhaps it still has a long delicate way to go. Because if you talk about the situation—this could be the same perhaps not only in Indonesia, but in the Muslim world in general—it might be at a level similar to Christian communities in many parts of the world.

The problem which Muslims face at the moment is that there are many Muslims who really do not yet comprehensively understand their own religion, and this could, of course, be the same in respect to Christianity. There are many Christians who declare themselves and, yet, even some of the cleverest Christians become very passive, for instance, due to a lack of understanding. Because of this, if the emphasis—this is my own perception—is to be centered on the political concept of the caliphate, it could also become the basis of strange opinions among others. I will give you an example.

The concept of the caliphate is not necessarily restricted to institutions, nor necessarily to the political context. It works even on the individual level. On the individual level, a person can question himself, can behave and can represent himself, as a caliph. This has been translated into English as "vice-regent." So we may use the terminology of the English to describe the caliphate as "vice-regency," which, at a personal level, can be the awareness that a person has the spirit to establish the truth, to do justice to others, to be fair to others, and also responsible.

Perhaps, to my understanding, the caliphate can be expanded in different ways. We do not deny that nationalism, which is also taking place in the Muslim world, is totally against the caliphate—or perhaps, not totally against the caliphate, but not fully in compliance with the caliphate. On the national level, I think that because of the complexities of the situation, to bring about the caliphate as it was in the past could, in a different context, be an issue.

Let me go for another two minutes, professor. No? No more. One minute. Alright, OK. As my last point, let me share something about the Muslims in the Philippines. It was my brother, Professor Wadi, who was informing us with regard to the different attitudes of Muslims who are educated in Southeast Asia becoming perhaps Malay-type Muslims, I might say, and the Muslims who studied in the Middle East, who perhaps on their return brought home alien pictures from the Middle Eastern groups. So perhaps here one should make a distinction between the cultural concepts of the Middle Eastern groups and the cultural concepts of the people who are in Southeast Asia in particular, and we have to recognize a difference on that issue. Because Muslims in the Middle East, with the exception perhaps of Egypt—in my writing, I have done extensive research regarding the relations between Arab Muslims and Arab Christians, who are known as the Copts of Egypt—are entirely different.

Because of this, with the exception of Egypt, most of the rest of the Muslim world never witnesses the plurality of the community. Because they have never seen this plurality, they want to deal as if there is a blueprint by which Islam has to be applied to the community. So on this particular point I think we have to make a distinction. Because of this, what was explained in the past needs to be reimplemented with this distinction, but this does not mean that we abandon the civilization and religion of Islam. Thank you very much.

(Chair) This is the end of Session 3. Thank you very much.

CISMOR
International Workshop
2005

November 6 (Sun.)

Session 4

"Religion and the Future of East Asia"

East Asia and the Challenges of Globalization: The Role of Monotheistic Religion in Maintaining Values and Identity

International Islamic University Malaysia SOLIHIN, Sohirin Mohammad

Introduction

This paper attempts to discuss the role of monotheistic belief in response to global issues. As each religion emphasizes ethics and morality, it becomes relevant to expand them into all aspects of human life. The paper will look at the religious precepts to be adopted as new strategies in response to the challenges of globalization. As the people of East Asia follow different religious beliefs, adopting such precepts would represent a new alternative for socio-economic and political development. It is inevitable, at present, that people attempt to modify their lives with spiritual nourishment and that certain regions of East Asia are witnessing a religious revival. Therefore, it would follow logically that their cultures and even lifestyles would be geared towards a religious way of life. The discussion also focuses on the definition, history, and current trends of globalization as well as the role of Islam and other monotheistic religions in seeking possible cooperation.

Globalization: Definition and Vision

Prior to discussing the role of monotheistic religion, it will be appropriate to deal firstly with the issue of globalization, which may pose a threat to certain aspects of religious belief. It is commonly understood that globalization is related to a process of doing certain things according to universal standards.[1] This process can be expanded into various areas, provided each of them is exposed at the global level, and can be considered as an open-border relationship of accepting the so-called universal standard of modernity which, sometimes, contradicts elements of indigenous cultures. In another respect, globalization is connected with the interdependence of nations in the fields of commerce, investment, communications, and ideas. Looking at the above definition, such things in fact already emerged hundreds of years ago. It is likely that the word globalization has been introduced with the aim of promoting global culture so as to replace the local, now regarded as obsolete.

It is quite unclear who initially used this word, "globalization," with this new vision on the eve of the new millennium. Whatever it is, it seems that globalization has been a subject of the utmost effort at conceptual redefinition by intellectuals and scholars. Previously, the words that had connoted globalization were more likely to be related with ideas of internationalization or universalism, depending on what it was that people wanted to disseminate across cultural and geographical frontiers. The views of the Greek philosophers, for instance, were widely circulated long before the emergence of scientific progress as we know it today. Without the use of modern communications, their philosophical ideas reached every single mind in the domain of intellectualism. It is quite interesting to note that the roots of globalization, as it took place in the past, were not simply related to commercial exchanges between people from different regions but also expanded into inter-cultural connections.

Intellectual Onslaughts

Human beings have to admit superiority over other living beings because of their capacity to discern the wide range of the universe. God gave them intellect to be utilized and to interact with others. This world is subjugated to humans as a place of settlement and of competition in achieving progress and goodness, and in view of this, the progeny of Adam strive to reach the highest level of achievement. Over time, diversity of thought emerged as a result of deep reflection on how to settle the earth and communicate with others. Philosophical rivalries among human beings may cause them to collide, of course, and sometimes cause tension. It is agreed that human beings have tendencies of egoism, but these can also help to expose ideas to overcome existing problems.[2]

However, not all human beings have an equal capacity to come up with great ideas that are demonstrated on a global scale, and it is a part of the rule of nature that they have been granted different intellectual capacities. Whatever the outcome of intellectualism, it will be of no avail unless it is disseminated to others. In view of this, globalization touches on the fundamental issue of promoted ideas, the results of advancing knowledge. Sociological experts maintain that human beings cannot perpetuate their lives if they isolate themselves. In this sense, intellectual interaction in socio-political, economic, military, medical, mathematic/geometric, artistic, and aesthetic fields, even in the metaphysical, could be seen as a process of globalization. Hence, the subject under discussion is related generally to the interaction between people of the Earth across vast distances.[3]

As mentioned, it can be claimed that the word "globalization" reflects a developmental term for phenomena that have already emerged before. Perhaps, due to the changing process and maturity of thought, the word has been re-introduced with a different emphasis. It could be

the same as the word *philosophy*, which is commonly understood as the attitude of human beings towards the universe, life, and society. But the origin of the term philosophy as used by the Greeks is related to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Thus, philosophy according to them comprises all speculative thought, and includes the arts, sciences, and religion.[4]

Those who make the greatest effort to think may globalize, and the thought resulting from the use of intellect will inevitably have an influence on others. It is worth noting that philosophical ideas can only be implemented with the adoption of policies which, in many cases, are carried out by the state. Since people are considered social beings, they are in dire need of the leadership mechanism to maintain social order, a notion also reflected in the fact that human beings form groups among themselves to attain their interests. This can be seen in Greek philosophies, especially in the fields of art, architecture, and government that influenced Western civilization. The process of influencing others is inseparable from globalization. The history of Western colonization also represents the articulation of ideas related to conquering other parts of the world; their presence is more likely to lead to domination and to the exploitation of natural resources in colonized areas, at the expense of local people in their "backwardness."

A Brief History of Globalization

Between the years 1000 and 1500, globalization had already taken root in the lands bordering the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. It extended beyond international trade, for it included the spread of religions, cultures, and technologies. At the time, this particular part of the Asian region could be regarded as the most dynamic one. Through maritime trade, Muslim merchants dominated the network and, at the same time, took advantage of the opportunity to propagate their religion. Malacca became a globalized center of commerce and culture. In addition, the Chinese also took advantage of an oceanic trading network, confirming civilizational exchanges across Asia which included the spread of Islam. We consider this to be cultural globalization.

Thus, we wish to point out that today's globalization, which is mainly characterized by the expansion of commercial contact with other parts of the word, had already developed many centuries before to transfer resources by sea and land. Eventually, the expansion of business also caused civilizational contact with other nations. This can be seen in the spread of Buddhism from India along trading routes, penetrating into Central Asia, Tibet, China, Japan, and even Southeast Asia.[5] Another example can be seen in business contacts which occurred between 200 BC and around AD 1000 along the so-called Silk Road that stretched across central and southwestern Asia, linking China to India, western Asia, and the Mediterranean. Goods, people, and cultural ideas swept across China, India, and Europe. Silk and porcelain, the famous Chinese crafts, were transported via Baghdad and the eastern Mediterranean ports, whence they were later dispatched to Rome. The Indian Ocean, which between 1000 and 1500 became more significant than the overland routes, greatly expanded links between Southeast Asia and the Middle East and enabled traders from Arabia, Persia, and India to visit the East African coast.[6]

The next step, which can be regarded as the embryo of globalization, is inseparably linked with the expansion of the Mongols between 1250 and 1350 when they forcefully conquered Siberia, Korea, Russia, Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkey, while also destroying other parts of Arab civilization in the Middle East.[7] The Mongol Empire at that time could be considered an agent of globalization in expanding their territorial and even cultural reach at the expense of the weak nations. Analyzing the history and process of international trade and colonial expansion, then, it can be seen that globalization is mainly concerned with the conquest of certain parts of the world at the hand of great powers.

With regard to the current trend of globalization, the West has benefited immensely from the progress of science and technology. In its time, the supremacy of the Mongol Empire enabled it to permit the transfer of technology from East Asia into Western Europe. China had also benefited from the opportunity of communication with other parts of the world, for which the Mongols had paved the way. A Chinese monk was the first eastern Asian visitor to Rome, England, and France. These kinds of open-door policies of the Mongol rulers allowed many other Chinese to settle in Persia, Iraq, and Russia.

The present advanced countries have benefited greatly from the "brain drain" of intelligent people from other parts of the world into Europe and North America. Similarly, if we look at the migration of people during the Mongol Empire, in the 14th century the Mongol rulers in China relied heavily on foreigners to serve in the international civil service, including Muslims from West and Central Asia and a small number of Europeans. Marco Polo, an Italian traveler, admitted that he spent seventeen years in China in government service. Despite the growth of Mongol civilization during the 1200s, their empire did not last long compared to others (as many historians might have predicted) because of their failure to take advantage of maritime commercial development.

Muslim Hegemony

The spread of Islam on a greater scale took place in the period between the 8th and the 15th centuries, during which time this religion demonstrated its powerful expansion across the boundaries of the Arab heartland. Muslims were able to penetrate distant geographi-

cal regions such as China and the Balkans. Through the growth of Islamic civilization in other parts of the world, Muslim scholars introduced the term *dar al-Islam* (the home of Islam). The concern of our discussion is related to the unprecedented expansion of any religion, and this case can be considered as the process of global Islamization. It had a great influence by spreading Arabic names, words, the alphabet, as well as architecture, social attitudes, and cultural influences to the peoples of the world. Ibnu Battutah made a journey around the world starting from Mali in Africa, traveling to Spain, Southeast Asia, and the coastal ports of China in the east. Throughout the journey he found in peoples attitudes similarities to the common worldview of Muslims.

The Muslim dynasty was able to expand its hegemony as the caliphate government expanded its territories into non-Arab regions from Morocco to Indonesia. Moreover, Muslims were leading the trade across the Sahara to Spain, and to the South China Sea. They made use of the Indian Ocean to develop the international trading network which linked China, Japan, Vietnam, and Cambodia in the east through Malaya and the Indonesian islands. They crossed India and Sri Lanka and then led the expansion westward into Persia, the East African coast leading into Mozambique, and the eastern Mediterranean.

Apart from the Indian Ocean, which represented the main gateway for trading routes, both the Straits of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf and Straits of Malacca in Southeast Asia were other important portals of trade exchange in the pre-modern era. Through these two main gateways to international commerce, the spices of Indonesia and East Africa, the gold and tin of Malaya, the batik and carpets of Java, the textiles of India, the gold of Zimbabwe, and the porcelain and tea of China made their way to distant areas. Such merchandise, when it reached the West, stimulated the people to explore its diverse sources in the East. It is worth noting that the global exchange of trade flourished following the downfall of the Mongolians and reached its height in the 1400s and 1500s, and while, in later stages, Muslim dynasties were in decline, their economic and cultural influences remained dominant.

Malacca: Gateway of Trade and Civilization

There is no doubt that various states around the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea were competing to make use of the maritime trade. East African states such as Mombassa with its mixture of African-Arab Swahili culture experienced a long competitive struggle. The Jews and Arabs maintained close ties with Western Asia, North and East Africa, Southeast Asia and China and, at that time, there was hardly any political force which was more dominant along the maritime trading route. Malacca, near the southern tip of Malaya, could be illustrated as the gateway of globalization in the pre-modern era. Through the Southeast Asian region, people exchanged ideas and trade. Some rulers of the coastal states in the Malay Peninsula and Indonesian islands were interested in attracting Muslim traders who, by that time, dominated interregional maritime commerce. Their fascination with the universality of Islam led them to conversion.

Apart from the strategic importance of the region and the efforts of Muslims to spread their religion in the midst of trade, Malacca became the main base for the expansion of Islam in the archipelago, as well as the last stop on the eastern end of the Indian Ocean trade route network. During the 1400s, Malacca was a flourishing trading centre attracting merchants from many lands in Asia and Africa. More ships dropped anchor in Malacca's harbor than in any other port in the world; seagoing merchants were attracted by its stable government and free trade policy. Among Malacca's population of 100,000 to 200,000 people were about 15,000 foreign traders, among them Arabs, Egyptians, Persians, Turks, Jews, Armenians, Ethiopians, East Africans, Burmese, Vietnamese, Javanese, Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, and Indians from all over the subcontinent. On the city's streets, some 84 languages were spoken. Malacca had become one of the major trading cities in the world, a multiethnic centre of globalized culture and commerce, much like New York, Los Angeles, or Hong Kong are today.

Chinese and European Domination

History also records that in the early 15th century, the emperor of the Ming dynasty, Yong-lo, dispatched maritime expeditions to southern Asia. Between the years of 1405 and 1433 a Chinese Muslim admiral, Cheng Ho, dispatched seven voyages with a large fleet of sixty-two vessels carrying nearly 28,000 men. The world had never seen such large-scale seamanship. During this oceanic journey, they sailed the maritime trade routes through Southeast Asia to India, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, Arabia, and down the East African coast as far as Kilwa in Tanzania. Malacca became their southern base, and its rulers also made occasional trips to China to strengthen the alliance.

Although the Chinese traveled mostly in peace and fought only a few military actions, some 36 countries, including a few in western Asia, acknowledged allegiance to China. During this period, China represented the greatest power in a globalizing hemisphere. Historians never came to agreement as to Cheng Ho's motive for undertaking such huge voyages. Some estimated that a diplomatic mission was the primary goal, with the recognition by so many foreign countries reaffirming the emperor's position. Others attribute it to commercial motives, since the voyage was carried out at

the time when Chinese merchants were becoming more active in Southeast Asia. In the early Ming period, China remained the most advanced civilization in the world. Under the Ming, China had opened up greater communications between the continents and had become the dominant world power well beyond eastern Asia. Unlike Christian Europe, China had little interest in spreading its religion and culture.

News of the vitality of Malacca and Hormuz reached Europe by the end of the 1400s. The Portuguese were able to gain access to Asian trade by making their way to India in 1498 and Malacca in 1509, marking the beginning of a new era of European hegemony in Asia. Although the Portuguese managed to seize Malacca in 1511 and had superior weaponry, the living standard was lower than the more developed societies of Asia. This is what eventually led the Europeans to use force to achieve their commercial and political ambitions. With European control over trade in the region, it could be claimed that the globalization of the next centuries was in the hands of Western Christians rather than the Muslims, Indians, and Chinese, who had laid the initial groundwork between 1000 and 1500.

Globalization: Advantages and Expectations

At present, when we talk about globalization it is not just focused on the dissemination of ideas, for it revolves around transnational borderless trade in the fields of industry, agriculture, technology, military equipment, and many others, on global scale. It refers mainly to the contemporary large-scale opening of borders as states remove countless regulatory barriers to international trade, travel, financial transfers, and communications. Here "globalization" is used synonymously with "liberalization." On this account, the term describes the creation of a single borderless world. It is presumed that opening borders will yield a global economy that replaces national economies; a "global" government will replace territorial states; a homogeneous "global" culture will replace diverse local cultures; and allegiances to a "global" community will replace national loyalties.[8]

There are numerous definitions surrounding the concept of globalization in its new facets and new emphasis. Some of them define it as the intercommunication of people through trade, investment, travel, culture, and other forms of interaction. They came to the conclusion that the current trend in globalization is mainly related to Western domination of the international economy.[9] Many people of different fields are using the word to signify that something profound is happening—that the world is changing, that a new world economic, political, and cultural order is emerging. The term is used in so many different contexts for different purposes that, sometimes, it creates confusion when trying to ascertain what is at stake in the matter of globalization, what function the term serves, and what effects it has on contemporary theory and politics.[10]

Despite worries about disastrous effects, globalization may bring benefits depending on people's response to it. We do not deny the emergence of various effects on communities, but with the rapid change of technological progress resulting from human advancement, globalization may, with the utmost care, also brings about good results. The positive aspects can be drawn into the following categories: First, the diversity of communications systems, i.e. air travel, telephone, computer networks, the Internet, radio, and television, allows us to make contact easily, irrespective of geographical boundaries. Second, in the aspect of trade, the exchange and movement of a variety of products, agriculture, and technologies run smoothly through the conduct of trans-world commercial practices. Third, with regard to *consciousness,* globalization is evidenced insofar as people conceive of the world as a single place, affiliate themselves with communities (e.g. of religious faith, race, etc.) that transcend borders, and otherwise understand their destiny in terms of trans-world affairs regardless of territories.

In addition, through the eruption of revolutionary communication systems, human beings, especially in the urban areas, get easy access to the means of acquiring information of various kinds. Knowledge of and contact with other civilizations can thus be gained through such progress in communications, which has helped people to obtain information needed to understand today's culturally interconnected world.[11] In terms of investment and global trade, increasing social mobility and the rising middle class benefit from easier and cheaper communication that can link human beings regardless of their geographical region and race.[12]

Problems and Challenges

Many scholars believe that today's world is organized by increasing globalization, which is strengthening the dominance of a world capitalist economic system and eroding local traditions through a global culture. The operation of transnational corporations with the sole aim of multiplying profits has caused a widening economic gap between the rich and poor countries. Basic necessities of life are set aside in favour of profits, and many countries in the South have been occupied with facilitating foreign investment in industries that are lucrative to foreign markets, forsaking the most fundamental needs of the people. Globalization promotes a consumerist mentality, leading people to opt for worldly gains regardless of ethical and moral values. Moreover, it marginalizes the indigenous cultures of the Third World by encouraging people to follow the patterns of the West. In the aspect of education, for instance, the curriculum is mainly focused on technical and managerial skills while neglecting the traditional subjects. It gears students to acquire specific

skills and techniques, but ignores the moral dimensions. In fact, globalization ultimately amounts to little more than adopting American and Western culture, which is detrimental to spirituality. Information technology (IT), which characterizes the current trend in globalization, promotes a moral crisis in the youth through its proliferation of pornographic advertisements. In addition, IT is being misused by certain groups to carry out illegal electronic cash transactions, which may cause heavy financial losses. Globalization has caused an increase in crime rates while, at the same time, people become confused by conflicting news from different sources. The boom in information technology is also being used to spread the political agenda of the big powers, which too often victimizes the Third World.[13]

It is quite interesting to note the views of scholars who regard globalization as a new form of imperialism that displaces the focus of domination of developing countries by the overdeveloped ones, or of national and local economies by transnational corporations. It is also considered to serve as a cover to neutralize the horrors of colonialism, thus again a discourse of neo-imperialism. The opposition to globalization focuses mainly on the destruction of local traditions, the subordination of poorer regions by richer ones, on environmental pollution and on the homogenization of culture and everyday life. Opponents include multiculturalists who stress the threat to national sovereignty and local traditions, environmentalists who fear the destructive ecological effects, and conservatives or religious leaders who see globalization as a threat to national and local cultures and the sanctity of tradition.[14]

Kamal Hassan is of the opinion that the negative aspects of globalization outnumber the positives ones.[15] He laments that globalization has created the political, economic, and cultural domination of the North over the South which is inadequately prepared to face the challenges. The global impact of modernization has caused environmental degradation and chaotic economic disparities, widening the gap between the rich and the poor countries while developing countries have shifted their focus from policies to meet their necessities to luring investment in order to make profits. Consumerism is on the rise, education has been commercialized, and the Western culture is swallowing up the indigenous cultures of the developing nations.[16]

Predictions have been made as to the possible consequences of globalization. Roland Axtmann, for instance, hints that globalization may produce a form of global citizenship, necessitating that we respond to the challenges of the global village. This eventually obliges us to create a forum to overcome the problems of inequality, poverty, and the widening gap between the rich and the poor—a task for intellectuals and scholars. The worst thing is that globalization could have the effect of creating new forms of imperialist domination under the disguise of universality and globality. Globalization serves as a new form of Westernization, or even Americanization, of the world. In view of this, we should not be surprised to see resistance from religious believers who reject the homogenization and Westernization associated with some forms of globalization.

The end of the 20th century, which is the landmark of globalization, is characterized by unparalleled economic growth and financial liberalization that have caused the widening gap between rich and poor countries. The richest quarter of the world's population increased its per capita GDP six-fold whereas the poor nations just experienced less than three-fold increases. The trend can be seen in Asia where, since the 1970s, several nations have demonstrated the ability to become industrial countries but where, at the same time, we witness the much slower progress of developing countries. Another effect of globalization is that global output per capita has risen considerably, but income distribution among countries has become more unequal.

As globalization has progressed, living conditions (particularly when measured by broader indicators of well being) have improved significantly in virtually all countries. However, the strongest gains have been made by the advanced countries and only a few of the developing countries. That the income gap between high-income and low-income countries has grown wider is a matter for concern. And the number of the world's citizens in abject poverty is deeply disturbing. But it is wrong to jump to the conclusion that globalization has caused the divergence, or that nothing can be done to improve the situation. On the contrary, low-income countries have not been able to integrate with the global economy as quickly as others, partly because of policies they have chosen, and partly because of factors beyond their control. No country, least of all the poorest, can afford to remain isolated from the world economy. Every country should seek to reduce poverty. The international community should endeavour—by strengthening the international financial system and through trade and aid—to help the poorest countries become integrated into the world economy, grow more rapidly, and reduce poverty. This is the way to ensure that all people in all countries have access to the benefits of globalization.

Monotheistic Belief: Islam and other Religions

Islam shares an emphasis on love with other religions, especially Christianity and Judaism. There are numerous passages in the Qur'an where God expresses his compassion for mankind. All commands, as contained in the textual evidence, will bring about goodness when followed, and all prohibitions will lead to dire consequences whenever people are heedless of them. The core

of Islam is the family and all human beings are regarded as God's family members.

The concept of Paradise is not just related with the life in the hereafter. It must be actualized to secure peace and to avoid conflict in this world. Mutual cooperation at the community and state levels could be considered as a manifestation of Paradise. Islamic monotheism accepts the doctrinal concept that there is only one single deity who deserves to be worshipped. All the prophets were given the task of conveying that message, to devote their lives exclusively to the creator. Throughout history, the message of monotheism was propagated with the practice of the *Shari'ah* in different environmental conditions. It comprises theological and sociological aspects. First, it relates to God's existence, with which no other beings can associate. Second, it has to do with His authority, signifying that human beings can never claim to have absolute power; the authority a person may possess should be in line with His mercy.

In the sociological context, monotheism proclaims a truth that can be practiced by human beings regardless of their religious affiliation. Islam affirms the oneness of the truth reflected in the theological framework as *tawhid* (lit. oneness or unity). Thus, the essence of religious belief is to affirm that there is hardly any duality of truth in this universe. Monotheistic doctrine confirms these two main aspects, and therefore, the issues of making association with Him, (known in Islam as *shirk*) represents deviation from theology. God condemns those who believe in Him but yet mix this with other, conflicting attitudes.[17] The second aspect bears upon the interaction of human beings in this world. Those who are aware of the truth, and yet indulge in sinful acts which usurp the rights of others, basically neglect the truth of theology. The core of monotheistic belief is to ensure the equality of mankind in which diverse ethnicities, races, and persons of different social status are to interact positively. Hence there should be no superiority, for dignity is accounted simply on the basis of piousness, as seen in the following:

> O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you despise each other). Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you. Allah has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things).[18]

The first aspect of monotheism noted above is related with the essence of revelation, which signifies the oneness of the truth that mankind is to observe. The Prophet Adam was warned of the emergence of conflict that could lead to bloodshed and cause frustration. Only those who rely on God's guidance will be saved.[19] Islamic monotheism must be understood in a context in which there is only one single truth, which is derived from God. Anyone who observes virtuous deeds, regardless of their religious affiliation, initially follows the truth of God. Hence, Muslim scholars put forward the theory that revelation consists of textual and non-textual aspects. The former are related to all the evidence contained in the Qur'an and *Sunnah*. The latter are related with the truth of human ideas. It is quite interesting to note the view of the Muslim theologian, Imam al-Shāfi'ī, who argued that the community is determined by a group of experts who use their knowledge to agree on something that affects public and personal life. Such agreements carried the weight of truth since it is impossible for a community to agree in error—which, according to him, arises from separation, not from collective decision-making.[20]

The Indonesian Muslim thinker Mohammad Natsir considers that *tawhid is* not simply related to attributes of God that necessitate ritual services among Muslims, to offer obedience. He argues that all intrinsic values existing in the community, such as humanitarian aid, cooperative efforts, and assisting the poor, should be maintained. By contrast, all evil deeds are seen as sinful acts and should be eradicated to save human beings from moral bankruptcy. He is also of the view that everything which is not specifically mentioned in the revelation can be regulated according to circumstances as long as this does not contradict the basic principles of *Shari'ah.* His statement reads:

> If the desired rule and system already existed in another country, we as Muslims have the right to take it from others. Each advance of civilization is not the monopoly of a certain nation. We have the right to take over good regulations from any other country, i.e. Britain, America, Russia, France, and Switzerland, as long as they do not contradict the objectives of our religion. Even non-Muslim countries made rules by taking examples from others that excelled in term of intelligence and civilization.[21]

As *tawhid* represents the single entity of mankind who came from one and the same source, then the concept of *ummah* is related to goodness and virtues. It is closely connected with the presence of human beings in society whose concern it is to enjoin goodness, establishing justice both at the individual and collective levels. From the start, human beings were embodied as a single *ummah* and the arrival of the prophets throughout history was aimed at guiding them to the right path.[22]

The main concern is that the word *ummah* is closely linked with truth and justice (*al-haq wa al-'adl*). All individuals, as members of the community, can only be considered as an *ummah* when they are ready to be governed by them. In a broader sense, *ummah* reflects the

augmentation of the family of human beings to become the family of God, whose members come from different races, tribes, nations, and beliefs. The divine rule requires every individual Muslim to observe certain principles in dealing with adherents of different religions. Natsir, again, maintains that conversion to a particular religion is the right of the individual and that God blesses those who sincerely make effort to search for true religion. According to him, all followers of religion are justified in defending their rights at any cost,[23] and argues that issues of religion sometimes become sensitive and lead to fanaticism. Therefore, God gives clear guidance to maintain peace and avoid physical clashes. The Prophet (PBUH) demonstrated tolerance in dealing with the People of the Book in the government, in order to maintain peace under this divine guidance:

> …and I am commanded to judge justly between you. Allah is our Lord and your Lord: for us (is the responsibility for) our deeds, and for you for your deeds, there is no contention between us and you. Allah will bring us together, and to Him is (our) final goal.[24]

The above guidance should be regarded as part of religious ethics for the maintenance of peace and religious pluralism. Responsibility is required to actualize the sanctity of this fundamental value.

Religious Cooperation: Response to Globalization

Since most monotheistic religions emphasize ethics and morality, it is wise to apply the benefits of the outcomes of science and technology to serve humanity. It is inevitable that religious leaders use globalization to promote the divine message in other parts of the world. In many cases, in the midst of spreading the message, they may face resistance from those who already subscribe to a particular belief. In view of this, those participating in the actualization of multi-religious ethics must be firm that preaching should not be addressed to those who have already embraced a particular faith, and that they should emphasize seeking common agreement based on matters about which they can cooperate to serve humanity. However, this requires continuous struggle, compassion, deliberation, and sincere intentions. Religious leaders must be aware of the sensitivity of propagation and the danger of clashing due to simple ambition to increase their followers. Such a goal must be eliminated in order to enhance the spirit of dialogue in seeking solutions to poverty, conflict, war, child abuse, discrimination, socio-economic exploitation, sexual harassment, drug trafficking, etcetera.

The thing that should be borne in mind is that we must avoid the tricky game in which, sometimes, under the pretext of boosting religious dialogue, in fact certain groups attempt to convert others. Humanitarian aid, for instance, should be given purely for the sake of saving people from the threat of starvation, death, and calamity. More importantly, the concept of peace as framed in religious sources must have the power to penetrate the hearts of state authorities. Otherwise, whatever the appeal for peace, a nightmare could result if efforts are not structured in the proper way.

When certain religions represent a minority, it must be ensured that their presence does not disturb the religion that is followed by the majority. It is, in fact, very crucial that the government play a vital role in adopting the ethics, rules, and principles of religious propagation to ensure the peaceful co-existence among religious adherents. At the global level, religious leaders must have the courage to raise their voices to stop military aggression against the Third World by superpowers. Moreover, since conflicts currently taking place in this world—such as in the Middle East—are between the followers of different religions, then it is necessary to activate the international forum of religious dialogue, to convene meetings to be attended both by clergy and political leaders in order to seek amicable solutions. Only through this system can all religious leaders contribute positively in response to the issue of globalization in a conducive and peaceful atmosphere.

It is a fact that the new millennium demonstrates scientific and technological advances which, possibly, have never been experienced before in human history. Yet, this situation is quite volatile. Instead of bringing about economic cooperation, development, progress, and peace, they generate conflict, war, and starvation. We must be constantly aware that all religions preach universal brotherhood, but due to the intolerance and ambiguity of other faiths, sometimes, it is impossible to put this into practice. We do not deny the efforts to boost economic parity in the poor countries, but it still remains far from reality as economic exploitation and religious bigotry have fostered feelings of hatred and have even produced violence. In order to galvanize efforts to achieve humanitarian goals, it is imperative to enlighten the spirit of tolerance and preserve the main characteristics of each religion, for each has its own patterns of living and spiritual concepts that need to be observed in the everyday lives of adherents.

All religious leaders must make constant efforts to promote justice and freedom at the global level. This requires commitment to making the world free of violence, conflict, and power struggles. It should not end up as slogans—it must be supported by action. Territorial ambitions and power struggles must be outlawed. Military leaders, scientists, and religious leaders should agree that war is an obsolete way of handling problems. Globalization should be utilized in a proper way, one that projects the vision of a peaceful world in which no human beings can enslave others simply to fulfill their lusts. Religion must struggle to actualize the ethical

norms according to which every man, woman, and child shall be esteemed as members of one human family.

In other areas, especially in the sphere of economic activities, ethical norms and values must be injected. This is the challenge for religious scholars: to devise ethical, but economically sound, policies, in keeping with religious values and scriptural injunctions, to build into the globalization process. Global ethical values within the consciousness of the individual and the community are the only hope for humanity. Scientists and religious scholars must work jointly to promote goodness and justice by adopting a long-term plan. Justice, love, and compassion that reflect the main character of religion should propel goodness, rather than formalities and ritual symbols. It should be kept in mind that certain aspects of globalization have made it easier to transmit the all-embracing message of religion, such that it might be considered the right moment and opportunity to convey to human beings as a whole the universal essence of each of our religions. As far as globalization is concerned, it has made societies less exclusive and more multi-religious, as if reality had compelled us to abolish our exclusiveness to develop a universal orientation. This, in fact, represents the right path that nations must take for a universal community founded upon a common humanity. Through this means, the religious response to globalization gives special emphasis to the use of multi-religious value systems to overcome human problems and to establish peace and justice. We may use different gates to enter the world of justice. This is illustrated by Jalaluddin al-Rumi who, in support of the notion of a common platform across religious boundaries, said: "The lamps are different but the light is the same."[25]

Notes

1 See Encarta Dictionary, 2004.
2 Concepts of the ego may differ from one to another based on the particular angle from which a person perceives it. Sigmund Freud holds that human beings possess three basic provinces of the mind, the other two being the id and the superego. He said further that the formation of the ego starts at birth in the first encounters with the external world of people and things. Meanwhile, in philosophy the term reflects the consciousness of self. Rene Descartes and Gottlieb Fichte consider ego the sole basis of reality. They hold that the universe exists only in the individual's knowledge and experience of it, while Immanuel Kant proposes two kinds of ego, one perceiving and the other thinking. Id dominates desire, the fulfillment of which an individual is compelled to seek in forms of immediate gratification. According to Freudian theory, the main factor behind the emergence of id is the libido, which is considered as a general force through which the sexual nature finds its expression. Superego is the term which indicates the element of mind that produces antisocial action and thought. See Reference Library, 2004.
3 See Craig A. Lockard, *The Seeds of Globalization*. Encarta Reference Library, 2004.
4 Reference Library, 2004.
5 Such cultural contacts through trading exchanges can be seen in the years between 200 BC and AD 1500. See Craig A. Lockard, op. cit., p. 23.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Scholte, Jan Aart, *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 3, July 1997, pp. 427–52.
9 See Craig A. Lockard, *The Seeds of Globalization*. In: Encarta Reference Library, 2004.
10 Douglas Kellner, *Globalization and the Postmodern Turn*, 2002. For details see >http://www.gseis.uda.edu/faculty/kellner/kellner.html<
11 Zandra Muzaffar, in Fountain Magazine, No. 43 (July–Sept.), 2003.
12 Kamal Hassan, "Challenges of Globalization." Al-Jazeerah, June 6, 2004.
13 Chandra Muzaffar, 2003.
14 Kellner, 1989.
15 Kamal Hassan is currently the rector of International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and these views were given during a lecture delivered at the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Islamabad, Pakistan.
16 Hassan, Kamal, *Challenges of Globalization*, Al-Jazeerah, June 6, 2004.
17 Qur'an, 4:116
18 Qur'an, 49:13
19 The way to put into practice the revelation is termed *Shari'ah* (lit. Islamic Law) which differed for every prophet. Certain Islamic laws were renewed from time to time based on the changing environment. In view of this, all new issues which did not emerge during the lifetime of the Prophet need to be looked into from the point of view of *Shari'ah*.
20 See Maine Sanneh in Encarta Reference Library, 2004.
21 Panji Islam, 19 December, 1950.
22 Qur'an, 2:213.
23 Natsir supports his argument with the verse of the Qur'an which says, "Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure. Allah will certainly aid those who aid His (cause); for verily Allah is Full of Strength, Exalted in Might, able to enforce His Will" (Qur'an, 22:40).
24 Qur'an, 42:15
25 Quoted by Zandra Muzaffar. In: http://islamonline.net/

A Proposal for the Role of East Asian Religious Culture in Alternative Globalization: A Perspective from Korean Christianity

Methodist Theological Seminary LEE Jung-Bae

1.

It has been more than a century since 'westernization' or 'modernization' was regarded as a universal value. This means that the enforced modernization that began in the late nineteenth century has made Western values a set of core ideals for East Asian nations. In the mean time, East Asia's traditions have been devalued or dispirited, and their national identities put in danger of being lost. Now that modernization is shifting into globalization under the ideology of neoliberalism, the concept of the nation is threatened with eclipse and the loss of its meaning—for globalization is producing a great number of multi-national or supra-national corporations which do not have to be concerned about nations or states.[1] Conceiving of the nation as a fiction, postmodernism has played a significant role in bringing about this situation. In agreeing with this trend of thought, we would have to say that transcending the boundaries of nation and state is what needs to be done for the future of humanity; it is also the aim of all religions. However, as long as the strong always win over the weak in the name of globalization, it could end up being another, reinforced, version of orientalism in the name of cultural homogenization. East Asian subjects are here understood as the recipients of Western discourses and interpretations. Nevertheless, globalization is a necessary task that should be achieved. For this reason, some people consider the regional integration of East Asia as an 'alternative' globalization.

Samuel Huntington's theory of a clash of civilizations shows real anxiety about Western globalization. Although it is suspected of justifying military supremacy by taking the clash between civilizations for granted, his theory is considered to be a significant perspective in that it emphasizes the emergence of self-consciousness in non-Western societies. Huntington suggests that nation, language, and religion are the core elements of a civilization.[2] The identities of non-Western existence are a reality that has been accumulating for a long time. The more harmful effects globalization has on these non-Western peoples, and the more it forces Western values onto them, the more unavoidable it is for them, now equipped with their own cultural identity, to clash with Westerners. But I think there is a way to avoid such a clash. It is possible only when the Christian West recognizes its own culture not as the absolute value, but as one among many.[3] Nevertheless, the project of globalization still demands West-oriented universality and imposes one nation's interests upon the others. This is why people in East Asia consider their local integration of East Asia as a counter-scheme to the Western bloc.

Although only a slight outcome of their efforts is visible now, a lot of lively discussions are under way to reconstruct the regional identity of East Asia on the basis of its cultural, historical, and religious particularities.[4] Generally speaking, self-identity becomes visible through certain shared values and norms. Identifying these values and norms, the people are now searching for an alternative globalization that would actualize the political, economic, and institutional integration of the East Asian region. The solidarity of East Asian nations which have shared Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism has a long history and thus continues to be suggested as a goal and project, despite its ambiguity. But the conflict and confrontation between Christianity, as monotheism, and the traditional religions make the goal very difficult to achieve. In the case of Korea, which has become a semi-Christian country, the antipathy against westernization is not so strong. But its own traditional religions have become something of a strange other to the people. For, since its introduction into Korea during the period of "the Western Domination over the East," Christianity helped Koreans in the process of modernization, inspired the spirit of their independence movement, and led the way to democratization. On the other hand, it is also remarkable that *Tonghak* (East Learning), *Jeung-san Kyo*, and *Won* Buddhism, rooted in Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, newly emerged as national religions in Korea. Those religions shared the same historical consciousness of the fact that Japanese imperialism invaded Asia in the name of 'Orientalism' (Pan-Asianism) and claimed to be "the Gateway to Overcoming Asia" while conspiring with the Christian West. In this respect, Korean nationalism, which has proclaimed its anti-America and anti-Japan position, is an undeniable reality.

In the contemporary general trend of globalization, however, it is obvious that nationalism cannot be an alternative either, because it is as problematic as understanding oneself through the eye of the other. For this reason, I think *To-bal-lon* (Theory of Indigenous Generation), or the perspective of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* (the Eastern Spirit and the Western Principle) can be an internal foundation on which to construct a discourse of East Asian regional integration, even though it has been criticized by both sides as the wrong way to go.[5] Now that we can expect more conflicts between civilizations because of forced

modernization (globalization), it is a prerequisite for us to understand religion as the core of civilizations in intercultural terms, before we construct a discourse of alternative globalization. Of course, what I shall be proposing might be a unique perspective generated only in the modern history of Korea. Still, it can be a meaningful response to the absolute demand for a genuine sense of global consciousness, arising from interreligious dialogue, to create an alternative globalization. With this goal in mind, I will discuss the issue of "modernization and national identity," which is the theme of this conference, in the following order: first, the relationship between national identity and Christianity in the process of Korean modernization; secondly, religious people's perspectives on globalization and their new consciousness of spirituality (religion); and finally, the role of religion for alternative globalization and a proposal for the regional integration of East Asia.

2.

Since it was forced to make an unequal treaty with Japan in the cause of modernization, Korea, against its own will, has been put under the influence of Western world powers such as the United States of America, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany. The introduction of Protestant Christianity into Korea was closely tied to the expansion of Western power. Fortunately, unlike any other Asian nation, the Christian gospel was not introduced into Korea as a political means to facilitate the European colonial occupation. Therefore, the early stage of Christianity in Korea took charge of *Gaehwa* ('reformation'), or the demanding task of modernizing late *Yi* dynasty Korea, in which the traditional religions had already lost their influence on the people. Moreover, the antagonistic feeling against the invader Japan made Korean people become tolerant toward the West and toward America in particular, and allowed them to show an open-hearted and receptive attitude toward Christianity. However, it is not the case that there was only one common perspective on modernization in the Western sense among the Korean people, because *Gaehwa*, or modernization, was inevitably accompanied by the process of forced destruction of their traditional identity, which had developed over a great length of time. The problem was that Japan tried to modernize the entire culture and institutions of Korea with its military power, on the one hand, while on the other, Western missionaries looked down upon the traditional Korean culture rooted in Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, and implanted Western values in the people's minds in order to awaken their human consciousness. Many Koreans' antagonistic attitude toward the West and modernization was even further intensified by their realization that Japan was carrying out its project of Asian expansionism with the connivance of Western imperialism.

From this experience of awakening to a harsh reality emerged different perspectives on Western modernization. Ever since the moment of their emergence and up to the current age of globalization, these perspectives have been functioning as specific frames by which to view the world, even though there have been some modifications. They are represented by the following positions: first, *Wi-j'ung-ch'uk-sa-pa* (the school of protecting the right and rejecting the evil or heretic) held the conservative position of protecting traditional Korean culture and institutions, rejecting Western modernization on the basis of a China-centered worldview; secondly, *Gae-hwa-pa* (the radical reformists) advocated building a wealthy state with a strong army with the help of Western civilization; thirdly, the moderate reformists (*Tong-do-s'u-ki*: Eastern spirit and Western civilization) tried to adopt Western civilization (*Ki*: *Ch'i*) while maintaining Eastern subjectivity (*Do*: *Tao*); and lastly, as a more advanced position than the third, advocates of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* took seriously both *Tao* (religion) and *Ch'i* (civilization) of the East and the West altogether. This last position of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* is the one to which I will pay close attention later in this article. For, whereas *Tong-do-s'u-ki* ultimately held a chauvinistic position as a modified version of the conservative worldview, *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* aimed at the coexistence of *Tao* and *Ch'i* of the East with the West, even though it was a minority position.[6]

First of all, *Wi-j'ung-ch'uk-sa-pa* followed the values of orthodox Confucianism (*S'ung-li-hak*: *Hsing-li hsüeh*) and thus rejected Christianity and the whole of Western civilization. Having been so exclusive as to disapprove of the existence of *Yang-my'ung-hak* (*Yang-ming hsüeh*) as a school of Confucianism, the Korean *li*-oriented *Chu-ja-hak* (*Chu-tzu hsüeh*) did not show any tolerance toward the foreign ideas introduced in the late *Chosun* dynasty period, but rather, regarded the introduction of the Western civilization as an act of invasion, proclaimed defiance of the heretic and the West, and finally led the militant movement of *Ŭi-by'ung* (righteous troops). Confucian scholars such as Choi, Yik-hyun and Kim, Hang-no represented this position. They considered the task of defending Confucianism and maintaining the China-centered order (*Li*) as a patriotic mission that a Confucian scholar must fulfill. This position was connected to that of the late Confucian scholars such as Shin, Hu-dam and Ahn, Jung-bok who had rejected *S'u-hak* (Western Learning) and *S'u-kyo* (Western Teaching: Catholicism) a hundred years ago. Shin, Hu-dam had even written a book entitled *S'u-hak-by'un*, or *A Critique of Western Learning*. Unlike the previous situation in which it had been possible for these Confucian scholars to engage in scholarly criticism, for the *Wi-j'ung-ch'uk-sa-pa* circumstances became so serious as to seem to threaten by force their national identity itself. It is understandable that orthodox Confucianism

could not help taking its exclusive and conservative attitude as a means of upholding their patriotism. Such an exclusivistic spiritual legacy was developed into the ethos of some Christians in the late period of Japanese colonialism. They refused to worship Japanese Shinto in order to keep the purity of their faith. Nevertheless, they are not exempt from the criticism that their China-centered worldview was so insensible to the reality of that time; their subjectivity was so distorted that they could not properly come to terms with modernization.

The next position is that of radical reformists who considered modernization as a task of destiny for the late *Chosun*, and thus took an open attitude not only to Western civilization but also to Christian religion. The *Gae-hwa-pa* (radical reformists) such as Kim, Ok-kyun, Park, Young-hyo, and S'u, Jae-pil who led the *Kap-shin* coup d'état (1884) tried to build an ideology of a modern state on Korean soil by taking Japan as an example. The fundamental ethos of this position was its denial of the whole Confucian culture that had been functioning as the value system integrating the traditional Korean society. They thought it was now useless. Sharing the same ethos of the *Kap-shin* coup d'état, Shin, Chae-ho made the following statement: "Today, where is China? Turn around that way, and America would become China; turn around this way, and Chosun would become China. So turn any country into the center, and it would become China; now then, where is the fixed China?"[7] However, the reformist position was problematic when seen from Shin, Chae-ho's nationalist view of history. As is well known, Shin, Chae-ho built his nationalist historical perspective on the basis of his criticism of Japanese orientalism's idealization of Asia. He saw through the danger and harm of Japanese orientalism or Asianism, which regarded Japan as superior to the Christian West and suggested that modernized Japan was the model for Asia, placing Asian nations under its protection and, finally, driving the world to a confrontation between the East and the West. Rejecting the idealization of Japan, Shin, Cha-ho thus emphasized the importance of nationalism and viewed human history as the struggle between *Ah* (ego: one nation) and *Bi-ah* (non-ego: other nations), or the conflict between nations (nation-states), but not between the East and the West.[8] In this context, it was a natural result that *Tonghak* emerged first as a nationalistic religion, followed by other religions such as *Jeungsan Kyo* and *Won* Buddhism, both of which put great emphasis on their national subjectivity.

However, we need to leave room for Asianism to be reconsidered later from a critical point of view as we observe the contemporary situation in which East Asian regionalism is being discussed as alternative globalization. What is interesting here is the fact that the *Gae-hwa-pa* understood Christianity not as a matter of religious concern but as a means of building a wealthy state with a strong army. Therefore, *Gae-hwa-pa* was able to accept Christianity as a new spiritual value that could lead the process of modernization in the place of the withering orthodox Confucianism. Therefore, it was quite a natural consequence that the spirit of *Gae-hwa-pa*, which tried to encounter the Christian West on the premise of the denial of traditional religions and culture, was later carried into the nationalist movement (*Shin-Gan-Hoe*) that would go beyond the boundary of the Christian church and religion.

The last two positions that draw our attention are, first, the moderate position of *Tong-do-s'u-ki*, which undertook the task of modernization after the model of the Chinese reform movement; and secondly, the position of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* as a fully advanced form of *Tong-do-s'u-ki*, which recognized the importance of both Eastern and Western cultures from the perspective of indigenous generation. The position of *Tong-do-s'u-ki*, based upon the metaphysical doctrine of *Jung-che-s'u-yong* (China as Substance and the West as Function), tried to maintain the Confucian *Do* (*Tao*) in the metaphysical dimension but accept Western civilization in the physical dimension. Kim, Hong-jip and Kim, Yun-sik represented this position. While accepting the whole of Western civilization including Christianity in recognition of the necessity of *Gae-hwa* (reformation), they intended to do so only on the basis of *Tong-do* (The Eastern Way or Spirit), that is, Confucian subjectivity. However, in essence the position of *Tong-do-s'u-ki* basically maintained the same exclusivism that the conservative party held, and was suspected of easily deteriorating into a kind of chauvinism, national suprematism, or resistance ideology when it was expressed toward foreigners.[9] In this respect, the stance of *Tong-do-s'u-ki* is distinguished from that of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up*, the last position I am going to discuss.

Yu, Kil-jun, the representative of the *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* position, criticized the radical reformism of *Gae-hwa-pa* for failing to keep their national subjectivity. More importantly, he recognized the importance of Western religion (Christianity) and civilization, understanding both of these elements in a more inclusive way as being correlated with the *Do* (*Tao*) and *Ki* (*Ch'i*) of the East. In his *S'u-yu-ky'un-mun-lok* (*Record of Journey in the West*), Yu, Kil-jun criticized the *Gae-hwa-pa* leaders of the *Kap-shin* coup d'état as follows: "They emphasize so much of the Western *Ki* that they finally neglect Confucian morality and try to replace the *Do* of Confucius and Mencius with the Western *Do*."[10] In other words, he is saying that since the so-called *Ki* (such as politics, law, and machinery) can be developed differently according to a particular place and time, but morality and *Do* (*Tao*: religion) have an unchangeable nature regardless of whether in the East or in the West, they should not abandon Eastern tradition or annihilate its subjectivity. We could interpret the establishment of the above-men-

tioned nationalistic religions such as *Tonghak*, *Jeung-san Kyo*, and *Won* Buddhism as sharing the same contextual understanding that Yu, Kil-jun shows in this statement. Consequently, Yu, Kil-jun did not follow the radical reformists' pragmatic view of religion, but recognized the importance of Christianity itself as the foundation of Western civilization; this set the stage for the later generation to understand the truth that the East and Christianity correlate with each other. The position of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* was later inherited, and advanced, by Rev. Choi, By'ung-h'un, the first Korean minister of the J'ung-dong Methodist Church and the pioneer of the Korean theology of indigenization. We can find the developing connection in a concise theological statement that he made: "The heaven of the East is none other than the heaven of the West."[11] This statement indicates the fact that the position of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* has enabled one not only to overcome one's exclusivity vis-à-vis others, but also to maintain one's openness to accommodate Christianity and Western civilization in the light of one's national subjectivity. Although it was a minority position and was not realized with visible historical results, the position of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* holds an important clue for our efforts to search for an alternative globalization.

3.

After less than a century of efforts to keep up with modernization, (South) Korea is now confronting the globalization that seeks to expand its free trade scheme and liberal principles of market economy. Because of their unpleasant memories of enforced identity by agents of colonialist modernization, Koreans do not always look smilingly on globalization. Furthermore, Koreans are also suspicious of the fact that globalization is being carried out according to the neo-conservative policies of world powers and their immoral principle of competition. However, just as modernization was inevitable in the twentieth century, globalization has become an undeniable general trend. The South Korean government is no exception to the trend of accepting globalization as the goal of its policy. But globalization is tearing down the boundaries between nations, states, and races, something unimaginable in the age of modernization, thereby insisting on the abandonment of traditions and history and requiring people to adopt a new identity of unlimited freedom. This points to the fact that denationalization and deterritorialization have become necessary conditions for globalization. Modernity's essentialism, which restricted the encounter with others, has fallen to postmodern deconstruction, making it possible for different religious traditions to cross boundaries and thus accelerate the process of globalization. But it is also an undeniable fact that globalization is imposing the homogeneity of Western culture, rather than respecting differences among cultures.[12] Against such Western-oriented globalization, many countries with the experience of being colonized in their past are taking a strong line of resistance, and many of these movements against Westernization and globalization throughout the world are organized on the basis of the revival of traditional religious values. It is in this context that I mentioned earlier the significance of Huntington's argument of "the clash of civilizations." In the following section, I will point out the totalitarian nature of (Western) globalization being carried out under the ideology of neoliberalism, the dark side of its consequences, and nation-states' subjective (religious) responses to it. I will recognize and discuss these aspects in the context of Korea.

We are now living in the age of globalization in which the development of transportation and information technology is accelerating the process of the compression of space and time, so that we cannot help connecting our region to others. Through this process, frequent transactions between different races are made, and mutual understandings between different civilizations or religions are being promoted as well. Numerous free trade agreements are being made under the tutelage of the WTO (World Trade Organization), and what becomes clear from this situation is that while the project of globalization centers on the economic sector, a religious cultural tradition, constituting the core of a nation's subjectivity, is not beyond the reach of the economy-centered Western perspective. For the West ultimately regards globalization as the process of Westernization and, by extension, as a globalizing of Christian civilization. Seen from the perspective of diplomacy and trade, the globalization being carried on under the Western ideology has two characteristics: first, the free trade agreement is a comprehensive agreement of economic integration, an intensified version of an American model (NAFTA: North America Free Trade Area); secondly, it is not so much a multilateral agreement but a bilateral or regional trade strategy made between blocs, which gives priority to one state (world power) over the other.[13] Obviously, the ideas of neoliberalism inhere in such a free trade agreement. First of all, it does not allow any discrimination in market accessibility: it provides an institutional guarantee of free trade for world powers to make sure that supranational corporations can earn maximum profits. Here the sovereign state's role becomes useless—in other words, a state loses its legal power to enforce certain regulations on the market. On the other hand, as the articles of a free trade agreement are subject to the arbitration of a third party such as ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes), multinational or supranational corporations consequently come to have the same level of authority as the state government of their counterpart, usually that of a small and weak country with less power. Furthermore, neoliberalism infringes upon the sovereign power of a state to such a degree that it demands mitigation of governmental regulations and the weakening of labor unions in favor of the market economy. The reality of the globalized world thus presents us with a situation

so reversed that the market regulates governments, not the other way around. This is why labor markets have become so unstable, and the contradictory structure of the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer is being reproduced on a larger scale. Therefore, some Korean scholars call neoliberalism a "global coup d'état" of corporations (capital) against their own people.[14] In this respect, neoliberalism is similar to but at the same time different from modern liberalism. For it advocates freedom without regard to equality; corporations, instead of states or nations, become everything. When we recognize that it has made us human beings into such desire-satisfying machines that we have lost a sense of community, and has destroyed the natural environment with so much emphasis on efficiency that we have come to the point of talking about an actual end of the world, we can say that the damaging effect of neo-liberalism is incomparably greater than that of modernist ideology.

Having deterritorialized states and put them under the control of neoliberalism, globalization now makes a totalitarian demand that interactions between civilizations, which are made possible by the compression of space and time, become uniform. It means that globalization is not only deterritorializing states as the material foundation, but now also decontextualizing long-standing local cultures, causing loss of their local otherness. We know for sure that the way for people to meet with each other in the age of globalization should be cross-cultural, but it is not realistic at all under the circumstance that the ideology of neoliberalism has made even the sovereign power of the state powerless. Neoliberalism is now converting people into consumers of cultural products that globalization has produced, or into slaves of "difference indicating signs" and thereby, deepening the loss of their identity.[15] In this circumstance, the revival of nationalistic religions is taking place under the flag of anti-Western civilization in Asia. Now that globalization takes a pattern of integration between regions (blocs), it is a reasonable speculation that such a feeling of crisis might develop into a clash of civilizations, as Huntington's analysis suggested.

Responding to the Western mode of globalization, East Asian states are actually conceiving a plan to integrate the East Asian region in an Asian manner, based upon shared traditional religions. Among several proposals for the plan, more people are paying attention to the convincing power of a constructivist proposal that applies the frames of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism altogether, or the frame of Confucianism in particular, as the scheme to integrate East Asian ideas, values, norms, and identities.[16] Even if everyone has the same optimistic prospect for the plan, however, no one is yet clear regarding the extent to which such an identity, built upon the frame of Asian religions, could be a necessary element of East Asia's political integration. For instance, South Korea, which has already become a semi-Christian state, obviously would not be fully open or tolerant to East Asian religious values. Furthermore, the terrible historical experience of colonization by Japan and the harmful effects of modernization caused by the West would not allow the Asian people to easily tear down the walls of their nationalism.

Nevertheless, I don't want to miss the important point of the plan to integrate the East Asian region in an Asian mode based upon shared traditional religions, because I have seen not only the limitations but also the ideological abuse that the existing Western theological interpretations make of monotheism. We see more often these days the phenomena of conservative Christianity exercising strong influence on the West, and Islamic fundamentalism gaining more supporters in Islam nations. These phenomena are closely related to the religious framework of monotheism. In this context, the choice that South Korea as a semi-Christian nation makes will have a very important meaning. For I believe South Korea should take the task of discussing the meeting of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism as a national affair, and do the work of reconceptualizing Christian faith in an Asian context with the support of its national policy. This is also the claim that Asian nations make for themselves, inasmuch as a variety of different communities with different cultures and religions coexist. In order to realize this claim, Asian people, including Koreans, should first and foremost interpret their own religious traditions not from Western perspectives but from their own Asian perspective, and then accumulate such interpretive experiences. In other words, East Asian people should establish themselves not as recipients of interpretations, but as creative subjects who understand their own traditions. This is an advanced version of the theory of indigenous generation (*Tong-do-s'u-p'up*) which was developed during the modernization of Korea; it has already been baptized with the contemporary hermeneutics of overcoming orientalism.[17]

The Koreans' history of accepting Christianity is quite suggestive for the age of globalization in that their very truth-experience, rooted in their religious tradition, accepted Christianity with the self-consciousness that "the heaven of the East is none other than the heaven of the West." In this respect, I have found it very significant that Korean intellectuals are paying attention to and doing research on their national religions, such as *Tonghak* or *Won* Buddhism. Although they are classified as nationalistic religions as is generally known, these religions offer much evidence of having assimilated the shock of Western Christianity in their own way. For example, *Tonghak* has incorporated both divine personality and impersonality; *Won* Buddhism interprets the Buddhist doctrine of co-arising as a doctrine of personalized grace. Having understood Christianity in the light of

their traditional religious cultures such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism, I believe that these religious ideas give us an important paradigm for reconceptualizing Christian faith henceforward.[18] They also encourage us to have a critical attitude toward Western material civilization from the eschatological worldview of *Huch'un-gae-by'uk* (New Beginning of the World). When the Western material civilization rushed into the East, this movement asserted a new spiritual beginning and advocated the task of taking care of the weak, women, children, and nature as the main elements of their teaching. It is in this respect that some religious people in Korea and some others abroad believe that these religions could create a critical alternative to Western civilization. A series of events in Korea in recent years—a diverse group's ritual performance of *Sam-bo-il-bae* (Three Steps and One Bow) to protest against the *Saeman-keum* reclamation project, and a Buddhist nun's (the Rev. Chi-yul's) desperate act of fasting for one hundred days to protest against the construction of *Ch'un-s'ung* mountain tunnel—show the attitude of Korean religious people longing for an alternative globalization.

4.

Not many people object to globalization in principle. If, as JPIC (Justice and Peace and Integrity of Creation) suggested, we could solve the problems of economic disparity between the North and the South, arms competition between the East and the West, and the preservation of Creation, then globalization would be a blessing. Teilhard de Chardin, as a theologian, foresaw long ago the possibility of globalization in terms of *supra-personalization* and *supra-socialization*. He considers globalization as culminating an evolution that human spirit has conceived. He firmly believes that, as human consciousness was being concentrated in the process of "noogenesis," or the growth process of mind or reflective consciousness, both human individuality (as the first phase) and social complexity (as the next phase) were raised to a new level of complexity-consciousness. For he believes that the divine Logos governs the whole process of cosmic evolution, in which inorganic matter, life, and mind emerged along with the phenomenon of human socialization—ranging from family, clan, tribe, and nation to the state. For Chardin, who views the whole process of evolution as spiritual development, the world is not merely a material foundation but rather, spiritualized matter. The "planetization" (globalization) based upon common thinking is the end toward which spiritual evolution is advancing. Here, globalization as the "Omega" point is even called *supra-spiritualization*, or the manifestation of Christ.[19] However, I doubt that such Christianity-centered optimism can be justified under the circumstance that individuality (locality) is deprived of its value, and while at the same time the JPIC is threatened with loss of meaning. The fact that the idea of totalization has fallen to the enforced ideology of the West, mainly by the U.S., requires that we reconsider the concentration on Christianity. The contemporary situation, in which individual religions are revitalized to such a remarkable extent that it is called the age of spirituality, does not allow the traditional ideological orientation (monotheism) to reappear. When the evolving spirit shows some degenerating aspects, it is because the role of religion is so reduced or abused that religion cannot properly manifest global consciousness.[20] So it would be necessary to redefine the essence of religion and emphasize its proper role for a just and desirable form of globalization.

It is Ken Wilber who expanded Chardin's Christianity-centered theology of evolution into a contemporary psychology of religion. Generally regarded as a distinguished scholar of transpersonal psychology, Wilber stresses the role of religion for the development of universal or global consciousness and concerns himself with healing the ill-effects of globalization. His major premise is that religion should universally (globally) enhance human consciousness. For Wilber, religion is located somewhere beyond the category of nation or state, and so is essentially different from the level of our ordinary consciousness. However, when religion is reduced to a national ideology or to a doctrine which is explained on the level of consciousness, a categorical error is made.[21] This is exemplified in the present situation of Western Christianity and Islam, where the conflict between them has been so intensified as to be called a clash between civilizations. The project of globalization that the West is leading cannot succeed because of such a categorical error. Although the material foundation has been provided thanks to technological developments like computers, human consciousness, which is supposed to lead that material foundation, is not yet globalized. The following analysis would deepen our critical knowledge of this problem.[22]

Since the beginning of modernization, human beings have divided the whole world into three separate territories: their mind (*I*), the objective world (*It*), and their collective world view (*We*) constructed within space and time. It is fair to say that religion, art, science, and morality respectively conform to these three territories. Modernity reduced *I* (religion) and *We* (morality) to the *world* (language) of *It* (science); postmodernity as a reaction to modernity emphasizes interpretation (*We*) only, while denying the objectivity of *It*. If we accept this analysis as true, then it would be obvious that only the integration of the divided territories of 'mind' (*I*), 'nature' (*It*), and 'culture' (*We*) could be beneficial for the future of humanity. Unfortunately, however, today's globalization is based upon "*It*" reductionism, which means that, whereas material revolution has already begun, spiritual revolution is yet to come. Postmodernism's denial of the domain of *It* cannot be a solution to this problem. What

is important here is to enhance human consciousness into supra-consciousness (religion), which is developing within the human mind (*I*). For the human mind is the only container of global consciousness. Within human consciousness, there are three modes of knowing: the eye of body, the eye of mind, and the eye of soul.[23] The eye of body perceives the world of objects (sensation or physical consciousness); the eye of mind allows logical thinking (representative and reflective consciousness); finally, the eye of soul recognizes transcendental realities (supra-consciousness). They are holarchically related to one another, containing one another without being reduced to any one alone. What this analysis implies is that human consciousness in the process of evolution should go through the stages of pre-convention and convention and reach the stage of self-transcending universal consciousness.

Of course, we often come across phenomena of degenerative consciousness. For instance, a religion stays at the stage of pre-convention or convention, or remains in a state of self-disruption. The project of globalization causing a lot of ill effects is another example of such degenerative consciousness. In spite of its degenerative tendency, religion must be the treasure house of self-transcending, universal, global consciousness (supra-consciousness) because it contains and provides us with the way to contact trans-ego (trans-nation), or the higher level of oneself. I think Hans Küng's emphasis on "Weltethos" shares the same spirit with this idea, even though it is criticized for being too Christian. The truth is that East Asian religions as well as Christianity each explain this way differently. At the supra-personal stage of self-transcendence, each one begins to have a genuine sense of universal worries about the world and the whole biosphere, not just oneself. For the ultimate *I* is not an individual ego but rather the presence of God's Spirit, the Buddha, or Emptiness.[24] The network provided by the Internet, I stress, cannot guarantee global consciousness, because the network as part of the technological infrastructure of economy is only value-neutral about consciousness. I firmly believe that religion can bring the trans-conventional global consciousness that is needed for the age of globalization. This is the reason why religion is now called the "old new way."

In this context, people today define the present age as the Age of Spirituality, in which different religions with different histories of development since the Axial Age converge onto one another and focus on disciplines and practices rather than doctrines. This is one of the main reasons why people pay attention to the important role that East Asian religions can play, and emphasize the revival of these religions. The stumbling block to this trend is the monotheistic religions of the West and the Arab states. Whereas ideological Christianity has been driving forward Western globalization, Islam has been instigating nationalist antagonism among the people as a reaction to it. Both religions are in reality going backward against globalization (universalization), thus falling into self-contradiction. In other words, both Christian and Islamic fundamentalisms are denying globalization. However, these religions were originally neither the monotheism asserting the numerical One over the Many, nor the theism distinguishing between personality and impersonality, but rather, were oriented toward the mystical infinite that transcends any nation or form of culture and appears in diverse civilizations and histories with different features.[25] This understanding of monotheism does indeed belong to the essence of Christianity and Islam. For example, St. Paul clearly made the same point when he proclaimed "the unknown God" in front of Areopagus.

Such an insightful discovery makes Christianity and East Asian religions mutually converge on each other to awaken global (universal) consciousness. The material foundation of globalization could be perfected only in this consciousness. Without the emergence of such global consciousness, the West-driven project of globalization would be an evil one. When individual religions become agents of self-transcending practice in accord with what their founders intended, globalization can be a hope for all. This ideal agrees with the ethos of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up*, which asserts that the heaven of the East is not different from the heaven of the West. In this ethos, globalization is far from the cultural homogenization that would alienate one tradition from another. The conviction of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* is that contact between different cultures should open the door to peace and coexistence without any one losing its individuality. Korea, China, and Japan, three East Asian countries, already accepted Confucian and Buddhist cultures, and now share the culture of Chinese characters. They also have the experience of meeting with Christianity, but each in its own way. All this implies that there is already an East Asian universality rooted in religious culture. It could be a common ground for regional integration and a foundation for alternative globalization.

However, it is difficult to actually advocate denationalism because of such sensitive issues as the Chinese government's Northeast Asian Project, the North Korean government's nuclear development program, and Japanese right-wing history textbooks. The conflict between China and Japan, both economic and military world powers, often makes it difficult to realize East Asian religionalism, and furthermore, the supremacist policy of the U.S. sometimes causes conflict in the region. However, the fact that these three East Asian nations share Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism and have the history of encounters and dealings between the East and the West as a part of their own history represents the basis for their overcoming all the national

differences and conflicts. Especially, Korea still preserves quite a large amount of the cultural heritage of Asian religions, but has accepted and developed western Christianity so seriously as to be called a semi-Christian state. Although it was a weak nation, Korea found a way to overcome the boundaries of nationalism in the spirit of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up*. Therefore, Korea has practiced developing global consciousness by the power of its religious culture before making efforts to globalize the material foundation. Overcoming neoliberalism as the ideology of globalization begins with asking a question about the meaning of human life and the genuine sense of community. This task cannot be distinguished from religion's role of awakening global consciousness. The South Korean government's "Doctrine of Balance-Keeper of Northeast Asia" would have convincing power if it recognizes the potential of Korean religious culture to develop global consciousness.

As was mentioned earlier, there has been an Asianism based upon a discourse of civilization which was dreamed about long ago but never realized. Koreans are thus given the task of reconstructing this unrealized dream to be appropriate to the age of globalization in the name of East Asian regional integration. Japan transmuted this past dream into an imperialist discourse of domination under the flag of "Gateway to Overcoming Asia" and thereby frustrated the dream. We today have to realize it by the power of religion. It is difficult to heal the ill-effects of globalization by actual political means alone. In this context, Ahn, Jung-keun's "Theory of Peace in the Orient" draws our attention.[26] He was not only a combatant in the Korean independence movement but also a Catholic. He had a dream that Korea, China, and Japan should establish solidarity among themselves while maintaining their independence. Unlike Shin, Chae-ho who translated the confrontation between the East and the West into the conflict between nations, Ahn, Jung-keun was a political thinker who recognized the role of Japan for Asianism. What is important about Ahn, Jung-keun is that behind his political thought of East Asian solidarity lay his Catholic faith and Confucian idealism, that is, the idea of *Ch'un-my'ung* (the Mandate of Heaven) that had guided his life.[27] Having absorbed from a Christian point of view Confucianism's assertion of the unity of all human beings, he wished that Korea and Japan would develop true brotherhood in order to confront Western colonialism. He tried to correct the evil of actual politics on a religious horizon transcending the West and, at the same time, overcoming the national boundaries of Korea and Japan. In order to do so, Ahn, Jung-keun intensified Confucian religiosity from a Christian perspective, and thereby developed it into his Asianism and his theory of peace in East Asia.

Now that we need East Asian regionalism as an alternative to Western globalization, the insight of Ahn, Jung-keun's as it is rooted in his religious background has a number of implications for us today. One of them is that the discussion of East Asian integration should begin with none other than our rediscovery of the importance of Asian religious culture. The following statement by Ahn, Jung-keun challenges us today, living in the age of globalization, to ask what and how it should be: "Civilization in general means that, no matter whether it is in the East or in the West, whether one is good or bad, man or woman, old or young, each and every one is to live peacefully together with each other while keeping one's heavenly nature, respecting morals, enjoying one's occupation on one's own land without fighting each other."[28] In order to realize such alternative globalization, the most important thing for us to do is to rediscover Asian religions, which, unlike the Western monotheism that has urged the ideology of globalization, emphasized the brother-and-sisterhood of all humanity on the basis of self-discipline—that is to say, a genuine sense of global consciousness. As we have seen in the case of Ahn Jung-keun's Asianism, we can expect a genuine perspective on globalization to come from the indigenous Christianity that has grown out of the soil of Asian religious culture. I believe that when Christianity meets with Asian spirituality and fuses with it on a deeper level, we can see an alternative value emerging from the process. It might be the last hope we human beings can have for the future.

5.

In conclusion, I want to revisit and summarize the discussion. Globalization itself is the right direction for human evolution, but overcoming its degenerative phenomena requires us today, more urgently than ever, to aim at the common good for the whole of humanity. If it continues to impose the Western cultural homogeneity on others under the ideology of neoliberalism, as it has so far, the project of globalization would cause the unwanted result of clashes between civilizations. The fundamentalist revival of monotheistic Christianity and Islam can make the project more difficult to accomplish. Globalization renders the concept of nation-state meaningless, which was unimaginable in the process of modernization in the past. What we need, then, is globalization infused with a sense of global consciousness. It means that we need to have globally universal consciousness which takes seriously into account all of humanity and the biosphere, prior to the globalization built upon the material foundation of the market economy. In this global consciousness, territorial boundaries (nationalism) are overcome; but individuality (the nation) is not lost—which means that there could be no victims of globalization. All religions in essence aim at global consciousness. All religious teachings of the founders, prior to being developed into doctrines or ideologies, are oriented toward self-transcendence. Globalization based upon global consciousness is the way to alternative globaliza-

tion. The insight into the possibility of such an alternative comes from East Asia. For it has already known the reality of modernization's success and failure, and has gone through processes of trade and of dealings between religions and civilizations. A potential resource is also found in this region where Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism coexist as a common foundation on which to be able to reinterpret (heal) the idealized Western Christianity. East Asia, with its past experience and religious culture, must take the lead for alternative globalization. In this respect, I expect that "cultural Asianism" or the "Theory of Peace in the Orient" proposed in the process of modernization could be critically reconstructed to be the foundation for East Asian regional integration aiming at alternative globalization.

Fortunately, Korea has advanced to denationalism on its own principle of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up*. This principle is still valid for the age of globalization, which is deterritorializing local cultures. For now that people talk about convergence of religions and call the present age the second Axial Age, the principle takes cultural syncretism as its methodology for survival and liberation (peace), which does not make anyone its victim. It shows the process of "globalizing" oneself by going beyond one's national boundaries, meeting with other cultures, and then actively transforming oneself. It thus makes the religious cultures of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Christian spirituality converge into one culture that can generate the driving force for civilized globalization, instead of savage globalization.

What is important here is global consciousness. It is the ultimate point toward which all religions are oriented, the result that a religion would achieve if it took off its garments of doctrine and ideology and thereby focused on the self-transcending practice that is its essence. It is at this point that we could think of the possibility of an alternative globalization being realized. Although this demanding statement contradicts the actual political situation today, we should do our best to realize it as religious people, for we cannot even imagine that the Spirit of God would act in human history without such an effort from our side. The world is now witnessing the degenerative aspect of globalization. People are worried about the end of the earth as a result of the ecological crisis and are seized with the threat of terror. It is more obvious than ever that East Asian religions should play an important role in civilized globalization to deal with those issues. In order to do so, we had better listen carefully to the experience of Koreans, who met with the West in the principle of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up*.

Glossary (In the Order of Appearance):
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism: 儒佛仙
"The Western Domination over the East": 西勢東占
Tonghak: 東學 (East Learning)
Jeung-san Kyo 甑山教
Won Buddhism 圓佛教
Orientalism 東洋主義
The Gateway to Overcoming Asia: 脫亞入口
To-bal-lon: 土發論 (The Theory of Indigenous Generation)
Gae-hwa: 開化 (Reformation), *Gae-hwa-pa*: 開化派 (The radical reformists)
Yi: 李, *Chosun*: 朝鮮
Wi-j'ung-ch'uk-sa-pa: 衛正斥邪派 (The school of protecting the right and rejecting the evil or heretic)
Do (*Tao*): 道 (Way of Life or Reason, meaning morality, subjectivity, or spirit)
Ki (*Ch'i*): 器 (literally, Vessel, meaning civilization)
Tong-do: 東道 (literally, Eastern Way, meaning Eastern morality, subjectivity, or spirit)
S'u-ki: 西器 (literally, Western Vessel, meaning Western civilization)
Tong-do-s'u-ki: 東道西器 (Eastern spirit and Western civilization)
S'u-p'up: 西法 (Western institution)
Tong-do-s'u-p'up: 東道西法 (The Eastern spirit and the Western principle)
S'ung-li-hak (*Hsing-li hsüeh*): 性理學 (Orthodox Confucianism or *Li*-oriented Neo-Confucianism)
Yang-my'ung-hak (*Yang-ming hsüeh*): 陽明學 [*Hsin* (心: mind)-oriented Neo-Confucianism that *Yang-ming* founded)]
Ju-ja-hak (*Chu-tzu* hsüeh) 朱子學 (Orthodox Confucianism or *Li*-oriented Neo-Confucianism that *Chu-tzu* founded)
Ŭi-by'ung: 義兵 (Righteous troops)
Li 理 (Order or Principle)
S'u-hak: 西學 (Western Learning)
S'u-kyo: 西敎 (Western Teaching: Catholicism)
S'u-hak-by'un: 西學辨 (*A Critique of Western Learning*)
Kap-shin: 甲申 (The Year 1884), *Kap-shin* coup d'état: 甲申政變
Ah: 我 (ego or self), *Bi-ah*: 非我 (non-ego)
Shin-gan-hoe: 新幹會 (An association for the Korean independence movement)
Jung-che-s'u-yong: 中體西用 (China as Substance and the West as Function)
S'u-yu-ky'un-mun-lok: 西遊見聞錄 (*Record of Journey in the West*)
"The heaven of the East is none other than the heaven of the West." (東洋之天卽西洋之天)
Sa-eun: 四恩 (Four Kinds of Grace)
Hu-ch'un-gae-by'uk: 後天開闢 (New Beginning of the World)
Sam-bo-il-bae: 三步一拜 (Three Steps and then One Bow)
"Doctrine of Balance-Keeper of Northeast Asia": 東北亞均衡者論
"Theory of Peace in the Orient": 東洋平和論
Ch'un-my'ung: 天命 (the Mandate of Heaven)

Notes

1 Jeremy Rifkin, *Biosphere Politics: A New Consciousness for a New Century* (New York: Crown, 1991). Korean Version tr. by Jung Bae Lee (Seoul, S. Korea: Dae-hwa Publishing Co., 1992.), pp. 428–436.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1997). Korean Version tr. by Hee-Jae Lee (Seoul, S. Korea: Kim-

young Sa, 1997), pp. 20–21.
3 Huntington, Ibid. pp. 437–438.
4 Young-jong Choi, *Regional Integration of East Asia and the Choice of Korea* (Seoul, S. Korea: Ah-y'un Publishing Co., 2003), p. 63.
5 Kil-jun Yu, "S'u-yu-ky'un-mun" (Record of Journey in the West) Ch. 14, *Letters* in *Yu Kil-jun J'un-s'u* (*Complete Works of Yu, Kil-jun*) Vol. 1 (Seoul, S. Korea: Il-jo-gak, 1971), p. 388. Methodist theologian, By'un, Sun-hwan viewed Yu, Kil-jun's position as the advanced version of *Tong-do-s'u-ki*. Sun-hwan By'un, "Tak-sa Choi, By'ung-h'un and the Oriental Thought," *Theology and the World* (Seoul, S. Korea: Methodist Theological Seminary Press, Fall 1980), pp. 101–104.
6 See my article, "The Faith of Korean Protestant Christianity and the Reality of Theology," *The Spirit of God Blows as He Wants: the Age of Spirit and Theology of Life* (Seoul, S. Korea: Han-deul Publishing Co., 1998), pp. 26–58.
7 Chae-ho Shin, "The Efficacy of the Heliocentric Theory," *Complete Works of Shin, Chae-ho*, Vol. 2 (Seoul, S. Korea: The Commemoration Project Committee of Shin, Chae-ho, 1977), p. 384.
8 Won-sik Choi & Young-s'u Paek, *East Asian Understandings of the Orient: the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Seoul, S. Korea: Literature and Intellect Publishing Co., 1997), pp. 216–220.
9 Il-s'up Shim, "A Study of the Thought of Gae-hwa in the late Chosun Period and the Process of Acceptance of Christianity," *Theological Thought* 28, (Seoul, S. Korea: Korea Theological Study Institute, Spring 1980), p. 161.
10 Kil-jun Yu, Ibid. p. 388.
11 *Dae-han-mae-il-shin-bo* (Korean Daily News) October 7, 1906. Sun-hwan By'un, Ibid. pp. 144–146.
12 Kwon-s'uk Yang, "Globalization and Crosscultural Hermeneutics," *Ethics of the Public and Peace: Collected Articles in Commemoration of the Retirement of Professor Sohn, Kyu-Tae* (Seoul, S. Korea: Korea Theological Study Institute, 2005), pp. 453–456.
13 Hae-young Lee, "Neoliberalism and FTA," *Ur-i Kil-b'ut* (Our Companions on the Road) 10 (Seoul, S. Korea, July 2005), pp. 30–37.
14 Hae-young Lee, Ibid. pp. 33–34.
15 Jean Baudrillard, *Société de Consommation.* English Version, *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures* (London: Thousand Oaks; California: Sage, 1998). Korean Version tr. by Sang-yul Lee (Seoul, S. Korea: Mun-ye Publishing Co., 1991), p. 98. Sil-ha Wu, *Deconstruction of Orientalism and the Right Understanding of Our Culture* (Seoul, S. Korea: So-na-mu, 1997), pp. 67–70
16 Young-jong Choi, Ibid. pp. 50–60.
17 See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994). Korean Version tr. by Hong-kyu Park (Seoul, S. Korea: Kyobo Book Centre, 1991).
18 See my book, in which I have developed this theme. Jung-bae Lee, *A Study of Avant-garde Indigenous Theology of Korean Protestant Christianity* (Seoul, S. Korea: The Christian Literature Society of Korea, 2003).
19 Teilhard de Chardin, *Hymne de L'univers* (Paris, France: Edit. du Seuil, 1961), pp. 26–27.
20 Ken Wilbur, *A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science, and Spirituality*, 1st edition (Boston: Shambhala, 2000). Korean Version tr. by Hyo-nam Cho (Seoul, S. Korea: Dae-won Publishing Co., 2004), p. 233 and the following.
21 Ken Wilber, Ibid. pp. 485–486, 495–499.
22 See Ken Wilber, *The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and Religion* (New York: Random House, 1998). The analysis is the main point of the book.
23 Ken Wilber, *Eye to Eye: the Quest for the New Paradigm* (Boston: Shambhala; [New York]: Distributed in the U.S. by Random House, 2001), pp. 323–394.
24 Ken Wilber, *A Theory of Everything*, pp. 323–394.
25 Ky'ung-jae Kim, *Nameless God* (Seoul, S. Korea: Han-ul Publishing Co., 2002), pp. 17–38.
26 Won-sik Choi & Young-s'u Paek, Ibid. pp. 205–215.
27 Won-sik Choi & Young-s'u Paek, Ibid. pp. 23–24. Jong-ry'ul Hwang, *When Faith Meets with National Consciousness* (Wae-gwan, S. Korea: Benedict Press, 2000), pp. 109–114.
28 The statement is part of Ahn, Jung-keun's memo that he gave one of the Japanese officials. Seung-hye Kim et al, *Buddhist and Christian Practices* (Seoul, S. Korea: Daughters of St. Paul Press, 2005), pp. 65–66.

Religion and the Sense of the Nation: The Philippines

Ateneo de Manila University CRUZ, Jose Maria Manaligod

In some Philippine towns and cities, images of Christ in his passion and death are carried through the streets during Holy Week. The images are ordinarily kept in private homes, either in storage areas or in those parts where people move about, such as living rooms. People's sense of ease in having an image of a dead person in one's house is rooted, I suggest, in a practice that dates from before the 16th century. When the *datu* (community headman) died, his remains, prior to secondary burial, were kept in the house of a powerful family with aspirations of installing the next *datu*. The ownership of images of the suffering or dead Christ, grounded partly in some ingrained memory of how to deal with a dead headman, is an act of devotion but also serves as an indicator of one's place in the contemporary social hierarchy. Various social forces, including religion, shape society, even as it gives shape to them.

The category religion allows for a fuller understanding of society, but its use is not without risks. The phrase "Muslim Mindanao," for example, prevents an appreciation of the fact that Muslims comprise only 17 percent of the population of Mindanao and only 4.5 percent of the national population. It conjures up a Mindanao with a Muslim majority, a notion contrary to fact.

Furthermore, in the phrase "Muslim Mindanao," the modifier is made to stand as a proxy for very complex socio-political realities. The transposition of socio-political realities into religious categories causes a blurring of ethnic and other differences, of contradictions within highly stratified Muslim communities, and of heterodox practices in everyday Islam. Not infrequently, effective remedies elude government planners because categories they employ are inappropriate.

Religion, whose role we seek to examine in the articulation of the sense of nation, does not have a permanent, immutable form. It takes on a particular form, depending on the particular historical period and the particular social context.

When that context is pluralistic, contamination can occur. For example, many Filipinos, who believe in the personal God of Christianity, find no inconsistency in believing as well in *karma*, an impersonal calculus of good and evil that belongs to another religious tradition. A believer who lives out his religion in a pluralistic context hears, so to speak, many voices alongside that of his religion. Even as believers formally assent to an orthodoxy, they might be quite comfortable in accepting a variety of heterodox ideas and practices.

The pluralistic context in which religion is lived explains how someone can move in and out of belief and unbelief, move from one particular belief to another, and move in and out of particular articulations of one's belief. Since Filipinos live in rapidly changing social conditions, exemplified by the temporary migration of millions, we should expect changes in the forms of religion.

Christianity in the contemporary Philippines is in flux, as described above. It certainly penetrates both the private and public spheres. But it falls short of vigorously engaging the space occupied by the formal mechanisms of civil authority.

When the question of religion's impact on society is raised, the People Power Revolutions, Edsa I and Edsa II, are often cited as concrete instances. Undoubtedly, the two events were laden with powerful religious symbolism. However, while religion was involved in the ejection of the incumbents, it did not provide the fresh energy and the new consciousness needed to reconfigure Philippine society. As in the Philippine Revolution of 1898, religion, a century later in 1986 and 2001, played a crucial role in political shifts, but not in any social revolution.

The Philippine society, which religion is supposed to help transform, has had a terrible record of providing for its citizens. In the period 1960 to the present, the population has grown from 27 million to 82 million, or at an average annual growth rate of about 2.6 percent. Although the incidence of poverty has declined from 58 to 33 percent, 27 million still live below the poverty line, with about 10 percent of the labor force unemployed. More than 8 million Filipinos now hold jobs overseas, but their increased earnings and the $8 billion dollars they remit annually to the national economy are purchased at a very high social cost to themselves and their families.

Does religion figure in shaping people's vision of the nation they wish to have?

In 1896, on the eve of the revolution against Spain, brothers Teodoro and Doroteo Pansacula led a successful armed uprising and later declared themselves governor and brigadier-general. When the revolution succeeded

in 1898, however, they did not recognize the authority of the revolutionary government led by Aguinaldo and urged their followers to do likewise. Furthermore, they instigated the harassment of the wealthy families in the locality, whose departure they viewed as a necessary step toward the equitable distribution of property. They proposed that the time had finally come "for the rich to be poor and for the poor to become rich." While the elite in various parts of the country considered the expulsion of the Spaniards a sufficient indication that the goals of the revolution had been met, there were those who, like the two brothers, sought freedom from all sources of their oppression, indeed an abundance of all good things.

The incident may be instructive when attempting to make sense of the 2004 electoral popularity, short of victory, of FPJ (Fernando Poe Junior) and of the 1998 electoral victory of Joseph Estrada. Significant differences between them notwithstanding, both appealed to the masses, in the dual sense that the masses related to them and that they considered the masses their constituency.

It is worth noting that while the Catholic Church withheld its support from both Estrada and FPJ, Estrada won by a huge margin and FPJ came close to winning in May, 2004.

When the masses make political choices at variance with the published preferences of the Catholic Church, does it mean that religion has lost its capacity to shape society?

The civil disturbances of May 1, 2001, sometimes called Edsa III, are instructive. In the early hours of that day, large crowds originating mainly from the blighted areas of Metro-Manila attacked the presidential palace, in protest over Estrada's ouster and detention. To the chagrin of many Church groups and NGOs that had openly supported the Estrada impeachment, many of the protesters came from areas that had been under their care for years. What the Church groups found disconcerting was not so much the fact that "their people" had moved over to the wrong side, but that the political action caught them completely by surprise. It was as if the Church had been out of touch with its own people.

The May 1, 2001 protest may be an omen of things to come. The event revealed not only a growing desperation among the people, but also their alienation from their traditional leaders, including the Church. If the Church is unable to renew its presence among the masses and to articulate its response to their social concerns, a parting of ways may occur. Millions of Catholics even now take their cue not from Church officials but from leaders like Mike Velarde and other charismatic figures, whose links to the Church are tenuous.

Edsa IV is a distinct possibility. The reason is that, when in Edsa III people went into a rampage, there were at work other players, whose social status and political agenda were not those of the masses. Sadly, Edsa III was never intended to bring about real reforms; nor could that be expected of an Edsa IV of similar character.

The Church may have to rethink its ways if it wishes to make a significant contribution toward the improvement of the people's quality of life.

In the Philippines, Christianity's presence in the public sphere has typically been in a denunciatory mode, not in a constructive mode. The Church has shown itself capable of tearing things down, as it did in the ouster of morally bankrupt administrations. What it has to demonstrate is its capacity to build up, its capacity to sustain a campaign for productivity and equitability.

The Church's failure to articulate the constructive dimension is indicated by people's idea of what constitutes good works. If one asked an executive to say what good thing he has done lately, he probably would mention a donation made to charity. Other good acts, such as the creation of jobs, would probably not be readily seen by him as a meritorious living out of his religion.

Incredible though it may seem, the average declared annual income of medical doctors in the Philippines is P100,000 or about $2,000. While many doctors carry out medical missions in the slums and perform other useful service to indigent families, the moral sense that impels them to serve others in such admirable ways is somehow suspended in the computation of their taxes. There is obviously a selective application of morality, a situation that arises from the lack of effective Church teaching on social realities, beyond sexuality and family life. Almsgiving has become, for most, the quintessential good work; the reshaping of society, meanwhile, is left to other hands.

As the State shows itself increasingly unable to design and carry out a program of national reconstruction, the Church is called upon to bring its vision and its resources to the project of rebuilding the country. But while its position on family planning is well known, its position on agrarian reform, taxation, the environment, and other important issues is not fully articulated.

The Church cannot hope to bring reform in these areas without wrestling with the formal mechanisms of civil authority. Should it succeed, however, in awakening the considerable qualities and resources of the people, the Church would then have to grapple with the issue of its intervention in matters of State.

Comment · Discussion · Session 4

Chair: Katsuhiro Kohara, Doshisha University

(Chair) Now, I would like to invite our two colleagues to give their comments. First, Professor Gao, please.

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
GAO Shining

Thanks, Chairman. I would like to say that I enjoyed the presentations of the three speakers. I will offer some responses to the paper by Professor Lee.

In 1999, I went to Seoul, Korea for the first time for a conference. On the plane somebody told me that when I saw many crosses towering into the sky, it would mean I had arrived in Seoul. In fact, before that trip, I was told many times that there were more churches in Seoul than in many European cities, which shows how fast Christianity has developed in Korea.

Professor Lee's paper looks back upon the history of Korea's modernization, which is very similar to the history of China—that is to say, the processes of modernization of the two nations are both related to Christianity. As I mentioned in my presentation, while the modernization of China began with the entrance of Christianity, the national consciousness of the Chinese people emerged and grew quickly in resisting the Western powers nearly at the same time. And Professor Lee says in his paper: "The introduction of Protestant Christianity into Korea was closely tied to the expansion of Western power." Although the results of Christianity's entry into the two nations are different—in China, Christianity is still on the margin of the society and its believers are just a small minority, while Korea has become a semi-Christian nation—the problems faced by them are the same: how to keep and develop their traditional cultures in the age of modernization and globalization.

In my opinion, modernization is a process caused by the change of economy and society when new forms of industrial production were introduced into pre-industrial society; modernization systematically intellectualizes every kind of organization and institution in order to control nature in the most effective way to the advantage of human life. Modernization has become an inevitable process. On the other hand, globalization, we can say to some extent, is just the expanding of modernization to the whole world. In fact, globalization is also an inevitable process. Of course, modernization and globalization are not all good for human life, about which Professor Lee's paper discusses very much. Especially as modernization and globalization have been accompanied by westernization, it is natural that, in the Eastern countries, there appeared many different understandings and even criticisms of these phenomena.

Professor Lee mentions four positions and pays more attention to the last one: the position of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up*. According to Professor Lee, this position "aimed at the coexistence of *Tao* and *Ch'i* of the East and the West altogether, even though it was a minority position." In China, ever since the end of the Ming Dynasty (early 17th century), there have been many different positions about Western culture and Christianity. Today, there are still many scholars who hold different ideas and opinions about modernization, westernization, and globalization. It is also natural for them to have such different opinions. I myself hold some positions very close to those of Professor Lee. However, what is important is how to realize such co-existence.

Professor Lee discusses three concepts: globalization, global consciousness, and alternative globalization. According to him, the three concepts are different from and related to each other. "Globalization itself is the right direction for human evolution, but overcoming its degenerative phenomena requires us today more urgently than ever to aim at the common good for the whole of humanity. …Globalization can make the concept of the nation-state meaningless, which was unimaginable in the process of modernization in the past. What we need in this context is a sense of global consciousness for globalization. It means that we need to have globally universal consciousness that takes seriously into account the whole of humanity and the biosphere, prior to the globalization built upon the material foundation of the market economy. …Globalization based upon global consciousness is the way to alternative globalization."

It is on this basis that Professor Lee argues, "all religions in essence aim at global consciousness. All religious teachings of the founders, prior to being developed into doctrines or ideology, are oriented toward self-transcendence. The insight into the possibility of such an alternative comes from East Asia. For it has already known the reality of modernization's success and failure, and has gone through processes of trade and of dealings between religions and between civilizations. A potential resource is also found in this region

where Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism coexist as a common foundation on which to be able to reinterpret (heal) the idealized Western Christianity. East Asia, with its past experience and religious culture, must take the lead for alternative globalization."

And Professor Lee expects that "'Cultural Asianism' or the 'Theory of Peace in the Orient' proposed in the process of modernization could be critically reconstructed to be the foundation for East Asian regional integration aiming at alternative globalization."

Basically speaking, I agree with Professor Lee about his principle and his ideal. According to my understanding, while the real globalization is an inevitable and ongoing process, "alternative globalization" is just a good ideal, and global consciousness is an indispensable basis for realizing the ideal. However, although Professor Lee gives us an optimistic picture of the role of the East Asian religions, I am not so optimistic.

On the one hand, as Professor Lee expects, the major eastern religions, as the cores of their respective cultures, should have very important functions for East Asian regional integration and even for alternative globalization. And as I mentioned in my paper, the religious spirit behind the various religious institutions, if understood rightly, has certainly, though to varying extents according to different religions, been cultivating some kind of transnationalism, rather than nationalism. At this point, I can say, Professor Lee and I have come to the same conclusion without prior discussion, even though I would say that all the major religions can help to cultivate global consciousness. And as Professor Lee mentioned, "global consciousness is the ultimate point toward which all religions are oriented. It is the result that a religion would achieve if it took off its garments of doctrine and ideology and thereby focused on self-transcending practice as its essence." Without such a global consciousness, there would be no real globalization that can keep and retain plural cultures. So, theoretically speaking, the common religious spirit of East Asia could facilitate the East Asian Community.

On the other hand, however, this is all very difficult in practice. That is not only because of the huge differences among the East Asian countries in terms of their political, economic, and social situations, but also because of the limited influence of at least some of the religions on modern society, as I described in my paper. Although I know very little about other countries' situations, I believe that what I said about my country is true. Furthermore, I do not believe that the religions in East Asia have had the will or the ability to remedy the strong nationalisms in these countries. And I think that is because of their weak consciousness of the transnationalist elements of their own religions; they need to enhance this consciousness and keep a distance from nationalism, especially the radical forms of extreme nationalism.

Some day in the future, I hope, the religions in East Asia will together play an active role in the realization of the idea, but that requires the enhancement of their own global consciousness—including some comprehensive response to so-called neoliberalism, neoconservatism, neoleftism, and other "others." Then they will be able to exchange their experiences in cultivating global consciousness among themselves both within a country and across countries. That, I think, is the first and most important step toward the realization of the great ideal.

Now I will pose my question. You know, in China, it is the intellectuals who are interested in principles such as the principles of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* mentioned in Professor Lee's paper. As for the common people, they do not care what you *say*, but they care what you have done, and this reminds me of what our great leader Deng Xiaoping often said: "No matter whether a black cat or a white cat, cats that catch rats are good cats." And so, since the principle of *Tong-do-s'u-p'up* was just a minority position as Professor Lee mentioned, I want to know how it can play an active role in Korea. So this is my question. Thank you very much.

(Chair) Thank you very much. Now, Professor Usuki, please.

Japan Women's University
USUKI Akira

Thank you for your introduction. I am Akira Usuki. I specialize in the contemporary political history of the Middle East. Recently, I have also been looking into Japan's wartime policy vis-à-vis Muslims and Islamic affairs. So from this particular standpoint with my personal background, I would like to attempt to share with you what I have recognized as possible issues while listening to the three speakers, instead of commenting on their presentations.

While listening to the three presentations, I first tried to identify their common threads, and I have come to think that it is probably a certain way of thinking, that is, trying to overcome a dualistic view of the world or a dichotomous way of thinking. As Professor Gao pointed out earlier, the process of modernization in the past, in the 19th century, has been examined from a dichotomous perspective, that is, the Western influence versus the local response. I think that, when we discuss globalization, we must set as a premise how our approach to this subject is different from, or similar to, this conventional dichotomous approach. Up until now, focus has been on the impact-versus-response relationship. Now,

in this 21st-century world, are we free from this kind of dichotomous way of thinking? Personally, I doubt that we have completely freed ourselves from it.

So much is this the case that it is very important to note, as I did when I read the papers, that our presenters Professor Lee and Dr. Solihin positively evaluate, to varying degrees, Samuel Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations—Dr. Cruz did not mention Huntington—which is in fact a natural conclusion, rather than an unexpected one. In a sense, we can say that Huntington's argument is based on an understanding of reality in which several pluralist worldviews coexist. In other words, his acknowledgement of several civilizations premises his argument. For this very reason, I think that his argument can serve as a starting point, in a very interesting manner, when we contemplate the possibility of discussing globalization by overcoming the East-West, Occident-Orient and Europe-Asia dichotomy.

We know that Dr. Cruz did not refer to dichotomy *per se*. Nevertheless, I found something striking in his presentation. Namely, I think that the way he talked about the acceptance of Catholicism in the Philippines while referring to the country's inner problems already contains some criticism of the dichotomous way of thinking which divides the world into East and West, Europe and Asia, and so forth. Essentially, we are dealing here with the question of how to construct an overall framework for discussing the question of globalization in the first place.

Likewise, another premise comes to my mind. It concerns a question that is often posed as to whether or not Japan is part of Asia. Of course, we know the answer is both yes and no. In my opinion, however, I think we can declare that Japan is not part of Asia, or at least, even without citing Japan's "departure-from-Asia" policy in the past, we have the undeniable historical fact that Japan defined itself as not being Asian while suzerain over its Asian colonies after the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars.

Despite this, Japan has been behaving as if it were an integral part of Asia since its defeat in the last war, and this ambiguity is problematic. We must clarify, when we discuss Asia in a gathering like this one, what place Japan occupies in Asia in the first place. I say this in response to Professor Lee's presentation which dealt upfront with Japan's colonial past in Asia and with Ahn Jung-geun, for which I am very grateful to Professor Lee. These topics are extremely important.

In similar discussions, the thesis that Japan is unique is very often proposed. While Huntington was writing his book, for example, he had included Japan in the Confucian cultural zone at first. Then, anticipating strong opposition, he changed his classification, detached Japan from the Confucian zone, and placed it in a category called "Japanese civilization" to which only Japan belongs, according to him. This classification is very problematic. A double-edged sword, it can be used in many different ways, for both good and bad. For the Americans, this serves as a good pretext for Japan-bashing. For Japanese nationalists, this serves as a theoretical weapon to defend their "Japan-is-unique" thesis.

With this in mind, let us go back to the question of the dichotomous worldview. In Imperial Japan during World War II, there was a Japanese scholar of Islamic studies who was considered ultra-nationalist. Many Japanese know of him: Ohkawa Shumei (1886–1957), the ideologue who proposed the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone. In 1938, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, he published a book called *Kaikyo Gairon (An Introduction to Islam)*. In this book, he developed an argument which was simply unexpected for a Japanese: Islam is Occidental. Why? Because Islam is the legitimate heir to Greek philosophy and sciences. This was a major shock to the Japanese, for whom Islam being Oriental was self-evident. The argument that Islam is Occidental posed a very challenging question to the Japanese. By that time, there were already those who had proposed the regional concept of "Middle Occident" to express the Islamic world. When we think of all this, we realize anew the importance of asking ourselves what significance can be found in dividing the world into East and West, Occident and Orient, and so on.

Professor Lee discussed the problem of Asianism. I think that an Asianist orientation could have been significant for Japan before the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, in contrast with the years after these wars. This is because Japan before the Sino-Japanese War was also in danger of being invaded by the great powers of the West, including the United States; Asianism could have been actively significant for Asians as long as Japan, too, could support it as an oppressed nation. In reality, however, the Asianism which followed the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars turned into something extremely dangerous, as an ideological tool for Japan to justify its hegemony in Asia and its invasive maneuvers.

In Imperial Japan during World War II, when Asianism was manifested as the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone, Islamic studies were considered as *kaikyo-to mondai* or "the problem of Muslims." In other words, Islam was a problem for Japan, a problem or political concern to which solutions should be found rapidly. Not only Islamic but also Asian affairs caused problems. In those days, *kaikyo-to mondai* ("the problem of Muslims") and *ajia mondai* ("the problem of Asia") were used as set technical terms in Japanese journals. This meant that Japan was not at all ready to study the future of Muslims in Asia from an Islamic standpoint.

Then, in 1937, when Japan invaded China, Japan began to think seriously about the problem of Muslims, the Islamic issue, within the strategic framework of breaking up China's anti-Japanese movement, which was a unified nationalist movement jointly formed by the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party. Japan contemplated the possibility of creating a puppet regime of Muslims to break up the unified anti-Japanese movement. This was the first time that Japan had looked into Islam as a part of their policymaking; Japan's attempt to gain understanding of Islam started as strategic research, closely connected to invasion. So this is another important issue that I wanted to share with you as relating to Japan's colonialism.

Now, I would like to ask a question to Dr. Solihin. I would like to know where Dr. Solihin stands with regard to the view that the development of Islam is in itself a globalizing movement. Reading Dr. Solihin's paper, I got the impression that Islam represented the pioneer of globalization, a historical first in globalization. How should we interpret the Islamic ummah as an atemporal global movement? This question is related to the expansion of the Islamic network that crosses over the East-West dichotomy.

With regard to the dichotomous way of thinking again, some extremely dangerous arguments are emerging in Japan at the moment, most relevant to us and most problematic of which is the dichotomous argument dividing the world into monotheistic and polytheistic regions. The proponents of this very simplistic argument say that the religious culture of Japan is polytheistic and therefore tolerant of others and non-confrontational, whereas monotheists are exclusivist, hard on others and prone to confrontation, including terrorism. With the premise that most major problems in today's world originate from monotheistic regions, some of them, regarding Japan's polytheism very positively, even propose that a Japanese-style polytheistic, peaceful coexistence should be the alternative model to be adopted by the whole world.

Behind this problem is another: when confronted by proponents of this Japanese-style polytheistic model of coexistence, we, the Japanese scholars of Islamic studies or leaders of Japanese opinion in general, have no effective argument to give in reply. I wish that our forum could also deal with such problems. I do not know what Professor Matsumoto said yesterday as I was unfortunately absent, but I think that we should recognize a problematic situation here in Japanese society, where intellectual opinions can be formed in dangerously close association with this kind of naive cultural nationalism.

What is most problematic is that this is taking place in Japan. We must determine what kind of message we want to communicate to the world, and how to do so, by deciding on the definition of Japan's place in Asia; and also, what we will do, or can do, to overcome the argument which attempts to condemn monotheistic religions outright. In connection with the question about what role Japan can play in organizing dialogues involving representatives of monotheistic religions, we must also ask ourselves if we can really say that our efforts, in the form of meetings like this one, are actually contributing to something. Or, as Dr. Solihin suggested toward the end of the morning session, shouldn't such an important gathering be held with the participation of political leaders? I think that we should discuss further the significance of this meeting: will it end up as a private meeting, or should we find a way to get our discussions to influence Japan's political policymaking?

In any case, in the Meiji era, there was a thinker who proposed a Japanese-style Asianism, Okakura Tenshin (1863–1913). He propagated the slogan "Asia is one." Unfortunately, however, since his time, Asia has never been one. What do we do about this historical fact? Can we use the word "Asia" so easily in the face of this constant state of division? In what sense should we use the word "Asia" as a place, if not in the purely geographical sense? How should we advocate "Asia" as a subject-forming concept, in the philosophical sense? We could use the world "Orient" instead of "Asia," but just as "Asia" always comes in a pair with "Europe," "Orient" is coupled with "Occident." In the widespread dichotomous worldview, Europe or Occident is the subject, while Asia or Orient can be significant only as its object. I think that we should view this way of thinking, which can also be termed "Orientalism," as a problem. This is how I felt while listening to the three presentations.

I would also like to add my view about what has often been said recently within the context of postmodernism. There is a term, "strategic substantialism," which is based on the argument that a civilization or a region can be hypothesized in a substantialist manner; that is, the substantial existence of any civilization or region can be postulated, but only as a counterpoint or tool for opposition or resistance. I think that it is also necessary to adopt such strategic substantialism to develop arguments and discussions. In this sense, I find considerable significance in setting topics on the basis of civilization, and so I am not totally against the notion of civilization.

I am afraid that my remarks are not very well-structured as comments, but I hope they may be taken as my proposal for further discussions. Thank you very much.

(Chair) Thank you very much, Professor Usuki. Now, let us have a short break of about 17 minutes. May I ask you to come back to your seats by 4:25 please?

Discussion

(Chair) Now I propose that we start our discussion. Before we begin, I would like to ask my Japanese colleagues to not speak too rapidly. Please speak slowly and clearly so that our interpreters can translate correctly.

We have one hour left, which is unfortunately too short a time to complete our many tasks. So I propose that we at least work in such a way as to allow as many people as possible to express their views. May I ask for your cooperation, and that you try to limit the time each speaker takes up at one time.

I am pleased that our commentators have made comments that contain very important points. Professor Usuki mentioned the question of whether Japan is part of Asia. It is not easy to give a definite answer to this question; so let us not go into this question now.

Nevertheless, the question of how we should define Asia is a crucial one. We have thus far recognized Asia in the dualistic opposition of Occident versus Orient, or West versus Asia. As Professor Usuki said, it is quite possible to adhere to the position of strategic substantialism. Using yet another term, it may also be called "identity politics," which a minority can use to make its presence in society felt by calling attention to the minority's characteristics in a strategic substantialist manner.

In general, Western and Asian civilizations tend to be positioned in opposition to one another. However, I do not think that this is the case. What has actually been happening is this: Western civilization has a universalist slant which tries to disseminate to the rest of the world that which is taken to be universal. This has been met by something that may be called "cultural particularism" on the part of Asian countries and regions, which try to resist this universalism by emphasizing their own cultural particularities. In this sense, this is not the confrontation of civilizations but the confrontation or clash of one civilization and individual cultures.

The objective of this session is to discuss Asia's future and the role of religion in Asia. As Professor Usuki mentioned briefly, monotheistic religions have been getting considerable bad press in Japan. We rarely get an opportunity to talk about the positive roles which monotheistic religions can play in society. Moreover, many books are published in Japan which say something to the effect that the world will achieve peace once all monotheistic religions disappear from the surface of the earth, and quite a few people agree with this sort of opinion. In the first place, many people have a negative attitude towards religion in general. The sarin gas attack in Tokyo subway stations in 1995 by the religious cult Aum Shinrikyo is partly responsible for the negative image people have about religion in general. There is an atmosphere in Japan that makes it difficult to discuss religion in a positive light. In such a situation, therefore, the question as to what sort of positive role religion can truly play in the context of East Asia is, in fact, a serious question. If we can demonstrate the positive side of religion to society in an intelligent and irrefutable manner, it would be truly wonderful. So, what can we achieve together? I propose that we keep this in mind for the remainder of our discussion hour.

First of all, I would like to ask each of the three presenters to respond to the commentators' comments and questions, very briefly, in about two minutes per person if possible.

Dr. Solihin, would you start, please?

(Solihin) First of all, I appreciate the comment that was made by Professor Usuki when he raised the topic of the book written by Samuel Huntington promoting the concept of the clash of civilizations. On first opening that book—even before reading it, but just reading the topic of that book—I totally disagreed with the concept of a "clash of civilizations." How did it get called a clash of civilizations? Civilized nations must derive from civilized peoples. By becoming more civilized, people become inclined to create peace in their communities. That is the number one thing. This is why the "clash of civilizations" should be avoided, based on the concept of religiosity.

With regard to the dichotomy of the world, under compulsion, perhaps, we have been forced now to accept the concept of the dichotomy or the division of the world into different groups. Yet, as a matter of fact, I think that this complies in part with the nature of human beings. Human beings are known as social beings and it is inevitable that they form groups among themselves based sometimes on race, on ethnicity, and even based on religiosity. But this does not mean that human beings form groups without having conflicts and problems among themselves.

This is true not only of human beings, but even among nonhuman beings. Non-human beings, like the animals, cannot coexist peacefully among the different groups. In my life I couldn't see that the lion will coexist with the mouse, that the lion will coexist with the cat, because of course, they are always under the threat of each other. Because of this I am saying that the grouping of human beings among themselves based on political interests creates a problem. And this is perhaps not only a problem with human beings, but with the concept of the nation-state.

The nation-state just always prohibits other people from settling down in a certain part of the world because one does not belong to the nation-state. And perhaps this is a political concept, especially used among political scientists, that truly defines an area around the concept of the nationhood as a whole. Because nationhood, I think—especially when you talk about Islam and our theme—I am saying that you can certainly understand that part of Islam complies with nationhood, but only that aspects which does not contradict the idea of nationhood, and not its soul.

So here I am saying that we have been forced by the political system, perhaps. I am not a historian, but mostly historians refer to the legacy of history and the past, about the divisions, and that kind of thing. And now the consensus of religious scholars, by saying that the Asian part of the world is in fact rich with religious belief—how far can religious belief play the role, the positive role of minimizing conflict among human beings? Like the conflicts in nature, human beings cannot avoid such conflict. The only thing is, how do human beings respond to the conflict?

This even applies in family life; I think I will share with you what I mean by family life. I was thinking before I got married… I am talking about myself, perhaps I can share with others a little about my family situation, just in my fantastic life—because since I got married, everything got really fantastic. One must come to the reality within marriage that it is quite delicate between two persons, the husband and the wife, unless you are able to communicate. If the communication breaks down, this is the beginning of problems. Because of this I am saying, human beings have been given the intellectualism, so they should play the role to communicate, to interact in positive ways to come up with solutions. I think this must be the importance of religion.

The concept of monotheism—I'll have to shorten this here, but I was really just surprised to learn, while staying here in Kyoto within the last couple of days… I did not realize that the concept of monotheism is being ignored, mostly, by the Japanese population, by the Japanese community here. So you have to come to the conclusion now, what's up with this phenomenon? Because historically, I have read, the Japanese basically believe in their own indigenous religion, Shintoism or whatever it is properly called. At least they have the concept of belief; whether it is monotheism or not monotheism is still something debatable. But anyway, I'm surprised that the concept of monotheism in the Japanese community is something people have never heard and never discuss anymore. How would it be made relevant, so that monotheism could be addressed among the Japanese people again? This meeting may bring understanding.

Now, we've talked about globalization in general. Why is it that most of the religious communities or religious leaders feel that religions are being threatened by Western globalization? To my understanding, if our religion, if your religion, if my religion does not effectively play a role, there must be something wrong with the followers of the religion, who do not actively introduce, do not actively disseminate the ideas of religious peace. That is why each of the religious followers, number one, should have a comprehensive understanding, and number two, have the duty themselves to socialize their ideas among others. So then this idea exists at the level of the community, this religious consciousness, but at the same time, individuals still proclaim as religious followers. This could be like steel in the minimum level of that understanding. And this I believe is also happening in any other religion.

As I was saying, in Islam, among the Muslims, both in the Arab world itself—you might be surprised perhaps—the level of understanding in the Arab community compared to the Muslims of the non-Arab Southeast is quite different. Among the Arab people that were in Iraq for instance, before the invasions of America in Afghanistan and Iraq, if you see the Iraqi people, to my mind, you Iraqi people, you are Arab, but how come many of you have abandoned your religion? And you do not even properly understand what the religion is all about, although the texts are also written in Arabic and you people use the Arabic language. And because of this perhaps, to my understanding—this lack of effort among religious people to disseminate ideas—because of this, what has emerged is that it has been swallowed by what has been said here to be the evil aspect of globalization.

As I was saying in the other session, and as we could hear Professor Usuki mentioning, how do we talk of globalization? Islam was also globalization, of course, in history, but how can globalization be used at the moment? Globalization as a tool, globalization as a means—not as an ideology. Not talking of globalization as Western ideology and a political ideology, but globalizing as a tool. If you have great ideas and they are well responded to by others, automatically new ideas will globalize by themselves. You can see this in the past before the eruption of the industrial or the technological revolution in the 20th century, all the great ideas were disseminated by themselves, without the use of the modern communications systems. And automatically they became globalized.

Of course I am talking about religion as a way of life, not religion as philosophical understanding, because you see that, of course, when I am saying the philosophical, I must have gotten fed up with the philosophical. Perhaps this is because a professor of philosophy has a different discernment. But what I want to say is, do not count religion with the philosophies. Because philosophies

always end up with nothing. That is why those who study philosophy, their heads are mostly bald, because there is only heat on their heads. I am not talking about this brother here; rather, my head is going bald because I studied philosophy. We are too busy working in our heads and never come to practice at all.

If you ask any philosopher about a certain thing which has been agreed on by most of the people, the philosopher will say to you, "I disagree." I will give you an example just regarding cars. When you ask, "What is a car, the definition of a car?" Most people agree that a car, number one, has an engine, and a car must have four wheels. If you ask the philosophers, your definition is not scientific. To define by the number of the wheel on the car, according to philosophers, then it depends from which side you are going to view the car. That is the philosopher's argument. If you see it from one side angle, you can see there are only two wheels on the car. If you see it from the top, you cannot see any single wheel on the car. That is the philosopher's argument.

Because of this I am saying, when you talk about religiosity, do not get it mixed up with philosophical ideas. Religiosity is something which is just a way of life, which is workable in the community. Thank you very much.

(Lee) Thank you for your critical evaluation. I have not enough ability to engage the discussion in English, so I will try talking in Korean, but briefly.

I would like to respond to the two commentators' questions briefly. First of all, I admit that my presentation is optimistic. What is clear, and what frames our premise, is that without any religious global awareness, the kind of globalization we wish to attain would be impossible.

Secondly, to the question Professor Gao asked about the cat anecdote, that is, whether the principle of *Tong-do-s'up-p'up* is similar to Chinese pragmatism, I must respond that they are different. The principle of *Tong-do-s'up-p'up* encompasses both openness and independence. If it has something in common with Chinese pragmatism, I think that would be its stance of opening up to the outside and modernizing. The principle of *Tong-do-s'up-p'up* took into account the weaknesses and emphasized the independence of Korean culture, on which basis opening was promoted. I think that this is quite different from Chinese pragmatism.

Korea recently celebrated the centenary of the Ahn Jung-geun incident, and on this occasion fully-fledged research about Ahn Jung-geun had begun mainly in the Catholic community. In my presentation today, I have tried to put forward an understanding of Ahn Jung-geun's special status on the basis of the principle of *Tong-do-s'up-p'up*. When we focus on this point, his argument does not seem very different from what may be called Asianism. However, I believe that the Asianism of Ahn Jung-geun had a more global dimension as compared to the Asianism that was promoted by Japan before, in that Ahn's movement was cultural in a broad sense of the word. So I wanted to highlight Ahn's stance from the Korean perspective.

As for Huntington's theory, I think that his worst error was excluding Japan from Asia. In the past, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, many Asian countries were behind Japan. If, over time, Japan has really weakened in its role and mission within Asia and has chosen to follow the Americans, I think this is not a very good choice for the realization of an alternative globalization for Asians.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about monotheism. I think that it is difficult to expect much of the ethos which is needed to break through the present situation to emerge from either Western monotheism or Japanese polytheism, with its strong syncretic aspect, alone. I believe that something radically new should be conceived, something which combines Western monotheism with its single god, and the mainly Japanese-style polytheism. I wrote a paper and proposed such a concept, a radical monotheism which encompasses monotheistic and polytheistic aspects. I would need more time to discuss this, so let me say that it may be possible to overcome the negative aspects of monotheistic religions through such a new concept containing the two extremes, and to arrive at a truly global religious consciousness.

(Chair) Thank you, Professor Lee. Next, Dr. Cruz, I am sorry to ask you this, but could you limit your remarks to two or three minutes?

(Cruz) I waive my time in favor of the pleasure of hearing the questions of the assembly. Thank you.

(Chair) Thank you, Dr. Cruz. Then, I propose that we move into a free discussion. I would like to ask Dr. Kamaruzaman to start, since she did not speak the last time either.

(Kamaruzaman) Thank you very much. Forgive me if the translator cannot keep up, but I have to keep up with time. So much has been said, right?, about globalization and the need for religion. Just to touch a few points very quickly, and then if we need a private discussion, we can go on to that later. Now we will talk about the situation of the world, this is my main concern. We have seen what has happened recently in New Delhi and I have just given my condolence to my good brother there.

You see, Muslims and Hindus were blown up in the middle of celebrations, holy days for both. How much

further can we go on with this? Now if the Hindus blow up the Muslims, then I can say that this is revenge, anger. If the Muslims blow up the Hindus, it is also the same thing. But both Muslims and Hindus were blown up—together. How do we explain this? Madness. We have all gone mad, and we are developing a generation of very confused people. And we scholars, what do we do about it? This is the situation. Now my main concern, I am very sorry that I get a bit passionate, but I do not want to be alive when the time comes that children blow up their parents and brothers blow up their sisters. Are we waiting for that time before we take action? This is my main concern.

Yes, there is globalization, and we should take the positive side of globalization. But people of religion, how do we take advantage of globalization? In terms of interfaith dialogue, this is a necessity, it is no longer a luxury. But interfaith dialogue has to understand our positions, we are treading on very sensitive issues.

Not every community is ready for interfaith dialogue. Our major task is to work within our own community to get them to reach out, then understand the other. But at the same time, we must also be conscious of the sensitivity of what is going on, and we must respect this sensitivity, otherwise we would fail even before we start. And because of that, we need what I call the etiquette of dialogue: what we can talk about and what we should not talk about. In terms of theology, be it monotheism, or polytheism, this is not a debatable issue. Interfaith dialogue—and I love the word "interfaith" as opposed to "inter-religious" because inter-religious only attends to institutionalized religion—interfaith includes those people with no institutionalized or formal religion, but with a sense of faith, of principles. And to some extent, I have more respect for these people. Because if you look in the West, many have rejected religion, but when it comes to humanistic issues, they will line up, they will form human chains to protect the people of Iraq whom they do not even know, and these "human chains" may not even profess a particular institutionalized religion. They are not looking for personal gain, paradise, or afraid of going to hell, but just for the purity of the spirit, of the issue itself. So "interfaith" to my mind is more enveloping as compared to inter-religious. So this is why I really like the word interfaith.

Moreover, the word is inclusive. And to my mind, I think it is high time that we stopped being exclusive. We should, I think, avoid issues that would form divides among ourselves. Now be it polytheism or be it monotheism, this issue is not the problem with the world. Our problem is that we do not know how to behave with each other. So interfaith dialogue, to my mind, is not the dialogue on theologies, for this is a dead-end road, as we said before.

Also, interfaith dialogue is not a platform to get others to dilute their faith, just so that they will be nice to us. No. Interfaith dialogue is where we can all work together towards a common issue. And because of that, to my mind, we can reach and touch each other at the point of ethics.

I'm sorry that I have no time to present what I call the oriental persona, and I took Confucius as an example of what I have in mind about the ethics. Now when you talk about ethics, all religions and every faith can agree on a lot of things. For example, there are the Ten Commandments of Judaism and Christianity, the Hindu Nyamas, the Ten Precepts of Buddhism, the Great Vows of Jainism, the Shari'ah of Islam, which all say: no killing, no stealing, no slandering, no immorality, even no alcohol for that matter, in many of the religions. And on the issues of human dignity at the level of the universal, not at the level of the particular, we can work together. Why not? There is so much that we can do, despite the fact that there are so many other things that we cannot do.

Now one last question, this is a challenge to all of us. I have to beg your pardon, excuse me, but take me as your sister, nothing else. If you like me, great, I am your sister. If you hate me, I still like you. I am still your sister. And this is my understanding of unity. I love disagreement, because with disagreement, I love you even more.

Now we are all lecturers, we are all professors. Before us, every semester, we face many students. What have we imparted to our individual students, that they will become the agents of change for the better of tomorrow?

Whenever we talk about responsibility, we always look across the board and say, "The government is not doing this, politicians are not doing that, the mass media should be doing this and that." But why do we not point to our own selves, for what have we done? As we say, when we point a finger at one thing, three more fingers are pointing back at us. And this I think is where the failure lies: we have not made it our personal business to work for a change.

Now, even if interfaith dialogue has failed, it is not necessarily because the dialogue is not catching on, but perhaps the event and organizers are suspected of having some other agenda. In interfaith dialogue, it is essential that there be sincerity. Interfaith dialogue cannot be made into a platform for personal agendas, for conversion, or any form of "lording over the other." It must be a dialogue of equal with equal, towards a common issue. If it is suspected, even with a slight suspicion, that something is not right, people will walk away. And once people walk away, they will not come back, because trust is a very delicate human element. And trust has to be built on sincerity, and sincerity is transparent.

You cannot proclaim sincerity, you cannot shout about sincerity. Sincerity is transparent. We have seen many attempts of dialogue that have failed. Then something is wrong, not necessarily with idea of dialogue, and it is not necessarily the case that the people have rejected dialogue, but perhaps people were not comfortable with the way things were going.

Forgive me my brothers and sisters if I got a bit carried away, but I am concerned about the direction our world is taking and I am sure you are as concerned, too. Thank you very much.

(Chair) Thank you, Dr. Kamaruzaman. Now, Professor Seth and then Professor Suh, please.

(Seth) Thank you. Let me add a little Indian perspective to the very interesting things that have been said. Let me start from the last commentator, Professor Usuki, and his suggestion—I know it is a provocative one, and I do not know whether he believes it—that Japan is not a part of Asia. I do not agree with him, I agree with Professor Lee.

Japan is very much a part of Asia, and always has been. Please do not forget the history of the last 2,000 years, the Heian period, and several other periods in Japanese history when it was closely interconnected with mainland China and with Korea. Through people like St. Francis Xavier, 450 years ago, Japan was intimately connected with the Roman Catholic Church in Goa where St. Francis Xavier first landed and where he lies buried, and with Kagoshima, as Professor Matsumoto mentioned yesterday, Kagoshima in Kyushu, which has a church in the memory of St. Francis Xavier.

What has happened is that the late 19th and 20th century was the Anglo-American century of Japan, starting in 1902 with the treaty with Britain which made Japan a member of the big boys' club or the rich man's club. And then, in one way or another, Britain and America, post-1945, post-1952 in the security treaty with America, you have been dominated. Even when you dealt with China, or with Korea, you dealt with them as though you were a younger brother of the Western colonial powers.

The 21st century must be a century for Japan where you once again look at Asian through your Asian eyes. You mentioned Okakura Tenshin. Okakura Tenshin was deeply influenced by one of the greatest universalists and humanists the world has ever seen, Rabindra Nath Tagore; and also by Mahatma Gandhi. I will come back to them in a minute. But you are very much a part of Asia.

There have been three main speakers, Mr. Cruz spoke about karma and Roman Catholicism coexisting in the Philippines. Professor Solihin spoke very eloquently about the ummah including people who are non-Muslim. And he mentioned—was it Muhammad Abdu who you were quoting, who went to Europe and found Islam but no Muslims, though while in Egypt he found Muslims but no Islam? And his Iranian colleague, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, was very much the same. So you talked about that and Prof. Lee talked about the convergence of East Asian religions and Christianity and the so-called dichotomy between monotheism and polytheism, and I want to break that down.

We labor under the simplistic idea that somehow, if we all became polytheistic and got away from monotheism, conflicts would some end! I think that is a very simplistic idea. Do not forget that Buddhist Burmese have fought Buddhist Thais over the centuries; so Huntington is all wrong I think, completely. The Chinese and the Japanese in spite of the fact that they share a Buddhist, Confucian heritage, are at loggerheads with each other. So he is completely wrong.

What I want to say is that the essence of the so-called "polytheistic religion of Hinduism" is contained in the last of the Vedas, the holy books which are the depository of 3,000 years of wisdom. And the last of these books are the Upanishads. And the Upanishads contain the very essence of monotheism. What do they say? That each of us, each individual goes through a cycle, a karmic cycle of birth and rebirth, and birth and rebirth, and this endless cycle goes on until you attain liberation of the soul. And the individual soul merges with the universal soul, which is the Paramatman, the atman unites with the Paramatman, the universal soul. This is nothing but pure monotheism.

So the dividing line between monotheism and polytheism is very, very, fine. You go to a Shiite mosque, and you see people kissing the tomb of Musa Al Kadhim in Baghdad, or you go to Najaf and Karbala and you see them tying pieces of paper seeking the intercession of the saints. This is totally un-Islamic. Mohammed, the Prophet, peace be upon him, he did not say that you need a mullah to intervene between you and your God, your communication with your God is direct, you need nobody.

So what is polytheistic in Hinduism, what is polytheistic in Islam? You only have to go to a Roman Catholic Church to see the icons or the Greek Orthodox Church to see the icons to know that polytheism or idol worship lies just below the surface.

Now let me just mention the etiquette of dialogue and the need for this universalist approach. Globalization as you all have recognized is a two-way process. Professor Gao mentioned that Seoul has more churches than many so-called Christian countries. Do you know that Los Angeles has more Buddhist churches and temples than

any Buddhist country? So America is as much an object of the process of globalization as any of us are. Every third child in a school in America is a person of color, nonwhite. And by 2025, every second child in American schools will be a person of color. So multiculturalism is a two-way process. We are objects of it, if you like, victims of it, but everybody else is subject to the same process of globalization.

So Professor Kamar's idea of a universalist approach, a dialogue of ethics—the comparative study of religions back to Okakura Tenshin and Rabindranath Tagore, great humanists, great believers in universalist values—which is lacking in the education system in so many countries including Japan. And I will end by—this is going to be a difficult one for the translators but *ganbatte kudasai*—I am going to quote to you from Tagore. This is the essence of the Upanishads, this is the essence of the universalist/humanist message that has been carried from India over the centuries from Gautama Buddha Oshakasama, down the ages through Mahatma Gandhi, and down the ages through justice Radha Benod Pal in the Tokyo war crimes tribunal. It is the same message of fairness, of humanity, and equality in the world.

Before I make the quote, let me say one more provocative thing, that if you look at the life of Buddha, and the life of Jesus Christ, do not forget that Buddha lived only 500 years before Jesus Christ, and his message came right up to the territory where Jesus Christ was born. Please observe the humility in both men, the compassion in both men, the nonviolence. "Turn the other cheek"—Christ did not get that from his Judaic origins, from Abrahamic or the Law of Moses who says, "An eye for an eye." Where did Jesus Christ get this "turn the other cheek" from, the nonviolence from?…

(Chair) Professor Seth, could you start to close your remarks…?

(Seth) Yes, yes, I'm sorry. I just make that quotation and tell you. But that is generally my view on this. And also the egalitarian streak in both Buddha and Jesus Christ, the egalitarian streak, the sense that all are equal before God. OK, this is the message that has been carried from India over the years, the message of humanity and universality:

"Where the mind is without fear, and the head is held high; Where knowledge is free; Where words come out from the depth of truth; Where the world has not been broken into fragments by narrow domestic walls; Where tireless striving stretches its arms towards perfection; Where the clear stream of reason has not lost its way in the dreary desert sand of dead habit; Where the mind is led forward by thee into ever-widening thought and action; Into that heaven of freedom, my Father, let my country awake." Thank you.

(Chair) Now, Professor Suh. Would you please keep your remarks short?

(Suh) Thank you very much. Yes, I will try to be brief. For the last two days, we have spent the most time discussing the theme of globalization. We have said that globalization is Occidental, Christian, universal, and so on. Along this line of thought, many colleagues have made proposals from the Asian standpoint, be it political, economic, social, or religious. With these proposals, we have contemplated what Islam is, what Asian religions and Asian polytheistic religions are, and what a combination of polytheistic and monotheistic religions would be.

Now, I have one specific thing to say. In the history of humanity, we have had Pax Romana and Pax Americana, and perhaps in the near future we may have Pax Asiana. This is one possibility. I have learned a great deal in this symposium, and I have come to be convinced that the most important role we can play from the Asian perspective is to make proposals. As Professor Kohara said, as with feminist issues and problems relating to the handicapped, we can speak from a minority standpoint, and if we were to bring this characteristic to the fore, I think that we must voice our proposals with more power.

When the pendulum has swung to the left, we cannot make it come back to the center by making it return directly to the center: the pendulum must swing fully to the very extreme on the left and then swing to the right, until it gradually returns to the center. I believe that the Asian perspective is most important, in that it allows this way of thinking while working on the problems we contemplate today. Thank you for your attention.

(Chair) Now, Professor Nakata, please.

(Nakata) I would like to point out something that has not been mentioned in this meeting over the last two days. We have been mainly discussing Asia and East Asia in particular. I feel that Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia are in reality two very different worlds. In Japan, we often describe people's physical appearances by saying "Southern type" and "Northern type." This is not very scientific, but two Japanese would say to each other: "I can tell you're of Southern stock" and "you're a Northern type." This is one proof that we know that North and South are different.

Likewise, I think that a southern island and a northern continent have different cultures. I myself feel very close to the Chinese and Korean people in terms of culture, in that we share the same Confucian cultural background and use Chinese characters; but in terms of mentality, I think I feel more at ease with Indonesians and Malaysians. I believe I can explain this by telling you

about the Arabic words, *zahir* and *batin.* They roughly refer to inside and outside, and they can be used to explain the idea that what is visible on the outside is different from what is on the inside, and the interior is the true substance, whereas what is outside is merely the form. If I simplified everything to this extent, there would be no room left for scholarship, but this is roughly what I mean. Anyway, in this sense, I am perhaps more at ease with Southeast Asians, who are culturally more different from the Japanese but are closer to my personal mentality.

We can apply this way of thinking to the topics of religion and religiosity. In terms of what appears on the outside as religion, I belong to Islam, which is, in my opinion, a very logical religion. As outwardly visible religions, we have Christianity, Islam, and many other religions. As for interior religiosity, it is something else. Thinking about what is inside and outside can give us material for further discussions and open up our eyes to other worldviews.

When discussing civilization, we can also make this inside-outside distinction. Both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia have logical and affective aspects. I believe that by thinking like this we can also change the way we view Asia.

(Chair) Now, Professor Nouh, please.

(Nouh) I am the only African here. You are all Asian, but frankly speaking, Egypt is also an Asian country. We have Sinai, a part of Asia, and Sinai is very important for Asia and for all religions as well. I have many points to talk about, but I face the limitation of time, so I will pick up one point only.

When we talk about the ummah and the caliphate, many people are afraid of what ummah means, and what caliphate means, and they have their own reasons. But today I want to talk about the ummah as the meaning of globalization in Islam. And I will pick up only two examples.

One example is from Islamic civilization; I will pick up from Islamic civilization one example only, the art of architecture, the mosque. The mosque is very important to Islam. In Arabia, the mosque is four walls, four walls only. But when you go to Morocco, you will find Spanish/European art in the mosque. Islam did not erase the identity of European people under Islamic civilization. Islam recognized the identity of the groups of the people. When you move from Morocco and come to Egypt, you find another art of architecture, and the same is true when you go to Turkey. When you go to India, you find the fantastic art of Indian mosques, even graves. We have the Taj Mahal, which everyone can go and see even though it is forbidden to build graves in such a way in Islam. But we have to keep in mind that Islam recognizes the identity of the other nations, other groups of people. When you go to Thailand, when you visit Malaysia, you can see wonderful mosques. When you come to Indonesia, you find the art of the Indonesian people, and even when you come to Japan nowadays, in Tokyo, you see Japanese art in the mosques also, very simple and very small, according to Japanese art. This is one example. Islamic globalization or globalization in Islam does not erase the identity of the others, but permit the identity of other group of any nation or of any peoples.

Now the second example. Because of time I will not give details, but it has to do with the people who live among the Muslims or live inside the borders of the ummah. Professor Solihin mentioned the meaning of the word *ummah* and gave an example from the days of the Prophet Muhammad, where in Medina, Islam considered Christian, Jew, and Muslim as one ummah. So ummah the in Arabic language has another meaning, it does not mean "nation." Professor Solihin has explained this in detail.

I can only give one example from history. When Muslims and Jews had to escape with their lives from Spain, it was only under the Ottoman Caliph that most of the Jewish people were saved. The Ottoman Caliph sent many ships to carry them to the area well known in that time as the Turkish Caliphate or Turkish Empire.

So these are two points, the last one briefly because of time. Yamamoto-san talked about the Arabic language and raised the question: Why do Filipino people insist on learning the Arabic language or give more attention to the Arabic language? I want to say that the Arabic language is a culture, it is not a language of religion only. It is a culture for all Muslim peoples, and for the Christian people who live in Arabic countries. The Jewish people in Spain have their own civilization in the history of Spain, and they wrote in Arabic. Their civilization had been revived by writing many books and important literature in the Arabic language.

If you go through all of Asia—from Arabia to Iran to Afghanistan to India to Thailand to the Philippines to Indonesia—you can hear Arabic words everywhere among native languages. If you take those words from them, there is no native language. If you take the Arabic word *salama* and other words from the Philippines, if you take the Arabic word KHABR and so on from Indonesia, there is no language. If you take such Arabic words from the Philippines, there is no city of Manila because Manila is an Arabic word, in fact; the capital Manila was the border where the Muslim merchants going back and forth to Indonesia were seeing each other off, so in this place they might say in Arabic FI AMAN ALLAH—it means *sayonara* and "may god keep you

safe." Later FI AMAN ALLAH became "Manilla." So if we remove Arabic words, no capital for the Philippines. So, I mean, the Arabic language is important for the Philippines. Thank you very much.

(Chair) We have only five more minutes, but perhaps we can have one or two speakers. Yes, Professor Shinohe, please.

(Shinohe) Having listened to my colleagues, I would like to share with you what has particularly caught my attention, instead of trying to figure out what is ultimately important about the theme of our discussion.

I think I can sum up this way: Mr. Yusanto said that in Indonesia people tend to turn to Islam in the hope of creating community-based values, and that Muslim groups work with a concrete sense of direction in compliance with the principles of Islam. Dr. Cruz said that Muslims account for "only 17 percent" of the population of Mindanao, whereas Professor Wadi said that Muslims in some parts of the Philippines, such as the Moro, are related to the Muslim powers in the Middle East and that Philippine Muslims are getting closer to the Islam of the Middle East as they grope for their identity, resulting in ideological and concrete movements. Dr. Solihin pointed out some movements for social reforms in which effort is made to preserve the positive side of developments, which sound rather familiar to us.

I think that we can place Dr. Kamaruzaman's concern in direct opposition to what Professor Wadi and Mr. Yusanto's remarks were about—that is, the division within the Muslim community, Muslims attacking and killing other Muslims. This is proof that their Muslim values are wavering, and such phenomena can greatly impact upon younger generations. I feel that what Dr. Kamaruzaman expressed as her concern should be taken seriously, as the possible consequences of the developments now taking place in the Southeast Asian Muslim community. In other words, we should pay close attention to what is actually happening today in Indonesia and the Philippines.

Dr. Cruz said that Muslims account for only 17 percent of the Philippine population. Nevertheless, the Philippine Muslim movements are, if not radical, somewhat synchronized with the worldwide Muslim movement. So once again, I think it is necessary to pay more attention to where the Philippine Muslims are going from now into the future.

(Chair) It is time for us to close this session, but it is unlikely that we do so with neat conclusions. I think, however, that we have at least come to one general understanding. We usually live in different places, and if we want to know what interests and problems others have, we must know the religious backgrounds of the places where they live. In this rapidly globalizing world, people in Japan too are becoming increasingly aware of this need.

One major factor that accounts for this awareness is the events of 9/11. Before this event, Japanese society did not take much interest in religion, perhaps in a manner similar to the way China was not interested in religion, as Professor Gao said. Then 9/11 happened, followed by all sorts of changes in the world. In this process, the way in which Japanese society should deal with religion has emerged as an issue of growing importance. I think that soon, as part of this process, Japan's place in East Asia will also be reexamined. Meanwhile, as Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi continues to visit Yasukuni Shrine, Japan's international relations with its East Asian neighbors may not develop as harmoniously as hoped.

It is therefore important for us to get to know each other better, while accurately grasping the complex actual situation, despite the challenge it implies, in order to overcome that challenge. Improving mutual understanding through insight into each other's religion is an important means for this purpose, which I think is becoming increasingly necessary.

This concludes Session Four. Now I would like to invite Professor Mori to offer some closing remarks.

Closing

MORI Koichi (Doshisha University)

(Mori) I would like to thank you all most sincerely for your active participation in the workshop over the last two days. Thanks to you, we have had a truly significant and fruitful international workshop. My heartfelt thanks go particularly to the ten professors who have come from five Asian countries.

I think we have had very rich discussions on topics relating to globalism and national identity which all East Asian countries share today, thanks to your contributions, with each one of you supplementing your remarks and enlightening others with the fruits of your work in your respective fields: theology, comparative religious studies, philosophy of religion, and so on. I was particularly impressed by the way in which you have shown your deep commitment to your respective monotheistic religions, not only as scholars but as individuals, and also the way you feel passionately about your countries, take deep, serious interest in issues concerning Asia and the world, and sincerely address yourselves to the challenge of figuring out how to deal with these problems

from the vantage point of your respective religions. I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to you all for your enthusiasm and great effort.

We have discussed globalism from various viewpoints, and we have come to the common understanding that globalism, with its various problems, is not functioning well, and is in turn bringing more problems to Asia. We have also come to have a very clear picture of the problems caused by globalism in East Asia.

Here is an important question: who must pay the most attention to these problems? The answer is, the advanced countries. For example, Japan, as an advanced country, must position itself on the side of globalism or globalization and examine what sort of economic problems it is causing for its Asian neighbors. It is time for us to seriously contemplate the issue of fair trade.

For another example, the United States, which is at the center of globalization, must also pay close attention to the problems of globalism. President Bush is scheduled to visit Kyoto next week and stay in the State Guesthouse, which is only a few hundred meters from here. So you see we are holding our workshop one week too early (laughter). Otherwise, we could have dragged Mr. Bush to our meeting and made him listen to our discussions… Anyway, what I want to say is that however harshly we may criticize Bush or the United States, this alone will not change the situation. I think that it is more fundamental and necessary to think about how the United States can change itself and what we can do towards that.

In our discussions about globalism, we have heard that globalism is secular and non-religious. How can religion respond to globalism, then? The premier representative of globalism, the United States, is in fact an extremely religious country, and I believe that the globalism advocated by the United States has a religious dimension to it. How does American religion differ from Asian religion? Perhaps they are different in form.

I think that we must make efforts to include the United States in our discussions, without the "religious" – "non-religious/secular" dichotomy. Then, what about Europe? Europe may not be religious, but in dealing with Europe, it would be necessary to collaborate with advocates of humanism and basic human rights in order to examine how we can work together to tackle the problems of globalism. I feel that strategies for dealing with globalism should be planned with the solidarity of all regions of the world.

I also wish to express gratitude for this international workshop on behalf of all the Japanese participants, because it has given us an extremely valuable opportunity to contemplate what Japan should do in the future with regards to the problems we have discussed.

In Session 2, Professor Asano asked a somewhat symbolic question about China and Korea in his comments: that is, whether or not China and Korea are states. I think the same question can be asked about Japan: Japan—what is it, anyway? I think that Professor Asano wanted to say that a national identity is not something static, but rather, something that is constantly evolving.

Asia—this is what is important for Japan in its process of new national identity formation. As Professor Usuki pointed out, there was a period in history during which Japan was not quite part of Asia. With this fact in mind, I have been newly awakened to the gravity of the task of redefining Japan's place vis-à-vis Asia when reexamining Japan's national identity.

The same can be said of China. What role is China trying to play in Asia in the future? A role of ethnocentrism-driven hegemony? If not, what role does China intend to play in Asia? If the Asian Common House, which Professor Matsumoto has proposed, were to materialize, I think that China and Japan would inevitably have to play significant roles. This workshop has made me think anew of their future role in Asia, away from the egocentric and hegemonic roles of the past, and their self-definition within the Asian framework.

Now, before I close my remarks, I would like to ask your cooperation for one of the tasks CISMOR is supposed to fulfill. We are preparing a report of this international workshop. It will be in Japanese and English at least, and also in Arabic, if possible. We would like to publish the entire proceedings of the workshop, including presentations, comments, and discussion, and make them available in English and Arabic to the rest of the world, to people in the United States and to those who need to read them.

During the workshop, the question was posed as to whether or not Japan is part of Asia. This is a very important question. As for me, having participated in this workshop, I have strengthened my belief that Japan *is* indeed part of Asia. This is because, as compared to last year's conference with eight American representatives and the year before last's with speakers from Europe and the Middle East, I feel that this time we are holding a meeting of close fellows, all from the same place: Asia. This has perhaps something to do with what Dr. Kamaruzaman calls the "Oriental Persona." It is not easy to logically explain this feeling, but I know that we all share it. Thank you for your attention.

(Chair) This concludes the entire program of the workshop. Thank you very much for your attention. I

would also like to thank our interpreters for helping us for so many hours. Thank you.

List of Researchers (CISMOR)

List of Core Researchers (CISMOR)

MORI Koichi (Director)
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
History of Religion in America

KOHARA Katsuhiro (Deputy Director)
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Christian Thought

ISHIKAWA Ritsu
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Biblical Studies

ECHIGOYA Akira
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Study of the Hebrew Bible

NAKATA Ko (Deputy Director)
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Islamic Political Thought

SHINOHE Junya
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Islamic Law

TOMITA Kenji
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Contemporary Iranian Studies

COHEN, Ada
Associate Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Jewish Studies

NOUH Samir
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Cross Cultures Studies (Islamic and Japanese Culture)

NAKAYAMA Yoshiki
Professor, Faculty of Letters (Philosophy) , Doshisha University
European Medieval Philosophy

MURATA Koji (Deputy Director)
Professor, Faculty of Law (Political Science), Doshisha University
International Relations

YAMAMOTO Masaaki
Professor, Institute for Language and Culture, Doshisha University
Jewish Literature

HOSOYA Masahiro
Professor, Graduate School of American Studies, Doshisha University
International Security Studies

ZIKMUND, Barbara
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
Visiting LCI Institute Scholar, Catholic University of America
American Religious History

USUKI Akira
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
Professor, Faculty of Home Humanities, Japan Women's University
Middle East Studies

MIURA Nobuo
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
Professor, Faculty of Cross-Cultural Studies, Kobe University
History of Science

TAHARA Maki (Takuji)
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
Staff Writer, Special News Section, The Tokyo Shimbun
Islamic Studies

MATSUNAGA Yasuyuki
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
Modern Iranian Studies

TESHIMA Isaiah
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
Professor, Faculty of Human Environment, Osaka Sangyo University
Biblical Studies, Jewish Thought

Reexamination of Monotheism and Dialogue of Civilizations – Joint Research Members

List of Research Members I (Alphabetical Order)

ASHINA Sadamichi
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University
Christian Studies

HIGAKI Juri
Associate Professor, General Education, Ashikaga Institute of Technology
Literature of Religious Thought in France, Interfaith Dialogue

ICHIKAWA Hiroshi
Professor, Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, The University of Tokyo
History of Religions, Judaism

KAMADA Shigeru
Professor, Institute of Oriental Culture, University of Tokyo
Islamic Thought

KATO Takashi
Professor, Faculty of Letters, Chiba University
New Testament Studies

KATSUMATA Etsuko
Non-regular employees lecturer, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Jewish Studies

KOBAYASHI Haruo
Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, Tokyo Gakugei University
Islamic Philosophy

KURIBAYASHI Teruo
Professor, School of Law and Politics, Kwansei Gakuin University
Systematic Theology

MOHR, Michel
Non-regular employees lecturer, Doshisha University
Modern Religious and Intellectual History

NAKAMURA Nobuhiro
Professor, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Doshisha Women's College of Liberal Arts
Science of Religion

NAKAZAWA Shinichi
Professor, Faculty of Policy Studies, Chuo University
Science of Religion

OKUDA Atsushi
Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University
Islamic Jurisprudence

SAWAI Yoshitsugu
Professor, Faculty of Human Studies, Tenri University
Science of Religion, Indian Study

SHIOJIRI Kazuko
Professor, Philosophy, Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Tsukuba
Islamic Thought

TONAGA Yasushi
Associate Professor, Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies, Kyoto University
Jewish Thought, Islamic Thought, Sufism

TORISU Yoshifumi
Professor, Faculty of Humanities, Nanzan University
Systematic Theology

TSUKIMOTO Akio
Professor, College of Arts, Rikkyo University
Study of the Hebrew Bible

TSUNASHIMA Ikuko
Non-regular employees lecturer, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Malaysian Studies

American Global Strategies and World of Monotheism – Joint Research Members

List of Research Members II (Alphabetical Order)

INA Hisayoshi
Editorial Writer, Nihon Keizai Shimbun
International Relations, Diplomatic Policy

ISHIKAWA Taku
Associate Professor, Department of Social Sciences, Toyo Eiwa University
International Politics, Study of Security

KITAZAWA Yoshiyuki
Professor, Faculty of Foreign Languages, Kyoto Sangyo University
International Relations, Study of the Middle East Area

LEE Aelia
Docent, Kyoto University of Foreign Studies
Ethnic Study of Central Asia

MIICHI Ken
Attache, Embassy of Japan in Singapore
Politics, Republic of Indonesia

MIYASAKA Naofumi
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, National Defense Academy in Japan
International Politics

MURAKAMI Yuzo
Professor, Doshisha Business School (Interlocking Researcher)
Economic Security

NAKAMURA Satoru
Associate Professor, Faculty of Cross-Cultual Studies, Kobe University
International Politics, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

NAKANISHI Hiroshi
Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University
International Politics

NAKAYAMA Toshihiro
Senior Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs
American Policy and Foreign Policy

OGAWA Tadashi
Vice-Chief, Planning Dept. Cultural Exchange Office
Director for Plans, Japan Foundation
Policy of International Cultural Exchange, Culture of Contemporary Asia

REZRAZI Elmostafa
Acting Director, Asia-Arab Media Research Project
Media Studies

SETH, Aftab
Director, Global Security Research Institute, Keio University
International Relations

UCHIDA Yuka
Sub-Chief Examiner, Policy Research Committee of The Democratic Party of Japan
American Policy toward the Middle East

YAMAGUCHI Noboru
Vice President (Major General), The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan Defense Agency
Ground Research & Command Development

Members of Research Projects 2005

Research Project 1
Religious Policy in Europe

ISHIKAWA Ritsu (leader)
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Biblical Studies

COHEN, Doron
Graduate Student, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Japanese Christianity from a Jewish Perspective

HIGAKI Juri
Associate Professor, General Education, Ashikaga Institute of Technology
Literature of Religious Thought in France, Interfaith Dialogue

KOHARA Katsuhiro
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Christian Thought

MIZUTANI Makoto
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Systematic Theology

MOHR, Michel
Non-regular employees lecturer, Doshisha University
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
Modern Religious and Intellectual History

YAMAMOTO Masaaki
Professor, Institute for Language and Culture, Doshisha University
Jewish Literature

YOKOTA Toru
Graduate Student, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Biblical Studies

Research Project 2
Understanding the West in the Structure of Iranian Islam

TOMITA Kenji (leader)
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Contemporary Iranian Studies

KAGAYA Hiroshi
Professors emeritus, Osaka University of Foreign Studies
Modern Iranian Studies

MATSUNAGA Yasuyuki
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development, Doshisha University
International Politics, Islamic Studies

NAKAMURA Asuka
Special researcher, Office for Research Initiatives and Development, Doshisha University
Iranian Studies

NAKATA Ko
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Islamic Political Thought

NOUH, Samir
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Cross-Cultural Studies (Islamic Culture & Japanese Culture)

SHIMAMOTO Takamitsu
Associate Professor, Center for Japanese Language, Osaka University of Foreign Studies
Islamic Thought

YOSHIMURA Shintaro
Associate Professor, Faculty of Integrated Arts and Sciences, Hiroshima University
Modern History of Iran and the International Relations of the Middle East

2005
Members of Research Projects

Research Project 3
Science and Modernization in the Monotheistic World

MIURA Nobuo (leader)
Visiting Fellow, Office for Research Initiatives & Development
Professor, Faculty of Cross-Cultural Studies, Kobe University
History of Science

KOHARA Katsuhiro
Professor, School of Theology
Christian Thought

Research Project 4
Images of Non-Muslim Religions in Middle Eastern Textbooks and Their Implications

NAKATA Ko (leader)
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Islamic Political Thought

NOUH, Samir
Professor, School of Theology, Doshisha University
Cross-Cultural Studies (Islamic Culture & Japanese Culture)

REZRAZI, Elmostafa
Acting Director, Asia-Arab Media Research Project
Media Studies

Research Project 5
Co-existence with Other Religions in Islam - Tradition and Response to the Contemporary World

NAKATA Ko (leader)
Professor, School of Theology
Islamic Political Thought

SHINOHE Junya
Professor, School of Theology
Islamic Law

SHIMOMURA Kazuki
Attache, Embassy of Japan in Syria
Islamic Studies, Middle Eastern Area Studies

Research Project 6
Historical Development of Europe and Islam

NAKATA Ko (leader)
Professor, School of Theology
Islamic Political Thought

KOHARA Katsuhiro
Professor, School of Theology
Christian Thought

21st Century Center of Excellence Program

CISMOR International Workshop 2005

Modernization and National Identity in East Asia: Globalization and the Revival of Religion

November 5-6, 2005

Editor: Victor A. Faessel
Published by CISMOR
(Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions)
Doshisha University
Karasuma-Higashi-iru, Imadegawa, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto 602-8580
Phone: +81–75–251–3972
Fax: +81–75–251–3092
http://www.cismor.jp/
email:staff@cismor.jp