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Islam Judaism Christianity

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CISMOR International Workshop 2004

War & Violence in Religion

Responses from the Monotheistic World

February 20-21, 2004

CISMOR
Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions

Doshisha University

CISMOR

The 21st Century Center of Excellence Program

CISMOR International Workshop 2004

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Table of Contents

Introduction

We are pleased to present this report on the results of research conducted during 2003 under the Doshisha University 21st Century COE (Centers Of Excellence) Program entitled "Interdisciplinary Research in Monotheistic Religions—From the Perspective of Cultural Coexistence and Security." The "Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions (CISMOR)," which was established in April 2003, is a central base for this COE Program. The 17 staff members include: seven persons from the School of Theology; one person from the School of Law; two persons from the School of American Studies; one person from the School of Letters; one person from the Institute of Language and Culture; and five persons from outside of Doshisha University.

As one can see from this diverse lineup of staff members, research on the three monotheistic religions originating in the Middle East—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—is undertaken not simply as a comparative study of religions, but as an interdisciplinary study targeting three monotheistic religions and their respective civilizations, taking into consideration a variety of perspectives including international security, the theory of civilization, and the modernization and history of science. The geographical regions covered include the Middle East, the European Union, South East Asia, and the U.S.

In 2003, research was initiated in two divisions: "A Reexamination of Monotheistic Religions and Dialogue on Civilization" and "America's Global Strategies and the World of Monotheistic Religions." In addition to the 17 members mentioned above and the staff of CISMOR, many researchers from all parts of Japan, coming from diverse backgrounds, will participate in these research divisions as joint researchers (please refer to the list of research fellows). For details of CISMOR's activities, please refer to the Center's website at [http://www.cismor.jp/].

In this report, we have recorded presentations, comments, and discussions from the international workshops that represented CISMOR's most significant operations during 2003. We hope that this report will provide a better understanding of the research activities being undertaken through this COE Program.

This COE Program is a central base of the Doshisha Graduate School of Theology, and maintains close ties with the research and education activities of that Graduate School. The Doshisha Graduate School of Theology has long been involved in research and education related to Christian Theology, and Protestant Theology in particular. When "Interdisciplinary Research in Monotheistic Religions" was selected as a COE Program, the

School of Theology simultaneously expanded its fields of research and education to include research in monotheistic religions. In 2003, two researchers in Islamic Thought and one researcher in Islamic regions were hired as full-time professors in the School of Theology. Two of these professors are themselves Muslims. This School of Christian Theology thus has three full-time professors specializing in Islamic religion, a situation that is extremely rare in any research institution anywhere in the world.

There are a number of reasons that the School of Theology expanded its fields of research and education to include research in monotheistic religions along with CISMOR. The first reason reflects the needs of the era. The terrorist attacks of September 11 and the war in Iraq, as well as the problems in Palestine that form the backdrop to these issues, have a significant effect on current world peace and security, and the three monotheistic religions mentioned above are closely related to each of these problems. In Japan, however, and indeed in any region throughout the world, there are very few research and education institutions that enable extensive and simultaneous studies of these three monotheistic religions.

The second reason is to promote social contributions by the School of Theology. In addition to providing accurate information regarding monotheistic religions to Japanese society, we hope that this School and CISMOR will play a role as a global base for research in the field of monotheistic religions. Since the time of the Crusades, the Islamic world and the Christian world of the west have had a history of opposition and conflict. Japan has always been positioned outside of this history of opposition and conflict, both historically and from the perspective of regional politics. We hope that Japan can turn this good fortune into a sense of responsibility, and play a role as a "mediator" between monotheistic worlds.

The third reason is to promote a reexamination of Christian theology. Over the past several decades, there have been numerous efforts in the field of Christian theology to seek out dialogue with other religions, and by doing so to promote a "theology of religions" or a "theology of dialogues" as a means of reexamining Christian theology itself. The results of these efforts, however, leave much to be desired. We feel that an examination of the ideal form of Christian theology is a crucial theme now that the coexistence of religions and civilizations has become an absolute necessity in today's world.

The most significant research operation undertaken by CISMOR during the 2003 academic year was an international work-

shop held in Kyoto on February 20 and 21, 2004, entitled "War & Violence in Religion—Responses from the Monotheistic World." The workshop welcomed 23 researchers from 12 countries and numerous Ph.D. students, who participated in active discussions with Japanese researchers and graduate students. Among the participants from overseas were some of the world's leading figures and researchers in the field of religion, including: M. Jurgensmeyer (USA; Religion and Violence); U. King (UK; Female theology and irenology (the study of peace); J. Johnson (USA; just war theory); I. Pappe (Palestine; Haifa University); A. Borujerdi (Iran; Ministry of the Interior); S. Kuftaro (Syria; Kuftaro Foundation); and H. Hanafi (Egypt; Cairo University).

The workshop was comprised of four sessions held over two days. The first session was an open symposium with about 350 participants. The second to fourth sessions were closed sessions, but the presentations, comments, and discussions have been recorded in this report. The report is going to be published also in Japanese and Arabic. The themes of the three closed sessions were: "War/Violence in Islam"; "War/Violence and Chrisitianity"; and "Toward Peace after 9/11."

The closed sessions involved historical and theological analyses and discussions of *"Jihād"* in Islam and "Just War Theory" and "Pacifism" in Christianity. There was also heated debate regarding the way that each religion understands war, within the specific contexts of Palestinian problems, 9/11, and the war in Iraq. Dialogues between religions have a tendency to become simply "drawing room discussions" between participants already sharing common views, but this international workshop was characterized by rather harsh mutual criticism, and at times even by heated debate between persons representing the same religion resulting from differences in those persons' understanding of war in the context of that religion.

With the proliferation of the Internet, there has been considerable discussion on the rise of "borderless information," but in fact, there has been almost no exchange of information between the English and Arab world, even on the Internet. We feel that the most important thing right now in the three worlds of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is the mutual sharing of accurate information regarding what the other person is thinking, what makes him/her angry, and what he/she wants. At this international workshop, we brought in simultaneous interpreters for Japanese, English, and Arabic, and we believe that the originally intended goals of the Workshop were achieved thanks to the efforts of these outstanding interpreters.

Based on a foundation of human interactions at international workshops and other venues, and with hints derived from past research exchanges involving the Program staff members, we have conducted a number of surveys and visits to the Middle East, the European Union, South East Asia, and the U.S. to examine the possibility of joint research and research exchanges with graduate schools and research institutions in those regions.

The goal of education in this COE Program is to foster "Specialists" that can contribute to the coexistence of civilizations in a world where clashes between civilizations are becoming increasingly harsh. We believe that the study of language for dialogue is not only an individual research theme related to each graduate student's research in monotheistic religions, but that it will become the foundations for the future work of specialists contributing to the coexistence of civilizations. In 2003, we established intensive courses in Arabic and "English for International Conferences" to increase the language skills of graduate school students. In 2004, we plan to create an intensive course in modern Hebrew as well.

We look forward to your continued interest in and support of this COE Program and the Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions.

Koichi Mori, Director

Schedule

Feb. 20 (Fri.)

10:00-12:30 Morning session Symposium (Open to the Public)
"War and Violence in Religion:
Responses from the Monotheistic World"
[Lecture room 1 in Meitokukan, Doshisha Univ.]
Chair: Prof. Katsuhiro Kohara (Doshisha Univ.)

10:00 -10:10   Introduction: Prof. Koichi Mori (Doshisha Univ.)

10:10 -11:40   Lectures:
Prof. Mark Juergensmeyer (Univ. of California, Santa Barbara)
"Religious Terror: Why is it Religious and Why is it Happening Now?"
Dr. Salahddin Kuftaro (Abunnur Islamic Academy)
"No War and Violence in Islam"
Prof. Akira Usuki (The National Museum of Ethnology)
"War and Violence in the Holy Land: Jerusalem
in the Mind of a Japanese."

11:40-11:50   Break

11:50-12:10   Comments
Prof. Barbara Brown Zikmund (Doshisha Univ.)
Prof. Yoshitsugu Sawai (Tenri Univ.)

12:10-12:30   Discussion

12:30-14:30   Lunch [Café restaurant AQUABLU, Westin Miyako Hotel, Kyoto]

14:30-17:30 Afternoon session Workshop
"War/Violence and Islam"
[Yamashiro-no-ma, Westin Miyako Hotel, Kyoto]
Chair: Prof. Kazuko Shiojiri (Tsukuba Univ.)

14:30-15:20   Presentations:
Prof. Ko Nakata (Doshisha Univ.)
"What does it mean to "Deny war and violence?"
"Frameworks of Islamic Discourse"
Prof. M. Din Syamsuddin (Indonesian Council of Ulama)
Dr. Ashraf Borujerdi (Ministry of Interior of Iran)
"War and Peace in perspective of Islamic law"

15:20-15:35   Coffee break

15:35-15:55   Comments
Dr. Jesper Svartvik (Lund Univ.)
Dr. Hashim Shahrir (RISEAP: Religional Islamic Dawah Council of Southeast Asia and the Pacific)
Prof. Kenji Tomita (Doshisha Univ.)
Prof. Akira Echigoya (Doshisha Univ.)

15:55-17:30   Discussion

18:00-20:00   Dinner/Reception
[Aoi-den, Westin Miyako Hotel, Kyoto]

Feb. 21 (Sat.)

9:30-12:30 Morning session Workshop
"War/Violence and Christianity"
[Yamashiro-no-ma, Westin Miyako Hotel, Kyoto]
Chair: Prof. Koichi Mori (Doshisha Univ.)

9:30- 10:20   Presentations:
Prof. J. T. Johnson (Rutgers Univ.)
"The Just War Idea in Historical Tradition and Current Debate."
Prof. Emeritus Ursula King (Univ. of Bristol)
"Christianity, Violence and the Peace Imperative."
Prof. Katsuhiro Kohara (Doshisha Univ.)
"Conflicts of Pacifism and Just War Theory from the
Japanese and Christian Viewpoint."

10:20-10:35   Coffee break

10:35-10:55   Comments
Ms. Nurit Novis-Deutsch (Hebrew Univ.)
Prof. Ibrahim M. Zein (International Islamic Univ. Malaysia)
Mr. Takuji Tahara (The Tokyo Shimbun [Newspaper])
Prof. Tomoaki Fukai (Seigakuin Univ.)

10:55-12:30   Discussion

12:30-14:30   Lunch [Café restaurant AQUABLU, Westin Miyako Hotel, Kyoto]

14:30-17:30 Afternoon session Workshop
"Toward Peace after 9/11"
[Yamashiro-no-ma, Westin Miyako Hotel, Kyoto]
Chair: Prof. Masahiro Hosoya (Doshisha Univ.)

14:30-15:20   Presentations:
Prof. Hassan Hanafi (Cairo Univ.)
"Islam, Risk or Promise?"
Dr. Ilan B. Pappe (Haifa Univ.)
"The Visible and Invisible in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict."
Prof. Koichi Mori (Doshisha Univ.)
"Can America overcome American Fundamentalism?"

15:20-15:35   Coffee break

15:35-15:55   Comments
Prof. Koji Murata (Doshisha Univ.)
Ms. Yuka Uchida (The Democratic Party of Japan)
Dr. Salahddin Kuftaro (The Shaikh Ahmad Kuftaro Foundation)
Prof. Mark Juergensmeyer (Univ. of California, Santa Barbara)

15:55-17:30   Discussion

Feb. 22 (Sun.)

Excursion

2003 Activities Report

May 10, 2003

CISMOR Symposium
Seeking A perspective on the Iraq War in depth
Location; Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Lecture 1: Koji Murata (Associate Professor of Faculty of Law at Doshisha University),
    "Depth of President Bush's Foreign Policy"

Lecture 2: Koichi Mori (Professor of Faculty of Theology at Doshisha University),
    "Depth of the Religious State, The United States of America"

Lecture 3: Ko Nakata (Professor of Faculty of Theology at Doshisha University),
    "Depth of Islam & Jihād"

Panel discussions

October 2, 2003

Lecture Open for Public
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Lecture
Prof. Dr. Peter Steinacker (The President of the Protestant church in Hesse and Nassau)

Jews, Christians, and Muslims—Dialogue and conflict in monotheistic religions

Commentator: Nakata Koh (Doshisha Univ.)

October 11, 2003

Memorial Lecture of Foundation of CISMOR
Spirituality in Japan & the Monotheistic World
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Lecture 1: Doi Toshitada (Sony Corporation) "The Social Evolution & Religiosity."

Lecture 2: Itagaki Yuzo (Prof. Emeritus at Tokyo Univ.)
    "Japanese View on Islam: allergy for monotheistic religion?"

December 6, 2003

Research Group 1
Reexamination of Monotheism and Dialogue of Civilizations, 2003, No. 1
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Speaker 1: Prof. Akio Tsukimoto, (Rikkyo Univ.)
    The background of Ancient Israel and Monotheism

Commentator: Echigoya Akira (Doshisha Univ.)

December 20, 2003

Research Group 2
American Global Strategy and the Monotheistic World, 2003 No. 1
Location: Doshisha Univ. Tokyo Office

Speaker 1: Murata Koji (Doshisha Univ.) Historical Trends of American diplomacy

Speaker 2: Yamaguchi Noboru (Japan Ground Self Defense Force)
    The U.S. Military Strategy under the Bush Administration diplomacy

Commentator 1: Tahara Maki (Tokyo Shinbun)

Commentator 2: Nakata Koh (Doshisha Univ.)

January 10, 2004

Research Group 2
American Global Strategy and the Monotheistic World, 2003 No. 2
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Speaker 1: Miyasaka Naofumi (Self Defence Univ.)
    International Terrorism and Anti-Terrorism Measures

Speaker 2: IshikawaTaku (Touyo eiwa Women's College)
    On the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Commentator 1: Nakanishi Hiroshi (Kyoto Univ.)

Commentator 2: Matsunaga Yasuyuki (Nihon Univ.)

January 17, 2004

Lecture Open for Public
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Speaker: Marcia Beauchamp (The Freedom Forum First Amendment center, USA)
    From Battleground to Common Ground

Commentator: Mori Koichi (Doshisha Univ.)

January 24, 2004

Research Group 1
Reexamination of Monotheism and Dialogue of Civilizations, 2003, No. 2
Location: Doshisha Univ. Tokyo Academy

Speaker: Katoh Takeshi (Chiba Univ.) Christianity and the formation of Monotheism

Commentator: Kohara Katsuhiko (Doshisha Univ.)

February 20-21

CISMOR International Workshop 2004,
War & Violence in Religion—Responses from the Monotheistic World-
Location Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus, Westin Miyako Hotel Kyoto

Session 1: Symposium "War and Violence in Religion"
Session 2: War/Violence and Islam
Session 3: War/Violence and Christianity
Session 4: Toward Peace after 9/11

March 6, 2004

Research Group 1
Reexamination of Monotheism and Dialogue of Civilizations, 2003, No. 3
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Speaker: Kamata Shigeru (Tokyo Univ.) Islam and the Development of Monotheism

Commentator: Nakata Koh (Doshisha Univ.)

March 6, 2004

Research Group 2
American Global Strategy and the Monotheistic World, 2003 No3
Location: Doshisha Univ. Tokyo Academy

Speaker 1: Uchida Yuuka (The Democratic Party of Japan)
    U.S. Policy towards the Middle East

Speaker 2: Ina Hisayoshi (Nihon Keizai Shinbun)
    U.S. Foreign Policy Community in Washington, DC

Commentator 1: Usuki Akira (The Japan Center for Area Studies)

Commentator 2: Mori Koichi (Doshisha Univ.)

March 18, 2004

Special Research project,
Understanding West from Iran-Islam structure, No1
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Speaker: Dr. Mohsen Kadivar (Tarbiat Modarres Univ.)

Commentator: Tomita Kenji (Doshisha Univ.),
    Matsunaga Yasuyuki (Doshisha Univ.), Nakata Koh (Doshisha Univ.)

March 29, 2004

Lecture open for Public
Education and Religion in Syria
Location: Doshisha Univ. Imadegawa Campus

Lecture: Salah Eddin Kuftaro (The Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro Foundation)
    "Education and Religion in Syria"

Commentator: Nakata Koh (Doshisha Univ.)

▌Reexamination of Monotheism and Dialogue of Civilizations – Research Members

List of Research Members (Alphabetical Order)

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(The Tokyo Shinbun Staffwriter, Special news section)
Islamic Study

Feb. 20(Fri.)
Symposium

War and Violence in Religion:
Responses from the Monotheistic World

International workshop

Religious Terror: Why is it Religious,
and Why is it Happening Now?

Religious Terror: Why is it Religious, and Why is it Happening Now?

University of California, Santa Barbara Mark Juergensmeyer

No one who watched in horror as the twin towers of the World Trade Center crumbled into dust on September 11, 2001 could doubt that the real target of such terrorist assaults was the global power of the United States. Those involved have said as much. Mahmood Abouhalima, one of the al Qaeda-related activists who was convicted of his role in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, told me in a prison interview that buildings such as these were chosen in order to dramatically demonstrate that "the government is the enemy."

The U.S. government, its allies, and the secular governments that it supports have frequently been the target of recent terrorist attacks. Other religious leaders or groups are seldom the targets. The assault on the Shi'ite shrine in the Iraqi city of Najaf on August 29, 2003 that killed over eighty including the venerable Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim was an anomaly in this regard. The al Qaeda activists who allegedly perpetrated the act were more likely incensed over the Ayatollah's implicit support for the US-backed governing council in Iraq than they were jealous of his Shi'ite popularity. Since the United Nations has also indirectly supported the U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan the UN has been another subject of Osama Bin Laden's rage. This may well be the reason why its office in Baghdad was targeted for the devastating assault on August 19, 2003 that killed the distinguished UN envoy, SergioVieira de Mello. Despite the seeming diversity of the targets the object of most recent acts of religious terror is an old foe of religion: the secular state.

Secular governments have been the objects of terrorism in virtually every religious tradition—not just Islam. A Christian terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, bombed the Oklahoma City Federal Building. A Jewish activist, Yigal Amir, assassinated Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. A Buddhist prophet, Shoko Asahara, orchestrated the unleashing of nerve gas in the Tokyo subways near the Japanese parliament buildings. Hindu and Sikh militants have targeted government buildings and political leaders in India.

In addition to government offices and leaders, other targets have been symbols of modern secular life and its decadence promoted—or at least allowed—by the secular state. In August 2003 the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, frequented by Westerners and Westernized Indonesians, was the object of a terrifying car bombing, reminiscent of the devastating attack in December 2002 on nightclubs in Bali where the main patrons were young college-aged Australians. In Atlanta and elsewhere in the United States, abortion clinics and gay bars have been targeted. The 2003 bombings in Morocco were aimed at clubs frequented by foreigners from Spain, Belgium, and Israel.

Two questions arise regarding this spate of vicious religious assaults on secular government and secular life around the world. Why is religion the basis for opposition to the state? And why is this happening now?

Why religion?

Religious activists are puzzling anomalies in the secular world. Most religious people and their organizations are either firmly supportive of the secular state or quiescently uninterested in it. Osama Bin Laden's al Qaeda network, like most of the new religious activists, comprise a small group at the extreme end of a hostile subculture that itself is a small minority within the larger Muslim world. Osama Bin Laden is no more representative of Islam than Timothy McVeigh is of Christianity, or Japan's Shoko Asahara is of Buddhism.

Still one cannot deny that the ideals and ideas of activists like Bin Laden are authentically and thoroughly religious. Moreover, even though their network consists of only a few thousand members, they have enjoyed an increase in popularity in the Muslim world after September 11, especially after the Afghan and Iraqi occupations by the US military and its allies. The authority of religion has given Bin Laden's cadres the moral legitimacy of employing violence to assault symbols of global economic and political power. Religion has also provided them the metaphor of cosmic war, an image of spiritual struggle that every religion contains within its repository of symbols—the fight between good and bad, truth and evil. In this sense, then, attacks such as those on the World Trade Center and the UN headquarters in Baghdad were very religious. They were meant to be catastrophic, acts of biblical proportions.

Though the World Trade Center and United Nations attacks and many other recent acts of religious terrorism have had no obvious military goal, they are meant to make a powerful impact on the public consciousness. These are shows meant for television. They are a kind of perverse performance of power meant to ennoble the perpetrators' views of the world and to draw us into their notions of cosmic war. In my study of the global rise of religious violence, *Terror in the Mind of God* (Juergensmeyer 2003), I have found a strikingly familiar pattern. In virtually all of the recent cases of religious violence, concepts of cosmic war have been accompanied by strong claims of moral justification and an enduring absolutism that transforms worldly struggles into sacred battles. It is not so much that religion has become politicized, but that politics have become religionized. Worldly struggles have been lifted into the high proscenium of sacred battle.

This is what makes religious warfare so difficult to combat. Its enemies have become satanized—one cannot negotiate with them or easily compromise. The rewards for those who fight for the cause are transtemporal, and the time lines of their struggles are vast. Most social and political struggles look for conclusions within the lifetimes of their participants, but religious struggles can take generations to succeed.

I once had the occasion to point out the futility—in secular military terms—of the radical Islamic struggle in Palestine to Dr Abdul Aziz Rantisi, the head of the political wing of the Hamas movement. It seemed to me that Israel's military force was such that a Palestinian military effort could never succeed. Dr Rantisi assured me that that "Palestine was occupied before, for two hundred years." He explained that he and his Palestinian comrades "can wait again—at least that long." In his calculation, the struggles of God can endure for eons. Ultimately, however, they knew they would succeed.

Insofar as the U.S. public and its leaders embraced the image of war following the September 11 attacks, America's view of this war was also prone to religionization. "God Bless America" became the country's unofficial national anthem. President George W. Bush spoke of the defense of America's "righteous cause," and the "absolute evil" of its enemies. Still, the U.S. military engagement in the months following September 11 was primarily a secular commitment to a definable goal and largely restricted to limited objectives in which civil liberties and moral rules of engagement, for the most part, still applied.

In purely religious battles, waged in divine time and with heaven's rewards, there is no need to compromise one's goals. There is no need, also, to contend with society's laws and limitations when one is obeying a higher authority. In spiritualizing violence, therefore, religion gives the resources of violence a remarkable power.

Ironically, the reverse is also true: terrorism can give religion power. Although sporadic acts of terrorism do not lead to the establishment of new religious states, they make the political potency of religious ideology impossible to ignore. The first wave of religious activism, from the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978 to the emergence of Hamas during the Palestinian intifada in the early 1990s, was focused on religious national-ism and the vision of individual religious states. Increasingly, religious activism has a more global vision. Such disparate groups as the Christian militia, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, and the al Qaeda network all target what their supporters regard as a repressive and secular form of global culture and control.

Part of the attraction of religious ideologies is that they are so personal. They impart a sense of redemption and dignity to those who embrace them. Those attracted to them are often men who feel marginalized from public life, and in that way, humiliated. One can view their efforts to make satans out of their enemies and to embrace ideas of cosmic war as attempts at ennoblement, empowerment, and dehumiliation. Such efforts would be poignant if they were not so horribly destructive.

Yet they are not just personal acts. These violent efforts of symbolic empowerment have an effect beyond whatever personal satisfaction and feelings of potency they impart to those who support and conduct them. The very act of killing on behalf of a moral code is a political statement. Such acts break the state's monopoly on morally sanctioned killing. By putting the right to take life in their own hands, the perpetrators of religious violence make a daring claim of power on behalf of the powerless, a basis of legitimacy for public order other than that on which the secular state relies.

Why now?

What makes these acts of religious violence occur now, and in a way different from the various forms of holy warfare and sanctimonious killing that has occurred throughout history, is that they are responses to a contemporary theme in the world's political and social life: globalization. In an interesting way, the World Trade Center symbolized Bin Laden's hatred of two aspects of secular government—a certain kind of modernization and a certain kind of globalization. I say "a certain kind," in both cases, since the al Qaeda network was itself both modern and transnational in its own way. Its members were often highly sophisticated and technically-skilled professionals, and its organization was comprised of followers of various nationalities who moved effortlessly from place to place with no obvious nationalist agenda or allegiance. In a sense they were not opposed to modernity and globalization, as long as it was of their own design. But they loathed the Western-style modernity that they imagined that secular globalization was forcing upon them.

Some twenty-three years earlier, during the Islamic revolution in Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini rallied the masses with a similar notion, that America was forcing its economic exploitation, its political institutions, and its secular culture on an unwitting Islamic society. The Ayatollah accused urban Iranians of having succumbed to "Westoxification"—an inebriation of Western culture and ideas. The many strident movements of reli-

International workshop

Religious Terror: Why is it Religious,
and Why is it Happening Now?

gious nationalism that have erupted around the world in the more than two decades following the Iranian revolution have echoed this cry. This anti-Westernism has at heart an opposition to a certain kind of modernism–its secularism, its individualism, its skepticism. Yet, in a curious way, by accepting the modern notion of the nation-state and by adopting the technology and financial instruments of modern society, many of these movements of religious nationalism have claimed a kind of modernity on their own behalf.

One could regard religious politics as a kind of opportunistic infection that has set in at the present weakened stage of the secular nation-state. Globalization has crippled the secular nationalism and the nation-state in several ways. It has weakened it economically not only through the global reach of transnational businesses but also by the transnational nature of their labor supply, currency, and financial instruments. It has eroded its sense of national identity and unity through the planetary expansion of media and communications technology and popular culture, and through the unchallenged military power of the United States. Some of the most intense movements for ethnic and religious nationalism have arisen in nations where local leaders have felt exploited by the global economy, unable to gain military leverage against what they regard as corrupt leaders promoted by the US, and invaded by American images of popular culture on television, the internet, and motion pictures.

Another aspect of globalization—the emergence of multicultural societies through global diasporas of peoples and cultures, and the suggestion that global military and political control might fashion a "new world order"—has also elicited fear. It is this specter that has been exploited by Bin Laden and other Islamic activists, and which caused many concerned citizens in the Islamic world to see America's military response to the September 11 attacks as an imperialistic venture and a bully's crusade, rather than the righteous wrath of an injured victim. When US leaders included the invasion and occupation of Iraq as part of its "war against terror" it was commonly portrayed in the Muslim world as a ploy for the expansion of America's global reach.

This image of America's sinister role in creating a new world order of globalization is also feared in some quarters of the West. In the United States, for example, the Christian Identity movement and Christian militia organizations have been alarmed over what they imagine to be a massive global conspiracy to control the world, involving liberal American politicians and the United Nations. Timothy McVeigh's favorite book, The Turner Diaries, is based on the premise that the United States has already succumbed unwittingly to a conspiracy of global control from which it needs to be liberated through terrorist actions and guerilla bands. In Japan a similar conspiracy theory motivated leaders of the Aum Shinrikyo movement to predict a catastrophic

World War III, which their nerve gas assault in the Tokyo subways was meant to demonstrate.

As far-fetched as the idea of a "new world order" of global control may be, there is some truth to the notion that the integration of societies, communication among disparate peoples, and the globalization of culture have brought the world closer together. Although it is unlikely that a cartel of malicious schemers has designed this global trend, the effect of globalization on local societies and national identities has nonetheless been profound. It has undermined the modern idea of the nation-state by providing nonnational and transnational forms of economic, social, and cultural interaction. The global economic and social ties of the inhabitants of contemporary global cities are intertwined in a way that supercedes the idea of a national social contract--the Enlightenment notion that peoples in particular regions are naturally linked together in a specific nation-state. In a global world it is hard to say where particular regions begin and end. For that matter, in multicultural societies it is hard to say how one should define the "people" of a particular nation.

This is where religion and ethnicity step in to redefine public communities. The fading of the nation-state and the disillusionment with old forms of secular nationalism have produced both the opportunity for new nationalisms and the need for them. The opportunity has arisen because the old orders seem so weak; and the need for national identity persists because no single alternative form of social cohesion and affiliation has yet appeared to dominate public life the way the nation-state did in the twentieth century. In a curious way, traditional forms of social identity have helped to rescue one of Western modernity's central themes: the idea of nationhood. In the increasing absence of any other demarcation of national loyalty and commitment, these old staples—religion, ethnicity and traditional culture—have become resources for national identification.

In the contemporary political climate, therefore, religious and ethnic nationalism has provided a solution to the perceived insufficiencies of Western-style secular politics. As secular ties have begun to unravel in the post-Soviet and post-colonial era, local leaders have searched for new anchors to ground their social identities and political loyalties. What is significant about these ethno-religious movements is their creativity–not just their use of technology and mass media, but also their appropriation of the nation-state and global networks. Although many of the framers of the new nationalisms have reached back in history for ancient images and concepts that will give them credibility, theirs are not simply efforts to resuscitate old ideas from the past. These are contemporary ideologies that meet present-day social and political needs.

In the context of Western modernism this is a revo-

lutionary notion–that indigenous culture can provide the basis for new political institutions, including resuscitated forms of the nation-state. Movements that support ethno-religious nationalism are, therefore, often confrontational and sometimes violent. They reject the intervention of outsiders and their ideologies and, at the risk of being intolerant, pander to their indigenous cultural bases and enforce traditional social boundaries. It is no surprise, then, that they get into trouble with each other and with defenders of the secular state. Yet even such conflicts serve a purpose for the movements: it helps define who they are as a people and who they are not. They are not, for instance, secular modernists.

Understandably, then, these movements of anti-Western modernism are ambivalent about modernity—whether it is necessarily Western and always evil. They are also ambivalent about the most recent stage of modernity (or post-modernity): globalization. On the one hand these political movements of anti-modernity are reactions to the globalization of Western culture. They are responses to the insufficiencies of what is often touted as the world's global standard: the elements of secular, Westernized urban society that are found not only in the West but in many parts of the former Third World, and which are seen by their detractors as vestiges of colonialism. On the other hand these new ethno-religious identities are alternative modernities with international and supernatural aspects of their own. This means that in the future some forms of anti-modernism will be global, some will be virulently anti-global, and yet others will be content with creating their own alternative modernities in ethno-religious nation-states.

Each of these forms of religious anti-modernism contains a paradoxical relationship between certain forms of globalization and emerging religious and ethnic nationalisms. It is one of history's ironies that the globalism of culture and the emergence of transnational political and economic institutions enhance the need for local identities. They also create the desire for a more localized form of authority and social accountability.

The crucial problems in an era of globalization are identity and control. The two are linked, in that a loss of a sense of belonging leads to a feeling of powerlessness. At the same time, what has been perceived as a loss of faith in secular nationalism is experienced as a

loss of agency as well as selfhood. For these reasons the assertion of traditional forms of religious identities are linked to attempts to reclaim personal and cultural power. The vicious outbreaks of anti-modernism in the incidents of religious terrorism that have occurred in the first decade of the twenty-first century can be seen as tragic attempts to regain social control through acts of violence. Until there is a surer sense of citizenship in a global order, therefore, religious visions of moral order will continue to appear as attractive though often disruptive solutions to the problems of authority, identity and belonging in a global world.

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No War and Violence In Islam

The Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro Foundation

Dr. Sheikh Salah al-Deen Kuftaro

I start my speech in the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful. Peace and blessings be on Prophet Muhammad, on his forefather Abraham, on his two brothers Moses and Jesus and on all the prophets and messengers of God, and on those who follow in their footsteps to the Day of Judgement.

Dear Audience,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to initiate my contribution with the universal greeting of the Muslims, *Assalāmu alaykum*, which means Peace Be With You All".

Also, I would like to congratulate Professor Koichi Mori and his CISMOR (Center for Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions) team at Doshisha University for arranging such a valuable workshop on a topic that certainly deserves to be clarified, namely "War and Violence in Religion—Responses from the Monotheistic World".

Now, before embarking on the function of Islam with regard to war and violence, I would like to alter our perspective in order to do justice to the Abrahamic religions. Firstly, I conceive war and violence in religion, including Islam, as being an effect of the war and violence of International (or more correctly Inter-State) Relations. How many wars have really been conducted due to the Abrahamic religions or Islam for that sake?

The First World War?

The Second World War?

The Gulf Wars? Etc.

Accordingly, the primary actors in the realm of international relations are not religions, but rather states. Religions have been used either to legitimize or to delegitimize a statist secular rationale. There are two main kinds of wars and violence that are associated with the states: intra-state (within states) and inter-state (between states), In most, if not all, cases, the root causes of these conflicts are not religious.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, we have all been witnessing increased attention to Islam, particularly from a negative perspective, or in relation to war and violence. It appears that the image of an 'Islamic Threat' has replaced what used to be the Cold War's 'Communist Threat'. One might wonder how the image of Islam has increasingly been linked to war and violence. Is it due to a sudden change in the Islamic teach-ings that has remained unaltered for over fourteen hundred years? Or are there external, i.e. non-Islamic factors that are socially engineering the idea of a clash of civilizations between the so-called Islamic Civilization and the Western Civilization? There are certainly some academics in the West who have been discussing such a clash. Strangely enough, we have also in the last couple of years been witnessing some people using Islamic slogans, terminology and appearance with the aim of precipitating the same clash of civilizations scenario.

Equally important is it to mention that in the post Cold War presentation of Islam, one cannot avoid but coming across the concept of 'Jihād', which is translated by most of the mass media as a 'Holy War'. This is a huge misrepresentation of the term 'Jihād', whose etymological meaning is 'effort or struggle' and the greatest struggle in Islam is the struggle of 'cleaning one self from one's lowly desires' (e.g. lying and stealing). The term 'Holy War' on the other hand is derived from the Crusades and from the Europeans' desire to justify an "Un-Holy War", i.e. a Non-Religious Quest, by providing it a 'religious clothing' through the use of the term "Holy". Hence it needs to be emphasized that the two concepts of 'Jihād' and 'Holy War' are incompatible whereas the former concept is derived from the Islamic Intellectual History and the latter from the European-Christian Intellectual History. What this means is that there is nothing called a 'Holy War' in Islam.

What has been mentioned ought to be conceived in the post-9/11 matrix too, because having witnessed the horrible events of 9/11 one cannot objectively ignore the indispensable question Qui Bono or Who Gains?

I would in particular remind us all that the Muslims' Friday prayer in the World Trade Center (WTC) used to gather more than 1,500 Muslims and many of them were victims of the terrorist attacks. Additionally, the events of September 11, 2001 have caused a backlash of Islamophobia in general and anti-Semitism in particular against the Muslims. I use the term anti-Semitism intentionally; I like all Arabs am a Semite, so the post-9/11 media portrayals of Arabs and Muslims as terrorists are in a very real sense anti-Semitic. Thus, we Arab Muslims have ourselves become the world's newest victims of anti-Semitism. In addition to this discrimination against Muslims generally, the bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq has created more casualties than the deaths from the 9/11 attacks. Overall, the heinous 9/11 attacks and the reactions that they sparked (which have caused great human suffering in Afghanistan and Iraq) have served the interests of those who seek a clash of civilizations between Muslims and the West in particular, rather than the cause of Islam.

There is a saying in International Relations that goes like *si vis pacem, para bellum*, meaning "if you want peace, prepare for war." Our Islamic perspective is the opposite: "if you want peace, prepare for peace." This is the Islamic spirit. "Islam" itself is a word whose etymological meaning is "peace". This characteristic has been a legacy of Islam for over fourteen hundred years. For example, when Prophet Muhammad received the Quranic revelation, which was a trust from *Allāh* (God), he peacefully invited people to Islam for thirteen years in Mecca. Thereafter the Prophet Muhammad migrated to the city of Medina with the Muslims due to the persecutions and terror of the Meccans. Hence it was the absence of the freedom of religion at the heart of a "final solution" against the Muslims that forced them to migrate, and it is indispensable to note they left their homes peacefully instead of fighting for what was their right. In Medina the Muslims created the first written constitution of human history, named the Charter or Constitution of Medina. Jewish and pagan Arab tribes were also part of Medinan society, which was thus one community despite the presence of religious differences. It was only after continuous aggression against the community of Medina and the threat of a "final solution" that defensive and pre-emptive battles were fought by the Muslims in order to secure their existence and religious freedom. This peaceful legacy was preserved by the successors of the Prophet Muhammad.

This physical Jihād of the Prophet was justified as a means of preserving the Muslim's human rights: freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and the freedom to peacefully invite people to Islam. However, in the contemporary world, there is hardly a need for such a physical *Jihād* based on the same rationale as the Prophet Muhammad's in light of the inherent rights of the world's communities (including Muslims) to invite people to their respective ideologies). Another indispensable aspect with regard to the physical aspect of *Jihād*, which is as mentioned earlier of secondary importance as compared to the 'struggle to purify one's self', is according to the Qur'an and the Prophet's practice not due to the actual disbelief of some communities in *Allāh* but rather due to the oppression, injustice, destruction and corruption caused by those communities. According to Islam, belief and disbelief in *Allāh* is a personal choice and human beings will be accountable for their decision on the Day of Judgement.

It cannot be said that every ruler of a Muslim empire or state followed Quranic teaching and the Prophet Muhammad's practice. Some of the rulers neglected the trust from *Allāh* and did commit transgressions in matters of warfare and freedom of religion; these transgres-sions, however, were not sanctioned by Islamic teachings. This kind of ruler fought for secular gain or dynastic glory rather than for the sake of Allah or in order to bring freedom, justice, and peace to the world. It should also be noted that that bad rulers in the Muslim world tended to be more oppressive of their Muslim subjects than of non-Muslim subjects. Furthermore, if Muslims in a state of war cannot even kill trees and animals, how then can any Muslim justify the killing of innocent human beings? It is preserved in the Quran that 'one who kills a human being without right, it is as if he killed the whole humanity and the one who saves a human being, it is as if he saved the whole mankind' (Q 5: 32). Some non-Muslim writers have not properly understood the concept of "the Sword of Islam" and have associated it with war, violence, compulsion, and the like. As noted in the Quran and verified by Muslim practice throughout history, however, the sword of Islam is properly exemplified by teachings such as "Invite all to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching" (Q 16: 125) and "there is no compulsion in religion" (Q 2: 256). To illustrate this point, Muslims ruled India for about a thousand years, but when India was divided into two parts the Muslims only got one-fourth of the land. Along the same lines, Muslims ruled Spain for about eight hundred years, but how many Spaniards are Muslims today?

I would like to conclude by saying that increased dialogue between the Abrahamic religions is indispensable—particularly in the aftermath of the great human cost of 9/11 and the wars on Afghanistan and Iraq. If the Abrahamic religions can come to common terms among each other, they will also function as a catalyst for coming in common terms with the rest of the world religions. In contemporary terms, we do not need a "war against terror", but a "defense against terror, injustice, poverty, hunger and oppression". I would also like to emphasize that wars and violence are the preserve of the realm of international relations and that Islam in particular has become an scapegoat in order to justify non-religious quests, perhaps under the guise of a clash of civilizations.

Islam is peace and Islam brings peace, not war and violence. Islam is for this reason not for a 'clash of civilizations', but for a 'peace of civilizations'.

Thus would I like to thank you all for your attention and end my humble contribution with the words "*ma'a Salāma*", meaning "with Peace".

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Wars and Violence in the Holy Land – One Japanese Man's View of Jerusalem

National Museum of Ethnology Akira Usuki

Using a travelogue of a pilgrimage to Jerusalem written by a Japanese Christian as my point of departure, I would like to discuss the origins of the continuing violence in Jerusalem. I want to focus in particular on a traditional spring folk festival celebrated by the Muslims in Jerusalem called the Prophet Moses Feast, or Mawsim al-Nabi Musa in Arabic, which takes place in April, around the same time as the Christian Easter and the Jewish Passover.

The Christian I am going to talk about is the novelist Kenjiro Tokutomi (1868-1927), a.k.a. Roka Tokutomi, a representative writer of the Meiji Era (1868-1912). He is known for his bestselling Hototogisu (literally, Cuckoo) and Shizen to Jinsei (Nature and Life), and is also a graduate of Doshisha University. Iichiro, a.k.a. Soho Tokutomi, his elder brother by five years, is known for the nationalistic arguments he wrote as a journalist. This representative Meiji Era intellectual also studied at Doshisha. He was a member of Japan's first Christian group, the Kumamoto Band, from which Doshisha was born.

I realize that Roka's pilgrimages to the Holy City of Jerusalem are no longer a popular subject of discussion. Now seems an appropriate time, however, to take a fresh look at the breach between the Holy City of Jerusalem he admired and the reality, a city full of nastiness. Many Christians do not seem to look directly at the reality of Jerusalem, but rather see the city through the filter of their beliefs, and what they do perceive can lead them to interfere with the area's social and political affairs for purely religious motives-with potentially violent consequences in some cases.

Roka made two pilgrimages to the Holy City during his lifetime. The first, made when he was 38, following the Russo-Japanese War, lasted about three weeks, from May 23 to June 14, 1906. An additional motive for his first pilgrimage was a visit to the Russian literary giant Tolstoy on the return leg of his journey. The second one was made at the age of 51, just after World War I, in the course of a round-the-world trip with his wife Aiko. The journey took about ten weeks, from March 30 to June 17, 1919, and included a visit to Syria on the way. After a short stay in Palestine, he visited Jerusalem in April, at Easter time.

The travelogue for his first pilgrimage was published under the title *Junrei Kiko* (literally, Travelogue on a Pilgrimage), and while the second travelogue was entitled *Nippon kara Nippon e* (From Japan to Japan). Each of these can be found in the 20-volume collected works of Roka. The first travelogue is also available in paperback, making it one of the author's most accessible works, but the second is a long piece that takes up three volumes of the collected works. The odd title signifies his journey around the globe, meaning that he left Japan for a pilgrimage to the Holy City and returned to Japan via Europe and the U.S.A.

Both of Roka's visits to the Holy City were made at very interesting periods in Jerusalem's history. At the time of his first pilgrimage, the autocratic rule of the sultan Abdulhamit II (1842-1918, reigned 1876-1909) was coming to an end in the Ottoman Empire; it was just before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the sultan's abdication. When he made his second pilgrimage, Jerusalem was occupied by British forces. The Ottoman Empire, allied with Germany, had lost the great and terrible first World War of the early 20th century. It was a time of great confusion and transition, with a new order emerging both locally and internationally; a peace conference was being held at the Versailles Palace in Paris. The national systems of the Middle Eastern countries were established around that time.

Today, I would like to focus on Roka's second pilgrimage to the Holy City. One of my reasons is because it was made around the time Palestine was separated from Greater Syria following World War I, for the first time in its history, to become an independent administrative unit under the British Mandate for Palestine, setting the stage for repeated Palestinian Arab riots against U.K. control and later against immigration/colonization by Zionists and Jews. The current unresolved Palestinian issue and ongoing exchanges of violence date back to that time.

The other reason has to do with the fact that, during the same period, Japan was accepted as a permanent member of the post-World War I League of Nations and took its place among the world's great powers. That situation resembles the current position Japan finds itself in as it dispatches its Self-Defense Forces to Iraq. It is at a crossroads, about to detour from the course it has followed since the end of World War II.

Before leaving on his second pilgrimage to Palestine, Roka lost his father in 1914 and reconverted to Christianity. His reconversion, however, is somewhat controversial. In his highly acclaimed biography, Roka Tokutomi Kenjiro, the literary scholar Yoshio Nakano describes Roka's Christianity before his reconversion as a strong admiration for Jesus as a human being and a devout reading of the Bible, particularly the Gospels of the New Testament. All this is said to have changed with his reconversion, however. The writer suggests in the same book that Roka seemed to set out on a delusional and self-righteous path, creating his own, one-of-a-kind version of Christianity, for better or for worse. Nakano identifies unchecked self-righteousness and a denial of the cross as key characteristics of the novelist's religious practices. There are some critics, in fact, who question whether Roka's faith, with its marked disregard for the cross, can still be called Christianity.

On April 22, 1919, immediately after Easter, Roka, who was in Palestine at the time, sent open letters to Kinmochi Saionji and other plenipotentiaries, the participants in the Paris Peace Conference, as well as Lloyd George, prime minister of the U.K., Woodrow Wilson, president of the U.S.A., and even General Edmund Allenby, captain general of the British forces occupying Palestine. The letters were, of course, ignored by all except the U.S. president. In his letter to General Allenby, Roka gave the following as the reason for his visit to Jerusalem. The letter, written in Nazareth, is included, unmodified, in his book.

The stupendous war (World War l) is just over. And now, lo, we have come!

I know you are a good Christian. We too love, and entirely believe in, Jesus. Here at Nazareth where he led thirty years of earthly life–1900 years ago? Nay, but yesterday it seems to me!–musing on the condition of humankind, I have come to the conclusion that at this moment he must appear again to establish the kingdom of God in the world. Neither war, nor peace conference (note: Paris Peace Conference), nor anything, nor anyone could renew the earth. None but he (note: Jesus Christ) could reform the world.

Come he must, not in spirit, but in actual flesh. What were promised so distinctly in Bible shall be fulfilled, not in dim future but in the vivid present. We have had enough of the Cross. Of dead Jesus and dying Christ we have had enough, nay, more than enough. For nineteen centuries we professed to Christians and yet we did nothing but to crucify him over and over.

Are we to crucify him forever? No, General, the reign of the Cross must cease, for the reign of Cross must mean the reign of evil. Indeed, the devil had had too long a reign. Away with the Cross! No more of the bleeding Christ! Let death with its pain perish and Life with its joy shine in its glory. To Cross we must cling no more. Living Jesus, risen Christ–to him we must look up. Bloody war without parallel in the history of mankind is over. What a gigantic Cross! Down with the Cross!

Almost two thousand years have passed since his first appearance here. Is it not the time the world should learn to do better by this time?

Decidedly he must come, the Prince of Peace! New Era must begin.

Jerusalem is known to be commonly held as a holy place by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. For Jews, the city is the holy place of the Wailing Wall, the western wall of the Second Temple. For Christians, it is the location of the Holy Sepulcher Church where Jesus was crucified. For Muslims, it is the site of the holy Dome of Rock where the prophet Mohammed ascended to heaven after a night's journey, and the holy place called Al-Haram al-Sharif where the Al-Aqsa Mosque stands. Being a common holy place for three global monotheistic faiths gives Jerusalem a unique character. It is, however, doubtful that Roka, who was a Christian in his very Japanese way, understood this unique character of the holy city. Actually, he came to hate the old streets of Jerusalem, and became extremely prejudiced against Judaism and Islam.

For example, Roka gives this description of the Jewish district of Jerusalem in *Junrei Kiko:*

"I came to a marketplace in this Jewish town. There, I saw a hanging sheep, with flies swarming around its crotch. I saw an old man sitting cross-legged in front of his tiny, cave-like, gloomy store, sewing a leather sandal of deep red. I saw a dirty goat tied up in the middle of the street. Everything was filthy. While the scenery outside Jerusalem's city walls would take your breath away, a glance inside those walls would make you wish that the whole city would burn down." (Paperback edition, pages 61-62) Clearly, Roka appreciated the beautiful view outside the city walls, but was extremely disappointed to see the filth within them, even to the extent that he wished aloud that everything lying within the walls could be burned.

He also commented on Muslims in his other work.

"The religion that Mohammed created is a religion of enmity. Its principle is the spirit of conflict and indignation. Born 600 years later than Jesus, Mohammed inherited a rough Arabic temper, but could not inherit the right to his family's property because he was an illegitimate child. He cursed his fate, had a grudge against his father, and was jealous of his brothers. He acted on his dark feelings, which made him somewhat akin to Cain, Ishmael, and Esau. Islam is by no means a religion of peace. Mohammed fought his father and brothers, and left a legacy of violence that has persisted through the times of the prophet and of the crusaders, played out by a different cast of characters in each generation." (Collected works of Roka, Vol. 12, p. 249)

Roka's attack was fiercest on the Arabs living in Jerusalem.

"Everywhere I went, I heard Arab voices saying, '*Baksisi,* (Please give me something, sir)!' I had always felt that the people around holy places

tended to be unpleasant, and found those strolling around Jerusalem to be especially so. Yes, sacred places are known to attract a whole variety of people, but I was utterly appalled to find so many of Jerusalem's residents unashamed to be beggars, which made me feel disgusted with the city. They were eager to extort, swindle and cheat, always thinking about tricking a person out of his money. There were Turks, Jews, Syrians, and Arabs, and even green-eyed Caucasian priests with crosses hanging from their necks or prayer beads in their hands. Most of those people were potential thieves, swindlers, or belonged to other criminal elements." (Pages 406-407 from Memories of Palestine; Vol. 10 of the complete works of Shinsei (literally, Rebirth)) Roka's disgust increased, leading him to declare that he hated all the people in Jerusalem.

The biggest problem with his description is its one-sided view-the nearly naked prejudice against Jews and Muslims expressed above. However, it cannot be said that such a one-sided point of view was totally his fault. Rather, we should pay attention to the fact that, in his day, Japanese Christian intellectuals depended almost totally on foreign information imported via Western channels, which must have played some part in distorting the perceptions of such people. In Roka's case, it should also be noted that his Christian faith operated outside the church.

Apart from Roka's prejudice against Judaism and Islam, I would like to introduce another interesting description related to the Jerusalem issue. This is about a scene at the festival of the prophet Moses that I mentioned at the beginning. Roka wrote the following lines on April 11, 1919.

It was at 10 o'clock in the morning that I heard noises from the street outside while I was writing in my room. At once, my wife and I rushed to the balcony in the small guest room, which was the best place to see both inside and outside the Jaffa Gate (of the old street in the Jerusalem that is surrounded by city walls). When I looked down, I saw seven red and white flags with Arabic letters embroidered on them passing through the gate. There were musicians playing four drums, seven gongs, and one flat drum, beating and jangling to make cheery sounds. Following the merry instruments were hundreds of swarthy Arab men, each wearing a white hood with a different color headband and a coarse, leather-like cloth, marching as they sang and clapped their hands. Occasionally, several elders holding canes crouched in front of the marching fellows, raising their canes to try to stop the procession as if they wanted the men to slow down a bit. The Arab men ignored the elders, however, driving them out of their way, and pushed on. Large crowds of spectators were moving along with the bold procession, too–men and women walking at the front and rear of the parade to make it an even greater procession.

This bustling crowd reminded me of an Egyptian demonstration that I saw in Cairo. (Roka is referring to a large revolution-inspired demonstration he saw in 1919 in Egypt, where he stopped to obtain a visa for Palestine). Was this a demonstration, or a festival? People were singing, cheering, posing, and flapping to the slow-moving uproar that was about to pass beneath our balcony. Here, excited men among the crowd drew their swords, dancing and brandishing them as they passed by. In a couple of minutes, the crowd had paraded through the narrow market street and gone off toward the Mosque of Omar ----. This day was an Islamic holiday. People said the crowd would march in the courtyard of the temple and go to Jericho to pray at the grave of Moses. There were some disquieting rumors going around about their aggressive actions, so I advised my wife to refrain from going out. I thought the English forces would prevent any incidents, but I stopped her anyway.

Easter was coming soon, and Jewish people would celebrate the Passover during the same period. Knowing that, the Muslims had challenged their rivals to a religious struggle by starting their festival first." (Page 268 from Vol. 12 of the complete works of Shinsei)

The above describes a scene of the Prophet Moses Feast, Mawsim al-Nabi Musa in Arabic. The Prophet Moses Feast of 1919 lasted from April 11th (Friday) to 18th (Friday) before the Christian Easter, celebrated by the Muslims living in and around Jerusalem. Christian Easter that year fell on April 20th (Sunday), while the Jewish Passover began on the evening of April 14th.

The Prophet Moses Feast originated back in the days of Salah al-Din (Saladin), a Muslim hero who liberated Jerusalem from the oppression of the crusaders in the 12th century. Salah al-Din is said to have set the Muslim feast at the same time of the year as Easter while still allowing Christians to visit post-liberation Jerusalem to celebrate their festival. Actually, while Mt. Nebo on the other side of the River Jordan and now part of the Jordan nation is commonly believed to be the site of the prophet Moses' death, Muslim folklore in Jerusalem has it that the Prophet Moses Mausoleum on the road from Jerusalem to Jericho is the true site of his grave.

The Prophet Moses Feast has been a well-known spring festival for the Palestinians around Jerusalem since the 12th century. The host of this feast was the Husseiny family, one of the illustrious families of Jerusalem. Muslims coming together from the surrounding areas of Jerusalem attended a Friday service at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the old city and then marched a distance of 20 kilometers in a parade toward the Prophet Moses Mausoleum, which is located in the Jordan Valley, just before the town of Jericho. The Husseiny family led the way at the head of the parade. Others followed sporting Muslim Sufi or Wali flags representing their respective cities and tribes, beating loud drums, some dancing as well, while making their way to the Prophet Moses Mausoleum.

In any case, the year after Roka's visit, the Prophet Moses Feast was thrown into a mad panic. In 1920, Mawsim al-Nabi Musa, Pesach and Easter all fell in the first week of April, in the midst of a growing antipathy among Muslim Arabs toward England and Zionism. At that time, unfortunately, Jewish Zionists belonging to Betar (the political group upholding revisionist Zionism, forerunner of today's Likud), which is a radical right-wing youth organization dedicated to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, snuck into the festival parade in an attempt to grab one of the holy flags, and got into a petty quarrel. This event later developed into the first Arabian uprising in modern Palestinian history, which eventually spread throughout Palestine. Since then, Palestine has seen similar uprisings, repeated over and over until today.

In fact, that brush during the festival triggered the development of confrontations between Muslims and Jews into incessant long-term violence. The British-mandated government consequently introduced a ban on the annual festival in 1937, due to a deep fear that it could grow into an Arab revolt. Roka's question about the festival—"was this a demonstration or a festival?"— was in a sense to the point. I presume that the Arabs in Palestine were demonstrating their natural ethnic anger and resistance to the occupation by the British troops from the beginning.

The Prophet Moses Feast is a model case of a festival celebrating a folk belief that turns into an issue of political confrontation. Historically, however, the festival provided a precious opportunity every year not only for the residents of Jerusalem but also for all Palestinian Arabs, or for the Muslims, Christians and Sephardic Jews exiled from the Iberian Peninsula into settlements during the Reconquista, to realize that they all shared a common living space. In other words, the festival was also symbolic of the coexistence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in Jerusalem. However, Palestinian politicians (the Husseiny family as the festival hosts in this case) began to use the occasion for political purposes, turning it into an anti-Jewish mass "disturbance," with the result that the newly immigrated Zionist Jews were compelled to disrupt the festival in the name of self-defense. Thus a pattern of escalating violence was started by the festival itself.

Jerusalem was something of an asylum, i.e., it served as a shelter. At the time of Roka's visit, the most serious affair of the early 20th century was the Armenian massacre in the Ottoman Empire, from which many Armenians had fled to Jerusalem. Roka naturally referred to the Armenians in his writings, although he seemed to have very little idea about the details of the massacre.

The Prophet Moses Feast was banned by the British mandate in 1937. This was in the midst of the Arab uprising that started in April 1936, a campaign of armed resistance similar to today's intifada. The ban on the festival remained in effect even after East Jerusalem and the old city were annexed to Jordan following the first Middle East War and subsequently came under Israeli control following the third Middle East War of 1967.

Finally, there were signs of revival in 1987, but they did not bring results because of the outbreak of the intifada (Palestinian uprising) in Palestine. Yet the tide began to turn with the signing of the Oslo Accord on September 13, 1993, and I've heard that the Prophet Moses Feast finally resumed in 1997. The pilgrimage parade to the Prophet Moses Mausoleum, however, was banned in the spring of the following year, this time by the Israeli authorities, after the Al-Aqsa intifada broke out in September 2000, on the grounds that the Palestinian Authority might abuse the occasion of the festival for political purposes. With the Israeli invasion into the Palestinian autonomous region at the end of March 2001 following the September 11th attack in New York, the possibility of the procession being revived seems to have become extremely remote.

I have tried to raise two arguments in connection with this topic. The first is about the implications of the fact that a person of religious convictions like Roka often creates his own ideal mental image of Jerusalem, a holy site, and looks at it from the outside in light of that ideal. The second concerns how annual ritual events, past or contemporary, rooted in folk beliefs can be politicized to incite violence, as seen in the historical example mentioned above.

Usuki Akira (1956-) Professor at National Museum of Ethnology. He has published many books to specializing Islam and nationalism. His books, including *Globalizes Palestinian / Israel dispute,* Tokyo Iwanami, 2004. *Fundamentalism,* Tokyo Iwanami, 1999.

Comment·Discussion
-Session 1-

Faculty of American Study, Doshisha University
Barbara Zikmund

I am very honored to be asked to comment on the presentations this morning. The theme of war and violence and religion is very timely. My comments are based upon my own understanding of religion and my personal experience as a Protestant Christian. I wish to share some things about religion and then I will ask each speaker one question; perhaps they can answer sometime.

I teach courses about religion in America in the graduate school of American Studies here. According to Diana Eck, the leader of the Pluralism Project at Harvard University, by the end of the 20th century the United States had become the most diverse religious country in the world. It is a microcosm of the religious mix of the entire globe.

In the past several decades, American Christian traditions have been challenged and stretched by rising immigrant populations that are not Christian, especially since 1965. In the 1950s people sometimes described American religion with the phrase "Protestant, Catholic and Jew." But since 1965 that no longer is accurate. The great influx of Muslims into the United States is now causing scholars to speak of America as a predominantly monotheistic country made up of Jews, Christians and Muslims.

These are the "People of the Book," who follow the scriptural story that moves through Hebrew scriptures to the Christian New Testament and then to the Qu'ran. These three religions worship one God. They agree on many things. In fact, their monotheistic stance is so strong that Hindus and Buddhists, who are coming to America in increasing numbers from Asia, are constantly trying to figure out how to adapt their non-monotheistic religions to this American monotheistic tradition and environment.

When I teach religion I always try to begin with a definition: What is religion? What is a monotheistic religion? Today I want to ask, "Why do monotheistic religions resort to war and violence?" My simple definition of religion involves four things: First, there is some kind of integrated set of beliefs. Secondly, there is some way in which people are encouraged to live, a certain way of life, a lifestyle. Third, there is some cycle of ritual activities. Finally, fourth, there are specific social, even political, institutions that give meaning to people's lives.

Some religions focus more on beliefs than lifestyle or rituals or institutions; other religions argue that lifestyle and rituals are the most important; and still others want to be sure that social, political and legal systems embody their specific values. Monotheistic religions believe in one God, who is the only God and from the perspective of most monotheists, the best God. This God of the monotheistic Holy Scriptures prescribes certain ways to live and requires certain ritual activities. Furthermore, this God desires that human beings support religious institutions and organizations. Today we must add that they also advocate support for governments that strengthen beliefs and enable holy living.

When monotheistic people think that their beliefs are violated, or when their way of life changes too fast, or when they cannot carry out their traditional rituals, or when the social and political context in which they live (the institutions and organizations) are threatened or corrupted, they become unhappy. In their unhappiness, they sometimes resort to war and violence. This is what is happening in our world.

Professor Juergensmeyer points out that we are experiencing violence and war in our contemporary world because some factions within monotheistic religions, not all, but some factions believe that their religious institutions and organizations have been corrupted by an unacceptable form of globalization. They have lost, as he puts it, power and faith in secular nationalism. They are trying to reclaim identity and control through acts of violence.

This is a very interesting argument. It may be that there is a religious vision of moral order that drives religious terrorism. A vision that is even beyond the foreseeable future: our children's children's children. But I am wondering, in the face of contemporary violence, if he has any suggestions about how this cycle of violence, once it has started, can be overcome? The terrorism and the martyrdom it encourages have almost become an end in themselves. Chaos and wanton disruption have become goals, and the larger religious vision seems to be lost. Given this situation, I want to ask him if he has any suggestions about how the zeal for righteous violence can be redirected? How can angry people rediscover and reclaim the hope that originally generated that response? I do not know, but at times it seems that stopping violence is hopeless, and so I ask that question.

Professor Kuftaro rightly reminds us that many of the actors in war and violence are not religions, but political states. Yet monotheistic religions usually find their identity in their control of institutions and monotheistic

religions have assumptions about the best social order. All monotheistic religions have some type of social agenda. Today that social agenda is changing. Religious people need to find new ways to relate to society.

Since the end of the Cold War, international views of Islam have been distorted, and many thinkers predicted a clash between Islamic civilization and Western civilization. Zealots on all sides have used this thinking, this idea of "clash," to promote war and violence. Yet Professor Kuftaro also reminds us that there is nothing called "Holy War" in Islam. Within Islamic history, as in all monotheistic religions, there have been some people who distort the faith. They do not preserve the message correctly. The true message of Islam is one of peace.

I am the Chairperson of the Interfaith Relations Commission of the National Council of Churches in the United States. Our commission, a group of many different Christians, works with Jewish and Muslim leaders in America to promote dialogue and mutual understanding. There are some people who say that the whole future of religious tolerance and religious understanding and dialogue in the world depends upon the United States, because the United States is one of the few places in the world where monotheistic religions actually live together in relative harmony. There are still anti-Semitic hate crimes, and religious prejudice, but generally speaking monotheistic religions in the United States have a positive and different experience than they do in other parts of the world. I ask Professor Kuftaro: Do you think there is anything that monotheistic religions in the United States should do to promote religious peace, and if so what is it?

Professor Usuki took us back to the beginning of the 20th century when a Japanese Christian novelist visited the Holy Land. He notes that Roka Tokutomi developed his own set of beliefs about Jesus, about the Cross and about the way Jerusalem should be viewed. He did not, following the customs of many Christians in that time, treat Jews and Muslims with a great deal of respect; but he did not ignore their importance. As an outsider he saw a vision of salvation in Jerusalem itself, which others who were closer to its history missed. He was coming from the outside, and he saw things that were invisible to those on the inside.

Professor Usuki noted how a local grassroots festival rooted in Palestinian folk beliefs was adapted to provide Muslims with a special holiday around the same season as the Jewish Passover and the Christian Easter. Unfortunately, as he tells this story, the festival became a political issue and has been repeatedly banned by those trying to manage the Palestinian/Jewish conflict.

Until today I was not aware of this Japanese writer-traveler. I am wondering about the future of the "Prophet Moses Feast." I want to ask Professor Usuki if he thinks that this feast should be revived? What would be the advantages or the disadvantages if it was

revived? Would it further mutual understanding and perhaps develop a greater balance between the three monotheistic religions in Jerusalem, Palestine, Israel?

In closing let me say that we have only begun to look at the question of war and violence in monotheistic religion. We will continue these conversations in the workshops this afternoon and tomorrow. All of the monotheistic religions set forth beliefs that contain a vision of God's peace. All of them seek the harmony of the human race created by one God. All of them take the social systems of the world seriously, maybe too seriously. As we move forward with our conversations I know that it is tempting to look at other religions, that is the religions we do not belong to, and say that they, not us, have not been as faithful to the traditions of peace as our religion.

But the fact is that all monotheistic religions have stumbled, have made mistakes, and have not always been true to their beliefs. At various times in their histories, each monotheistic religion has justified and called for violence in the name of God, calling violence God's will. They all worship the same God, but they claim one view is the best (their view). In these conversations, as with all interfaith conversations, I want to say in closing that it is important for all of us to remember that none of us is God. We make human claims, but in the end we need to recognize human limitations. Thank you very much.

Faculty of Humanities,
Department of Religion, Tenri University
Yoshitsugu Sawai

The theme of this international symposium is extremely important for the world today, and I feel very honored to be allowed to comment on these lectures.

First, Professor Juergensmeyer says that religious terrorists target secular states, and that in all religions, not just in Islam, it is secular states that are attacked by terrorists. Professor Juergensmeyer calls religious terrorism, in which violence is given meaning by religion, "cosmic war" and explains religious violence within a framework of an absolute dichotomy between good and evil. Professor Juergensmeyer's further analysis is that those engaged in religious terrorism tend to abhor Western-style modernity.

Starting from these points, I would like to ask some questions of Professor Juergensmeyer. While it is probably possible to say that almost all religions can, theoretically, with regard to their doctrine, take sides with either violence and non-violence, India's Gandhi stuck completely to nonviolence. It seems that his path of nonviolence can open the way to the harmonious coexistence of different religions in the future. Professor Juergensmeyer is a specialist in Gandhi's philosophy and has published Gandhi's Way. As a religious studies scholar myself, I

am also particularly interested in Gandhi's life and thoughts, among India's religious thinkers.

The opposite of the word "violence" is "nonviolence." It is said that the word "nonviolence" made its way into the English dictionary because of Gandhi's nonviolent movement. E. H. Erikson, a world-renowned psychoanalyst, wrote Gandhi's Truth in 1969. This book has also been translated into Japanese; perhaps there are many people in the audience who have read or heard of it. In this book, Erikson calls Gandhi's nonviolence "militant nonviolence." The juxtaposition of these two words immediately highlights a contradiction since the word "militant" would more naturally be associated with the word "violence." But with this unusual wording, Erikson tried to emphasize that nonviolence has had such major societal significance that it deserves to be called militant, just as in the way Gandhi led India to independence through nonviolence. Gandhi showed through his own actions that nonviolence can be more militant than violence.

Now, turning our eyes to the current situation in the world, we see an unstable Afghanistan and an Iraq still at war, as already discussed briefly. In such conditions, I believe that we must really grasp the idea of nonviolence according to Gandhi, its true meaning. I think that the human race has entered the 21st century to seriously contemplate on the meaning of nonviolence. So I would like to ask Professor Juergensmeyer's opinion on nonviolence, the idea that it is more militant than violence and its power to move people's hearts.

Professor Kuftaro has shared so much with us, from an insider's viewpoint, that is, from a Muslim's viewpoint. In particular, Professor Kuftaro's presentation has allowed us to better understand the difference between "jihād" and "Holy War" and the etymological meaning of "jihād," which originally means "endeavor" or "struggle." Professor Kuftaro's talk has also provoked in me a question as to whether "jihād" and "Holy War" are clearly distinguished in today's societal and cultural context. I think that what these two words mean overlaps considerably.

The mass media generally translates "jihād" into English as "Holy War." Professor Kuftaro says this is not appropriate. Then, if we need to translate it into English, what would be the most appropriate translation? After all, in English, I think, the meaning of "jihād" overlaps with that of "Holy War." That is, although it is possible to theoretically distinguish the two notions, they still overlap in reality. I would like to have Professor Kuftaro's views on this point.

Professor Usuki has presented an excellent analysis, based on the records of pilgrimages to Jerusalem by Roka Tokutomi, a Japanese Christian, of how an annual spring festival there (Prophet Moses Feast) was the origin of violence which gradually developed into a political conflict. Jerusalem is an extremely precious sacred

place in Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Those who embrace these three religions have shared everyday life in this same place for a long time. Professor Usuki's analysis is that Jerusalem as the Holy Land symbolizes the coexistence of different religions. Referring to the records of Roka Tokutomi's second pilgrimage to the Holy Land, in particular, Professor Usuki has shown an archetypal process by which violence penetrates festivity, bringing about inter-faith confrontation; that is, an analytical explanation of the origin of violence. Then, what about Toutomi's first pilgrimage to Jerusalem? Does he describe the coexistence of the three religions in the records of his first pilgrimage? In other words, did he perceive then that the three religions were existing peacefully, side by side? I would appreciate it if Professor Usuki could clarify on this point.

The modern philosophy of the Enlightenment has secularized religion and has given rise to the tendency of explaining everything rationally and logically. In such a secularized world, religiously motivated terrorism may be, in a way, viewed as a spiritual or religious struggle against secularization. Professor Juergensmeyer has explained the position of religious terrorists in the framework of "cosmic war." In religious terrorism, in the confrontation between good and evil, a process which involves violence, good must overcome the evil and turn everything in this world into good.

When we deepen our understanding of religiously motivated terrorism in today's world and of the world-views embraced by those who are called extremists, I feel that it is, in a way, an opportunity to deepen our understanding about what we essentially are like, that is, how "religious" we human beings are. What I mean to say is that religious terrorism shows in a negative way how much "something religious" is needed in the world today. In today's world, each one of us, not just religious studies scholars but everyone, believers and non-believers alike, all of us are called to gain a deeper understanding of the significance or value of religion itself.

These are my rather simple comments on the very interesting lectures by the three speakers. Thank you very much for your attention.

Discussion

(Chair) Now following the two commentators' remarks, I would like to ask the three speakers to respond to the comments: Professor Juergensmeyer, Professor Kuftaro and Professor Usuki, in this order, please.

(Juergensmeyer) Thank you. I want to thank the two commentators very much for their excellent comments and their very good questions.

First of all, about monotheistic religions: I am not sure that monotheistic religions have a monopoly on violence or images of war. I have spent many years in India, and in Hinduism if you look at the calendar art of Indian religion and Hinduism, it is full of bloodshed: the great wars, the Mahabharata, the Ramayana, the great battles between good and evil. You get the feeling that war and bloodshed is as Hindu as apple pie, as we might say in the United States. It is very much a part of the Hindu tradition, which is one reason why Gandhi was really rather a surprise in evoking a different aspect of the tradition.

This is also true in Theravada Buddhism. In the Mahavamsa, the chronicles of Sri Lanka, there are the great wars between the Tamil and the Sinhalese Buddhist kingdoms. This is less the case in Mahayana Buddhism, and that is for complicated reasons because in China and Japan, Buddhism is one strand of a complicated religious pattern in which the authority of the religious aspect of the State's authority is buttressed by other forms of religion than Buddhism, and so Buddhism can safely become peaceful in a Chinese and Japanese context. But that is not true of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, nor in Tibet for that matter.

Monotheistic religion may have a greater tendency toward authoritarianism, and we can discuss that as a possibility, but I do not think it has a monopoly on violence as the Hindu and Sikh violence has shown, as the terrorism in Sri Lanka and violence associated with Tibetan Buddhism, and even a form of Buddhism in Japan has also shown. Now the profound question about how to respond to violence, what can we do? Let me tell you a story.

My story is about a playground, a playground where children are fighting in the school, let us say, the United Nations school. And one little boy is bigger than all of the other little boys in the playground. Let us call him George. Now George, not only is he bigger, but he wants all the other little boys to play the games according to his rules. He wants to keep all the sticks and stones in his own hands, because he thinks if he has them all he can have order in the playground. But a lot of the other little boys are very jealous of George. So one day another little boy comes up, and let us call him Osama. And this little boy hits George over the head, and he says "George, you are mean, you are a bully, you do not play fair, and you are evil."

Now what can George do? There are a lot of different responses. One is he can say, "The hell I am," and he can take his sticks and stones and bash Osama over the head and beat him down to the ground. And as soon as he does that he can look around and see another little boy, a friend of Osama's, let us call him Muammar, and hit him over the head. And while he is looking around he sees another little boy, let us call him Saddam, who has no relationship to Osama, but George is thinking

Saddam may want to try to hit me over the head sometime, so maybe this is a good time to hit him. So he grabs him and he wrestles him down to the ground and beats him to a pulp with all of his sticks and his stones.

So I ask you, is this a good way to bring peace to the playground? What about all the other little boys, are they not watching and saying, "Maybe Osama was right; maybe he is a big bully after all."

Now I am not suggesting that George should not do anything. That would be a foolish thing to do; after all, it is very bad to be hit over the head. But would it not be a good idea if George reported little Osama to the authorities and said, "Like everybody else on the playground, you have to abide by the rules, and you have to go to the authorities."

And then maybe at the same time he also looked around at the other little kids and said, "If others of you think that I have been a bully and I have not played fair, I am sorry and I am going to try and be better and maybe we can play some of the games according to your rules some of the time as well."

And maybe that might be a better way to bring peace to the playground. So what I am saying is that Gandhi does have a response to this situation of violence. What I have always liked about Gandhi is not that he was idealistic; I thought he was very realistic, and very practical.

What I have discovered in an attempt to look at responses to religious terrorism, to terrorism in different forms, that is a solution that relies solely on violence has never worked; empirically, it has never worked. There has never been a case that I can find when violence solely has been a solution. In some cases in combination with attempts to appease the general concerns of the supporters of violent groups militant actions have been effective, but especially where the supporters are large and various and multinational, the only solution has been one that has tried to deal with the general problems that have given rise to violence in the first place and to seek some sort of negotiated settlement, as in the case of Northern Ireland, for example.

A remarkable example of where a pattern of terrorism that has existed almost for a century has been brought to some kind of uneasy resolution through negotiation and an attempt to try to bring a mutuality of respect to both sides, which I think ultimately, is the only solution to the response to violence of any sort, including religious violence.

(Kuftaro) I appreciate the complementary nature of these two commentators. I would like to begin by answering Dr. Zikmund's question. It's because in the West there is this philosophy of "ladies first." In Islam, or at least what is said about it in the West, a woman is worth half of a man. But what I would like to propose is that women are in fact everything to society. Because while a woman may be half of a man, or alternatively

half of society itself, women are the ones who originally raise these men who make up the other half. That's why I say that women are everything to society. I am grateful for what Dr. Zikmund showed us through her valuable question, and I am very heartened by her association with the National Council of Churches in the United States. Two years ago, the Chair of that Council visited us in Damascus, and we were able to undertake a warm and constructive dialogue with him at that time. I pray for the continuation of this dialogue, which will bring a greater depth to our two civilizations.

Dr. Zikmund's important question brings up the issue of what it is necessary for monotheistic religions in the United States to do in order to facilitate peace. Let's say that that is for our three countries to increase our understanding of each other, no matter where we are—be that the United States, Japan or the Middle East. As a first step towards this, religious leaders may sometimes engage in dialogues regarding their own problems. That is to say that all religious leaders must endeavor to understand the essence and dignity of their own religions. And they must understand that each of these three Abrahamic monotheistic religions is, in essence, appealing for peace, fellowship and mediation. Therefore, if the followers of any of these three religions can understand their truth as a first step, then we are one-third of the way to understanding. The remaining two-thirds is up to dialogue. This dialogue is not just for religious leaders, but also for the followers of the Abrahamic religions.

We must put an end to things such as the use of force, extremism and the rejection of outsiders, because we live in the 21st century and with the advent of modern means of communication, we have become a family called a global village. We were meant to live in a convivial atmosphere where everybody knows each other.

Also, it is said that people are the enemy of that which they don't know. Accordingly, if I get to know my friends the Christians, my friends the Jews, and those who are far separated from these religions, then I will realize what I need to do in order to build this global village society.

At this point, I would like to shift the religious dialogue from the top to the base [base: al-qaa'idah]. However, this is not Bin Laden's al Qa'eda [al-qaa'idah], but an organization for young men and women [al-qaa'idah]. I am currently building an organization in Syria where Syrian Muslims, Christians and Jews come together to discuss their cultures. It is my hope that these leaders can work to communicate to other believers and supporters the unity of these religions in their principles and foundations, to make God's message a reality on earth, and to understand the messages of our teachers, the great prophets.

Dr. Sawai's question, which called for further explanation in regard to Islam, is a terribly important one in this age where Islam is sometimes accused of being a religion of extremism and terror. However, in the short time available in this meeting, I must attempt to explain Islam in only a few words. In three words, Islam is about faith, knowledge and work. Many chapters in the Qur'an are associated with faith and knowledge, and others with faith and work. For example, at the beginning of many verses in the Qur'an is the phrase "Those who believe, and do deeds of righteousness" [Chapter 2 (The Heifer) verse 277, etc]. However, the "deeds of righteousness" referred to here are not ibadat (a rule of conduct in Islam), but rather any action which is beneficial to humanity. Therefore, the last words of the Prophet of Islam were the ones which he constantly spoke, namely: "When the Day of Judgment comes, if one of you has in his hands the young branch of a hemp palm, or a piece of its bark, make him plant it." This teaching instructs the reader to keep working, planting trees, farming, and so on, even on the final Judgment Day.

In the same way, Islam is also a religion of knowledge. The holy Qur'an tells of when the one God first revealed his words to the Prophet of Islam, when He was alone with God in a cave. The first word he received, along with His realization that He was the Prophet of Islam, was "Read!" Chapter 96 (The Clot), verse 1. However, he was illiterate, and was therefore unable to read or write. This is an important message for all Muslims—to seek knowledge. As a result, in Islam these words are quoted as those of the Prophet: "Seek knowledge, even unto China." Yet is there religious knowledge of Islamic teachings in China? No. So what is being said here is that Muslims, no matter where they find themselves in the world, should seek out current knowledge.

Similarly, Dr. Sawai enquired about the concept of jihād, but of course the Islamic idea of jihād has been misunderstood throughout the world, and particularly in the West. There are three kinds of jihād which occur in Islam: the greatest jihād, the great jihād, and the lesser jihād. Many Westerners have focused on the notion that jihād is a war declared against non-Muslims. This is a misinterpretation of the concept of Islamic jihād. The greatest jihād is the one against the mind and pleasure, a jihād against all of the desires of the mind, the evils which stir up my mind and thoughts—whether they be something which hurts me personally, something which hurts others, or something for which I attack others. For that reason, when the Prophet of Islam returned from the many wars to protect the Muslims of Medina, he said, "We have returned here for the jihād against the mind and desires, from the lesser to the greatest jihād."

Between these two is the great jihād. Our Lord spoke the following as a commandment to the Prophet of Islam in the holy Qur'an: "Doing so, we explained this to many, nonetheless." [Chapter 25 (The Revelation) Verse 52] This is a command to discuss those things fully with them, using the Qur'an, and those teachings of the

Qur'an which call for friendship, solidarity and dialogue.

Please don't misunderstand me. Just as you enjoy dialogue, we are also a people who enjoy discussion. We love our way of life, just as you do yours. And, as a rule, Islam and Muslims do not approve of what is going on in the land of Palestine. There, Arabs and Muslims who are protecting their own government, and through this tyranny, are driven to suicide. However, this action is not a pillar of their religion.

Jihād, when we go into the meaning of the lesser Jihād, has a short interpretation, and is the defense of soil and spirit. Why is it that we gave freedom to the French Resistance against Nazi occupation, but we cannot give it to those Arabs and Muslims who are protecting their own land and their very selves? What if the mistaken Western understanding of jihād, which we want to correct, were to be used? We have concluded that they are sympathizers with violence, radicals, and the supporters of a political dictatorship, but as my friend previously remarked, the people in those three positions do not understand the reality of their own religions.

I want to tell you another story as an example, so that you can understand my explanation more easily. In a nutshell, they [the Palestinians] go to mosques (the religious world) or political resolution (the political world) in the same manner that I would play a sport. (That is, they straddle the two fields.) It isn't as if Sharon actually represents Judaism, nor does Bush represent the teachings of the Messiah–fellowship, compassion, forgiveness and peace. Likewise, we stress that Bin Laden in no way represents Islam. His ideology is extreme, but as I have already commented, that extremism exists within Islam, Christianity, and also Judaism.

Now, though, we must give strong support to those who hold intermediate and moderate philosophies. The support that we give should be the type that allows these people to stand on a world stage, allowing them to appear on television in order to explain that Islam is a religion of compassion.

Islam can be explained by two phrases. The first is the words of our Lord to the Prophet of Islam, in the holy Qur'an, "We sent thee not, but as an act of Mercy for all creatures." [Chapter 21 (The Prophets) verse 107]. God did not say that he sent the Prophet to the world as a punishment or in order to fight, nor did he say that he sent Him out of a spirit of compassion for the people of Islam. He says, "We sent thee not, but as an act of Mercy for all creatures."

The second is the words of the Prophet of Islam, "I was sent to complete the glorious creation." Hence, he was not sent for war, nor for jihād or crusades. He was sent out of a spirit of mercy for all mankind, in order to teach the glorious creation. And that glorious creation, found within the monotheistic religions, is a common factor not only of the monotheistic religions, but in all the world's religions, and also in all human beings.

Therefore, regardless of religion, I speak to you as friends by virtue of our humanity. The Prophet of Islam expressed it in the following words: "Man is the friend of man. Love and hate." Thank you for listening.

(Usuki) Thank you, Professor Zikmund and Professor Sawai. As Professor Kuftaro has just pointed out, just as we must ask ourselves to what extent Sharon represents Judaism and to what extent Bush represents Christianity, we must pose the question to what extent Roka Tokutomi represents the Japanese or Japanese Christians. Professor Zikmund has made an important remark and posed a very difficult question about the possibility of the revival of Moses' feast and what such a revival could mean to the coexistence of the religions.

When we examine these questions and the current situation as a whole, we must keep in mind the actual local situation in which the large majority of the Palestinians have become refugees. It would be better if this question concerning devotion to saints were taken up by someone like Professor Tonaga of Kyoto University, but I should just say that in those days devotion to saints was not recognizable to Roka Tokutomi. It was an event imperceptible to his Christian sensibility. Yet, I think it is important to note that there have been such grassroots festivals, such as Nabi Saleh, one of the largest in which the faithful pay a visit to the tomb of a saint called Ziyara, and another feast called Nabi Rubin. This is a phenomenon typical of Palestine as the Holy Land in that Jewish and Christian heritages described in the Bible have been adopted in Islam and that inter-faith sharing has existed on the grassroots level. Of course, placing too much emphasis on this point may also complicate the matter. Today we have many Muslim attendants among us; perhaps the subject of devotion to saints can be taken up later.

I think I have answered Professor Sawai's questions with what I have just said. Roka Tokutomi's earlier writings around the time immediately after the Russo-Japanese War show a Christian viewpoint. The question is not whether this is good or bad, but whether he was different from many other Japanese Christians who later visited Jerusalem. In a word, most of them did not really see the local situation; they made a tour on the Holy Land, and that was it. No questions were asked. How should we view this? In reading works by present-day Japanese Christians, for example Shikai-no Hotori (By the Dead Sea) by Shusaku Endo, a contemporary Catholic novelist, one notices that local Muslims, Christians and Jews are merely part of the scenery. Isn't this a grave matter? I have taken up Roka Tokutomi today for this reason as well, to question this blindness to reality. Earlier, Professor Mori mentioned the possibility of the Japanese playing some kind of intermediary role and asked what kind of intermediary the Japanese could be. I think there is still a serious prob-

lem to overcome first. We, the Japanese, who cannot even see the local situation clearly, how can we be an intermediary at all? I think that our first task is to have a vision that would allow us to see clearly what is really happening over there. I should close my remarks with this slight digression.

(Chair) Thank you. We have received many questions from the floor for our speakers. We have even received some rather sophisticated questions, but I am afraid that taking up highly specialized questions would take a little too long. So I would like to choose questions of more basic nature which are likely to interest many people, and ask them to our three speakers.

Studying the questions received from the floor, I have noticed some common interests. One concerns language. In today's lectures, for example, we have often heard the word "violence"; we have taken notice of various definitions and interpretations of the word "jihād." Since Professor Kuftaro has explained the word "jihād," I would like to reciprocate by briefly explaining the present situation in Japan concerning this word. In Japan, the word "jihād" is often used in newspapers and the like, transliterated in Japanese as "jihâdo" followed by "seisen" in parentheses, which means "holy war"—I think we have many journalists in the audience today—and Professor Kuftaro has pointed to us that "jihād equals holy war" is wrong. It is an extremely important point. Professor Sawai has also touched on this. We have received many questions asking whether jihād is really NOT holy war at all.

Similarly, with regard to violence, some questions have been addressed to Professor Juergensmeyer about how violence should be defined. I would like to select a few questions to ask to each of the speakers.

First of all, for Professor Juergensmeyer, I will put two questions together. Professor Juergensmeyer has mentioned his talk today and also says in his book, Terror in the Mind of God, that political and economic stability are necessary to remove disputes and violence from today's international community; so, the question is: Isn't it extremely difficult to achieve a dialogue when each religion has its notion of "cosmic war"?

Another question is why, among the numerous buildings in the United States, the World Trade Center was attacked by Islamic extremists; what was the significance of that?

Next, as I mentioned earlier, many people have asked Professor Kuftaro if "jihād" doesn't overlap considerably with "holy war" after all; this is the first question. One wonders if it is exaggeration to say that there is no holy war in Islam. Professor Kuftaro has said in the lecture that religion is merely being used by the state; then, is it possible to say, some wonder, that disputes and conflicts, including September 11th, have nothing to do with religion?

Also, I have another question to which I would like an answer, if possible. Many people have pointed to issues concerning women and peace in Islam, which were not covered directly in the lecture, in connection with Islam being a religion of peace. How are the issues of women and peace treated in Islam? As a specific example, some would like to know Professor Kuftaro's view on the recent heated controversy in France about the treatment of Muslim girls wearing headscarves in public schools, in which President Chirac expressed his intention to ban headscarves in public schools.

For Professor Usuki, we have many questions regarding some details about Roka Tokutomi, but I will take up only one of them. Roka Tokutomi seems to have developed an extremely narrow worldview; was there some major factor that led him to extreme self-righteousness or self-absolutism?

Another question goes beyond the Middle East issue and touches on the overseas dispatch of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, which Professor Usuki mentioned in his lecture. My question is this: Japan somehow seems to have ended up showing its approval of violence on the part of the United States by supporting the US government; in such a situation, what is most important, in your opinion, Professor Usuki, for Japan in its future interactions with Iraq and the rest of the Middle East?

As our time is limited, I would appreciate it very much if our speakers could briefly respond to these questions. First, Professor Juergensmeyer, please.

(Juergensmeyer) Yes, thank you; excellent questions all of them. With regard to the World Trade Center as a target, if the point of the attack was to find a symbolic statement of the power of the United States in the global economy, what better example than the World Trade Center, which was after all the "World" Trade Center.

People from over 80 countries worked in that building, so it was a tragedy experienced not only by Americans but by people throughout the world. But if you are going to select targets to show America's economic and military dominance over the rest of the world, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which were the two targets on September 11th, 2001 could not have been better symbolic targets.

I think that in general the actions of religious activists have had this extraordinarily important symbolic power; that is, making a statement. These are actions meant not just for their military purpose, but these are actions meant for television. And not just for American television, and not just for CNN, but I think for al-Jazeera television, to be seen throughout the Muslim world to show that someone can stand up in the playground against the big bully.

Now as to the question about religion's role within a global society, here is a topic that I hope we continue to pursue in the next couple days: not only religion as a problem, the way in which religious images have been interwoven through acts of violence and aggression in the contemporary world, but also the way in which religion can become a solution for some of those problems, or some of that violence.

One way would be to take the power of images, like the images of cosmic war and as Rene Girard has suggested, the scholar of literature who has used the theories of Freud to look at the way in which ritual can become a very powerful means of alleviating violence by symbolically expressing it, maybe cosmic war, that genie needs to be put back into the bottle. It needs to be put back into the power of religious language and literature.

So in a curious kind of way, the problem of religious violence may be solved in part not by more violence, but by more religion: by allowing the religious life to flourish in a public setting where these symbols can be seen as powerful religious symbols and not be identified with this-worldly actors. That means that I think and this is something I am sure we will explore in the next couple days that in the emerging global civil society, spiritual values and moral truths do have a role, and religion does have a role to play, but not in an exclusive sense.

In some ways the problem of religion in a multicultural world is like the problem of language. Here we are conversing in English and in Japanese and in Arabic, and thank goodness for the wonderful skills of those people back there in the booths who are helping us understand each other, and discovering that even though we are using different languages, we are saying things that are meaningful to all of us. I think in the same way we need translators among religion, to show that the spiritual values and the moral truths are throughout the differences of religion fundamentally the same.

(Kuftaro) In relation to the problem of confusion between jihād and holy war, wouldn't the events of 9/11 be considered a jihād against others? In speaking of holy wars, even though in our own Arab-Islamic history that (holy war) refers to the Crusades, open-minded Christianity takes no responsibility for that war. It was purely a war with the aim of colonization, based on the flimsy pretext that Christians were being persecuted in those countries. Armies led in the name of the Cross, the name of holy war, and the name of Christianity were sent "to liberate the persecuted Christians" in our countries. We cannot accept this interpretation of our history. I want to emphasize that the Crusades was a war of colonization.

In regard to the problem of jihād and the events of 9/11, it should be said that Bin Laden is an ideological extremist. In view of that, whether it was he who was, in fact, its mastermind, whom we condemn and consider guilty, or whether it was someone else, I say that we carry no responsibility for these actions. Islam is a com-passionate, fair and just religion, and in regard to Bin Laden being clearly named as a representative of Islam. This deception has been hoisted as a slogan by certain Westerners, in order to damage our religion, faith and identity. Islam holds no responsibility for his actions, nor do Muslims.

At the time of that reprehensible crime, which you also censure, many official and unofficial that is, religious official and unofficial condemnations were issued. However, we are always talking about Bin Laden, al Qa'eda, terrorism and jihād. We have appealed for investigation into the reasons that led to Bin Laden and people like him to commit this sort of deplorable crime. Within them lies a serious threat that shocked the whole world: that of extremism.

Extremism is a dangerous sickness, and this problem (sickness) cannot be cured by putting those affected with it to death. If we were to kill them as a means of dealing with the sickness, others just like them will most likely come up with even more violent schemes. Therefore, I would like to see a statement issued across the board by educated people from all levels of society, the media, religious leaders and politicians. I want politicians to accept that the solution for this problem is not to kill sick people, but to cure the sickness.

The issue of hijab is a small one, but in France it has been exaggerated to the extent of becoming a secular war concerning religion. Why should Mr. Chirac be so upset by this hijab which Muslim women wear over their heads? I say that when a Muslim woman covers her head with that hijab, she is following the example of Holy Mother Mary, the mother of Christ. Is there anyone who knows the color of the hair of Christ's mother, Our Lady? Wouldn't she have been wearing the hijab? Let's get off this side-track. Do Muslim women, by covering their heads with the *hijab*, cause any injury to secularists? The hijab is not an Islamic symbol. If we think that way, then the *Kippa* is not a Jewish symbol, nor is the cross a symbol of Christians.

To Muslim women, the hijab is determined by Islamic law. They are making a choice to wear it, not doing it against their will. The Qur'an states: "Let there be no compulsion in religion." [Chapter 2 (The Heifer) Verse 257] So how can we compel a woman to wear the hijab over her head? She chooses whether or not to wear it. In our society, 40% of women wear the hijab, and 60% do not. No Muslim can wave a stick at a woman not wearing the hijab and order her to put one on. This is a part of God's law originating from the Sunna (customs) of the holy Qur'an and the Prophet, and as a consequence, Muslim women are making a choice.

Some progressive thinkers and reformers feel that this problem is an ancillary one, and is not a fundamental of the religion. Regardless of the fact that it does not damage French secularism, and moreover, is a way for us to show deep respect, as well as being considered as

a part of freedom of speech, freedom of belief, and freedom of thought—the single piece of fabric which Muslim women wear on their heads does not affect any of these—this problem is a delicate one. However, it is a choice for Muslim women to make. Accordingly we cannot make this into a domestic issue, because God's law applies, regardless of location, be that under the sea or on the moon. If this is a domestic matter, concerning only France, and as such non-French people have no right to intervene, then I would like to put forward that this is God's law, for which we must show respect, and is something which we need to give careful consideration. Thank you very much for listening.

(Usuki) I think the questions addressed to me are about the reasons for Roka Tokutomi's self-righteousness and how Japan can deal with Iraq and the Middle East in connection with the presence of Japan's Self-Defense Forces in the region.

As for the first question, I am not a Roka Tokutomi scholar, and unfortunately I must say that I can give no accurate answer. However, one thing I can say, which is also related to the issue of the Self-Defense Forces, is that Roka Tokutomi was, despite his gradual transformation as a Christian, a product of the Meiji era after all. In other words, he was very explicitly conscious of being Japanese. This is similar to what today's Japanese often find in the Meiji-era Japanese, some sort of healthy nationalism, if I may put it this way. Now, with regard to the ongoing dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces, we can say that there is almost no reason for this other than that of being allies with the United States. The Self-Defense Forces have arrived in Samawa, a place the Japanese people had never heard before. In fact, few Arabs even know where it is. Still, in Japan, almost everyday we see TV images of the Self-Defenses Forces there, and why they are there is explained only after the fact. I think that this symptomatic approach with no consistent underlying philosophy is quite typical of Japan's attitude toward the Middle East. The official reason for sending the Japanese Forces is to support Iraq's reconstruction, and the action has been accomplished in form, without taking into consideration Iraq's real needs in reconstruction. This situation reminds me of similar steps taken in the past before which led to grave errors, and it is enough to provoke a sense of crisis.

Coming back to Roka Tokutomi in this context, as a Japanese, he was overtly ignored in his time, but he deserves to be appreciated for his assertiveness in that he bravely maintained his position in the face of the US President and the British Prime Minister of at the time and even of Allenby. In view of this, what is deplorable about today's Japan is the lack of deep-rooted, consistent vision or philosophy. I am not a nationalist, but I find it quite shameful for the Japanese that our government has made important decisions while still being quite ignorant of the Middle East situation.

(Chair) In closing, I would like to ask the three speakers to give short messages to the Japanese audience. If each of you could do it in about one minute, would you start in the same order, from Professor Juergensmeyer, please.

(Juergensmeyer) Just following what I last said that it seems to me that the problem of religious violence in the world is not a problem of religion, but rather a religious critique or response to profound social and political occurrences throughout the world.

We should be concerned about religion because it makes these situations in some ways more problematic; that is, it does increase the absolutism and encourage the violence. But it also, as I said in my previous remarks, provides the possibilities of a solution, as we see that the moral virtues and the spiritual depth of religious traditions can bring something to global civil society that may be a part of the harmony and the non-violence of its future.

(Kuftaro) I would like to say a few words to our Japanese audience in closing. We love you and greatly value the large role you are playing in establishing peace in Middle Eastern regions. However, your suffering is also our suffering. You underwent horrific experiences due to the atomic bombs which were dropped over Nagasaki and Hiroshima, but we are also suffering in the same way today in the Middle East, in a bloody struggle between truth and injustice. With you standing by our side, we must advocate for truth through international law and the application of its decisions. We must have others understand the original texts and principal sources of Islam. The reason for this is that humans in their essence are the enemies of that of which they are ignorant. If any of you would like to know or learn more about Islam, we can be reached at [Admin@kuftaro.org]. I hope that you will talk with us regularly. Thank you very much.

(Usuki) I may end up saying something redundant, but I should just say that I hope through today's lectures and discussion, the audience has gained a much clearer understanding of what is happening in the world and what is really important. I myself feel that we Japanese owe it to ourselves to make an effort to understand the Middle East and Islam, the so-called Semitic world, the world of Abraham's religions, from an insider's viewpoint. In this sense, welcoming a speaker directly from that part of the world and listening to him speak in Arabic has been for us a rare and very valuable occasion. Thank you.

(Chair) Thank you very much. This concludes today's symposium. Thank you again.

Feb. 20(Fri.)
Workshop: Session 2

War/Violence and Islam

What does it mean to "Deny war and violence"? Frameworks of Islamic Discourse

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1 Introduction

The concept of "incommensurability" appears in the history of science, but this term can also be applied to dialogue, mutual understanding, and comparisons of different religions and cultures. The concept of "war and violence," or, tracing even further back to the meanings carried by terms such as "to deny," "to agree," "to oppose," "good," and "evil," differ significantly in the context of discourses on each religion or culture. The goal of this presentation is to promote greater awareness of the differences between the frameworks of discourses in different cultures and religions, and at the same time to clarify how war and violence are symbolized within standard Islamic discourse.

2 What meanings can the term "to deny" have?

Meaning of the question "what is denial" differs fundamentally depending on whether or not a distinction is made between the concept of "excommunication," sanctions, and this world and an "afterlife." In cases where the concept of "excommunication" exists, when a person is excommunicated for some act, given that the person is excluded from the common group, "denial" is logically carried out. In cases where sanctions clearly indicated by law are present before the fact, then the denial is considered to be as strong as the sanctions placed upon the person in question. In religions and cultures that differentiate between this world and the afterlife with regard to the less severe sanctions, then even if sanctions have not been established in this world, there is still a sense of denial with regard to the person in question if sanctions will be made in the afterlife.

The concepts discussed above, however, cannot be shared among cultures and religions, and this will make comparisons, mutual understanding, and dialogue difficult. In religions such as Shintoism, where membership does not have a fixed, unambiguous formula, there is no "excommunication," although there may be concepts similar in meaning, such as ostracism, inhumanity, or brutishness. In Islam, there is a legal sanction from the common group, referred to as *takfir* but this differs significantly from Christianity, which is based on the structure of the Catholic church, in that there is no "institution" that formally declares this "excommunication." An analysis that acts as an index for denying the application of sanctions cannot be applied in cultures or religions that are not premised on the allocation of sanctions for specific acts. In cultures or religions where sanctions have been formalized, a discourse on

"denial" becomes to some extent a "legal" one, and in many cases, with the exception of scholars and non-scholars, some degree of convergence may be expected. If we apply this framework to cultures and religions that have no sanctions, then when a private individual denies a given act, then there may be an inappropriate (false) identification of the problem, for example with regard to whether that individual intends to place sanctions on the person who conducted that act. In cultures or religions that do not have a concept of an afterlife, it is difficult for the concept of sanctions in the afterlife to have any meaning. Of course, the above differentiation is an analytical one, and in fact is quite complex. In a society with a low level of human mobility, "excommunication" itself functions as a sanction, and in Islam, *takfir* corresponds not simply to "excommunication," but to the death penalty.

3 The frameworks of Islamic discourse with regard to the denial of war and violence

Although there is no formal system in Islam that officially recognizes doctrines, there is a high level of unity and stability that transcends eras and regions, supported by "Islamic Law." In the West, morality and law are characterized by two-value structures, as in the case of "good and evil" or "legal and illegal." In contrast, Islamic Law has a structure based on a five-value logic that subsumes morality, and categorizes all human behaviors casuistically into five groups: obligatory acts; *wajib*, recommended acts; *mandub,* permissible acts: *mubah,* acts best avoided; *mukruh;* and prohibited acts; *mahzur* (also called haram). More specifically, these five categories are defined as follows:

Obligatory acts: Failure to do these acts will lead to punishment in the afterlife.

Recommended acts: Doing these acts will lead to rewards, but failure to do them will not lead to punishment.

Permissible acts: *Allāh* permits these acts to be done or not, but neither persons who do these acts nor fail to do them will be punished or rewarded.

Acts best avoided: Avoidance of these acts will be rewarded, but even if they are done no punishment will result.

Prohibited acts: Doing these acts will lead to punishment in the afterlife.

It is important to note that Islamic Law is a system of codes that prescribes an explicit relationship between

Allāh and mankind, and the validity of that system is guaranteed by punishments in the afterlife. Cases in which punishments are prescribed in this life, such as theft, robbery, drinking, adultery, false accusation of adultery, murder, causing of injury, or the renunciation of Islamic Law, are in fact exceptions. In order to understand evaluations of acts and events in the Islamic world, it is important to make judgments not only looking at phenomenal acts by nations, but also taking into consideration people's expectations with regard to judgments in the afterlife.

A discourse on the evaluation of Islamic values is conducted basically according to the five categories discussed above, but in addition to these, there is *takfir* (excommunication)—a category that lies on a boundary between law and theology—which declares that any debates falling outside of these categories are no longer internal debates for Islam.

For this reason, it must be understood that Islamic discourse is not conducted based on two-law, two-value logic, as in the case of Western concepts such as good / evil, legal / illegal, truth / honor, correct / incorrect, agreement / disagreement, approval / denial, or friend / foe, and must not be incorrectly translated using such two-law, two-value logic.

4 War/violence in Islam

As we can see from the above discussion, it is meaningless to put at issue the question of whether Islam "approves of or denies war and violence."

The question at issue is, "Into which of the five (or six) categories outlined above should one classify acts symbolized as war or violence in other religions or cultures?"

Islamic Law grants inviolability; *hurmah* to legally protected assets in five categories: (1) life, (2) property, (3) honor, (4) lineage, and (5) religion. Because no violation of any of these assets is permitted, then although as a rule violence in general that constitutes violations of these assets is prohibited, violence intended to protect one of these assets may have approval in exceptional cases. Acts of violence intended to protect the legal assets of an individual are recognized as acts of self-defense by individuals as well, but acts of violence intended as a retribution for the violation of rights are not accepted by individuals. Retribution in this world is conducted through criminal law, and authority for the execution of courts and punishments lies with the relevant public official (the Caliph or his representative).

War falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the public official (the Caliph or his representative), but while

fighting against gangs of robbers is obligatory, fighting against rebels is not obligatory; in fact, submission is recommended. Wars or civil wars involving battles for power other than that of the lawful Caliph are prohibited. Wars with pagans in the name of god are referred to in legal terms as *Jihād.*

Jihād involves an obligation of solidarity, but its initiation requires certain fixed conditions, and war is prohibited in cases where these conditions are not fulfilled. That judgment, and the execution of *Jihād,* falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Caliph. Nevertheless, just as individuals will recognize acts of violence as self-defense when the individual's legal assets are being protected, in cases where the Islamic world, *daru-l-islam,* suffers an invasion, fighters of that land (adult males) are charged with the task of fighting against the invaders as an obligation of *Jihād,* without awaiting orders from the Caliph.

The above is a summary of standard Islamic discourse with regard to war and violence. The concept of "holy war" is nothing more than a means of instigation used by some demagogues of Westernization.

5 Conclusion

Here, we have clarified the problems with understanding concepts like war and violence as separate from the framework of Islamic discourse, and using the frameworks of other religions and cultures, but that does not mean that it is impossible to achieve comparisons, understanding, and dialogue are with differing cultures and religions. This is because such concepts are not fixed and unchanging in any religion or culture, but rather are dynamic concepts that change internally or within the context of interactions with other religions or cultures. Certainly, it is impossible to understand other religions and cultures without being prepared to change the framework of our own awareness. But if we have the determination to change, we will not be the same persons tomorrow that we were yesterday, and if the world of tomorrow changes, then we may see a new world in which a horizontal merging of awareness (*horizontverschmelzung* in German) is achieved, and in which different religions and cultures can coexist.

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War and Violence: A Muslim Perspective

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Background

War and violence are two common phenomena in the world today. In the post Cold War the world was not free from war and violence and even many kinds of peacelessness (the appropriate opposite of peace) occur in many parts of the globe. Peacelessness, which includes poverty, illiteracy, injustice, exploitation, corruption and other kinds of immorality, beside tension, dispute, conflict, violence, terror and war itself, has manifested as global threat and potential destructive element of human civilization.

The most challenging problem the Earth's dwellers are facing today is accumulative global damage resulted from many sectors of modernization. Modernization that had undergone since the second half of the twentieth century in many countries has brought both positive and negative impacts to human's life, Despite its undeniable positive impact such as to alleviate standard of living or ease communication between people so that they could exchange ideas and developed their material civilization, modernization has also created a negative crash such as encouraging secularization that in turn brought immoralities into existence. Modernization has emphasized its material shape while ignored spiritual dimension of humans' life. As a result, modernization that had taken the form of dehumanization created crisis of humanity, as it paved the way for moral relativism, permissivism and liberalism to occur in society. Religionists have responded to these phenomena by appealing to the reconstruction of Global Ethics in the centennial anniversary of the Parliament of the World's Religions in Chicago in 1993. Yet, there have been no so far significant changes in human's civilization until the coming of the new millennium.

Accumulative global damage is an output of the World System and its derivatives in many fields of life, socially, economically, politically, and scientifically. The World System was based on anthropocentrism that put man at the center of human's consciousness, Differ from the centrism that put God at the center of human's consciousness and therefore life is oriented to attaining both material and spiritual happiness, anthropocentric life orientation has produced modern men with superiority complex, arrogance and egoism. As a result, modern men are competing with each other and inclined to dominate over each other, This behavioral tendency, at the international level, has encouraged many leaders of the world to show their superiority and conceit, and bring their nations to impose political hegemony by dominating other nations.

The world today has witnessed emergence of the hegemonic power, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union that brought the West as the single world super power. Hegemony performed by the world superpowers has included political liberalism through insisting Western liberal democracy on other countries regardless of their respective socio historical and political background, while ignoring the way of implementing that liberal democracy, most of the time, violates the principles of democracy itself, The world hegeronic power has also insisted liberal capitalism through pressuring other nations to adopt it. Through its global instruments, such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund, liberal capitalism has deepened its grips within the economy of countries of the Third World, and, the world hegemonic power has also paved the way for liberal morality to emerge through secularization in society that, in turn, spread out immoralities.

These tendencies, in part, have a share in the coming into being of many kinds of gap and discrepancy between nations and within one nation, such as the gap between the richest and the poorest, between North and South, between the developed and less developed countries, This very fact stemmed from, and in turn, created global injustice that served as the very root of tension, conflict, violence, war and terrorism in the world today. Without intending to justify terrorism, as the most destructive kind of violence, attribution of terror to a particular religion or religious group would only create reaction with religious justification, and launching war against terrorism through terrorist mode of action by a nation toward another would encourage greater reaction in the farm of war against state terrorism.

Terrorism has no root in religion and indeed has no religion. No religion of the world would justify terrorism, Therefore, religious radicalism or fundamentalism could not be paralleled with terrorism as they are two different things. Religious radicalism and fundamentalism, as common phenomena in many religious communities, derived from literal scripturalistic understanding of religion and, In part, emerged as rejective response to modernization and secularization exercised by ruling political authority. In many cases modernization, as the implementation of the World System, victimized a certain segment of the society and made them marginalized and deprived, These marginalized and deprived groups usually react to challenge the secular regimes, which they perceive as tagut or tyrant and oppressor, in the name of religion and under religious banner. Phenomena of radicalism and fundamentalism in religious community, as well as war and violence between religious communities, should be carefully studied through taking into consideration both theological and sociological factors, and therefore war and violence should not be simplifistically attributed to religion, as religion may be only mean of justification.

War and Violence: Historical Perspective

War and violence are indeed old phenomena and they are as old as the history of mankind. Violence, barbarity, cruelty and other forms of inhuman actions had appeared since the very beginning of human history. Yet, life phenomena that are inclined to humanity, such as peace, security, tolerance, benevolence, love and mercy are also as old as religion and civilization. Culturally, the first phenomena are considered as one characteristic of life of uncivilized people, and the. second are perceived as general characteristics of civilized society.

In the process of history, both phenomena had appeared coincidentally and overlap. Phenomena of violence are inherent in revolutionary process of change, whereas phenomena of peace are intrinsic in evolutionary process of change. The struggle between revolutionary and evolutionary ways had been reflected in the struggle between War and Peace. [1] Throughout the history of mankind until the end of the second millennium war, violence, tension and conflict were happening in many parts of the globe, in Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. And at the beginning of the new millennium the world has witnessed the reemergence of the most destructive form of violence, i.e., terrorism including state terrorism.

In the twentieth century the world had experienced two phases of World War, the first between 1914-1918 and the second between 1939-1945, followed by the Cold War for forty years (1950-1991) coinciding with tension and war in several regions, such as, Korea, Vietnam, Middle East, the Arab gulf, Balkan. Yet, the end of the Cold War did not end wars, tensions and conflicts. Ironically, in the period of no longer world bipolarization between East and West since the West remains as single world power tension and conflict continued and brought possibility for clash of civilization.

The end of the Cold War is perceived as the end of history since Western liberalism has had a momentum to spread out all over the world and capitalism began to disseminate in many countries, including in the Third World. This brought Francis Fukuyama to conclude that "we may be witnessing the end of history as such; that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government". [2] The new world phenomena has also encouraged Thomas L. Friedman, a journalist of the New York Times, to create his Golden Arches Theory, that is that no two countries that both have McDonald's have ever fought a war against each other since they each got their McDonald's". [3]

Both might be true that the twenty first century is the era of globalization and at the same time the era of the Western civilization, as it is evident that the West remains the holder of supremacy of world's civilization. Yet, that this is the end of history is questionable. Challenging Fukuyama was Samuel P. Huntington, who in his Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order explains the emergence of non-Western civilizations and the possible clash between these civilizations and Western civilization; "the population explosion in Muslim countries and the economic rise of East Asia are changing global politics. These developments challenge Western dominance, promote opposition to supposedly "universal" Western ideals, and intensify intercivilization conflict over such issues as nuclear proliferation, immigration, human rights, and democracy". [4]

Critiques to Huntington's thesis are not without arguments. One of the arguments, inter alia, is that it is irrelevant to confront Islam versus the West because Islam is now present significantly in the West and has become an important factor of the Western culture, in line with the rapid growing of Muslim population in many Western countries. Yet, the eminent "clash" between Islam and the West is not exaggerated. This derives from a long history of rivalry between the two civilizations and cultural sentiment inherited from their historical interactions.

Leaving aside Islam and West relation, Huntington's thesis suggests that shrinking world as a result of globalization would not necessarily lead to peaceful and harmonious world, since the world has been developing in the line of civilization therefore could lead to civilizational clash. Many scholars followed Huntington bringing black scenario for the future of human's history. Kaplan, for example, predicted that what will appear in the new century is not a world with peace and harmony, but rather a world with anarchy or the "coming of anarchy", that is the world that is divided into many mini cultures and civilizations, Hans Magnus Entzensberger, too, forecasted that the world in the post Cold War would not face peaceful and calm situation, but rather face period of anomic violence evinced by emerging conflicts between small unorganized groups and without any clear reasons, [5]

These seemingly dooms-day theories are indeed development of what had been obsen'ed earlier in the second half of the twentieth century. At this time many had seen the world is facing problematique (world

problematique) stemming from the facts that the world had developed military technology proceeded by the coming into being of military industrial complex and then the arms-race between developed countries. The world at that time had recognized the term "the war system" that led to that "world problematique", as stated by J. Stanovnik: "The global problem of the arms race and militarization seems to symbolize the culmination of the present world crisis and "world problematique", It is not only the expression of the profound contradictions and antagonism which divide the world and bring it into conflict rather than into cooperation, It also and above all demonstrates how the boundlessly creative human talent of scientific inquiry is being manipulated and misdirected to purpose which run counter to the innate human instinct for survival.[6]

From psychological perspective war and violence are rooted in biological instinct of human being that is aggressiveness instinct. Because of this instinct human being tend to aggressively attack others in their struggle for survival and the struggle for the fittest. Violence is transformed into a massive war when people began to unite under a certain base of solidarity, such as nationalism, micronationalism, communalism, religious belief, economic interest and political ideology.

Combination between instinct of aggressiveness and solidarity feeling would encourage people to engage in struggle for existence, while sometimes denying other's existence, Consequently, coexistential orientation as a prerequisite for living together in a pluralistic society or world is declining. Stirred by another human's instinct such as need for power would encourage human being to dominate others, At international political scale this tendency would create tendency of dominating and building hegemony by a regime over others, between nations and within one nation.

War and violence are not thus motivated by merely psychological factor but also stimulated by sociological factors socially, economically and politically. In this context, any war and violence between two or more groups of religious people are not necessarily derived from genuine religious motive, because religion may only be used as mean of justification, Thus, war and conflict should not be seen as religious in nature, but those are war and conflict with religious nuances.

Ambivalent Tendency of Religion

Religions have seemingly ambivalent tendency toward peace and harmony. On the one hand religions preach peace and harmony between people of different faiths, because they came from the same God and therefore they are members of the great family of mankind, but on the other hand religions also teach war to other people. Religious preaching toward peace and war is justified by the Holy Scripture of respective religions.

Does religion have an ambivalent nature toward peace and harmony? The answer is relative, depending on how one interprets religious text. Many believe that religions have genuine ambivalence; it is that religions at one hence teach followers to live in peace and harmony with co-religionists, but if there are any reasons for war, war should not be avoided.

Others believe that religions only teach good values and therefore do not preach war. Verses of the Holy Scripture concerning war should be read in the context of the time when those verses are revealed. Another solution could be considered such as war is inevitable way to peace. In other words, war is medium to establish peace, because if there is conflict between good and evil, evil should be defeated.

In theological and philosophical perspective religion is believed to preach only peace not war. But in its empirical manifestation religion is ambivalent toward peace and harmony. It is true that religion can serve as an integrative force paving the way to peace, dialogue and cooperation, but in another time it can also be disintegrative one leading to conflict, violence and war.

The disintegrative face of religion manifests from at least, three characteristics of religion as always appear in the consciousness of the believers.[7] Firstly, religion brings about absolutism. This becomes a consequential outcome of personal and subjective belief in the Absolute Reality or God, absolutism is often followed by rejective attitude against other faiths. In many cases absolutism becomes a root for fanaticism and sectarianism that lead to conflict in both intra and extra levels of religious community.

Secondly, religion preaches expansionism that is a doctrine on the obligation of the followers to expand or spread their belief to all mankind. The history of religions bears witness of the fact that almost all religions were expanded out of their cradles. Expansionism, that has theological legitimacy from the Holy Scripture, is believed as a sacred mission to be undertaken. The problem starts to occur when the mission being accomplished by each religious group toward the other, an inevitable interaction thus arises and becomes a driving factor for tension and conflict.

Thirdly, religion has also a penetrative tendency into non-theological areas, such as social, politics, and economy. This penetration, which takes the form of involvement of religious sentiment in activities in those fields, may bring dispute or conflict may exist in those fields to religious conflict.

These three characteristics of religion often serve in praxis as factors of war and violence culturally and politically. History of mankind has shown evidences of great wars under the name of religion that killed millions of people and destroyed thousands of worship houses, Holy war is thus justified and religious terms, such as jihād or crusade, are given strict and rigid sense of meaning as relating only to holy war .

Islamic Viewpoint

Islamic perspective on war and violence is based on the very nature and principle of Islam itself. As a religion that promotes pure and strict monotheism Islam stresses the doctrine of the Oneness and Unity of God *tawhid* and makes it its the central and cardinal tenet. Tawhid does not only teach that the Almighty God is One, the Creator of the universe *rabb al-nas*, the King of mankind *malik al-nas*, and the One whom should be worshiped *ilah al-nas*, but also teach that there is consequential link of unity, such as unity of creation, unity of existence, unity of knowledge, and unity of life.

This doctrine of unity has of course an implication to unity of mankind and unity of mankind's civilization. The concept of unity, in this context, does not imply a unified or united treatment of things, but suggest that there are analogy and correspondence between the Creator and the created, and between all creatures. Consequently, mankind should be bound in (one) humanity, future and purpose of life.

Islam is a religion of peace, and the word Islam (derives from Arabic verb slm, literally means peace, safe, secure, whole, complete, healthy, or unblemished) essentially means peace. Realization of peace in Islam begins with man's submission to God, the Creator, Submission he. re means that human being liberates himself or herself from submission toward other than God as implicitly stated in the words "*La Ilāh illa Allāh*" or "there is no god but *Allāh*". Liberation process continues to the struggle for salvation. Yet, Islam orders to gain not only self salvation, but also collective salvation or salvation for all mankind. The whole process of liberation and salvation will terminate at gaining peace or salam. Therefore, Muslims are taught to chant a special prayer for peace, usually after their formal prayer or salat as follows:

> Oh Lord, Thou are (source) of peace
>
> From Thou peace rises
>
> And unto Thou peace returns
>
> Thus make us, oh Lord, live in peace
>
> And bring us to enter paradise, the abode of peace.
>
> Blessing unto Thou, oh Lord. the Almighty, and Thou who has Majesty and Glory.

From the above prayer, it is very clear that Islam teaches peace and instructs its followers to engage in peace, because peace is the ultimate goal of life, Muslims are taught to symbolically exercise peace, at least five times a day, by reciting the words "*al-salām 'alaykum wa rahmat Allāh wa barakatuh" or "peace, love and mercy from God be upon you*". When reciting these words in their formal prayers they turn their faces right then left, which means spreading peace to everybody surrounds. That the Muslims begin their formal prayer by chanting "*Allāh akbar*" or "*Allāh* the Greatest" and end it with words of peace may well suggest that vertical relation to God should proceed to horizontal relation between mankind. Through content analysis of prayers within that formal prayer one may understand transformation of consciousness of the actors from personal orientation to a more collective one.[8] This will suggest that piety Muslims should develop is social piety, not merely personal piety.

Religious instruction for Muslims to establish peace receives further spirit from Prophet Muhammad when he ordered the Muslims to spread out peace or "Ifshu al-salam", implementation pf which should not only take the form of greeting to others by using the words "al-salam 'alaykum", but more important is realizing peace in concrete actions, at least, according to another Prophet's saying, through getting rid a thorn of the street.

Peaceful orientation of Islam is further explained in the Qur'an that the very essence of the Islamic message is none but establishing love and mercy *rahmat* to all mankind *li al- 'alamin*. [9] This Islamic vision about the future of human's civilization that should be covered by love, mercy and peace implies its appeal toward universal peace. An idea should be added here is that Islamic teaching concerning peace touch also upon methodological aspect that is that treatment of peace should be comprehensive or holistic in approach. A verse in the Qur'an stipulates an order to enter into peace as a whole and by all (*udkhulu fi al-silm kaffatan*) (chapter II, 208).

Doctrinal teachings from the Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition described above explain very obviously the nature of Islam as a religion of peace. Then, what is the meaning of war that is also obviously often mentioned in two sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the Hadith, and empirically being factual part of Islamic history? It is interesting that the Qur'an mentions the term "war" as many as the term "peace." Though war in its more literal meaning *harb* is only mentioned six times, but its synonym *qital*, literally means killing and its derivatives are mentioned about 170 times, and the term '*jihād*' and its derivatives are mentioned 41 times, comparing to peace that is only mentioned 151 times. Of course, frequency does not mean here that Islam emphasizes war more than peace.

Muslim scholars have argued that war in Islam is not aiming at attacking others but is meant for self defense. The causus belli of many wars in Islamic history, especially in the time of Prophet Muhammad such as wars in Badr and Uhud, is self defending against threat and attack from other sides. No facts in Islamic history can be used to prove that Muslims had engaged in war with the initiative and motive to attack the enemies. In ful-

filling self defense Islam seems to be very strong appealing as indicated in many verses of the Qur'an using the word qital or kill.

Yet, Islam's insistence to the Oneness of God *tawhid* and therefore calls mankind to genuine and strict monotheism. though with prohibition to exercise any coercive action to may imply possibility for initiative to launch war against infidelity. Indeed, imperative of war in Islam is against infidelity *kufr*, because in Islamic perspective infidelity contradicts human religiousness instinct as a drive to believe in the oneness of God and therefore it is against humanity. This justified motive for war is justified in the Qur'an (chapter VIII, 39) "and fight with them until there is no more persecution and religion should be only for *Allāh*, but if they desist, then surely *Allāh* sees what they do", Yet, peace should be put in priority, as verse 61 of the same chapter stipulates "and if they incline to peace, then incline to it and trust in *Allāh*; surely He is the Hearing, the Knowing",

From these verses it clearly suggests that peace and war are two conceptually different ideas, but in essence they are related to each other, that is that peace is the ideal and war is inevitable way to that ideal. Professor Mark Juergensmeyer has put it in well sentences that ". . . Islam is ambiguous about violence. Like all religions, Islam occasionally allows for force while stressing that the main spiritual goal is one of nonviolence and peace".11 It is true that the main characteristic of Islam is peace and therefore Islam is very sensitive toward all kinds of peacelessness, especially injustice. Islam is a religion of peace *din al-salāmah* and, at the same time, it is also a religion of justice *din al- 'adalah*. Imperative of justice is frequently appealed at the end of the Friday's sermon every week quoting a Qur'anic verse "surely, *Allāh* commands you all to establish justice and the best deed".

It is pertinent, in this context, to underpin the misunderstood concept of *jihād*, The term *Jihād* derives from the Arabic verb *jihād* which literally means "serious efforts"; *jihād*, therefore, terminologically means serious efforts or struggle in order to achieve the noble and best objectives, As an important doctrine of Islam, *jihād* has in principle moral and spiritual dimension, and in its highest degree *jihād* takes the forms of self purification, being closer to God and ability to self restraint from bad things. It is true that doctrine of *jihād* includes holy war or physical contact, especially for the purpose of self defense and to safeguard the integrity and integration of the Muslim community, but it has a broader coverage of meaning as to include also serious efforts or struggle in all domains of life such as economy, politics, diplomacy, science and information, etc. This is what is meant in the Quranic verse "and struggle in the way of God with your wealth *amwal* and self *anfus*"(chapter IX, 20).12 So, the imperative of *jihād* should be fulfilled at the first and utmost through building material abilities and capacities in order to solve all

problems exist, and then through developing the best attitudes, such as being patient, persistent, or confident in meeting all challenges.

From the perspective of the Qur'an, *jihād*, in its narrow sense (physical contact or war), is allowed only with certain circumstances and prerequisites, they are; Firstly, *jihād* or war could only be conducted without excessive actions, and that is limited only to those who fight against the Muslims. " And fight in the way of *Allāh* with those who fight you, and do not exceed the limits, surely *Allāh* does not love those who exceed the limits" (chapter II, 1 90). Secondly, that *jihād* in the sense of war could only be done to those who attack the Muslims and expell them from their homeland. "*Allāh* does not forbid you respecting those who have not made war against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you forth from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly, surely *Allāh* loves the doers of justice" (chapter LX, 8), Thirdly, if there is an offer or initiative from the enemies toward peace, then efforts for peace should be given priority, as it is explained in the verse "and if they incline to peace, then incline to it and trust in *Allāh*,; surely He is the Hearing, the Knowing" (chapter VIII, 61). Fourthly, in that no excessive war Prophet Muhammad ordered the Muslims to guarantee and protect the rights of the civilians, especially women and children, agricultural lands, houses of worship and religious leaders.

Touching upon the issue of terrorism that became the most actual and crucial global issue soon after the September eleventh 2001 terror actions in the U.S, Islam has a very clear position that is that Islam is against any kind of terrorism. Though, as Walter Lacquer has concluded in his The Age of Terrorism, "That there is no definition of terrorism that can possibly coyer all the varieties of terrorism that have appeared throughout history", terror action of all kinds, including state terrorism, can not be justified. From Islamic perspective, terrorism is a crime against humanity, therefore it must be condemned. The Qur'an stated in this context that ". . . whoever slays a soul, unless it be for manslaughter or for mischief in the land, it is as though he slew all mankind . . ."(chapter V, 32).

Muslims' reaction toward terrorism is distinct and definite that is that they strongly condemned terrorism, because terrorism of all kinds has no roots at all in Islam. That the Muslim World has shown their pessimistic reactions toward war on terror launched by the U.S President George Walker Bush is because that war on terror has taken the forms of attribution to Islam, generalization to the Muslim community, and thus destroying the image of Islam, Moreover, war on terror has taken the form of terror itself that is by attacking other countries without justified reasons. In this context, war through attacking, aggressing and invading other sovereign states is not the answer.

Concluding Remarks

From Muslim perspective, war and violence are a great danger for human's civilization, and therefore should be prevented. Accumulative global damage should thus be undertaken through accumulative global damage control. That is the task of all believers to work together, joining hand and hand, to launch their noble efforts in order to establish a new world order that is a peaceful world based on ethical and moral values.

Despite their differences in many things religions share common moral values concerning peace. It is the time now for all religionists of the world to show their common commitment to peace through common efforts to get rid of all kinds peacelessness of the world, and in particular to genuinely combat stop violence and terrorism.

1 Djoko Suryo, "Mengungkap Gejala Kekerasan dalam Sejarah Manusia: in Syifaul Arifin (et,al), Melawan Kekelasan Tanpa Kekelasan, or Against Violence without Violence (Jakarta: 2000), p. 33.
2 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History," The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), p. 4.
3 Thomas L. Friedman, 772e Lexus. a, id the Olive Tree, Understanding Globalization (New York: 2000), p. ix.
4 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilization a, id t/7e Rel7laking of World Order (New York: 1 996), p. 31 .
5 see Djoko Suryo in Syifaul Arifin, op, cit., p. 58.
6 J. Stanovnik "Global Problems' and the Role of Science and Technology In their Solution" in J. Gvishiani (ed), Science,

Technology and Global Problems (Oxford: 1 979), p. 41, Quoted in M. Din Syamsuddin, Religion a,7d Peace (unpublished), p. 9.
7 M, Din Syamsuddin, Etika Agama dalam Membangun Masyarakat Madani or Religious Ethics in Building Civil Society (Jakarta: 2000), p. 189.
8 In their formal prayers or salat Muslims recite variety of prayers that start from that with personal touch, like Lord forgive me, to prayers that bring collective consciousness by using terms such as "peace is for us and for you all."
9 Many exegesis's of the Qur'an even interpret the word ~alamin is meaning the universe, not only human being but also other creatures.
10 A verse in the Holy Qur'an stipulates that "there is no coercion in religion."
11 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God,'—The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley: 2001) p. 79.
12 The word amwal, plural of mal, means wealth and includes all material abilities; the correct meaning of anfus is self, not soul as usually translated. The singular of the word anfus, nafs, has two plurals, they are ,nufus (means souls) and anfus (means self).

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War and Peace from the Viewpoint of Islamic Law

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In the name of *Allāh*, the most beneficent and the most merciful. May the peace and blessings of *Allāh* be upon you. First of all, let me thank all those who have contributed to organizing this conference. In the age of partnership supported by revealed religion, interreligious dialogues are important. Since I do not have enough time to clarify the fundamental aspects of different religions, I would like to focus on just a few points today. I hope you will have the opportunity, God willing, to deepen your understanding of these issues in the future.

Let me briefly talk about some issues concerning war and peace from the viewpoint of Islamic Law. We greatly appreciate a history in which revealed religion has brought safety and peace to a society to enjoy a safe and peaceful society. The most ideal moment for any

dogma to be formed is when stability has been established and turmoil is under control. On this assumption, the revealed words of God allow us to understand the environments and social conditions where these religions were established. A dispatch of a prophet can be more meaningful when he successfully promotes fellowship and philanthropy. This should be God's ultimate purpose. A verse in the Qur'an, which is filled with wisdom, tells us to "recall how He favored you when your hostility to each other had torn you apart. He united your hearts in one faith and through His Grace you became brothers. You were on the verge of falling headlong into the abyss of fire, but God saved you."

Islamic Law does not permit exploitation from or attack on any group with the aim of economic and social inclusion. These activities are regarded as unjust

as shown in a revelation saying, "Do not approach any immorality. God does not love those who commit immorality." From this point of view, *jihād* should be regarded as self-defense and a justifiable war against hostile acts. This phenomenon *(jihād)* could include various aspects of social life such as wealth, property rights and dignity as a human. If we consider it right for a group to protect its own existence and independence from another group's hostile acts, then such efforts deserve praise. Aside from *jihād,* which has the connotation of defense, the verses in the Qur'an include several other words depicting wars such as *quital* (fighting), *nafr* (conquest), *ghazw* (invasion), *fatk* (assault) and *ightiyal* (assassination).

There are, for example, *Allāh*'s supreme words that tell us, "if somebody challenges you to a fight *(quital),* fight back *(quital)* with dignity in the Cause of *Allāh,*" and "march forth *(nafr)* whether you are light or heavy, strive hard *(jihād)* with your wealth and your lives in the Cause of *Allāh.*" In this sense, *jihād* is regarded as one of the gates to heaven. In *Allāh's* supreme words, "*Allāh* has preferred in grades those who strive hard and fight with their wealth and lives above those who sit at home. These people will be the winners in the end," From this we can see that *jihād* covers a wider area of social life. *Jihād* is a struggle in which one sacrifices one's wealth and life in the Cause of *Allāh.* Struggles and conflicts in early Islam, especially those occurring while the disciples were still alive, were used as measures to protect a community in its formative period. In the words of the Qur'an:

God has bought from the believers their lives and their money in exchange for Paradise. Thus, they fight in the cause of God, willing to kill and be killed. Such is His truthful pledge in the Torah, the Gospel and the Qur'an–and who fulfills His pledge better than God? You shall rejoice in making such an exchange. This is the greatest triumph.

This community was to be governed by God's rules, which had been established in various religions prior to the establishment of Islamic Law. Furthermore, monotheism has a peace-oriented nature. The Qur'an says that "reconciliation is best." If a community does not favor peace, peaceful coexistence and the dignity of humankind, war will be inevitable.

Events in the world progress from imperfection to perfection according to their capability. If there is something to hinder their way toward perfection, conflicts and wars will occur. This is when *jihād* is caused by humans so as to let the event advance toward its perfection. In *jihād,* we have to take account of the dogmatic concept of defense. Whatever it is that has prevented the event from progressing toward perfection will cause conflicts and wars. In the Qur'an, there is a

verse saying "Do not force religion," which may indicate this.

Islam today is facing wars, both overt and covert, with the powers governing and controlling the present-day world and modern Western civilization. Modern Western civilization possesses measures to govern with overwhelming peace-keeping and military abilities; measures of information and culture, which have become enormously influential since the communications revolution at the end of the 20th century; and economic measures to control development policies by controlling production and the processing of resources in the entire Third World, especially the Islamic World. Modern Western civilization has been facing, since the beginning of its formation in the European Renaissance period, challenges from Islam in the fields of dogma, politics, finance and social systems. It is still facing these challenges.

The Islamic political-organizational system, of course, collapsed along with the fall and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, the Industrial Revolution occurred and sciences in various fields progressed, which consequently allowed nations of modern civilization to control the entire world economy, when the Islamic world had no power left to pose a challenge in the field of economy and trade.

Islam, however, has always been a challenge in terms of culture to Western civilization and its dominant power. The challenge has always involved projects to promote political and organizational reconstruction of the Islamic world. This Islamic challenge, therefore, confronts the Western powers and their domination of the world and, even, the universe. In this context, a confrontation between Islam and the Western powers cannot be avoided. However, Islam, as a culture, lifestyle, civilization, social system and religious community, has never surrendered or retreated from any confrontation, at any phase, by any means. Our message is, in short, to praise the eternal god, *Allāh.*

I have studied common revelations given to Muhammad, a disciple and prophet, and other prophets preceding him, such as Moses, Jesus and Abraham and come to this conclusion: Since idolatry was an element common to the periods of the Prophets Muhammad and Abraham (peace and blessings be upon them), revelations common to the two prophets emphasized letting people know about the great creator and describing the characteristics of God. The Prophet Abraham was sent to the Chaldean people living in Babylon and Iraq. They had a time-honored civilization, including the Code of Hammurabi, which was excavated by archeologists in Mesopotamia along with other ancient writings. Archeologists assume that there existed in the community of Abraham basic legislation to pave the way for community organization but not monotheism.

For this reason, the Chaldean people may have des-

perately needed a guide to lead them along the right path. This is why the Law of Abraham is also called a monotheistic law. There are verses that include things given to Muhammad and things given by a prophet (Moses?), which are common to the Torah and the Qur'an: Isaaiah 42:1-21; 60:1-22; 54:1-12 and 28:10-12 in the Torah; and the Confederates 45, the Cattle 1 and the Journey by Night 111 in the Qur'an. These common parts have turned out to have a legislative nature.

In addition, based on studies of the social situation, we can imagine how the Israeli people actually lived. Groups among them acted dishonestly to each other, having no ethical discipline. Studies of the Torah have shown that the revelations given to the Prophet Moses often emphasized respect for others' rights rather than the true meaning of the monotheism.

It has been commonly accepted that no studies comparing the *Injil* (the Gospels) and the Qur'an have indicated there are verses common to Muhammad and Christ. Teachings by the two chosen prophets sometimes share the same views and other times take oppos-

ing positions. There can be, however, a third viewpoint: that nothing was mentioned about the similar verses in order to emphasize the correctness of the Law of Christ, which was established before the Law of the Qur'an. There is also a fourth viewpoint: Since the gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John were all written after the Prophet Jesus died, none of their verses correspond to any verses in the Qur'an. Therefore, it is not easy to prove any differences from the writing of a great creator (Qur'an) by showing convincing evidence. May the peace and blessings of *Allāh* be upon you.

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Comment · Discussion
-Session 2-

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Few would argue with Jessica Stern when she states that "[t]he twenty-first century is seeing a resurgence of holy terror." My generation, which grew up in the 1970s with news programs reporting on the political terrorism of the radical leftist activist groups such as the *Brigate Rosse,* the *Baader-Meinhof gang* (sc. the *Rote Armee Fraktion*) and the *Bewegung Zwei Juni,* has experienced the change from political terrorism to religious terrorism, by which I have in view contemporary terrorist groups whose discourse to a high and palpable degree is profoundly religious. To oversimplify the present state of affairs, the average terrorist has laid down the political pamphlet and started to quote religious authorities instead. All this is not to acquit politics and religion of responsibility (sc. that terrorists remain what they are, but that their motives shift from time to time), but rather to underscore the necessity to seek to understand the lethal phenomenon of Terror in the Name of God (which is also the title of Jessica Stern's book). Charles Townshend may very well be exaggerating when he states that "A world in which 80

percent of terrorists were not Marxists but Muslims…," but at any rate he corroborates the shift of paradigm from politics to religion. Bruce Hoffman in his Inside Terrorism argues that the religious terrorist groups emerged in 1980, that they by 1994 constituted a third of known terrorist groups (16 out of 49), and that they in 1995 amounted to almost half (26 out of 56). Were it only matters of religious instead of political discourse per se, it might not be so problematic. What makes it so urgent and pressing is that experience teaches us that when religion is the principal rationale for terrorist acts, the terrorists are more eager to sacrifice their lives and the casualties are more deadly, in the words of the British minister Lord Chalfont: "… the whole time I have been involved in [anti-]terrorist operations, which goes back 30 years, my enemy has always been a man who is very worried about his own skin. You can no longer count on that, because the terrorist is not just prepared to get killed, he wants to get killed."

In his by now famous book *La revansche de Dieu: Chrétiens, Juifs et musulmans à la reconquête du monde,* Gilles Kepel argues that the three monotheistic religions today have a distinctly political dimension, which certainly is not new, but has returned with a force which may surprise those who had counted out religion in their enlightened society. To them the return of God

must be all the more terrifying. The contemporary global resurgence of religion makes the secularisation theories of the late twentieth century less interesting.

In this brief response to the three thought-provoking papers on religious terrorism in the Muslim world I would like to mention three points. Let me start by refuting the very popular assertion that extremists lately have hijacked religion. I think that it is too easy to state that extremists pervert the true and pure essence of religion. Can we not be so honest that we admit that violent metaphors, violent narratives and also violent exhortation exist in the sacred texts? If denied, we have no possibility to interpret them with irenic hermeneutical keys. In the words of the always provocative but also truth-loving David Hartman of the Shalom Hartman Institute in Jerusalem:

The Bible doesn't teach you tolerance; that I want you to know… The Biblical framework is not the source of tolerance. That's not the place you go for that. You go there for passion, for zealousness, for extremes. Biblical people are extremists.

Since this session addresses the question of extremism in the Muslim tradition, I would like to suggest that this is no less true for readers of the Holy Koran. If this is correct, which are the specific challenges for monotheistic adherents, i.e. for readers of the Bible and the Koran? One answer to this complex question is given by Charles Kimball in his book with the interesting title *When Religion Becomes Evil*. His mission is to understand "the factors that can and do lead people of faith and goodwill–wittingly or unwittingly–into destructive and evil patterns of behaviour." The reader of his book and this article should be aware of the fact that his book is intended for a wide audience. One should, therefore, make allowances for a few generalisations in his book. However, it is necessary to point out that a number of scholars probably are at variance with his fundamental understanding of the very concept of religion. Needless to say, this critique takes us to the very centre of his book. Kimball always talks about the peaceful genesis of all the religions, that, so to speak, the calm infant in this cradle has been kidnapped by violent forces. He seems to argue that when people belonging to a religious tradition become violent, they are per definitionem betraying the irenic essence of their religion. His key to the problem of religious violence is always that people need to return to their "authentic" sources. The solution always lies in pristine history, in the paradisiacal origin: the earlier, the better; the more primitive, the more pristine. "In fact, at the center of authentic religion one always finds the promise of peace."

Those who take a different stand in this question may want to ask him if only religions have peaceful sources, or if this applies to secular ideologies as well. To go into extremes, could one for example argue that even Nazism—a phenomenon which we all associate with contempt, cruelty and genocide—has a nucleus which celebrates the dignity and rights of every human being? Or is Nazism rather to be understood as a perversion of another true ideology? If yes, is not Yehuda Bauer right when he describes militant religious groups as religious mutations of Christianity, Judaism, Islam etc.? These militants cannot find the promise of peace at the centre of their religion, because it is a violent mutation of something different. In order to become peaceful, it must become something else than it is; it must seek pacification neither at the centre, nor in the origin, i.e. in history, but in the future by adopting different ways of thinking in the present context.

The contemporary discussion on religion and violence suffers from something of a semantic and etymological escapism. It is not enough to state that Islam and sala'am are related etymologically; perhaps they are, perhaps they are not; scholars disagree there. Be it as it may—we have to move beyond semantic escapism. The answer to the challenges of religious violence is not to be found in etymology. Let me give you an analogy from the Christian world, which is my own tradition. This example does not focus on etymology, but on the related phenomenon of pronouncing one's own tradition not guilty. Most scholars today agree that Christendom was a necessary condition for the Holocaust to happen in Europe. Christianity did not cause the Holocaust, because if it were the single cause or the most important cause, it would then be a sufficient condition. To assert that it was a necessary condition is to acknowledge that without Christendom, i.e. without 2,000 years of Christian teaching of contempt in Europe, the Holocaust could not have happened. During a meeting in Jerusalem a Christian elderly lady who for the first time heard the dreadful story Jewish-Christian relations in history said, "What an un-Christian thing to do!" Whereupon a Jewish scholar replied, "Well, let us admit that in history this has been a very Christian thing to do!"

Going back to Islam, it is not sufficient to declare that extremists' interpretation of Islam is not Islam. The real challenge—and I would like us to address that question today—is to ask what parts of traditional Muslim teaching are a necessary condition for contemporary militant Islamists, and how this violent legacy can be opposed.

My second point is that we all know that religious terrorists are no longer just prepared to get killed; they want to get killed. This trend was observable before the bombing of the US Marine and French forces headquarters in April 1983, but has certainly escalated since then, first and foremost in Israel but also in other countries as well. The transformation of the suicide and martyrdom concepts ought to be one of the most important topics for scholars to study and for conferences to address. As is well known, intihar ("suicide") is absolutely forbidden in Islamic law, but somehow the concept of *istishhad* ("martyrdom") has opened the way for the suicide bombings. A part of the problem is that the Western world does not hear the condemnations of this transformation. The reason may very well be that we in the West do not listen carefully enough, but it is also possible that Muslim authorities do not articulate their critique enough.

In my third and last point I wish to dwell upon the disputed question of the interpretation of the concept of *jihād* which is discussed in the papers on Islam and violence. Professor Nakata addresses this topic in his paper. Since I have already dealt with the problem of etymological escapism, I need not repeat my arguments. The question is not whether *jihād* is called for in conflicts, because it is; but whether and to what extent the criteria and conditions are legitimate. Who defines, who decides, and who refutes? Once again I think the Western world cannot really hear the ongoing discussion, which suffers from philological escapism. I appreciate the approach taken in Bruce Lincoln's book Holy Terrors: Thinking About Religion After September 11, in which he distinguishes between maximalists and minimalists, i.e. between those who believe that religion ought to dominate all aspects of social, indeed human existence, and those who do not. In one of the papers it is suggested that three points are characteristic of every religion. That proposal is certainly part of the expansionistic and maximalist approach which Bruce Lincoln describes in his book. I do not think, however, that every religion always is and necessarily must be maximalist and expansionistic. Professor Syamsuddin advocates theocentrism in his paper, and once again we need to ask important questions. What kind of theocentrism? Is it *Sharia?* If yes, what kind of interpretation of *Sharia?* How is it to be implemented, and what are the consequences for non-Muslims? I believe that all these are good questions to be asked and we need to ponder the answers.

These three thought-provoking papers on Islam in our contemporary society have raised a number of wide-ranging questions; CISMOR is to be commended for arranging this important workshop. May our discussion help us discern theologically profound ways of approaching the broad variety of religious experience, because, as Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks has stressed on numerous occasions, if religion is part of the problem it must certainly be part of the solution.

Regional Islamic Dawah Council of SEA and the Pacific
Mr. Shahrir Hashim

(*assām aleykm*) Peace be upon you; Konnichiwa; and (*selamat petang*) in my mother tongue. I thank CIS-MOR for inviting me. I am not a religious scholar. I am a soldier who has been involved in a lot of peacekeeping work on the ground, so I would appreciate if more of this dialogue would be conducted where those who are on the ground who have been suffering after everybody has gone should be invited to say a few things of what they feel or what they find on the ground.

The discussion on war and violence in the Muslim perspective: it is most unfortunate, that again mention, that as a retired solider who has been by the grace of *Allāh* to do the work to improve the standard of the Muslim in South Asia and Pacific. In the war of yesterday the civilian was a victim; but in today's war, the soldiers end up as victims: on entering the country he suffers, when everything is over he has to face the bombing, the sniping, and what have you.

As a soldier again in peacetime they train for war and in war they train to organize the peace. My view of the issue of war and the eventual violence is all made by the political decisions of the government of the day. As a Muslim and a father of six, of course with one wife, I have been into several battlefields, but as a peacekeeper, and not as an invader. And in a nutshell, war between opposing forces are declared and is a thing of the past. Today it should be dialogue. That will keep the peace together.

The analysis of today's talk is very apt, of course. Injuring the innocent is certainly wrong in any language. As food for thought, Malaysia and Indonesia were having a dispute over two small islands, very tiny islands. And Indonesia has got 17,000 islands; surely they can give us two islands. But no, we have to decide which one to give to the other.

But unfortunately one island is good for scuba diving; the other island is totally useless. So the best of the two countries, we have decided to send it to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, and it was decided fortunate to us, that we have the two islands, and unfortunate for my brothers in Indonesia, they lost the two islands. So again dialogue is the best answer, even on territory, is the answer to solve most of our problems.

There is of course the Prophet Muhammad (Arabic), who said there are three ways to stop the bad things. Of course one, you can do it physically. If you cannot, use your tongue; it means you talk about it. If you still cannot, then hit for whatever he has done. Now my question to the panel really is what we need really is engagement strategy. The problem is on the Muslim image, because the interpretation is wrong. We Muslims have gone from a very long line of adjectives, for example we were fanatic at one stage, fundamentalist the next stage; then we became extremists, then later on militant, and eventually to the terrorist. I do not know what more adjectives will be coming in the future.

So what we need is really the engagement strategy, the engagement to the non-Muslim explaining to them, and also to the Muslim explaining how to go about in explaining things. This is important because when the 9/11 was the major topic, a lot of people were buying the Koran. But buying the Koran is not good enough; you need a teacher to explain the interpretation of the Koran. Otherwise, you get too many interpretations of the *jihād*, and it could be very, very unholy.

We have also in the case of Japan, invited teachers to come to Malaysia to see what Islam is so that they can send the message back to the children on the ground. The future is important. Maybe the current generation may not be able to solve the problem, but let us hope our children's children's children can solve the problem, and we will have a better world maybe in the near future; of course not in our lifetime.

The other one is defense, but I do not know whether the American ways or the Austrian way is correct for defense. When Islam says you can defend your country it means it defends on the ground, not goes into the other side and defends before they even land. So this is another interpretation that needs to be looked into.

Lastly I would thank the organization, and for members of the scholars here, remember that in war there are no runners up; there is always one winner. You cannot come out second in any competition in war. Thank you.

School of Theology, Doshisha University
Kenji Tomita

I would like to comment briefly on what I see as an important common idea underlying the lectures by Dr. Borujerdi and Dr. Syamsuddin. This is what Dr. Syamsuddin discusses in his paper. Dr. Borujerdi referred to it in the lecture as the cultural and economic invasion of Western civilization. It is the idea that it is Western civilization and not Christianity itself that Islam is opposed to and basically considers its enemy. It is civilization of the modern West. How is this modern West characterized? I think it is characterized by secularism, materialism, and free competition. Those in Islamic civilizations question modern Western civilization in these aspects, I think. Let me know if I am wrong.

On a domestic scale, within one country, free competition produces a winner and a loser. If problems arise in this process, the central government can regulate them. On an international scale, there is no equivalent of the central government. The United Nations has no binding power, and it is not a government. Therefore, free competition in the international community, free competition initiated by the West, spreads

across the world as part of globalization, naturally causing in this process various forms of tension and problems. Yet, there is no central body capable of mitigating them. What should those opposed to this trend do, then? In some cases, they cannot help but end up resorting to violence.

Thinking along this line, I think the problem that concerns us today is not merely a confrontation of religions, namely Christianity, Judaism and Islam. I think that there are factors beyond religion, that is, the secularism and materialism of the modern West, which are also closely related.

Modern Western civilization has been spreading worldwide through globalization. I think in some aspects this movement has been destroying the traditional values of diverse societies as well as these societies' visions of human existence, spirituality and humanity.

These are my comments. I would like to speak a little more if I have not used up the five minutes.

School of Theology, Doshisha University
Akira Echigoya

My name is Akira Echigoya. I am very pleased to be here.

Listening to Professor Kuftaro this morning and the three speakers from this session, I have gotten the message that we need a better, more accurate understanding of Islam. It is important that we ask ourselves if Islam has been understood correctly so far. This has not necessarily been the case. Since September 11, 2001, people's interest in Islam has grown considerably. Yet it is a great problem that Islam is understood in association with those terrorist attacks. So, I think it is extremely important to discuss what can be done so that Islam can be understood correctly.

Dr. Syamsuddin strongly argues that terrorism is not rooted in religion, that confrontation between different religious groups is not necessarily based on purely religious motives, and that religion is used to justify many other things. Dr. Syamsuddin points out that it is problematic to view Islam by linking it with the September 11th terrorist attacks.

So the main question becomes how it is possible for Islam to be understood correctly. Professor Nakata and Dr. Borujerdi say that war and violence are prescribed by Islamic law. A Christian standpoint tends to dictate a dichotomous attitude toward violence and war: whether to embrace nonviolence or approve of and accept violence. In Islam, on the other hand, war and violence are prescribed by the law. I take this to mean

that this can lead to diverse interpretations, rather than the imposition of restrictions. I really feel that it is not easy to try to understand Islam from the outside.

Mutual understanding requires dialogue. The need for dialogue has been repeatedly emphasized. In fact, dialogues between Christianity and Islam have been taking place for a long while now. They started at the turn of the century, between the 19th and 20th centuries. The World Council of Churches (WCC) was established in 1948, after World War II, which fostered dialogues between Christian and Muslim communities. Then, the Vatican also began calling for dialogues with Islam. Now what is important is to know what positive results these dialogues have actually produced.

Unfortunately, Professor Tarek Mitri of the WCC is not here to give us an account of its activities. But what we know is that dialogues have been taking place. As they are likely to become increasingly important and necessary, how will they be organized? Up until now, the Christian community has been the initiator of dialogues, to which Islam, as a fully global religion, is obliged to respond. So I would very much like to know if there are concrete ideas as to how, in what manner, Islam will undertake a dialogue with Christianity and other religions. Thank you.

Discussion

(Shiojiri) Thank you, Professor Echigoya.

Now we would like to move on to questions and answers, with you in the audience, the three speakers and the four commentators. Professor Hanafi, please.

(Hanafi) I have a very simple question as an academician. Is it enough to make a certain kind of apologia for Islam, Christianity or Judaism, taking some textual analysis, preaching peace and rejecting violence? I think we are not in a church; we are not in a mosque, we are not in a synagogue. We are respectable scholars who came here to analyze the fact of violence in religion, and so on.

My question is the following: these groups who are committing violence: where to go? They are oppressed inside their homes. They go outside, and they feel a world dominated by globalization, by USA, a strange world which they do not belong in. They saw Afghanistan; they saw Chechnya, and so on. Where to go for any Muslim activist who would like to perform his faith in order to live in a world of justice, not in a world of power? Then we are the victims of violence in the Muslim world, and you are the victims of violence in the external world. These active groups, where to go?

Can we go to the roots of violence, which is injustice in the world? In our homes, oppression and outside our

homes, domination, and over that trail we can get into violence very easily by getting to the roots of violence, not to the textual analysis which we can read them in both ways.

(Shiojiri) Thank you, Professor Hanafi. Can you tell us to whom you have addressed your remarks?

(Hanafi) I think to our Muslim scholars as well as to our Christian scholars; to Mark and to Syamsuddin and to Brother/Sister Borujerdi and to all those we have heard in the morning and in the afternoon

(Shiojiri) Thank you. Then, Professor Syamsuddin, please.

(Syamsuddin) I agree with Professor Hassan Hanafi that the most important for the Muslim scholars as well as the scholars from other religions to bring about sociological analysis emphasizing theological and textual analysis. But in our case we feel that we are asked to bring about a theological analysis from the textual notion of Islam.

I think elsewhere in the paper we mentioned that war and violence as attributed to Islam and the Muslims cannot be seen as merely religious in motive. I call it maybe "war with religious nuances," if that is the correct English word, in the sense that there are sociological factors, social, economic, political, and religion is only being used as a means of justification.

But they have the right, Osama Bin Laden and others to attribute themselves to Islam and proudly identifying themselves as Muslim terrorists. Maybe they do not call themselves as terrorists, maybe as mujahedin, the people of *jihād*. And maybe in their sight we are wrong, the moderate scholars like Professor Hassan Hanafi and others, of being moderate and weak to what I call Neo-Imperialism. And this is in the personal experience that we are facing now Neo-imperialistic power of the world because of the…

And I mention in my paper at least three modes of manifestation, expression: number one, new Imperialism insists on political liberalism by selling modern and liberal Western democracy to the countries of the third world, and number two, economic liberalism by insisting Western capitalism to the world. Also I call it moral liberalism, which paved the way for many kinds of immoralities, especially in Muslim society.

So at the end and of course there are many other factors. I read the book by Peter Bergen, a CNN correspondent, "Holy War, Inc." analyzing and bringing up everything about the al-Qaeda network in the world, and in 24 countries, but it was fortunate, there was no mention of Indonesia. I came across through this report

that Osama Bin Laden and others were trained by the CIA and the United States, and being used to face the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. So these kinds of things we have to take into consideration, and not merely bring up things related to Islam.

We do not deny that there is Muslim terrorist as there are terrorists from other religious communities, and as a matter of fact I want to show that religion is ambivalent towards peace and war, war and peace, at least from the seeming indication from the verses of the Holy Scripture. But in my opinion we have to take into consideration the non-theological factors of the case, as the terrorists.

So I do believe that as you mentioned the very root of global terrorism is global injustice. We cannot combat terrorism unless we combat and cut the very root of global terrorism, which is global injustice.

So in the problem solving, I think it is time for the moderate wing within religious communities to work together bringing the peaceful imperative from all religions to work together, but without making generalizations, attributions, destroying the image of others. Because it will be perceived, like in the case of the Muslims today, as another form of terrorism. Thank you.

(Shiojiri)　Thank you. I would like to let as many people speak as possible, so I hope that those of you who have not yet spoken will respond to the next questions.

Your name and country, please.

(Kato)　My name is Kato, and I am from Japan. I am trying to think from a theological point of view, as there are not many theologians here today.

While listening to the lectures and comments, I noticed that peace among people was discussed, and this is quite natural since war is part of the theme. I would like to know if in Islam God's peace is not considered as an issue. The speakers and others have mentioned that God is the source of peace, and it is people's peace. So I would like to focus on God's peace, seriously and not just intuitively. If God's peace has not been discussed so far, is it because it is taken as given? Or if it has been discussed, what would be the conclusion? We plunge into discussing people's peace because God's peace is taken for granted? I would like this point to be elaborated.

(Shiojiri)　By "God's peace," do you mean "peace with God" or "peace under God"?

(Kato)　I mean "peace with God."

(Shiojiri)　Peace with God. Professor Nakata, please.

(Nakata)　In today's lectures, we have heard the word *salām* several times, which I think is originally the same as *shalom*, and which is etymologically at the origin of Islam. *Salām* and Islam come from the same origin, but their meanings differ slightly. Professor Svartvik also said earlier that there is a controversy over whether or not *salām* (peace) is the origin of Islam. In fact, Islam comes from *salām,* but the two words mean different things.

Salām means "peace," while Islam is originally an Arabic transitive verb derived from *aslama*, which means "render peaceful" and means "render the other person peaceful" when it becomes a transitive verb. "Render the other person peaceful" means disarming oneself completely to surrender, submit oneself, give oneself totally. So Islam is usually taken to mean "submission to God" and not "making God peaceful." The original meaning of Islam is giving oneself totally to God.

Therefore, in Islam, one does not say "peace with God." Arabic is a Semitic language, and its etymology adds rich connotations of which one is always aware. The relationship between God and man is that of *Khāliq* and *makhlūq*, creator and creature. We surrender totally to God's will to be one with God, to make God's will our will, and in so doing peace of mind is attained. This is how it is conceived.

I hope I have answered the question.

(Shiojiri)　Dr. Borujerdi, what do you think of this?

(Borujerdi)　Allow me to say this again, "Peace be upon you." We are now considering peace from the viewpoint of revealed religions. However, we can see wars going on in regions where Muslims, Christians and Jews live. What are the causes of these wars? In other words, are the issues of war and peace related to the fact that the community is Islamic, Christian or Jewish, or not? I wish we could live in a region where the situation is different from what it is now. For example, I wish there were no oil at all in our region. Oil is a major cause of wars, in Iraq and in other regions as well. In Iraq, wars break out because those who want to become rich try to gain control over the oil.

Therefore, we should discuss the revealed religions using an approach mentioned in the lectures this morning and this afternoon. Those lectures emphasized that peace and safety are inherent in these religions. So, we need to look to other situations, causes and meanings that lead to wars. They do not belong to religions, but to people, rulers and those who have control over communities. This means that we should consider this issue from a political angle, not from the viewpoint of religion or doctrine.

I do not believe that there is a problem on our side.

The revealed religions come down to one point. These religions are all based on messages from God. The Great God is one single being, and needless to add, the teachings of God are the same. The modern revealed religions of Islam, Christianity and Judaism come from the same source: the will of God. The situation in which we live now was brought about by dominating powers and forces, not by communities, people or religions. The [revealed] religions are religions of peace. If these communities have the ability to live together with one another, no war will break out. In many countries, Muslims, Christians and Jews are living together without any conflict. In Iran and other countries, there is no conflict because people live, managing their situations well, based on the teachings and what they have learned from the revealed religions. Wars are caused by those who try to take control over the communities. The teachings of Islam include the protection of Islam. Islam does not permit us to be amenable to the control of non-Muslims who put pressure on the Islamic community, Islamic law and Muslims and try to keep us under control. We Muslims believe that all Muslims are capable of living together with non-Muslims without controlling them or being controlled by them. Based on this fundamental principle, if someone tries to exert control over us, we must protect ourselves and our beliefs even if that leads to war and results in our expulsion.

(Shiojiri):　Thank you very much.

Any questions in connection with this, or with other subjects? Earlier, Professor Hanafi said that both parties, those inside and those outside Islam, are victims of globalization. Any questions in regard to this?

Yes, Professor Johnson, please.

(Johnson)　Thank you. I am James Turner Johnson from Rutgers University in the United States. This is a question for Professor Nakata. When I was reading the brief outline of your paper published in this book, the conference summary, I was interested that you mentioned the concept of the *jihād* of individual duty. I was especially interested in that because I thought we might at last get a detailed discussion of this concept which a variety of groups that we have come to call terrorist have, in fact, used to justify their own actions. I am thinking of the assassins of Sadat; I am thinking of Osama Bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri and others in their 1998 fatwa; I am thinking of the argument that Hamas makes for the eradication of the state of Israel.

But in fact, while we might have had a productive discussion on that, you did something that I found quite astonishing: you began to talk about terrorism as related somehow to the idea of bughat. I must say that I am very puzzled by this, because it seems to me that the actions of these groups that I am talking about do not at

all fit with the notion of bughat and with the *ahkam al-bughat,* the laws of rebellion.

These people do not describe themselves as *baghi;* they do not describe what they are engaged in as *bughat;* they do not follow the laws of *bughat.* This category of *bughat* applies only to conflict within Islam, and so maybe it might apply somehow to the al-Qaeda bombings in Saudi Arabia recently, but I do not think the Saudis would agree with that.

So I wonder if you could elaborate a bit as to why it is you think that this category and not the category of *jihād* of individual duty is the better one for describing the approach and the activities of these people that we have come to call terrorists.

(Nakata)　I would like to answer that question. First of all, the problem with the term *jihād* is that various small groups have begun to call their cause *jihād,* whether they are in Palestine or Iraq, whether they are partisans of Osama Bin Laden or not. As I have said earlier, Islam is a system of scholarship, within which general agreement has been reached on some subjects and has not been reached on others.

Basically, the system of Islamic law presupposes one leader who unites the Islamic world who is called imam in the Islamic terminology but is usually called caliph and who is the successor of Prophet Muhammad and his successors Abu Bakr, Umar, Osman and Ali. This is the ideational structure of Islam.

When the Islamic world becomes united and wages war, the caliph alone has the right to declare *jihād.* Others never have that right. But as I have said earlier, when an enemy attacks, you may resort to violence in measure as legitimate self-defense. It is just as ordinary citizens in time of peace—not wartime—are not allowed to use violence on others. But if they are attacked suddenly, with no time to ask for help from the police, they are entitled to self-defense. Likewise, in Islam, if an enemy invades your territory, you try to protect your own territory any way you can, just as you protect your private home by yourself. In this case, it is not necessary to get the caliph's permission in advance, which is prescribed in the Islamic law.

Today, Muslims in Iraq and Palestine, for example, fight because they have been invaded at home. This is really the same thing as the case of someone who is at home, assailed by a burglar and in mortal danger, with no time to call the police. So he must fight for his life. They do the same in Palestine and Iraq. Of course, they can also choose to surrender, but some prefer fighting. So it turns out that many groups call their movement *jihād* today.

I used the words baghy (rebellion) and bughat (rebel), but it does not mean that the present situation can be better explained with these words. I used these

words because the word terrorism is problematic. As Professor Hanafi said earlier, there are people who have no choice except to resort to violence. If we say we deny violence, where should those people go?

Using the word terrorism makes such people criminals. Mao Zedong said "zaofan youli," which means there are reasons for revolts. This slogan is no longer fashionable today. It does not say that it is all right to revolt, but it says there are always reasons for such an act. There are always reasons for terrorism as well.

There is a Japanese proverb: "Even a thief has his reasons." This does not say that theft should be approved but that there are always reasons why people resort to criminal acts and terrorism. So the first thing we should do is listen to them and find out their reasons, and persuade them to correct what is wrong. Those who can be called bughat according to the Islamic law do not call themselves as such because, as I said earlier, they are people who believe that their interpretation of Islam and the Qu'ran is correct and revolt against the legitimate caliph or imam. They think they are correct and so do not call themselves bughat.

With such people, the first thing to do is not incriminate and punish them immediately but listen to them, persuade them and let them surrender. Sometimes, this approach ends up a failure, and the dialogue is broken. Then, you must fight and beat them. But even then, you do not fight as the legitimate side, the side of rule and order, good over evil. In the Islamic concept of bughat, revolts always have their reasons and deserve to be heard. So you adopt the same attitude in fighting. So I used the word bughat instead of terrorism because I believe there is something we can learn from the classic law of Islam, and not because I think it is better to explain today's terrorism as bughat. I hope I have answered your question.

(Shiojiri)　Thank you. Professor Johnson, any more comments or questions?

Other questions, please? You were raising your hand earlier.

(Miichi)　My name is Miichi. I am from Japan. Since this morning, we have been listening to talks and discussions about religion, especially about Islam and its being a religion of peace, and about religion being essentially unrelated to violence and war.

I think it is indeed so, and I agree with the view that the Muslim community, umma, is getting unfair treatment and, as has been repeatedly said, that Musilm extremists do not necessarily represent umma. Still, we cannot deny the fact that there is excessive violence, even when we consider the tenant that violence may be used in self-defense.

Professor Nakata said that the first thing to do with those who are opposed to the Islamic law is persuade them. I think this is indeed what should be done when different interpretations of the law are allowed.

I do research on the Indonesian politics. I sometimes interview Indonesians with radical tendencies, and when I talk with them on a personal basis, almost 100% of them say that 9/11 and the Bali bombing that happened two years ago have no legitimacy under Islamic law. However, it is very rare for such people to make public statements condemning violent acts committed in connection with Islam or in the name of Islam.

In view of such a situation, I think, although Muslim scholars and political leaders are naturally entitled to make statements to criticize the outside world about extremely unfair treatment of the Muslim community, they should also show a firm attitude toward violence within their community and declare it anti-Islamic. Otherwise, Islam will not be able to fully contribute to peace.

I am not a Muslim myself; I am just an outside observer. Still, I would like to ask, from my personal point of view, if the leaders of the Muslim community should also assume their responsibility to maintain peace in the name of their religion.

(Shiojiri)　Thank you.

I think that Professor Syamsuddin is the right person to answer this question, concerning excessive violence in the Muslim community, directly observed in Indonesia, and the contribution that Muslim leaders can make to alleviate the situation.

(Syamsuddin)　Thank you, Miichi-san, on Indonesian Islam: Islam in politics in Indonesia. I think our stand is very clear, theologically as we believe in Islam as a religion of peace. To the current situation, especially in the post-September 11th, 2001 and also the Bali bombing, the Marriott Hotel bombing in Indonesia and others, we do issue a statement, especially from the organization the Indonesian Council of Ulama.

As a matter of fact there is consensus among the 60 nationwide Islamic organizations in the country, so not the MUI (Indonesian Council of Ulama) alone. Because number one, the statement should be read comprehensively, we strongly condemn any kind of terrorism, but always missed by the media there is poignant statement that we appeal to the Muslims to prepare themselves for the bad implications for the United States attack on Afghanistan.

As far as the Bali bombing is concerned, for example, we set up an independent commission consisting of experts on bombing, chemistry, physics, nuclear, from the PhD holders from European universities. They found that the explosive materials in the Bali bombing

was so high that it could not have made use of C4 RDX. So it is impossible for those people to confess to engaging in that Bali bombing; the perpetrators of that action to have the ability to make use of such high-explosive materials.

So we do suggest to our government and intelligence to conduct thorough and sound investigation of possibility of the employment of external power, external maybe intelligence or power. And because these people were not well known in Indonesia, they were returnees of Afghanistan; they were recruited sometime in the '80s or the end of the '80s to go to Afghanistan and the sites in Malaysia and others.

So we do not deny that there was a terror action in the country, and we do not deny that there were several Muslims participating in those terror actions. But what we want is a just and thorough and sound investigation about the possibility. Though I do not subscribe to the conspiracy theory, there is a possibility about the collaboration of both the power, force domestically and international. So this is our position. Why? We are in a very crucial situation, especially after the collapse of the New Order regime, the Suharto regime in Indonesia and we begin the era of reform. The nation is in multicrises, multidimensional, multilevel of multicrises and the phase of transition is continuing in the country.

So really it is a fragile society, so we do not want the internal conflict within our community, as the outsider divide us into liberal, radical and then moderate, by making use of such categorizations, which in our feeling is really violent, because sometimes a language is violent.

So we do not want, and many envoys from the outside came to see me at the Council, especially the special advisor to the White House, a special advisor to the Australian Prime Minister, and insist to us to confront the radicals. In our opinion, the so-called radical groups consist of more than 60, Laskar's front committees were the product of the reform era, because in the past regime, the New Order regime, Suharto regime, liberty was a very expensive thing, and there was no liberty among our society. And many Indonesian leaders established political parties, but some like those young people did not establish political parties, but they established Laskar front committee league, more than 60 such organizations or groups in Jakarta itself.

But I do not agree if sociologists observe or categorize them as political radicalists, because in my closer observation of them, maybe they fall into the category of ethical radicalism. Because they have high sensitivity toward all kinds of immoralities produced by secularization, and established Islam the large organization did not show their response.

So maybe with exception to a few organizations like Laskar *Jihād* or Islam Defense Front which engage in anarchism, but the rest of these groups, it is true, it is

ethical radicalism. This is our own internal problem within the Muslim community, but we have our own way to solve the problem.

We can now, because there is a great obsession among the groups to establish the Islamic *Sharia*, as Dr. Svartvik was asking. We have a discussion with the groups and asking them what do you mean by the *Sharia* and establishment of the *Sharia* in the country. And when they answered that *Sharia* is Islamic law and mentioning criminal law, we do not agree with them from the mainstream of Islam in Indonesia, because we understand Islam is not only Sharia.

So we do not agree with Sharia in the sense of law or criminal law, because it is a reduction to Islam. So what kind of theocentrisms we need to build, not only within the Muslim community, but other religious communities, is theocentrisms which emphasize ethical and moral codes of conduct, which emphasize elements of religion. So, not through legalistic, formalistic approach, but rather such substantive approaches emphasizing ethical and moral values.

(Shiojiri)　Thank you. Professor Zikmund, please.

(Zikmund)　I am Barbara Brown Zikmund; I am from the United States. I am teaching here in Japan right now. Unfortunately I cannot be here tomorrow, and perhaps this question is better asked in the sessions tomorrow, but I need to ask it today. My question is about the special kind of violence known as "martyrdom" or "self-sacrifice," and its role in interfaith relations.

All of the monotheistic religions have a prohibition against killing, against murder. Most of them are against suicide or self-sacrifice or martyrdom. Yet many of our traditions celebrate martyrdom. I am an historian of Christian history, and I know that there are sayings and memories in Christian history about martyrdom. It is said that "the blood of the martyrs are the seeds of the Christian church." Christians quote the saying about Jesus: "Greater love has no man than this, than to lay down his life for his friends."

These are very powerful symbolic messages in our traditions about dying for your beliefs. Yet the teachings of our religious traditions say that murder and suicide are not allowed. So how do we reconcile these two? We want to say ultimate commitment requires a passion that is so great that you give everything to it. Faith in the cause is more than your life, your passion is deeper than your life, and the future is more important than the present. The cosmic time that Professor Juergensmeyer talked about this morning invites us to do things now for a better tomorrow.

So how do these monotheistic religions build a culture that deals with this situation of martyrdom or self-

sacrifice? This is a very powerful force. Within all of the monotheistic traditions there are beliefs that support killing, and also traditions that deny killing. I hope that we can talk more about the tension between the prohibition against murder and the encouragement of self-sacrifice.

(Shiojiri) Thank you. May I ask Professor Nakata to answer that question?

(Nakata) I think Professor Kuftaro or other Muslim scholars are more qualified than myself.

(Shiojiri) Then, Dr. Kuftaro, please.

(Kuftaro) As for the issue of suicide or martyr attacks, there is no evidence of such attacks in the age of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him) of Islam. In modern times, however, such attacks have taken place. The global community condemns these acts on the grounds that they are suicides. Needless to say, suicide is not the right thing to do. However, aside from the question of whether or not such attacks are acceptable, we should turn our attention to the tragedy of a man whose land is occupied, whose house is destroyed and who is stripped of property. Under such circumstances, what should we expect him to do? If a cat is kept in confinement in a room for three days without any water or food, we will find a savage beast there when we open the door after three days.

We tend to condemn martyr attacks as acts of barbarism, saying that someone committed suicide involving other people. Instead, we need to think of the background to his suicide. From the viewpoint of Islam, however, a suicide is not tolerated for any reason. For our lives are planted by God within us, and God has entrusted us with our lives and ordered us to protect them. On the day of reckoning, God will judge how we have treated our lives.

Nevertheless, let me reiterate that we must turn our eyes to the tragedy of a man who has been deprived of everything. I would say that a man who blows himself up and involves other people does so because of the distressing circumstances around him. He chooses to put an end to his life and go to another world, where, he believes, his own existence will be recognized and God will judge between him and those who victimized him in the lower world. There was no concept of a martyrdom attack either in the days when the Prophet of Islam lived or in the days when the Caliph lived. But we would like to emphasize this. I am the head of the largest Islamic organization in the Middle East, and we will reproach such attacks for any reason if the attack is against civilians. Meanwhile, there is a justifiable resistance than the occupying power. Since the resisters

do not have weapons to use to fight against the occupying power, they plant explosives in their belts to blow up themselves and this involves combatants of the occupation authorities. However, the killing of civilians is a criminal act, which will be condemned on the day of reckoning. Examples of such killings include the 9/11 attack, the bombing in Bali and the killing of Jewish civilians in Tunisia.

(Shiojiri) Thank you. Now, Mr. Alizadeh, please.

(Alizadeh) I am Abdol-Reza Alizadeh from the University of Tehran (Iran). I am studying law and sociology and several years in Islamic law. I would like to declare my opinion about the topic as a participant participating in this workshop for increasing my understanding.

In final analysis, I as a Muslim researcher declare that even though religion sometimes may cause some violent activities, not as a religion, but as a faith, a belief. Religion is a faith and faith is one kind of potentiality, one kind of power. Generally speaking, the faith may come from nationality, religion, philosophy, ideology, and even insanity.

Faith is a power or potentiality and therefore, may cause hostility and conflict between human beings. Power is our problem, not religion. Power, even nationally or international should be conditioned and restricted. The most of national powers (ie. national sovereignty) conditioned deliberately or by the force, even by humanistic, altruistic, and moralistic forces of the world, that merely believe in reason and science. Now, one thing has remained: the restricting and conditioning of power in the international sphere of social and human life. A French proverb has been said "Power spoils, and absolute power absolutely spoils," and there is not in French literature "religion spoils." In addition, according to sociological studies (particularly in the conflict theory) war and violation, as well as crime is inevitable, and comes from the human relationships. Therefore, we can not escape from the war, conflict, hostility, and violation.

Finally, we should firstly recommend the people that prevent themselves and the others from "war and violation". The religion (particularly Islam) emphasized on this recommendation. Secondly, when a war takes place, it must be a war between human beings, and should be under ethics (human moral rules). Also the religion emphasized on these moral principles.

Therefore, what is the charge of religion? This is my question, what is the charge of religion in our complicated and meaningless world? In my opinion, we should try to restrict and condition the total and unrestricted power that is the main danger for the human life.

(Shiojiri) Thank you. Professor Hanafi, please.

(Hanafi) I wish also that our friends from Israel would answer, but let me be very clear and specific. This morning we asked what would be the English term for jihād. Thomas Aquinas spoke of just war. We in our contemporary Islamic thought, we spoke of defensive war. We spoke also lately on liberation war. Then, the best term would be liberation struggle, liberation national movements which is one of the legitimate rights according to the United Nation charter. If you are occupied then jihād is only a liberation war if somebody is occupying the land of others; not jihād against the Muslims, and not jihād means aggressive war against anyone who did nothing for you, but only when you are occupied and there is no other means by which you can liberate yourself except by what we call war.

But my question is the following: the same thing with suicide bombers. This is a bad translation of the martyrdom operations. Let me take the case of Israel and the Palestinians. We have three types of Israelis: the soldiers who are occupying the Palestinian land, and there is no way by which neither the application of the United Nations resolutions, neither the road map to divide the Old Palestine into two states.

Until now the West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem are occupied. No one is doing anything. The balance of power is in favor of Israel. The only thing left for the freedom fighters is suicide bombing. They do not have Apaches, they do not have F-16s, they do not have bombs, they do not have tanks. Then they are offering their lives as the maximum they may have.

The settlers are militarized civilians living in settlements, and they are seeming soldiers, that is why to fight them by the Palestinians who are kicked out of their homes, this is also a legitimate right. The civilians, surely they are maybe innocent, but the civilians also, when Israel is bombing the civilians in Gaza, in the West Bank. Now the jihād and Hamas are reacting by another bombing of the civilians.

Bloodshed from both sides created a certain kind of balance of power, and we are very mature for peace because everyone is losing innocent civilians from both sides. Everyone is tired, everyone has a moral consciousness concerning these innocent civilians, bombed from both sides. That is why it may create a certain kind of balance of power, not on the material level, but on the psychological level. That is why it is really our duty for those who are eager for peace is to appreciate those who are offering their lives for the sake of letting future generations live for peace.

(Shiojiri): Thank you, Professor Hanafi.

Since out time is limited, instead of directly moving to an answer, I would like to invite another question.

Professor Pappe, please.

(Pappe) My name is Ilan Pappe from Haifa in Israel. I would like to echo the words of Professor Hanafi, and to caution against dealing with martyrdom as the most important and attractive phenomenon, and definitely I would not advise it to be the crucial issue to be discussed tomorrow as an important issue.

I think there is something very sensational about it, there is something which echoes the current media images of Islam, which are connected to martyrdom as if everything else which is done around the world is not as bloody, as atrocious, and as incomprehensible as a human behavior as the suicide bombs. So I would rather not focus on it.

On the contrary, I think that what we should focus on is within this context of suicide bombs or whatever we call it, is on two issues: the first issue is to ask ourselves what is the difference of the acts of violence which are perpetrated by various groups and individuals. Why do we pay attention to a certain form of violence, and we neglect other forms of violence. Why should we only focus about the interpretation of jihād? Let us focus on the interpretation of terrorism: State terrorism, individual terrorism. Is occupation a lesser form of terrorism than the war against occupation? Is it not the fact that in most cases where we are talking about Islamic terror we are talking about an act against a violence perpetrated against someone?

Now the act against violence can be also very violent and reprehensible and repugnant, but nonetheless, we should remember that it is not born in a vacuum. Let us not adopt this essentialist view of Islam that out of the blue Muslims around the world are becoming violent. They are becoming violent because someone inflicted violence upon them, and the case of Israel and Palestine is a good case in point.

Do we want to focus on the suicide bombers, or do we want to focus on the occupation that bred the suicide bombers? Do we want to focus on the religious Muslim person who may or may not violate a precept of Islam by committing suicide, I am not an expert in Islam, so I do not know if it is that problematic for a Muslim to commit suicide. Why should we not focus about the religious Jew who sits in an F-16 and kills more people with one bomb than any suicide bomber would dream to kill in 50 subsequent bombs? Is he not a religious person who committed an act of violence by throwing a bomb on a concentration of houses? In fact, is he not more cowardly by making sure that he himself will not die in the operation because he sits in the cockpit of an F-16? Is that not a luxury to have such a thing? And yet in our images he is more moral. Why? Because he is Westernized? Because he does not kill himself? That makes him better? In fact I have more appreciation for people who kill themselves in the action than

people who sit in an F-16 and drive home afterwards, after landing, going back to their families as if nothing happened.

This kind of killing happened in Europe, where people happily lived on without even inflicting any pain on themselves after doing terrible things to others. So I think that if we focus on the act itself, which seems to capture the headlines, we are going to miss the point, and the point is in fact that it is nationalism rather than religion that turns in the case of Judaism for example, religion into a force that sanctions violence.

Did Judaism sanction violence before the creation of the state of Israel? Was Judaism a religion that gave credence and credibility and legitimacy for occupation, colonization, expulsion, before it turned into a national movement? Can anybody give me an example from 70AD to 1882 of any Jewish scholar who in any way talked about violence?

And I can give you ample examples after 1882, when in the name of Judaism you are allowed to expel, to colonize, to occupy, even to execute people. This is an important question: what nationalism did to the monotheistic religions, rather than what monotheistic religions do to human beings. Thank you.

(Shiojiri) Thank you. Professor Syamsuddin, please.

(Syamsuddin) I am very interested in the sympathy from Professor Pappe and the idea I think is that one concept in religion should be understood in its context without leaving the context. Because the very essence of the terminology in, I do not know, I do not think only in religion but also in other fields of sciences, the context is very important.

I am not from the legal Islamic law background, but in response to the question about self-sacrifice, istishhad in Arabic right, seeking for martyrdom, I read that one famous Muslim jurist today, Dr. Kordovim concluded that it is allowed in Islam for istishhad. In the case of the media call it suicide bombing, but I read it from other sources, *"istishhad"* the bomb of the martyrdom. That brings many jurists in other countries,

including in Indonesia our Committee of Fatwa within the Indonesian Council of Ulama, to discuss the issue and come out with a conclusion that there are two central doctrines of Islam.

Number one, *istishhad*, issue of martyrdom, and also the prohibition of pessimism, to kill oneself "let us not do". The other consolation from our Council, from our Committee of Fatwa that istishhad is prohibited in Islam, I mean killing oneself, sorry not istishhad; killing oneself without any reason, it does not fit the criteria of istishhad, seeking for martyrdom, to kill oneself.

Because life is very important as good a creature as created by God, *Allāh*, but there are two things if the istishhad, seeking martyrdom in the dar al-harb, such as in Palestine or maybe in Iraq, it is a different thing, because the criteria from the Koran is driving, that the Muslims were driven forth from their homeland.

But in other fields, because we are facing the arguments from Muslim terrorists in the country, Muslim radicalists in Indonesia, that kind of martyrdom, suicide bombing like in the Bali blast, there was one person killed himself with the bomb at the first blast, the first bombing. So our response, it is not allowed in Islam, because Indonesia is not dar al-harb, is not a body of war, rather a body of peace, dar es-salam. Thank you.

(Shiojiri) Thank you, Professor Syamsuddin. Many of you must be feeling that you still have so much to say and so much to share, that your questions have deepened, or that you have more questions and difficulties than when you have arrived here today. In any case, if we could, with this symposium as a new beginning, have such occasions for dialogues in the future, I believe that mutual understanding between Islam and the other monotheist religions will deepen.

I would like to thank our speakers, Professor Nakata, Professor Syamsuddin, and Dr. Borujerdi. Thank you very much. My thanks also go to our commentators, Dr. Svartvik, Mr. Shahrir Hashim, Professor Tomita, and Professor Echigoya; thank you very much.

This concludes Session 2 for today. Thank you.

Feb. 21(Sat.)
Workshop: Session 3

War/Violence and Christianity

The Just War Idea in Historical Tradition and Current Debate: a Summary

Rutgers University James Turner Johnson

The Just War tradition constitutes the main line of moral thought in western culture on the justification of resort to armed force and the proper use of such justified force. Though historically it has been shaped by non-religious as well as religious sources, it is possible to separate out the religious elements, and here I focus on these.

Though the deep roots of the just war idea reach much earlier, a coherent tradition of thought and practice did not coalesce until the medieval period. Specifically, this coalescence began in the mid-twelfth century and, so far as Christian doctrine was concerned, was substantially settled by the time of Thomas Aquinas, a century and a quarter later. The conception thus defined, just war tradition in its classic form is illustrated in Figure 1.

The conditions for the just resort to force (later called the jus ad bellum) consisted of four requirements: sovereign authority, just cause, and right intention in two senses: avoidance of wrong motivations such as personal gain, the desire to inflict cruelty or to dominate, or implacable hatred of the enemy, and the positive aim of establishing peace.

The first requirement, that only sovereign authority could use force justly, followed from assumptions about the responsibilities of political rule: that the sovereign is responsible for creating and maintaining a just order within the political community, and thus establishing a state of peace. Under the conditions of history, in which sin and injustice remain, the ruler might have to employ force to do this. This was stated in a favorite biblical text of medieval just war theorists, Romans 13:4: "Do not fear the prince, because he is the minister of God for your good, to come in wrath to punish the evildoer." So the first mark of just warfare, as conceived classically in Christian just war thought, is that it must be undertaken only under the authority of a sovereign, one responsible for the public good, and as a tool toward achieving and maintaining that good.

But a sovereign might use force only with just cause and with a right intention in the two senses already identified and explained. Just cause, as conceived here, meant any or all of these three reasons: to defend the common good, to retake things wrongly taken, and to punish evildoers. The classic definition of just cause

thus points back to the sovereign's fundamental responsibility for the entise good of the political community its members, and for the framework within which political communities in general might exist and prosper.

Another part of the classical tradition were two kinds of efforts that limit the use of force in a just war (later called the jus in bello): noncombatant immunity by lists of persons who normally do not take part in war and bans on certain types of weapons deemed especially cruel. Both of these approaches to restraining conduct in war have been taken up in the international law of armed conflicts.

Let me now compare this classic conception to two contemporary versions of Christian just war thought: those of Paul Ramsey and of United States Catholic bishops.

Two books published by Ramsey in the 1960's (War and the Christian Conscience, published in 1961, and The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility, published in 1968) provide a landmark in recent Christian just war thinking. Here Ramsey offers a concept of just war based in the idea of Christian love of one's neighbor, and idea which, he args, both justifis the use of force by Christians and limits it. (See Figure 2.) To prevent unjust harm to the neighbor, Ramsey argues, love of that neighbor justifies (and even may require) the use of force in order to protect one's neighbor. At the same time, love of the attacker as also a neighbor whom one must love implies restraint: one may not use more force than necessary to prevent the intended harm, and one must direct the force used only against those persons actually engaged in causing or threatening the harm. Ramsey expresses this line of thinking as the principle of discrimination: the obligation, in love, to use force directly and intentionally only against combatants, and not to harm noncombatants both directly and intentionally. Ramsey grants that, under the rule of double effect, there might be occasions when noncombatants might be harmed indirectly and unintentionally. But, args love requires, Ramsey, that persons not engaged in making war not be targeted in war.

Ramsey also introducs a second principle of limitation, which he represents as not drawn from love but from reason: the principle of proportionality. But there is also a sense in which this principle derives from love,

since one should not do to the enemy more than what is needed to subdue him or prevent him from doing the harm he intends. In any case, for Ramsey these two principles each defining limits on the use of force, along with his basic reasoning about when resort to force is justified, defins a just war idea rooted in Christian love of one's neighbor. Ramsey has comparatively little to say about the problem of the resort to armed force, regarding this as a problem for political judgment and not Christian ethical reflection. Reearding the problem of moral conduct in war, though, his thinking has had an enormous effect. Subsequent moral discourse on war routinely refers to the principles of discrimination and proportionality, and not to lists of noncombatants and weapons bans.

My second example of contemporary Christian thought is the concept of just war as defined by the United States Catholic bishops (in two slightly different versions) (Figure 3): that of their widely disseminated pastoral letter, "The Challenge of Peace" (1983), and that of a later statement, "The Harvest of Justice Is Sown in Peace" (1993). While there are internal differences, it is more important for our purposes are to note the distinctive features common to both but different from the other conceptions of just war already described.

The first is the postulate that Catholic just war tradition begins with a "presumption against war" (1983), or a more general "presumption against the use of force" (1993), with the corollary that the just war criteria function to override this presumption in specific cases. This fundamentally changes the nature and meaning of the just war idea from that of classic just war thought, where force in itself is morally neutral and uses of force take their moral character from the circumstances surrounding them.

The second new feature is the bishops' introduction of several prudential criteria which, individually and collectively, reinforce the "presumption against war" idea: that requirements resorting to force be a last resort (interpreted as meaning that all other alternatives must have been actually tried and have failed, and not that they must have been considered), that it must have reasonable hope of success, and that it must be proportionate in terms of the overall good done versus destruction that it causes. In practice, the United States Catholic bishops have used the criterion of proportionality in the jus ad bellum sense to reinforce the idea that modern war is inherently disproportionate due to its destructive potential.

Together these features redefine the just war idea to have to do fundamentally with restraining the evil deemed inherent in war, rather than, as in classic just war thought, having to do with a government's responsibility to oppose and punish evildoing in order to ensure justice. Theis redefined position leaves open the possibility of a just war, but also makes clear that such a war is itself an evil to be avoided, if at all possible.

Contemporary religious just war discourse is thus framed by the parameters of these three versions of just war: the classic conception, Ramsey's conception, and that of the United States Catholic bishops.

JOHNSON, James T. (1938-) is Professor of department of Religion, Rutgers University . His many books includes *The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions,* College Park: Pen State University Press, 1997. and *Morality and Contemporary Warfare,* New York: Yale University Press, 1999.

FIGURE 1
THE JUST WAR TRADITION
IN CLASSIC FORM

The Jus ad Bellum: Criteria Defining the Right To Resort to Force

Sovereign Authority: Reservation of the right to employ force to persons or
communities with no political superior.

Just Cause: one or more of the following
Defense: of the common good, of the innocent against armed
attack
Retaking persons, property, or other values wrongly taken
Punishment of evildoers

Right Intention: two senses
Negatively, as evils to be avoided in war,
including hatred of the enemy, implacable
animosity," "lust for vengeance", and "desire to
dominate."
Positively, the aim of producing peace.

The *Jus in Bello*: Criteria Defining Right Conduct when Employing Force

Noncombatant Protection/Immunity:
Lists of persons not to be spared the harm of war (e.g., women,
children, the aged, the infirm, and others deemed unable to
wage war; also such groups as clergy, merchants, peasants on
the land, and other people in activities not related to the prose-
cution of war).

Limits on Means:
Attempts to limit weapons deemed to be indiscriminate or
unnecessarily harmful; days allowed for fighting

FIGURE 2
THE JUST WAR TRADITION
IN CLASSIC FORM

Love of one's neighbor and the Christian use of force:
Love of the innocent neighbor as the source of permission and (the
sometimes) obligation in order to use force to protect that neighbor

Love of the guilty neighbor as the source of the obligation to use no
more force than necessary against the guilty while protecting the
innocent

The *jus in bello* principles*:*
Discrimination: the obligation never to use force against innocents
directly and intentionally

Proportionality: the obligation to use no more force than necessary in
order to achieve just end

The rule of double effect:
One may never directly or intentionally do harm to an innocent per-
son; yet because a good act may have bad effects, it is allowable to
harm innocents indirectly and unintentionally when directly and
intentionally aiming at a legitimate target.

FIGURE 3
THE JUST WAR CRITERIA
AS DEFINED BY U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS:

A) THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE (1983)

PRESUPPOSITION: There is a "presumption against war."

Jus ad Bellum:

Just Cause: To confront "a real and certain danger": to protect innocent life in order to preserve conditions necessary for decent human existence and to secure basic human rights

Competent Authority: "In the Catholic tradition the use of force has always been joined to the common good: war must be declared by those with responsibility for public order."

Comparative Justice: relative levels of right on both sides of a dispute; whether sufficient right exists to override the presumption against war

Right Intention: "War can be initiated only for the reasons set forth above as a just cause": during conflict, pursuit of peace and reconciliation, avoidance of unnecessary destruction, and in unreasonable conditions.

Last Resort: "For resort to war to be justified, all reasonable alternatives must have been exhausted."

Probability of Success: No use of force is permitted witteel when the outcome will be "either disproportionate or futile"; yet "at times defense of key values, even against great odds, may be a 'proportionate' witness."

Proportionality: "The damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to the good expected by taking up arms."

Jus in Bello:

Proportionality: Avoidance of "escalation to broader or total war" or "to the use of weapons of horrendous destructive potential."

Discrimination: "The principle prohibits directly intended attacks on non-combatants and non-military targets."

FIGURE 3
THE JUST WAR CRITERIA
AS DEFINED BY U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS:

B) "THE HARVEST OF JUSTICE IS SOWN IN PEACE" (1993)

PRESUPPOSITION: "The just-war tradition begins with a strong presumption against the use of force and then establishes the conditions when this presumption may be overridden for the sake of preserving the kind of peace which protects human dignity and human rights."

Jus ad Bellum:

Just Cause: "Force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation of the basic rights of whole populations."

Competent Authority: "To override the presumption against the use of force the injustice suffered by one party must significantly outweigh that suffered by the other."

Legitimate Authority: "Only duly constituted public authorities may use deadly force or wage war."

Right Intention: "Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose."

Probability of Success: "Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success."

Proportionality: "The overall destruction expected from the use of force must be outweighed by the good to be achieved."

Jus in Bello:

Noncombatant Immunity: "Civilians may not be the object of direct attack, and military personnel must take due care to avoid and minimize indirect harm to civilians."

Proportionality: "Efforts must be made to attain military objectives with no more force than is militarily necessary and to avoid disproportionate collateral damage to civilian life and property."

Right Intention: "The aim . . . must be peace with justice, so that acts of vengeance and indiscriminate violence . . . are forbidden."

Christianity, Violence, and The Peace Imperative

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Over the last ten years increasing attention has been given to the potential connections between religion and violence, especially since the growth of international terrorism. A whole new field of studies has come into existence, and this workshop provides further evidence of developments in this area. During recent years, violent incidents have occurred within very different religions and cultures, so that the question arises of how do religious teachings and practices fuel violent action. Some argue that increasing global violence has nothing to do with religion but is caused by political and economic factors, whereas others take the view that religion is part of the problem of violence and therefore must also be part of finding a solution in order to counteract violence.

At an international conference more than ten years ago, I remember taking part in debating a motion that "interreligious unity and peace are impossible" since religions divide people more than unite them, due to their different truth claims, their different ways of living, their support of ethnic and religious antagonism, and due to and their teachings which promote hatred, conflict, even violence and/or war. Scholars have particularly pointed to the intransigeance of monotheistic religions where the outsiders, the "others", are often seen as being in error and therefore are either excluded by force or included by force, through conversion. If there exists a phenomenon of religious violence we must analyse it in detail, examine and explain its causes, find its perpetrators and victims. But we also need to enquire what resources religions possess for the overcoming of violence and the transformation of violent into non-violent behaviour. Given the growing militarisation around the world, the ever more refined technological possibilities of destroying lives, property and the environment, the increasing occurrence of numerous regional conflicts and wars, the growing nuclear capability and the possibility to extinguish life on earth, peace is no longer simply an optional alternative to violence, but it takes on the character of an urgent imperative, an absolute necessity, if humanity and the planet are to have a worthwhile future at all.

In 2001, I was part of an international jury for a German prize in contextual theology and philosophy, to be awarded by a Christian aid agency for a full-length article on "Religions and Violence", submitted by postdoctoral theology students from different countries. When the topic for this competition was first announced, the description ran as follows:

Nowadays, a large number of national and international conflicts have a religious character: Northern Ireland, Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda, Afghanistan, Indonesia, etc. are examples of a disquieting phenomenon. Are religions the cause of violence, or do they act as peacemakers? To what degree are religions in danger of causing violence? Is the root of the problem religion itself, or is it the use of religion as a mere instrument to achieve certain goals? Which role do religions play in the emergence and the surmounting of violence? Which basic rules have to be observed in this context? What are the consequences of the intractable reality of violence for theology and philosophy?[1]

However, the list of countries mentioned in this passage is far from complete; we could add several others, for example Israel and Iraq. The central issue of this statement, relating to religion as an instrument, cause or contributor to both violence and peace, is at the heart of what I want to say. I cannot look at these issues from a wider, comparative context here, but I will mainly concentrate on Christianity in dealing with the following three topics:

1. Religious motivation for conflict, aggression and violence;
2. The Bible as a book of war and peace;
3. The peace imperative and some practical efforts toward peace-making.

1. Religious motivation for conflict, aggression and violence

Conflict, aggression and violence are considered an evil besetting human lives in all cultures. But why does such evil exist? Where does it come from? Religious and philosophical thought, mythological and folk stories, have all provided countless examples for answering these questions. In both Judaism and Christianity the origin of evil, and the many different forms of suffering arising out of human conflict, aggression and violence, are ascribed to human disobedience, symbolically expressed in the Genesis story of Adam's and Eve's primordial transgression. In Hinduism and Buddhism, by contrast, a strong link is perceived between suffering and ignorance, due to our true nature being hidden from us. We are tied to an almost endless chain of evil through our desires and cravings which

create greed, hatred and illusion–"three fires" which are endemic to the human situation. It is an explicit aim of Buddhist meditation practice to extinguish these three entities and replace them by their opposites—generosity, love and insight. Ultimately, however, only an inner illumination or enlightenment can free us from a false view of the world and a false clinging to the self. I do not think any religion teaches that human beings are inexorably aggressive. The diagnosis is that human beings engage in aggression and violence, thereby inflicting much suffering on each other, through the basic imperfection of their nature, their incompleteness, brokenness, self-centredness and ignorance as well as through envy, pride and lust—attitudes of the human mind and heart which in Christian theology are traditionally classified as "sins", understood as purposeful disobedience to the will of God. This implies, to some extent, the responsibility of human beings for their own actions. Thus it comes as no surprise that many religions know some form of a regular "confession of sins" or the explicit admission of wilful wrongdoing and the guilt associated with this. Yet the mystery of evil far transcends individual human action and guilt. Writing about the symbolism of evil, Paul Ricoeur has said that "each of us finds evil already present in the world; no one initiates evil but everyone has the feeling of belonging to a history of evil more ancient than any individual evil act. This strange experience of passivity, which is at the very heart of evildoing, makes us feel ourselves to be the victims in the very act that makes us guilty" (1987: 200).

The experience of some overwhelming powers of evil, these which can overcome and strangle us, is particularly strong in the encountering of violence. Violence is both a particular form of human wrongdoing and a cancerous structure which afflicts us beyond individual and collective acts of violence. One of the most extreme and dangerous forms of violence that human beings inflict on each other is the deliberate killing of other fellow beings, especially in war. What have religions to say about this extreme form of aggression? Do they strive to counteract it, or do they foster, legitimate or even cause violence and war?

Several contemporary examples come immediately to mind where one can answer this question with a clear "yes". Religious beliefs and practices have frequently contributed to causing dissent, aggression and war. The existing diversity of competing and even contradictory religious worldviews with their absolute, mutually exclusive claims to truth are a genuine source of profound tensions; they create conflicts which can lead to violence and war. Some defenders of religion argue that religion is only superficially responsible for this, whereas the real reason for any military aggression is the difference in political and economic power, and the competitive struggle for chronically scarce resources. Many thinkers also consider human aggression as

innate; they point out that violence has always existed in all human societies, so that the rare exceptions of non—aggressive and pacifist societies are much more in need of explanation than violence. Many have been the debates over whether aggression, violence and war are natural and inevitable, or whether they are a culturally learned response which can be avoided if only we could reform ourselves and educate human beings differently.

There is no doubt that throughout history religions have played a most important role in war, and religious justifications for violent actions have been legion. Far from abolishing wars, religions have integrated them into their symbolic universe by ritualising and even absolutising them. Yet scholarly work on religion has so far been more concerned with the irenic and community-building characteristics of religion than with its destructive power in promoting dissent, guilt, violence and war. Today, more than ever, we are greatly in need of a phenomenological analysis of the religious attitudes, ideas and institutional processes leading to violent actions resulting in human aggressions, conflict and war.

In the small but insightful study on War and Peace in the World's Religions (1977), the Christian pacifist John Ferguson came to the conclusion that whilst Christianity and Buddhism have been the most clearly pacifist religions in their origins and essence, both have been deeply involved with militarism from an early stage in their history. By contrast, Zoroastrianism, Islam and Shinto have been clearly militarist in their origins and essence, and yet they have also produced figures of reconcili-ation and peace. Of Christianity he writes: "The historic association of the Christian faith with nations of commercial enterprise, imperialistic expansion and technological advancement has meant that Christian peoples, although their faith is one of the most pacific in its origins, have a record of military activity second to none" (1977: 122).

Among Christians there have been three different historical responses to war. Pacifism was the dominant position up to the reign of Constantine when Christianity became a state religion. Until then no Christian author approved of Christian participation in battle, whereas in 314 C.E. the Council of Arles decreed that Christians who gave up their arms in time of peace should be excommunicated. The second, widely influential response was the formulation of the just-war theory, taken over from Cicero and articulated by St Ambrose and St Augustine. This theory states that Christians can legitimately participate in war provided that it is declared by a properly constituted authority and certain ethical conditions are maintained in the conduct of war. A third and further development was the idea of the crusade which emerged during the Middle Ages and was much influenced by the Hebrew concept of a holy war. The New Testament, so obviously more

International workshop

Religious Terror: Why is it Religious,
and Why is it Happening Now?

oriented towards peace than war, has been used as a justification for all three Christian responses to war- pacifism, just-war and crusade. Examining these responses Robin Gill has written: "The situation of the pre-Constantinian church appears all the more remark- able when it is realised that no major Christian Church or denomination has been consistently pacifist since Constantine. Indeed, Christian pacifism has been large- ly confined to a small group of sects, such as the Quakers, Anabaptists, Mennonites, Brethren and Jehovah's Witnesses. Further, pacifists within the churches, as distinct from sects, have in times of war been barely tolerated by their fellow Christians"(1977: 37). Conscientious objection or the refusal to give mili- tary service is treated by the larger contemporary churches as a matter of individual conscience rather than as a fundamental issue of the Christian community which requires a firm commitment regarding the churches' stance on violence and war. If we consider the central position of the Bible in both Judaism and Christianity and the importance of its teachings in the shaping of western culture, it is appropriate to examine biblical thinking about both violence and peace, and about the elimination of violence, especially in its most virulent form, as organised war between different nations.

2. The Bible as a book of war and peace

The life- and thought-world of the Bible have sus- tained the faith of countless generations; the Hebrew Bible is God's law—Torah—for Jews, and as Old and New Testament it is God's living word from which mil- lions of Christians have drawn spiritual sustenance and guidance in practical matters. The Bible has shaped many aspects of western civilization, whether in sci- ence, philosophy, theology, law or the arts. Many con- temporary secular people, even when entirely non-reli- gious, are still influenced by some ideas originally enshrined in biblical texts.

The Bible is also a book of many contradic- tions, a book of dialogue and discussion, whose words provide a record of desperate struggles for hope and a greater humanity. Over the centuries, biblical texts have been put to many different uses. Many biblical stories bear witness to the human inclination towaseds aggres- sion, conflict and violence, but they also tell of the immense potential and promise, and of the assistance of the Spirit for humans to make peace. Our present socio- political conditions around the globe make it imperative to overcome violence and seek all possible resources for creating greater peace on earth. But how far have biblical texts helped to support and sanctify violence and war?

The Hebrew Bible, which became the Old Testament for Christians, celebrates the works of a warrior God in many of its passages. Numerous are the texts which

declare the Lord's might in battle as well as his venge- ful nature. Many passages speak of the reliance on arms, sometimes leading to the total destruction of the enemy, vividly expressed in the books of Judges, Samuel and Kings. What has been called the essentially tribal God of the early section of the Pentateuch is transformed into the national God of the so-called his- torical books, with an increase in the deity's use of force in defending an expanded and well-defined terri- tory. Here we meet a people and its God embroiled in a seemingly endless series of wars.

Many are the stories of the Old Testament in which the works of a warrior God deserise a holy war against the enemies of his people, stories which proclaim God's kingship and sovereignty over the whole world. For the ancient Hebrews the reality of war was experi- enced in and attested to by history, on it later reflected upon theologically. God, the warrior, leads his people into the promised land and undertakes warfare against the enemies of his people. This idea-of the holy war- appears in the narratives of the Old Testament and in the laws governing war, as articulated in Deuteronomy 20. It has been said that the idea of the Israelite holy war has no parallel in the ancient world.**2** Such wars are described, for example, in 1 Samuel, chapters 7 and 15, and in the book of Joshua. However, after King David the wars were no longer "holy wars" of this same kind; his successors fought secular wars of conquest and defence, including the war of the Maccabees. Thus, the holy war is not the only war found in the Old Testament; there are other wars of defence, especially against the powers of Assyria and Babylonia. Yet from the earliest Chronicles onwards we also find evidence of troubled attitudes towards the frequently depicted violence, and there exist many counter references to the Old Testament texts which celebrate violence; many passages, especially among the prophets, set forth an alternative vision of peace. The prophets—Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Micah and Jeremiah—each judged mili- tary resistance as morally wrong and offensive to Yahweh. The world of the Old Testament is a world where history was under stood as a struggle and where the coming of peace promised for messianic times, an eschatological hope to be realised in the future. It has been said that

An attentive reading of the Old Testament reveals that no other activity or condition occurs more often than violence. More than six hundred passages deal explicitly with peoples, kings or other individuals attacking and killing others; about one thousand texts speak of God's wrath, which often punishes people with death and annihilation; and there are over a hun- dred instances in which God is said to order the killing of people." (Hendrickx 1988: 39, based on Lohfink 1983).

The outpouring of God's wrath is an affirmation of God's power and sovereignty, but it is also seen as

God's deliberate action to call people to repentance. Many Hebrew words imply violence yet the most important one, "hamas", can refer to three different aspects: physical violence, exploitation through robbery or commerce, and verbal abuse. These forms of oppression always refer to acts committed by the stronger against the weaker, whereas the efforts of the weaker to throw off the yoke of the stronger, of the oppressor, are never called violence. The victims of violence are Israel, the people, the stranger, the widow, the orphan and the poor, whereas the agents of violence are the different nations, kings and officials, persecu- tors, false witnesses, the rich, the priests, and judges.

However, our contemporary experience of acts of violence are quite different in character from the violent actions of ancient Near Eastern peoples described in the Bible. Biblical texts, as well as those from the scrip- tures of other religions, have to be interpreted within their specific historical and cultural contexts, so differ- ent from our own. Religious institutions have often constrained tendencies to violence through the emer- gence of the ideal of social justice and through preach- ing universal values. Whilst a value such as the idea of universal human brotherhood or of a family of humankind "cannot erase conflict, any more than pleas- ure can erase pain, . . . it may support a consensus that removes occasions for conflict" (Klausner 1987: 217).

Traditionally the participation in certain religious rites has helped individuals to develop not only courage in general, but also the special kind of courage needed to commit violent acts. From this point of view the religious blessings bestowed on warriors and armies through the ages have been of the greatest significance in fostering the psychological acceptance of what appears as the legitimate use of violent force in war. Equally important is the perception of the enemy as the "demonic other"-the "alien" outside the boundaries of one's own social and religious group, the enemy of God, the representative of a false doctrine, the agent of most hideous crimes. Littleton (1987) speaks of the "lethal redefinition" of the victim by the killer and the community that passes judgement upon the other as something less than human-a monster, beast, animal even rotting matter such as "garbage" and "trash". Verbal abuse regularly accompanies such redefinition, which establishes that the effecting on death of such an individual (or of whole groups of people) is a permissi- ble, even worthy, act. But the same author also percep- tively points to the final paradox of this pattern of vio- lence: whilst one must dehumanise one's enemies in order to employ violence against them, one must at the same time dehumanise oneself to become an instrument of slaughter, eradicating such tendencies as guilt, fear and compassion.

People have long been pessimistic about eliminating war, but for the future of humanity and the planet it is of decisive importance whether we as a species can

learn to resolve our existing conflicts without recourse to violence and war. One of the greatest religious ideals, foura in the Bible as well as in the sacred writ- ings of other religions, is the promise of the gift of peace, understood as attainable in this life. Peace is associated in all religions with the notion of spiritual well-being, with inward wholeness, freedom from per- sonal anxiety, perfection and joy. The negative defini- tions of peace as absence of disturbing desires, as free- dom from strife and war, whilst helpful, are not suffi- cient. Even when religious teaching on peace has been onesiddly "spiritualised" by being primarily related to individual interiority, there has always been a social dimension to the religious understanding of peace. It is surprising, however, that we have well-developed just- war theories whilst a fully articulated Christian theolo- gy of peace still awaits development. The discipline of "peace studies", first developed after World War II and understood in different ways, has been rightly called "the science of survival". Yet rarely do its practitioners look at the ideas or "seeds" of peace found in different religious teachings. It is most rewarding to study the challenge of peace found at the heart of different reli- gious traditions, for the experience of peace is part of the soteriological promise of a different state of exis- tence.

The Hebrew Bible contains many stories of wars, yet some of the great deliverances, such as that of the Israelites from Egypt, were achieved without violence. In fact, the idea of peace runs throughout the Hebrew scriptures, where the word shalom, the word for "peace", is found 249 times. It comes from a root meaning "wholeness" and thus is richer in meaning than our word "peace". Shalom is also very prominent in the Rabbinic tradition, where it stands for truth, jus- tice and peace. It is said that the Torah was given to make peace in the world, and one of God's names is peace. Shalom refers to both spiritual and material con- ditions. Famous is the passage from the prophet Isaiah 2:2-4, describing how the Lord will gather all nations together in peace:

"Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, to the Temple of the Lord of Jacob that he may teach us his ways so that we may walk in his paths. He will wield authority over the nations and adjudicate between many peoples; these will hammer their swords into ploughshares, their spears into sickles. Nation will not lift sword against nation, there will be no more training for war."

The images used by Isaiah in other passages to describe peace were interpreted by later traditions as being of three kinds: the peace of the river, of the bird and of the cauldron. The fullest image is that of the river (referring to Is. 66: 12), a state of being and a dynamic movement which carries with it the prosperity and love between peoples and with the Lord. The image of peace as a flying bird (Is. 31: 5) is the peace

International workshop

Religious Terror: Why is it Religious,
and Why is it Happening Now?

which is obtained by preparing for war, by maintaining an armed force to keep off, intimidate and destroy the enemy in order to protect and save a people. The Lord watches over his people like the bird that spreads its wings to protect its young. One has to be vigilant because evil is near; this is a diminished shalom indeed. An even more desperate and diminished kind of peace is that associated with the image of the cauldron (Is. 26: 11-12), a fragile peace full of anguish where divine power is poured out to the detriment of the enemy like a boiling cauldron and where one has to save one's skin and possessions. Discussing these three kinds of peace Armand Abecassis maintains:

There is the peace that comes when violence, injustice and trouble are happening to someone else; there is the peace that comes from the power to intimidate and prevent others from harming us; finally there is Shalom imaged in the river that unites, enriches and fulfils the whole human race. Peace that is just the absence of war, or the peace that exists in a cemetery are not the Shalom that comes into being when men and women strive to love each other and to see in every human person a reflection of the infinitely loving and life-giving God (1988: 14).

For the ancient Hebrews peace was a social concept; it applied to harmonious relationships within the family, local society and between nations. The greeting "shalom", in use since the time of the Judges and King David, expressed the positive aim of encouraging cooperation. Later this greeting was used by both Jews and Christians. It is worth mentioning here that the Arabic term "salaam" is etymologically related to the Hebrew "shalom", and the formula "peace be with you" has been used as a salutation and blessing among Muslims since the time of the Qur'an. "Salaam" again means more than our "peace", for it extends to contentment, good health, prosperity, security, fullness of life. Contrary to the western view which has associated Islam with military power, Muslims understand Islam to be the religion of peace, for the Qur'an sees peace as the will of *Allāh* whom it describes as "the King, the Holy, the Peaceable" (59: 23). Peace is a transcendent gift, but it is also present in personal relations and is part of wise statesmanship. Historical examples of the time of the Prophet and later show that Islam has been a considerable instrument of peace. A most remarkable modern example of Muslim commitment to peace is the Pathan Abdul Ghaffar Khan who, like Gandhi, practiced nonviolent resistance which he developed through the influence of the Qur'an.

Christians too, in spite of their violent history and theory of the just war, have a strong tradition of peace grounded in the Sermon on the Mount ("Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God", Mt. 5:9) and in Jesus's parting message to John, "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give you, not as the world gives it" (Jn. 14: 27). Christian pacifists have been inspired by Jesus's own example and what one might call the bias towards peace in the Christian gospel. The church applied the title of "prince of peace", first used for the Davidic king in the Hebrew Bible, to Jesus. The Christian liturgy often repeats the words "The peace of the Lord be always with you". It also makes much use of the prayer, "The peace of God, which passeth all understanding, keep your hearts and minds in the knowledge and love of God and of his Son, Jesus Christ our Lord". In modern times there has been a revival of the "giving of peace" at the end of celebrating the Christian eucharist, often accompanied by the shaking of hands and kissing in peace. The contemporary Christian peace movement uses the Bible as a teacher of peace, drawing particularly on Jesus's saying "love your enemies" (Mt. 5: 44; Lk. 6: 27) and on the beatitudes described in the Sermon on the Mount. Its insights have been directly applied to practical matters in the discussion of contemporary military politics by German peace campaigners whose call for peace, based on a new politics of the Sermon of the Mount, raised widespread debate.[3]

Here we have an example of using Christian ideas as a resource for contemporary thinking about peace, just as Gandhi drew on the resources of the Indian tradition in developing his practice of non-violent action in situations of conflict. The religious heritage on peace shows that peace has to be willed and aimed for, that it can be attained through the transformation of one's mind and heart as well as one's actions, that it leads to contentment, equanimity and well-being at a personal and social level whilst, and at its fullest and richest, peace is linked to the idea of perfection, of wholeness, of divine presence and the power of spirit; peace in this ultimate sense is considered a gift, a fruit of the spirit itself.

3. The peace imperative and some practical efforts toward peace-making

Today the yearning for peace is greater than ever, yet we seem to live in a permanent state of war and violence. In a Guardian article (23 February, 2002) on "War and Peace" Eric Hobsbawn argues that the past 100 years have changed the nature of war, that the world as a whole has not been at peace since 1914, and is not at peace now, and that the prospect of peace in our new century is remote. The twentieth century has been called the most murderous century in history: an estimated 187 million people have died in the numerous terrible wars since 1914. That is the equivalent of more than 10 % of what was the world's population in 1913. Interstate wars used to dominate in the past, but international wars have now declined, whereas the number of conflicts within state frontiers has risen sharply and the burden of war has increasingly shifted from armed forces to civilians. Hobsbawn writes that only 5 % of those who died during World War I were civilians, whereas this figure increased to 66 % during World War II; it is estimated that 80-90% of those affected by war today are civilians. According to another source,[4] of the 101 conflicts that occurred between 1989-1996, only six were interstate wars and all the others were territorial, tribal intra-state wars, and 80% of the countries that are cuttertly at war train children as soldiers. How can we ever achieve peace?

To quote from an article on "War", found in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought: "the more organized society becomes the more complex its wars, which naturally follow the cultural, religious, political, and technological conditions of the time. Nowadays these conditions make war potentially suicidal for humanity. Christians in the past have only interpreted war. But today the point is to prevent it."[5]

Peace is simply no longer an option; it is an imperative. Numerous individuals, groups and institutions are working to overcome and abolish war. Yet how often has the cry "Never again war!" been uttered without any effect. We desperately need a new peace consciousness and culture in the contemporary world. The attainment of greater peace, of conflict resolution in non-violent rather than violent ways, will only be possible if we put our mind and heart to it-if we want to make it happen. And that will require tremendous effort and work. Much rethinking is needed, in fact, a development of both new ideas and practices. Is it not disturbing, shocking in fact, that Christian theology has devoted so much effort to the just-war theory, but has never given the same attention to developing a theology of peace? Where can we find seeds for making peace?

Only if we take the peace imperative absolutely seriously can we survive as a global community; since the violent, destructive events of September 11 this is becoming more obvious than ever. The nature of war and violence has changed radically, so that it is no longer enough to work only for the abolition of war-violence, strife and hatred have to be addressed in all their ramifications. We have to find non-violent conflict resolutions and peaceful, non-violent ways of dealing with religious, ethnic, social, economic and political differences. To create a new peace culture in the world we need to develop a new peace consciousness among the world's citizens. This is a practical task, but it is ultimately connected to spiritual and ethical tasks, and this is why the resources of the world faiths and a spiritual outlook on life are an indispensable ingredient for developing new forms of peace education[6] and peace action, so as to nurture the growth of a peace consciousness and culture. We also need political negotiations and new peace instruments for non-violent conflict resolutions and a stronger United Nations-related global authority to control and settle armed disputes. Ultimately this requires profound attitudinal, economic and political changes. In fact, we need a radical civilizational change in the contemporary world.

Current levels of violence and wars of destruction might easily feed a profound pessimism, but there are also many signs of hope, encouraging changes of direction and new ventures which inspire a more optimistic approach in the belief that it is still possible to make our world a more peaceful place. A new vision of peace is integral to many contemporary statements and documents, and some of these draw explicitly or implicitly on religious and spiritual ideas, often drawn from Christian sources.

The Catholic ecological thinker Thomas Berry, much shaped by his deep knowledge of American native traditions, eastern religions, and the work of French thinker Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, speaks about "reinventing the human" as part of the great work that must be done in order to create a viable future on planet earth, a project that belongs to all women and men in the world. In his seminal book *The Great Work*[7] he argues that in order to develop the new world vision and dynamic required for building a viable, peaceful, ecologically balanced human future, the politics, education and financial arrangements around the globe (or governance, universities and corporations) all need fundamental restructuring. This task is impossible to achieve if humankind does not creatively draw on what Berry calls the "four wisdoms": (1) the wisdom of the classical traditions, that is to say the wisdom of traditional religions and philosophies; (2) the wisdom of native peoples; (3) the wisdom of women; (4) the much more recent and newer wisdom of science. These sources of wisdom are equally needed for developing a viable peace culture.

To mention other peace initiatives, quite a few years ago, the German philosopher, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, suggested a global Peace Council of all religions; but this proved to be premature. However, out of it arose the World Council of Churches' consultation on "Peace, Justice, and the Integrity of Creation" which widely influenced members of the Christian churches around the world. In 1991, the theologian Hans Küng published his book *Global Responsibility. In Search of a New World Ethic*,[8] which concludes with a powerful appeal to peace: "no human life together without a world ethic for the nations; no peace among the nations without peace among the religions; no peace among the religions without dialogue among the religions."[9] This effort led to much discussion and eventually produced the *Declaration Toward a Global Ethic*[10] by the Parliament of the World's Religions in Chicago 1993, a declaration that has a strong commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life, summed up in the categorical statement "There is no survival for humanity without global peace!"[11]

This commitment to a culture of non-violence and peace is reiterated in the principles of *The Earth Charter,* developed through an international consultation process and approved at UNESCO Headquarters in

International workshop

Religious Terror: Why is it Religious,
and Why is it Happening Now?

Paris in March 2000. It is a declaration of fundamental principles for building a just, sustainable, and peaceful global society in the twentieth century, drawing its inspiration, among other places, from "the wisdom of the world's great religions and philosophical traditions". Again, its call for action includes the promotion of "a culture of tolerance, nonviolence and peace" (IV. 16), and it underlines the need for "sustainability education" (IV. 14b), and "the importance of moral and spirituality education for sustainable living" (IV. 14d). The Earth Charter calls all people to "Recognize that peace is the wholeness created by rights relationships with oneself, other persons, other cultures, other life, Earth, and the larger whole of which all are a part" (IV. 16f). This is a profoundly spiritual statement which could provide an inspiring motto for a much needed peace education.[12]

The World Council of Churches' most recent response to call for peace for future generations has been to declare the decade of 2001-2010 as a "Decade to Overcome Violence". Individuals and groups in churches around the world can use its Study Guide as a basis for discussion grouped around four themes: (1) the spirit and logic of violence; (2) the use, abuse and misuse of power; (3) issues of justice; (4) religious identity and plurality. If we come to understand how these themes are interwoven, we can learn to build lasting peace grounded in justice.

The Christian witness for peace carries an evangelical mandate, an imperative to love our enemies, as expressed by St Paul in his second letter to the Corinthians:

"The love of Christ leaves us no choice…With us therefore worldly standards have ceased to count in our estimate of any person. When anyone is united to Christ, there is a new world; the old order has gone, and a new order has already begun…It is as if God were appealing to you through us: in Christ's name, we implore you: be reconciled" (2 Cor. 5: 14, 17, 20)

But, by and large, Christianity, throughout much of its past history, has rejected a radical peace witness as utterly impractical, utopian and other-worldly. Christians have often cultivated personal, inward spirituality while accepting and condoning the most inhuman, most violent political realities. Until now, Christian pacifist and peace groups have been marginal in the Christian tradition. In the global crisis of terrorism, violence and countless regional wars which threaten humanity and our natural environment, world peace is not a single, isolated issue but part of a complex of threatening problems which include political oppression, ecological destruction, mass starvation, racism, sexism and numerous human rights abuses. Jesus's gospel of love implies a holistic ethic of life which affirms the sanctity of all life, of every living being and of the whole cosmos.

Perhaps we can hear the urgent appeal of the biblical call to love and peace more clearly today once we realise that we live in one world with one shared destiny. As the Christian thinker Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, who was much inspired by the biblical vision of one creation, once wrote, life now has to be raised to a new stage for "The age of nations has passed. Now, unless we wish to perish we must shake off our old prejudices and build the earth… The more scientifically I regard the world, *the less can* I see any possible biological future for it except the active consciousness of its unity."[13] This unity can only be achieved through love and not through coercion. Teilhard de Chardin saw the global community at a new critical threshold of development, which he sometimes described as "the planetisation" (or what we might today call "the globalisation") of humankind, a search for a more integral, pluralistic and harmonious unification (and not a uniform standardization). This cannot be brought about by external forces of coercion but requires consent, cooperation and the transformative powers of altruistic love. It is remarkable how his prophetic ideas about love as a higher form of human energy for changing individuals and civilization, first developed over sixty years ago, are parallelled and developed even further in the late work of the Russian-American Harvard sociologist Pitirim A. Sorokin, whose important work on *The Ways and Power of Love* (originally published in 1954 and reprinted in 2002) is beginning to attract renewed attention.[14]

Peace is no longer an option in our global world; it is a necessity. To create a just and peaceful coexistence beyond discrimination and violence in our pluralistic world today, we need to harness the powers of love and cooperation; it also requires education, dialogue, the growth of a new awareness, and much political will for social and individual transformation. The peace imperative invites us to find and forge a new way ahead, to create a new, harmonious and just way of living for all of humankind. This is a great but arduous task for which we need all the inspiration, spiritual and practical support we can find in order to meet the greatest challenge human minds have ever met: to create true peace on earth.[15]

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5 *Brian Wicker "War" in The Oxford Companion to Christian Thought edited by Adrian Hastings, Alistair Mason and Hugh Pyper, Oxford: OUP 2000: 746-8; see p. 746 for the quotation. See also Wicker's helpful entry on "Pacifism", op. cit.: 508-9.*

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12 *For more information on the Earth Charter contact Earth Charter International Secretariat c/o Earth Council, PO Box 319-6100 San José, Costa Rica. E-mail <info@earth-charter.org> website: http://www.earthcharter.org*

13 *P. Teilhard de Chardin, Human Energy, London: Collins 1969: 37 f. The first part of this quotation is inscribed over the entrance of the School of International Relations at Georgetown University, USA.*

14 *I have compared the prophetic vision of these two thinkers in "Teilhard de Chardin's and Pitirim Sorokin's Theory of Love", Zygon 39/1, March 2004: 77-102.*

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Conflicts of Pacifism and Just War Theory: From Japanese and Christian Viewpoints

Doshisha University   Katsuhiro Kohara

1. Two Different Understandings of War: Focusing on Hiroshima

Hiroshima has different meanings for different people. For some, it has become a symbol of pacifism, while for others, it is an example of a necessary action in a just war. This fact was driven home to me in 1995 by the controversy surrounding the Enola Gay exhibit at the United States National Air and Space Museum, a division of the Smithsonian Institution. This exhibit displayed the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima. War veterans, in particular, reacted very strongly against the fact that the exhibit sought to present not only the ethical perspective of the dropping of the bomb but also that of on whom it was dropped. The exhibit, which might have been interpreted as depicting the dropping of the atom bomb as an act of mass murder, became the subject of intense criticism. The resulting controversy led to the sudden downsizing of the exhibit and the director of the museum being pressured into resigning his post.

In the perception of history held by many Americans, not only war veterans, the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima was a "necessary evil"—a necessity brought about by Japanese military aggression. This implicitly places the dropping of the atom bomb within the rationale of the just war theory.

In Japan, on the other hand, the censure of the original exhibit provoked a different kind of criticism: the feeling that the failure to communicate the enormity of the Hiroshima tragedy has led to an ongoing lack of interest and understanding. This prompted an awareness of the need to inform people more thoroughly of the actual fate suffered by the victims of the atomic bombs. Given the enormous difference between the respective perceptions of Hiroshima typically held by Americans and Japanese, however, this awareness has had a minimal practical effect.

The opposing views of Hiroshima, one seeing it as a symbol of just war and the other as an anti-war symbol, seem to set the just war theory and pacifism in opposition to one another. My purpose in this paper, however, is to illustrate the specific values of pacifism while simultaneously arguing that the just war theory and pacifism are not keep polar opposites they might seem. Just war theory has had a substantial influence not only on Christian history but also on contemporary international society. To discuss the relevance of pacifism to just war theory, I will focus on Christian pacifism and the pacifism that has emerged in Japan since the war, as symbolized by Hiroshima.

2. War and Peace in Modern Japan

2-1. Changing Understanding of War

While many in the United States have come to disapprove of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the following quotation from Robert J. Lifton suggests that approval of and even forgetfulness of the atom bombs is widespread not only among the general populace but also among theologians and religious leaders:

"But about four decades later a survey of post-Hiroshima theology found that the atomic bombings had been surprisingly ignored by theologians…There have of course been periodic condemnations of Hiroshima and of subsequent nuclear buildup from various religious sources, but generally as ethical rather than theological statements. Mainstream American religious leaders, moreover, have more often accepted the Hiroshima bomb than condemned it."

I turn now to Japanese society, which has not been greatly influenced by Christianity either before or after the war. It will become clear that attitudes toward war provide a glimpse into profound dimensions of both pre-Hiroshima and post-Hiroshima Japan.

a) Before Hiroshima: the Era of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

The American justification for dropping the bomb was to prevent the expansion of Japanese militarism. Naturally, the proponents of Japanese militarism at the time had their own perceptions and justifications for their actions. For Japan, extending Japanese hegemony into East Asia was seen as a sacred goal, the formation of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." In the dogma promoted by Japanese militarists, in order to eradicate the old world contamination of Western civilization and to bring about a new world order centered on the Japanese spirit, the "Divine Country" of Japanese history was placed on a par with the "Kingdom of God" of Western Europe. The veneration of the emperor as a God in human form was used to counter the monotheistic conception of the deity in the West. Since this Japanese belief was actually modeled on the western conception, the belief in a Divine Nation sustaining National Shinto was in fact moving towards something along the lines of the Christian "Kingdom of God."

b) After Hiroshima

The bitter experience of the Hiroshima bomb, and the risk of global war between the United States and the Soviet Union that followed, brought Japan's militaristic way of thinking to an abrupt end and led a post-war pacifism that has focused on the nuclear threat. The image of war as a final apocalyptic war (such as a nuclear war) has held so much sway that issues involving non-nuclear regional wars have consequently been neglected by the anti-nuclear peace movement. In effect, this has meant that the just war theory has hardly been considered at all. Furthermore, since the peace movement had made apocalyptic nuclear war its basic focus, after the dissolution of the cold war structure, and the increasing remoteness of the nuclear threat, discussion of peace itself also has lost a lot of steam.

2-2. Characteristics of Japanese Pacifism

Pacifism is considered a basic premise of the Constitution of Japan, drawn up after the war. The preamble of the constitution includes the following:

"We, the Japanese people, desiring peace for all time and deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationships, have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want."

The pacifism envisioned by the Japanese constitution includes, according to the definitions of violence and peace of Johan Galtung, not just a negative peace (the absence of personal violence) but also a positive peace (the absence of structural violence). Taking the view that peace cannot be achieved merely by getting rid of personal violence, Galtung expands the concept of violence in the following way: "violence is present when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations." He describes this violence as structural violence.

In light of this definition, then, the pacifism that is set as an ideal in the Japanese constitution is a positive peace that aims to overcome structural violence. This is because "tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance" and "fear and want" are precisely what is meant by "structural violence."

A further characteristic of the post-war Japanese pacifist movement is that it is an "experiential pacifism," grounded in the national experience of tragedy, vividly symbolized by Hiroshima. In other words, it is not a "conceptual pacifism" derived from philosophical reasoning but an experiential pacifism that is grounded in a history of concrete suffering and that sees all war as illegal and criminal.

3. Structural Violence and Positive Peace

3-1. Characteristics of Christian Pacifism

This experiential pacifism, seeking to overcome structural violence, has important similarities to Christian pacifism. Christian pacifism is historically premised on the experience of severe persecution. Furthermore, as a result of recent scholarly research on Jesus, the image that had been widely held of Jesus as a (supernatural) apocalyptic prophet has begun to give way, and new interest is being shown in the image of Jesus as a teacher of wisdom who showed the way toward a transformation of the world's order.

Furthermore, from the 1960s on, as represented in the thought of liberation theology and such theologians as Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg and many others, the focus has shifted toward working for social transformation, and this development has become an important dimension of Christian faith and theology. This focus has also become an important dimension of Christian pacifism, as can be seen, for example, in the thought of pacifist theologians such as H. Yoder and S. Hauerwas. According to their viewpoint, pacifism is intimately linked to a practical social ethic.

In summary, Christian pacifism must not stop at a negative peace that merely seeks the elimination of personal violence but rather must shift its emphasis to a positive peace that seeks to overcome structural violence.

This brings us back to the important question of the relationship of pacifism to the just war theory. A pacifism that concerns itself only with the elimination of personal violence (physical, armed violence) can only stand opposed to the just war theory. A pacifism that also seeks to overcome hidden structural violence, on the other hand, can take due consideration of the complexity of policy judgments inherent in the just war theory. And at the same time it can maintain a critical distance from the idea of just war, thus retaining the ability to promote humanitarian considerations.

3-2. Idolatry and Structural Violence

Next, I will point out that the prohibition against idolatry, a traditional belief common to monotheistic religions, is closely related to structural violence. The prohibition against idolatry is grounded in the fundamental identity of monotheistic religions. What we refer to as "idolatry" is the treatment of something from this world, whether it be an object or a concept created by humans, as though it were a god. In this sense, idol-

atry is nothing more than an icon–a symbolic force that justifies and deifies structural violence. We were made aware of the existence of this symbolic force in its most tragic form by the events of September 11.

In line with this concept of "idolatry," from the perspective of a Muslim with a rigorously heightened "vision," the World Trade Center might have been an "icon" that embodied the most overt form of materialism. Just as the Taliban destroyed the great Buddha statues in Bamiyan, the terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center. If the Pentagon is a symbol of the direct personal violence of military might, then the World Trade Center served as a symbol of the structural violence of capitalism.

In order to ensure that the desire to prohibit idolatry in modern times does not lead to destructive behavior, we must precisely discern just what are the "idols" of modern society. The concept of "structural violence" can play a supporting role in this societal self-examination.

3-3. Transformative Memory: Eschatology and Evolution

Finally, I would like to discuss Eschatology and Evolution as key concepts in the religious and ideological justification of structural violence. Eschatology talks about the world as being in a state of war between good and evil. With this type of worldview as a premise, violent acts can be justified by the belief that the world is already in a state of war. Simply put, there is a danger that Eschatology can function as supporting structural violence by providing religious justification for personal violence. However, theologians of absolute pacifism, like S. Hauerwas and others, have actually emphasized Eschatology as an argument for peace. Kanzo Uchimura, a famous Japanese absolute pacifist, believed that world peace would arrive with the second coming of Christ. Therefore, it is a mistake to say that Eschatology itself is dangerous. Rather, it is necessary to maintain the awareness that the concept of the "end of the world" can be transformed into either combative energy or energy that strives for peace, and we must seek the wisdom to control this awesome ambiguity appropriately.

Eschatology is an extreme type of religious worldview, common to the monotheistic religions, but its influence has sometimes changed form to arise even in the secular world. Evolution is a representative example of this phenomenon. What we refer to as Evolution is not "Biological Darwinism" but rather "Social Darwinism." Social Darwinism attempts to apply the approaches of Evolution—the "struggle for survival" and the "Survival of the Fittest"—to human society. Social Darwinism, which was conceived in the 19th Century, gave birth to "Eugenics" at the beginning of the 20th Century. Eugenics applies the principles of

Evolution and genetics to humans, attempting to improve upon the natural fate of men. Eschatology tries to portray man's fate based on the premise of Gods absolute power, but Social Darwinism trieds to depict the fate of men in the absence of God. In this sense, Evolution, as represented in Social Darwinism, can be seen as a secularization of the Eschatology of Christianity.

One of the other elements born out of Social Darwinism is an Evolutionary understanding of civilizations. Stated simply, since the beginning of the 20th Century, Western societies have generally taken the approach of ranking civilizations by comparison with the Anglo-Saxon civilization, which they have viewed as the pinnacle of civilization. For this reason, just as Eschatology sometimes functions as structural violence that justifies personal violence, Evolution, premised upon a ranking of civilizations, can be transformed into structural violence in which "superior" civilizations naturally control "inferior" ones.

4. Conclusions

Structural violence exists in the religious dimensions of idolatry, Eschatology and in social dimensions like Social Darwinism, and it is extremely important to be aware of this multidimensionality. Therefore, if absolute pacifism is to demonstrate effective power in the 21st Century, a crucial issue will be to analyze and understand these multidimensional aspects of structural violence.

In any case, we cannot deal with the realities that both preceded and followed Hiroshima merely by continuously debating an either/or choice between the just war theory and pacifism. We should not get bogged down in either/or choices but rather look at both pacifism and just war theory in relation to the contexts in which they operate.

What is clear is that the either/or question of going to war or not going to war is not the only issue. Our world is so replete with intolerance and suffering that the simple decision to not fight a war will not solve anything. The issue is how to act in solidarity with the oppressed and the persecuted, how to share in their risks, and how to seek out the path to reconciliation. This endeavor must be taken up as a matter of justice.

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2. War and Peace in Japan

2-1. Changing Understanding of War

- Robert J. Lifton
  - "But about four decades later a survey of post-Hiroshima theology found that the atomic bombings had been surprisingly ignored by theologians. ... There have of course been periodic condemnations of Hiroshima and of subsequent nuclear buildup from various religious sources, but generally as ethical rather than theological statements. Mainstream American religious leaders, moreover, have more often accepted the Hiroshima bomb than condemned it."
  - (*Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial*, p. 346)

2-2. Characteristics of Japanese Pacifism

- Two Characteristics
  - Aiming to overcome structural violence
    - Cf. "tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance" and "fear and want" in the preamble
  - Experiential pacifism
    - grounded in the national experience of tragedy vividly symbolized by Hiroshima

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3. Structural Violence and Positive Peace

2-1. Changing Understanding of War

- Before Hiroshima

(Western Civilization — Japan — Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)

2-1. Changing Understanding of War

- Before Hiroshima

(Western Civilization — Emperor as a God in human form, National State, Divine Country — Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)

3-1. Characteristics of Christian Pacifism

- The Image of Jesus
  - From apocalyptic prophet to a teacher of "wisdom"
- Theology: social transformation
  - Liberation theology
  - Eschatology: Jürgen Moltmann, Wolfhart Pannenberg (German Theologians)
  - Pacifist theologian: J. H. Yoder, S. Hauerwas
- Critical Insight Toward Just War Theory

3-2. Idolatry and Structural Violence

- "Idolatry" in the traditional sense
  - a worshiping of a part from the world as thought of as a god
- "Idolatry" in Modern Times
  - a symbolic force that justifies and deifies structural violence

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2-1. Changing Understanding of War

- Before Hiroshima

(Western Civilization — Emperor as a God in human form, National State, Divine Country — God, Christianity, Kingdom of God — Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere)

2-1. Changing Understanding of War

- After Hiroshima

(Apocalyptic War)

3-3. Transformative Memory: Eschatology and Evolution

3-3. Transformative Memory: Eschatology and Evolution

- Eschatology
  - as normative energy: war between good and evil (structural violence)
  - as energy that strives for peace: pacifism ex. Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930)

2-2. Characteristics of Japanese Pacifism

- The Preamble of the Japanese Constitution
  - We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in the peace, free from fear and want.

2-2. Characteristics of Japanese Pacifism

- Two Types of Peace
  - Negative Peace: the absence of personal or direct violence
  - Positive Peace: the absence of structural violence
- "Structural Violence" by Johan Galtung
  - "violence is present when human beings are influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations."

3-3. Transformative Memory: Eschatology and Evolution

- Eschatology
  - as normative energy: war between good and evil (structural violence)
  - as energy that strives for peace: pacifism ex. Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930)
- Evolution
  - as a secularization of eschatology
- Social Darwinism, Eugenics
  - toward an evolutionary understanding of civilizations (structural violence)

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4. Conclusions

- Understanding of the multidimensional aspects of structural violence
- Overcoming an either/or choice between the just war theory and pacifism
- Finding solidarity with the oppressed and the persecuted (justice and care)

Comment·Discussion
-Session 3-

Hebrew University
Nurit Novis-Deutsch

Good morning. I thank you for the opportunity to enjoy these three lectures and to comment on them. One of the interesting questions raised this morning was: Are pacifism and just war theory in opposition to one another? I would like to comment on this question using the equivalence of pacifism and just war in Judaism, the religion in which I am versed.

In Judaism, the basis of dealing with questions of war and peace is three-fold. One is through interpretation and retelling of Biblical passages, homiletic exegesis. The second is application through Jewish law, called *Halachan*. The third is a more principled discussion using the lens of Jewish philosophy.

As Professor King noted, the Hebrew Bible seems to take violence and war for granted. I think in part this is a descriptive phenomenological outlook on human nature, one that says: "look around you and you will realize that violent impulses are part of the human experience. Starting right at the beginning of the Bible, with Cain murdering his brother Abel, the text refuses to beautify human nature."

In this, I disagree with Dr. Pappe's comment yesterday. I think acts of violence were not invented with the birth of Nationalism. But the Bible is not only an onlooker on violence. Since Judaism is the first fully developed monotheistic religion, it has the dubious privilege of bringing religious zealotry into the world: the belief that together with one God there is only one Truth, and that idolaters deserve whatever violence they incur.

It is sad to see how all three monotheistic religions internalize this particular lesson at different times in their history, usually while wielding power. How the stance fits in with the numerous references to peace in the Hebrew Bible is an interesting question. The Bible contains several moral regulations of warfare, and I think Professor King mentioned them, so I will skip on to the next part of my comments.

While Biblical Judaism established some concrete rules for a just war, and made a point of stating that bloodshed is highly forbidden and that life is sacred, it relegated the more lofty ideal of pacifism to the end of days. However, this changed as Judaism became the religion of a persecuted people, landless and militarily powerless for over 2,000 years.

The sages then began emphasizing the importance of

living in peace and delegitimized war, perhaps because of their inability to resort to war; yet at the same time, their misfortune of being its perpetual victims made them sensitive to this issue. Using Professor Kohara's term, this is another example of "experiential," rather than "conceptual" pacifism.

Principles such as actively seeking peace began to be considered imperative, taking precedence even over the value of truthfulness. For example, rabbis decreed that every bride should be publicly praised as beautiful, even if this is a lie, for the sake of creating peace between her and her husband.

Thus, the order changed: peace became the value of choice by Jewish law and philosophy, and rules regulating wars were deferred until the end of days, or at least until the return of the Jews to their land. In addition, a serious attempt was made to reinterpret the Biblical commands regarding war against idolaters so as to neutralize them of all practical value.

In Jewish philosophy in this period, violence was condemned on principled grounds, and there even rose some proclaimed pacifists, from several Jewish mystics in the Middle Ages to the renowned philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. His pacifism is unique in that it is based not on an aim for unity and peace, of the sort which we hear so much of: "look how similar we are!", which, in my opinion, is an oversimplification, but rather on a recognition of the other, a fostering of a sense of responsibility towards him.

In other words, in Judaism the opposing values of pacifism and just war seem to have coexisted in different ways throughout history by either turning one into a practical guide for life or into an ideal of the sort that need not be practiced. The question is, of course, which of the two options is more important, and this seems to be influenced by the circumstances in which the Jewish people find themselves at various periods in their history, even to this day.

Regarding a possible third reversal between the importance of these two values—pacifism and just war—which some believe took place as Jews returned to their land, let me say this: please let us try not to oversimplify things when dealing with something as complex as people and their conflicts. The world is complex as is history. The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which was referred to yesterday, is far more complex than can be done justice to in several minutes of discussion. Invariably speakers end up demonizing one side or the other when treating the conflict simplistically. This demonization is devastating, both when

done by one side to the other, and when made as self-criticism, as we heard yesterday. It is devastating because it breeds hate, and hate does not allow us to see the other. Please let us remember to make a place for complexity.

In short, Professor King called for the creation of a theology of peace and in the spirit of Jewish law, I would like to add a call for creating a religious code of laws for peace. May each religion work to create a practical body of binding moral laws whose aim is a society where otherness is celebrated and war is both unnecessary and considered unjust. Thank you.

International Islamic University, Malaysia
Ibrahim Zein

First, I am really delighted to be here. Now let me just say this, that why an insider and outsider view is irrelevant in the discourse on war and violence within religions. It is because the 'other' is always the victim of sacred violence, and obviously his or her voice needs to be heard, or the whole discourse on just war or holy war will be a futile exercise, or worse, a monotonous monologue.

Now, addressing some of the issues which were raised this morning, I would like to say that yesterday there was a talk about why *jihād* is not holy war, and this morning we were again lectured by Professor Johnson that the broadest sense of holy war can include *jihād* of the sword.

My problem with this kind of argument is that here we see somebody represent a culture, and the representation is a shorthand notation and a superimposition of presonal position, your own culture, emplaced on other people's culture. Why not just call it *jihād* of the sword? Because the holy war, in Islam, is not anything holy. War is brutal, destructive, and there nothing holy about it. And, for us Muslims, it might be a contradiction in terms when you are talking about a holy war. So I am not here beautifying our history, but I am saying that, let us, when we are using a concept, use the concept as it has been used by the people themselves rather than misrepresenting the other.

The discussion of today was based on the assumption that the march for ethicality and higher principles is always in human history, and human beings are marching for peace. And some of the discussion was an interplay between history and the text, the scripture; and I just want to remind you that this assumption, the march for ethicality and higher principles, has been hijacked by exclusivists in respective cultures and traditions. In Christianity for instance, I am an outsider, yet I give myself the privilege to ask critical questions, as challenges that people from the other tradition might

look into it critically and then come up with intelligent answers.

In Christianity, regarding; the pacifism of the primitive church, Christianity moved from that position into the city of justice and then into the concept of holy war and Crusade. What is in the idea of the city of justice, which was not addressed by the learned speaker, is that when the city itself was conceived, it was against the heretics. The heretics were there, and when holy war actually was conceived, the non-Christians, (i.e. the Muslims and others) were the object of the holy war, and [against them] the holy war was launched, as the Crusade was launched.

The third point is that in history we have to address the following: there is a paradox between the Crusade when it started, because the Crusade, historically speaking, was for peace; but peace within Christendom. And thus violence actually was exported to others and here what was sacrificed was the universality of ethics. It is good to preserve peace within the Christendom, and then make violence a 'pictorial' surface for saving souls, violence directed against the other.

My submission is that it would be good if Christianity developed a theology of peace as has been said here. If Christianity developed a theology of love, Christianity would teach the two other Abrahamic religions this theology, rather than advocetire a just war.

My problem is with the submission of Professor Johnson, that when we are talking about the possibility of just war we are not faced with the tradition of the primitive Christian church, which is a tradition of pacifism. Kather, I agree with Professor King, and I feel that what she is calling for, this culture of peace, is something to be looked into, and I think if Christianity can develop this theology of peace, other traditions can look critically into their tradition as well new paragraph.

Finally, I feel that Professor Kohara is giving me a voice due to the way he interprets Christianity and the way he aligns with liberation theology, is for this is something worth of being looked into. Thank you very much.

Journalist, The Tokyo Shinbun
Takuji Tahara

Good morning. Please allow me to speak in Japanese, rather than in bad English.

I am not a scholar but a journalist. For the last twenty years or so, I have been covering the Middle East. My way of covering the region is to work in the field myself. One day I am in southern Lebanon with a guide from Hezbollah, covering their anti-Israel military operations; then a month later, I am listening to Israeli politicians in the Knesset. Or one day I am standing by

the Shatt al-Arab River in southern Iran, and the next month I am on the other side of the river in southern Iraq. Over the years, I have been moving around like this. So I would like to give my comments on today's talks from the viewpoint of someone with such a background, someone who is not a religious scholar at who believes in working in the field.

First of all, I would like to say something that resonates with what Professor Kohara and Professor Johnson said. Professor Kohara said that eschatology has two sides, conflict and peace, and Professor Johnson mentioned, with regard to the notion of just war, various transformations over time. I am not a specialist in Christianity, and because of my personal experience I have a tendency to view things in an Islamic framework. In Islam, it is possible to base yourself on the Qu'ran and justify either peace or conflict for the sake of justice. Considering this, I tend to think that there must be limits to our attempt to determine whether the essential nature of a religion is that of peace or conflict.

Having said this, I must add that I do not think we can overlook the religious side of the matter when we are faced with a realistic political challenge. In the mid-1980's, before the peak of the Cold War, I was visiting the left-wing Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) camp in Lebanon, when the civil war was still raging. I was talking with a combatant there, who happened to be Christian. I asked him whom he respected most, and he said Marx, Lenin and Jesus Christ. Another combatant, who was a Muslim, answered the same question with Marx, Lenin and the Prophet Muhammad. The political body to which these two men belonged was a secular socialist party. Yet, on a personal basis, they were both carrying something religious in themselves; perhaps because they were on the battleground where they could die at any moment. This touched me very deeply.

We should also note that what matters more to combatants, these who must justify their actions, are contradictions actually taking place around them in the world, rather than their religion or religious interpretations of their actions. It is hard to imagine that the notion of justice can totally vary, at its core, from one community to another, depending on the religion or religious tendency, although the religion of its members, such as combatants, may have a measure of influence. The determining factor must be something universal and common to all humanity. So I think, in examining actual political problems, it is more important to focus on the universality that exists beyond religions and religious sects as well as on tolerance and individual autonomy, which make it possible to recognize that universality, than emphasize ruptures caused by religious differences.

The question of individual autonomy is extremely important for Japan, too. The absence of this autonomy can be, I dare say, fatal. Today, we have before us the reality of a Japanese military presence outside Japan for the first time since the end of World War II. Until now, Japan's pacifism has been founded on the idea of international cooperation. This term, "international cooperation", has been, in Japan, something like an object of blind worship. Yet, as the world situation has changed, the meaning of "international cooperation" has also changed. During the Cold War years, Japan's "international cooperation" had the US-Soviet power balance as a point of reference. In today's US-led monistic world structure, Japan's international cooperation is discussed almost entirely in terms of alliance and affinity with the United States. It is quite disheartening to notice that the Japanese, in general, seem to have not looked into this change deeply enough. This is where the question of autonomy comes into the picture.

In dealing with actual political issues, which include military issues, religion, which specificaiiy shapes individuals' views of life and death, has an extremely important place. I think that the only way to truly achieve peace is to work from a common ground of tolerance, instead of differences, and toward mutual compromises.

Associate Professor, Central Research Institute,
Seigakuin University
Tomoaki Fukai

Since I have only five minutes, I would like to focus on a few points and ask questions in particular about Professor Kohara's lecture, which I found extremely interesting. It has been my belief that discussions of war, from the standpoint of Christian theology and religious faith, usually end up at two extremes: with an argument for absolute peace at one end and debates on the limits of the permissibility of war at the other. I feel that this kind of dichotomy is not very productive.

I also believe that if theology is to be useful in any way, we must discuss the question of "before war," or prevention, and that of "after war," or mediation. So far, prevention and mediation have been considered as political questions, rather than theological challenges. However, I believe that it is exactly on this point–prevention and mediation—that theological questions can be found. This is because I think that theology should always be eschatological.

Now here are my questions: Professor Kohara said that eschatological reflections lead to two extremes, an Armageddon-type of war versus peace. I think that the eschatological function of theology—when it is viewed as eschatological—is that of relativization. In other words, the notion of the "Last Judgment," for example, if we believe it, can serve to relativize the individual and the state by preventing them from playing god and becoming an omnipotent judge. Professor Kohara, what do you think of the role of theology in this sense?

Given this role, theological discussions on peace and war would concern policy planning more than religious doctrines and questions of faith; theology approaches policy making in that it serves to distinguish good from bad and suggests solutions based on past experiences. I believe that, in this way, theology can actively contribute to peace. Professor Kohara, what is your opinion? I also believe that in this sense, theology should be further politicized.

Discussion

(Chair) Thank you very much, all four of you. Now I would like to start our discussion.

First, I would like to say a few words about what I found slightly problematic while listening to yesterday's discussion. That is, discussions on religion and theology can be hindered by the differences between ideas and reality, when a good balance should be attained between the two. Yesterday I felt that the questions were mostly concerned with reality, but the responses, on the whole, were coming from the ideational level.

For example, when someone questions George Bush's Christianity, the answer is that it is not Christianity. Then, what about Osama Bin Laden's Islam? The answer is that it is not Islam, period; the discussion is over. These are ideational discussions, but we have the reality that these two men claim to be a Christian and a Muslim, respectively. I think that the discussions should have been based on this reality. So I hope you will keep this point in mind.

Other questions have been posed in the comments. When we deal with pacifism and the theory of just war, pacifism is relatively easy to understand while the just war theory is quite difficult. Professor Zein has asked a question of Professor Johnson; so let us begin with Professor Johnson.

(Johnson) Thank you, Professor Mori. I will respond to Professor Zein and then I would like also to say a couple of things to my colleagues up here at the front table. Professor Zein, I will be happy to shelve the idea of holy war with reference to *jihād* of the sword if you and your colleagues who spoke yesterday will also shelve it with regard to the Crusades.

As I pointed out in my talk, the term "holy war" does not appear until 400 years later than the Crusades. It is a term that has been retroactively applied, and if we are not going to impose a cultural projection upon the idea of *jihād* of the sword, then I suggest that those Muslims who use the term "Crusade" as a metaphor for trying to describe any activity of the West in the Middle East need to reconsider whether they are not guilty of the same kind of cultural imposition.

The idea of holy war, as I suggested, is a meaningful idea which allows for a certain comparison across cultures, if we understand it in a very carefully restricted sense, as having to do with warfare that is religiously authorized, religiously justified, and limited by religious rules.

I will stand by that, as I have, in fact, stood by it in the book that I referred to, but it simply does not do to say, "Well, we are not going to apply this to the term *jihād* because that is not a native term to the *jihād* tradition, but we are going to apply it to the Crusades." It is not a native term to that tradition, either.

Let me say to my two colleagues up here that the idea that somehow we can sit down together, pacifists and just war people, and find some sort of common ground is already illustrated by the position of the US Catholic bishops that I referred to. Their position that just war begins, or rather that Catholic tradition begins, with a presumption against war and that the just war tradition is simply a set of rules to override that general presumption, is historically an attempt at finding common ground between the just war and the pacifist wings in the American Catholic episcopate.

It is a very problematical idea; it is an idea that fundamentally changes the notion of just war as I have suggested in my talk; and it is, I think, ultimately one that tends to obscure both positions more than it helps. I would not, for example, think that any just war theorist would agree that the justifications offered for dropping atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki would fit within the just war criteria.

In fact, the rebirth of the idea of just war in Western thought began in 1944 with the publication of an article in the Jesuit journal "Theological Studies", which was a very scathing criticism of the counter-city bombing in Europe, including the bombing of the German cities by the Allies, although it took into account of the bombing of the British cities by the Germans, and there seems to me to be no reason whatsoever that this same kind of argument would not have been applied a year later, or a bit more than a year later, to the bombing of the two cities, here in Japan.

It is simply misleading to think about this as an exercise in just war theory; there simply was no just war theory in the American discourse about war setweer 1940-45. So I will stop there. Thank you.

(Chair) Now, I would like to invite all of you who are at the table to speak.

Professor Juergensmeyer, please. Push the button, please.

(Juergensmeyer) I would like to thank all three presenters for what has been an enormously helpful and interesting set of remarks. Professor Kohara would be interested that Hiroshima figured in the language of some of the people involved in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center.

When I interviewed Mahmud Abouhalima, who was one of the people convicted of the 1993 attack, I pointed out that if he had been successful at that time, both towers of the World Trade Center would have crumbled immediately, not allowing the tens of thousands of people to escape, as they did on September 11th, 2001, and the towers would have fallen sideways, rather than imploding the way they did on September 11th, thereby, killing not only the 25,000 people working in each tower and another 25,000 visiting, a total of 100,000 in the two towers, but then another 100,000 people in the surrounding buildings in the shadow of those two enormous edifices.

I said 200,000 people would have been killed if they had been successful in their 1993 attack. And he said 200,000: that is exactly the number that the Americans killed in Hiroshima in their act of terror. He had already made the moral equation in his mind. An interesting observation.

My question is for Professor Johnson: a wonderfully lucid elucidation of just war theory and I personally have been helped enormously in my own work by your book, and your comments this morning are also helpful. Some years ago, Robert McAfee Brown, one of my colleagues at Berkeley during the rise of liberation theology, suggested there could be just revolution, that you could apply just war theory to revolution. Can there be, in a sense, a just terrorism?

Can you apply the principles? I am not saying you would agree with the logic, but could there be an applicable logic within Christian or Islamic tradition that would justify the way in which maybe Maddi or Faraj have tried to do it in Islamic thought, the basic principles of just war thinking in their own acts that they feel are legitimated by their traditions.

And I would include the Jewish tradition, after all Yigal Amir was very careful to get rabbinic approval before he carried out his act of assassination on Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, suggesting that there was a kind of just violence or just terrorism calculation in his thinking as well.

(Johnson) Robert McAfee Brown was not the first person to suggest that there might be a concept of just revolution, and I believe that same idea appeared a number of years earlier in a book jointly written by Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus called Movement and Revolution, where the just war principles were laid down carefully with regard to possibilities for revolutionary activity.

The big sticking point is this notion not of just cause, not of right intention, but this notion of sovereign authority. Very few revolutionary groups, in fact, have the kind of internal coherence that allows them to take authority for the well being of the people that they aim to represent.

If you can find a way to satisfy that requirement, then at least we are on the same page in talking about the possibility of just revolution in the sense of just war. But I think that is a major issue, and, historically, it certainly is the case that the main line of just war theory has been extraordinarily reticent to give the right of the use of the sword to revolutionary groups. I think, for example, of Luther in his denunciation of the German peasants' rebellion of 1525. He was thoroughly in favor of the ends that the peasants were trying to achieve; yet he was thoroughly against their resort to violence to achieve those ends.

As for the quick jump you made between the possibility of just revolution and terrorism, I must say I do not follow you there. It seems to me that terrorism is a different kind of thing entirely. Terrorism is a form of action, a form of violence, which aims at non-combatants as the primary or the only targets of political or military gain, and revolution does not necessarily involve that kind of activity.

As for whether Islamic groups may be said to be engaging in just warfare, my position on Islamic radicalism and issues of violence has been that I want to see them held to the standards of the Islamic tradition first and foremost. After that is done, then we can sit down at the table and talk about whether it meets the standards of the just warfare of Western culture.

(Chair) Professor Johnson says that terrorism and war are different; Professor Juergensmeyer, would you like to respond to Professor Johnson?

(Juergensmeyer) No, it seems to me that Faraj, for example, developed a line of thinking, which, in his mind envisioned a kind of implicit warfare in which there were legitimate moral bases for taking the action that he prescribed. Now, two questions: is it, in fact, based in solid Islamic thought, which is a question not only for you but also for the scholars of Islamic law and ethics around the table, but also is it applicable in this particular case? It is a coherent theory. Is it not, in an interesting kind of way, parallel to just war thinking, even if invalidly applied?

(Chair) Now, I would like to invite the others to speak: Dr. Pappe and Professor Kuribayashi, in that order please. We would like to focus on the idea of just war, please.

(Pappe) Thank you. I want to thank the panel for three excellent contributions. What was missing, in my mind, and can add to clarification of the notion of just war, is a prior discussion of power and knowledge, which was totally absent, and is essential for understanding the issues at hand.

What I mean is that at the beginning of the 21st century the notion that there are universal definitions of what terrorism, is what just war, is what peace is, and all of these definitions emanate or emerge from political thought of 19th century Europe, a notion that has been challenged in the post-colonialist world.

There are many Western scholars who find that irritating, that what used to be in the 20th century a universal definition is now a culturally conditioned definition. And I think that the aim of this workshop is not to come and tell us that there is one definition for terror. In this regard, the definition of terror should be open for negotiations. One man's terror is another man's war of liberation. Who is going to decide who is the terrorist? The state or the individual?

Is the Western scholarly establishment going to establish and determine who is a terrorist, or are we going to open the negotiations and include the 2/3 of the world that was excluded from such negotiations in the 20th century. It is quite amazing to hear echoes of Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilization" in a workshop that wants to bring civilizations closer to each other, rather than pushing them further into conflict.

A final point: I think a lot has to be said for exploring the theology of liberation, and I would like to mention one example: among the Christian Palestinian communities, there is a strong movement called Sabil. Sabil means "the way," which preaches non-violent opposition to the brutal Israeli occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the apartheid discrimination of Palestinian citizens in Israel. It derives its sources from theology, from Christianity, and it is a very interesting and positive contribution to the future relationship between Jews and Arabs in Palestine and may serve as a model for other troubled spots in the world. Thank you.

(Chair) Professor Kuribayashi, please.

(Kuribayashi) I teach Christian theology at Kwansei Gakuin University.

I would like to limit myself to a single question for each of the two speakers. My questions come from the same line of thought. Please take them as questions and not as comments, since I would very much like to have answers. First, I have a question for Professor Johnson, with regard to the notion of just war; pardon me if the same topic was already treated in yesterday's discussion.

Professor Johnson has shown us some very clear standards for just war. I very much doubt that the war in Iraq initiated by the Bush Administration meets these standards. So, I would like to have Professor Johnson's opinion on this. I am one of those who believe that, in realistic terms, absolute pacifism does not work, and I believe that trying to determine whether this war can be called a just war or not is a serious issue, from a Christian viewpoint, and we get the same impression by listening to the various debates held among Christians in the US about the war.

Along the same line, I would like to ask Professor Kohara a question concerning the exercise of violence. Professor Kohara said, at the end of his presentation on Liberation Theology, that what is important is solidarity with the oppressed and the persecuted. I agree that this is true. Meanwhile, US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, and the neo-conservatives, have their official but different reason for seeking solidarity with the oppressed and the persecuted. The neo-conservatives justify the war [in Iraq] by saying that they want to unite with the oppressed and the persecuted in Iraq, such as the Kurds and Sunnis, in order to oust Saddam Hussein and his dictatorship, one that violates human rights, and in order to establish democracy in the country. I think that the difference between this and Liberation Theology deserves to be clarified.

(Chair) All right, I will ask Professor Johnson to answer the first question. For the second question, I think it is better if Professor Nakanishi answers in Professor Kohara's place, followed by Professor Shiojiri.

(Johnson) Professor Kuribayashi, the answer that I would give to the question you raise would differ depending on which version of the just war theory one supports as I outlined.

[Official] The US Catholic bishops have not expressed any official opinion since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, that is, the military action as it was named by the US. They did, however, express serious reservations prior to that, calling for the exploration of additional non-military alternatives to secure, what they granted, were just ends.

I think that in answering this question, though, we need to take account of the full range of justifications that President Bush offered, consistently, in his three public speeches prior to the beginning of military action. Not simply pre-emption against weapons of mass destruction, but also violation of UN Security Council Resolutions, consistent and repeated since the end of the First Gulf War, and thirdly, the egregious violation of the human rights of the Iraqi people and of his neighbors in Iran and Kuwait.

My own judgment on this is that there was a justification for the use of military force arising out of these second and third criteria, the second and third justifications, that is, independent of the question of whether there were, in fact, weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

In the 1990s there was a considerable just war debate in the US and, to some degree, in Western Europe, over the justification of the use of armed force to correct massive abuses of human rights, and a new consensus formed around this issue, between the war in Bosnia and the genocide in Rwanda, and a number of other violent conflicts that occurred during that period.

The choice to use force in those cases, it was widely agreed, was be a just choice. And if we follow that line of thinking, one might want to argue that the use of force to dethrone a dictator such as Saddam Hussein, and to attempt to replace his government with a more just government, would be justified.

I want to say, for a moment, a couple of things to Dr. Pappe. I was not the one who introduced the notion that America and the West are the cause of the evils in the Islamic world; I was not the one that introduced the idea of a clash of civilizations under the rubric of Crusade. I do not believe that these are useful categories, but I will not sit here quietly and here them used and not respond to them.

(Chair) As I said earlier, I will invite Professor Nakanishi and then Professor Shiojiri to speak.

Perhaps Professor Nakanishi has questions and comments, but I would like to ask Professor Nakanishi to begin by answering Professor Kuribayashi's question about Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neo-conservatives, if possible.

(Nakanishi) I am sorry, but I was preparing my comments so I was not paying very close attention to Professor Kuribayashi's question; please allow me to use Professor Mori's words as a starting point.

I think that are many different definitions of neo-conservatives; some people think of themselves as neo-conservatives, and some are given that label by others. It is not very constructive to discuss what makes someone neo-conservative and so forth.

Mr. Cheney and Mr. Ramsfeld are pragmatic politicians, rather than thinkers. Even if they may have an underlying grand vision, I think that they make decisions as American political leaders. In this sense, they probably support what we consider to be neo-conservative, that is, democratization of the world by American power, leading to a liberal, free world. But in actual policy making, it is unlikely that they give priority to this alone. I am aware of different US attitudes toward Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea, and so I feel that it is not very productive to focus on neo-conservatism.

Perhaps I have not answered the question very well; please forgive me.

I have some questions and comments of my own. May I present them now? I am a political scientist, and I rarely have had the opportunity to examine the question of religion directly. So I have been learning a great deal from today's discussion, for which I am very grateful.

In my opinion, the question of how to perceive the world's current situation is vital. Perhaps this point was already discussed yesterday: the environment in which we find ourselves today, humanity's present situation, is essentially that of a globalized society, as it is often called, in which people, materials, and different cultures which have never been in direct contact before come into very frequent contact with one another.

Throughout much of the 20th century, a period marked by two major wars and the Cold War, the basic challenge for humanity was to avoid a war between nations and to minimize its resultant damage to people if such a war were to become unavoidable. From the end of the 20th century to the present, new, unprecedented forms of interaction have been emerging, allowing people who would never have had any direct contact otherwise interact with each other. This has produced various forms of tension, including terrorism and conflicts. I think that this phenomenon must be recognized as a problem facing humanity today.

In view of this, we should ask ourselves if we can apply, without modification, the just war tradition which Professor Johnson spoke about and which is basically a product of modern Europe, from a time when the sovereign nation-state system had a central role in issues involving violence, to the present world, which is undergoing what may be called global civil wars. As Professor Johnson mentioned briefly, the Middle Ages, in which Thomas Aquinas completed his just war theory, probably has more to teach us today with regard to the question of violence than do our modern times, with the developing sovereign state-nation system.

Finally, I would like to ask a question about another problem that is related to Galtung's concept of positive peace, which Professor Kohara mentioned. I think that the concept of positive peace is quite significant in many ways, and particularly as an antithesis of the 20th-century concept of negative peace, which is peace maintained by avoiding war. Still, it seems inappropriate today to say simplistically that positive peace is peace attained by fulfilling all hopes and desires. I feel that instead of adopting such an all-inclusive definition, we need a new notion of positive peace with newly demarcated limits as minimum conditions for peace.

So I would like to know how religion, or more specifically, the satisfaction that people get by fully practicing their faith, can be placed within a positive peace theory like Galtung's.

(Chair) I invite Professor Johnson and Professor Kohara to respond briefly.

(Johnson) There is a great deal more similarity between the medieval age and our own age in terms of warfare than there is between the assumptions of the wars of the First World War and the Second World War and our own age. The face of warfare in the Middle Ages was one which involved relatively small bands of lawless individuals. It was one which involved rapacious princes who governed for their own good and not the good of their people, and it was also a warfare that involved sovereigns who genuinely sought the good of their people and of the international order.

The kinds of assumptions that motivated the recovery of just war thinking in the United States and in the West were largely based on the memory of the Second World War and, more distantly, the First, in addition to the surrounding reality of the nuclear standoff between the United States and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other hand.

We do not live in that world anymore. The world that we live in, the world that we have been in for over ten years, is a world in which warfare, the characteristic face of warfare, has been small wars. Not wars using the major weapons of the superpowers, or even the major powers, but warfare that uses outmoded weapons, as in the former Yugoslavia, warfare that uses machetes and knives, as in the case of the Rwandan genocide, and warfare that uses very low-technology means as a way of killing. It has also been a warfare that is not regulated by the means of regulation by which states attempt to regulate their own conflicts. As I suggested earlier, the law of armed conflict in international law is a concept that historically and thematically is related to the older just war tradition.

The real problem in the contemporary face of war is that many of the actors are not interested in this; they are not interested in trying to limit harm to non-combatants, for example, because it is in their interest to get their way by hitting the most vulnerable parties in society. And so it seems to me that we actually have a great deal to learn from looking back at what medieval thinkers had to say on the subject of warfare, because their warfare was much more like the kind of warfare that we actually have now than were WWI and WWII.

(Kohara) As Professor Nakanishi has pointed out, it is indeed true that not all problems can be resolved with positive peace alone. Naturally, Galtung's theory presupposes political and economic stability. He comes to Japan almost every year, and recently he has placed more emphasis on the importance of ensuring and stabilizing cultural and religious identity. So, it is possible to point to the very large place that religion has come to occupy in his concept of positive peace, particularly since 9/11.

In this connection, we are all aware that the present Bush Administration cannot bring about stability solely through military power. This means that the distinction between "hard power" and "soft power," which is often used, has begun to spread. One challenge that interests me in this situation is how to link the concept of positive peace proposed by religious scholars with pragmatic policy-making theories.

(Chair) Now, Professor Shiojiri, please.

(Shiojiri) Since yesterday, we have been continuing the debate over just war and holy war. Professor King pointed out that the justification of war and discussions on the theory of just war have a long history and there have been various arguments made, while studies and discussions on peace have not been pursued very much. I received these words with a certain remorse in my heart.

I think that it is possible to view the just war theory as a result of the development of various means of justifying wars whose objectives or needs are actually recognized in given situations. Discussions on the just war tradition have theological dimensions because attaching a religious significance to war has been the most effective form of justification. In turn, a war religiously recognized as "just" gradually attains a new dimension as a holy war. Those who take part in these wars can be persuaded to risk their lives and harm others because it is a holy war.

Now, if discussions on just war and holy war have evolved against such a background, one involving religion, how will it be possible, although it may prove very difficult and impose many obstacles, for us to start our argument for "holy peace" or "just peace," that is, not just peace but peace in a religious sense, which we must protect with our lives—this sounds a little aggressive, but I think it is important to continue seeking absolute and holy peace—by flexibly transforming eschatological ideas that have so far supported just war and holy war into something constructive in order to attain peace.

I would like to have Professor King's opinion regarding this point, as she has said that peace has not yet been discussed sufficiently, as has the just war theory.

(King) I very much appreciate your intervention because I think that we have much to discuss on the just war theory and on the notion of holy war. I think that it is very helpful to us, as a group, and to me, personally, to get these historical clarifications and be clear about the exact kind of terminology used, what holy war meant, when the word was first introduced, what *jihād* meant, etc.

I also appreciate what Professor Pappe said earlier

about the relationship between power and knowledge, and how knowledge has to be set in relation to its context, and who speaks for whom and who represents whom, and how we can relate to each other in our pluralistic diversity, both religiously as well as ethnically, politically and economically.

But I think we have also to consider the need for an innovative and creative new approach to problems that are both very old and also very new. Professor Johnson just mentioned the kind of no-tech war, while at the same time we have a very high-tech war possibility and potential. Everything happens all the time conjointly, together at different levels; this is the complexity of our modern world.

But if we look at the spiritual message of the religious traditions, we can see that there is always this concern with salvation, with the honor and glory of God, but also with the salvation of the human community, and concern for the human being in terms of human flourishing. I think that one of our most problematic concerns today in the postmodern world is what it means to be human, who counts as being human. When you examine historically the debates about the other, about the outsider, about the barbarian, it is always said that the people who are the victors, the people who are the dominant powerful ones, often declare the others as almost non-human, or as lower forms of humanity.

This is really the question: can we recognize each person as a human being? What does it mean to be fully human, and what does the full humanity of women mean in today's world? These are all relatively new questions. Even though they are also very ancient questions, they are configured in a new context, and I feel that the same is true of peace.

Peace is not just an individual condition, it is a social condition, it is a global condition; it means something at different levels, in very different contexts. It cannot be conceived of without justice; it cannot be thought of without care, as was said this morning; it cannot be thought of without love and concern for human well-being and flourishing.

What do we do when we give birth to people? A baby does not commit violence; a baby is not able to give peace; but this little baby grows into a full human being, whether male or female, and can make peace or can make violence. Quite a few thinkers in the 20th century, and also now in the twenty-first century, are trying to point out the need for profound civilizational change, which requires a new peace consciousness in order to create a peace culture rather than a war culture.

If you examine our discourse in the English language—I cannot speak for Japanese or Arabic—it is remarkable how many words, how many metaphors we use which are really violent, which are antagonistic, which are so highly competitive in that they try to push out the other, and do not give respect, but create tension. We do this all the time; we use a language that is a language of fight and struggle and violence, so you get not only structural violence, you get also discourse violence and linguistic violence.

I feel that we have not given enough creative thinking—theologically, philosophically, culturally—to what peace means, and how one can best promote good relations, an understanding of coming together in terms of friendship or amity or tolerance, exercising respect and according dignity.

I think we need to do a lot in terms of education—from the family onwards to primary school education, secondary school education, university studies—in order to promote a culture of peace at a global level, in a planet that is, for us today, truly a planet of one human family. And yet how much are we at war with each other?

(Chair) I would like to have those of you who have not yet spoken to speak now: Al Roshd, Rhodes, and Eastvold, in this order, please.

(Al Roshd) In that connection, I think that, there is an important issue that has not been pointed out yet, and that is the very issue that constitutes an underlying basis of the topics we are discussing now. That is the issue of politicians using religions as weapons to serve their national interests. In addition, around the world we can see many examples of such conflicts today. There are conflicts between Arabs and Israelis and between Russians and Chechnyans, as well as other cases.

For example, Bin Laden… I would say that it was the United States that made Bin Laden the way he is. I would say that it was the United States that provided weapons to Bin Laden in the war between Russia and Afghanistan. I would say that it was Russia that made the Chechen rebel leaders emerge. I would say that it was Russia that provided weapons to the rebel leaders. I would say that it was Israel that had Ahmed Yassin discharged from prison. Is there any shadow of a doubt that Israel's Mossad knew the whereabouts of Ahmed Yassin and what he ate for breakfast or dinner?

Meanwhile, there is the issue of the strategic use of individuals by great powers. They use individuals, not the Islamic army or the Crusades, for instance. They use these people to serve their strategic interests in the world. It is simpleminded for us to believe that America's war in Afghanistan or America's war in Iraq is a war on terrorism. These wars are strategic wars designed to gain control of underground mineral resources. Of course, we are well aware that Iraq has ample amounts of oil and Afghanistan has an abundance of underground resources. I would suggest that

we put some thought into the fact that these people, who believe they are fighting in the name of Islam, are actually used by big powers to serve national interests.

These are what I believe to be the underlying bases of these issues. We should distinguish between politics and the political use of religion, and between them and basic religious beliefs found in the scriptures given by God. We must not mix up them. Thank you for your kind attention.

(Chair) Now, Mr. Rhodes, please.

(Rhodes) Thank you. I am Howard Rhodes from Princeton University in the United States. Professor King, there seems to be some small amount of consensus among participants that just war theory is to be included among those religious attitudes, ideas and institutional processes you favor, would be shown to lead to violence, conflict and war.

One form in which this claim has been made is that the just war theory is, in some way, blind to peace by being invested in a kind of a structural violence (i.e. by being focused on war). Another way in which this claim has been made is that the just war theory is one representative of a form of knowledge that is inherently invested in a certain kind of political project (particularly a project that oppresses certain minority communities). Unsurprisingly, some of us, myself included, find these claims to be either unconvincing or obfuscating, and I would like to bring up a few points for further comment.

One way in which these claims are unconvincing at a historical level is that they seem to be blind to the historical role of just war theory in the creation of international law, a system of law ideally oriented towards securing the common good among nations. Another more normative point is that the central place of the criterion of right intention in classical just war theory justifies war only insofar as a political community has peace and justice in mind, in a verifiable manner. These seem to be instances in which just war theory very much has a kind of peace and common good in mind.

The importance of right intention also goes some extent towards answering questions about just war theory as representing a particular form of knowledge with very particular kinds of power interests. This deeper level is represented by the role that the idea of not directly intending evil so that good may come of it has played in the development of just war theory.

It strikes me that any argument against just war theory, in the interests of certain kinds of political groups, must address whether the problem with just war theory is that it prevents these groups from justifying evil acts (such as suicide bombings against civilians) so that some notion of good may come of it.

(Chair) Is your question addressed to Dr. King or Professor Johnson?

(Rhodes) Dr. King.

(King) I think this is really more a question for Dr. Johnson than for me. I have problems with the just war theory; I find it extremely intriguing as a theory, but it is a theory rather than a practice, and I feel it has many problems at the practical level, particularly as you pointed out in terms of the role of right intention.

For me it is also the question that today most of the violence of war is addressed or hits civilians rather than combatants, and that is one of the great problems. I think, if I understand the traditional theory of just war correctly, and Professor Johnson may point out that I do not, but if I understand it correctly, I see it as applying to combatant rather than civilian groups. So that is problematic for me, very problematic. There has also been the debate of whether any war can ever have been just, or whether there are always factors coming into play which go far beyond what the theory allows for, and I think you tried to indicate this.

What I profoundly regret is the intellectual effort and the energies that have been consumed, and the intellectual passion that has been invested, in developing very refined criteria for a highly theoretical debate about a just war when I would prefer to see the option for peace to be refined in far stronger terms than the option for war. Thank you.

(Johnson) Let me say something to both these issues that have been raised. As for the understanding of just war tradition as having to do with combat between combatants on both sides, you are absolutely right on that.

Where you are wrong, Professor King, with all due respect, is that you do not distinguish between types of use of force and the reasons for them, and in response to that, I would argue, at least, that there are real differences between, let us say, the use of force, even very low-tech force, in the Rwandan genocide on the one hand, and the use of low-tech or even high-tech force in other cases.

I also would argue that there has been an important development that many who do not pay close attention to the implications of high-tech warfare have perhaps missed, and that is that for the first time in quite some time, it is now possible for an armed force that is equipped with precision guided weaponry to do what the just war tradition has said that it ought to do: that is, use weapons against targets in such a way as to intentionally avoid collateral damage to the noncombatants. This is really not the place to get into this, but I would be perfectly happy to talk with anybody in private

about this once we are done here.

As to the matter of conspiracy theory, it has always seemed to me that conspiracy theories are very useful for those that want to avoid questions of individual responsibility. Following the conspiracy theory through, I suppose the United States organized the entire warfare of the former Yugoslavia so that it could impose the Dayton settlements and thus find a way to protect the Bosnian Muslims. I suppose that the United States organized the oppression of the Albanian Kosovars so that it could bomb the Serbs and find a way, thereby, to provide protection to the Albanian Kosovars. But you know, this is just to my mind utterly absurd. The United States is not that powerful. The United States, in any case, simply does not do that kind of thing, and to suggest to Osama Bin Laden that he is in fact a puppet of the United States might be very dangerous, because I am sure he does not regard himself as, in any sense, a puppet, nor do his close lieutenants and the organizations in many countries in Southeast Asia and South Asia, and in the Middle East for that matter, who are in affiliated organizations.

(Chair) Now, Mr. Eastvold, Professor Hanafi, Dr. Borujerdi, and Professor Juergensmeyer, in this order, please.

(Eastvold) I have two observations. First—and I say this with great reluctance knowing that I am very much out of my depth—it seems that in our haste, yesterday and today, to combat the generalizations that are often made about Islam, we may have fallen into the trap of generalizing in such ways about Christianity, and particularly the brand of Christianity of which Bush is our representative, for good or ill.

Let me preface my remark by saying that I am an American evangelical, and I study, among other things, American evangelicals. I voted for Bush in 2000, and chances are I may well vote for him this November as well. But I and a good number of my co-religionists do so for reasons that I assert any good Muslim would recognize as valid if they took into account our core motivations. If that claim seems unbelievable I would propose you may not have listened closely enough and understood us.

Second, a more focused comment to Mr. Al Roshd, who said that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were strategic rather than moral or in the international interest: if it were a simple matter of strategy and naked national interest, why would we alienate our allies on both sides of both oceans? It does not make long-term strategic sense for us to do that unless we believed more was at stake, and that the nature of international order justified certain measures that were in the long run detrimental to our narrowly construed partisan interests. Thank you.

(Hanafi) Yes, I have a very simple methodological question for the three panelists concerning the relation between theory and reality. Can we approach reality, which has its own logic based on contradictions and conflicts of power and conflicts of interests, by a theoretical approach and a theoretical debate concerning the just war?

Theories are made to justify, not to oppose, in general, questions of peace and war, as a camouflage to reality. But what matters is really the contradicting laws in reality based on conflict of interests. All the theories of hunger will not prevent a hungry boy from dying; a piece of bread can do it. Again, are we going really to make a certain kind of intellectual salvation for scholars without entering into the deep analysis of contradicting interests concerning reality?

My last remark is to Professor Kohara. What is his feeling concerning Sakhalin and the Northern islands? How can he approach these problems through the Japanese and Christian theories of peace?

(Kohara) What is the intention to ask about Sakhalin, the problem about Sakhalin?

(Hanafi) The intention is that I want to know how effective the theoretical analysis on the just war is concerning reality–political, sociological, psychological reality of citizens and of nations.

(Kohara) Let me give you a brief historical background. In Japan, the movement for the reversion of Sakhalin, or rather the northern territories, has existed for a relatively long period. This movement has been mainly advocated by people with nationalistic or patriotic tendencies, as represented by conservative political parties led by the Liberal Democratic Party. Japan's religious communities, Christians and Buddhist leaders, have never actively engaged in this movement as part of their agendas. The northern territory issue in Japan is a very political issue, especially for conservative political parties, and it has not been much of a religious issue.

(Borujerdi) In the name of *Allāh*, the Merciful, the Munificent. First of all, I would like to thank you all for giving me this brief opportunity to talk to you.

Today, we decided to talk about the reality of the world. I would like to emphasize that common people do not have any role in the outbreak of war. However, common people do have a significant role in the creation of situations that could naturally lead to a war.

I visited Iraq about two months ago and talked with people there. They said, as if they were stating the obvious, "We will eventually kill the Americans and those

who attack us." As you know, they lived under the rule of a dictator in Iraq. However, they now think that a dictatorship is better than the control by foreign powers. They do not accept any rule by external forces, and to get rid of the calamity, they will sacrifice themselves. This is characteristic of Muslim people. They believe that *Allāh* the Supreme will reward their acts in another world by sending them to heaven. It is this belief that leads Muslim people to martyrdom and drives them to acts of self-sacrifice to rescue other people from disasters.

I believe that we need to reach a common understanding on the content of discussions we have had regarding just war, holy war and terrorism for the last two days in this symposium. I call on the chair and all participants in this symposium to reach a common understanding of these issues so that we can raise these issues with other people. In the future, people will benefit from that, if *Allāh* so wishes.

(Juergensmeyer) I have enjoyed this discussion very much. I have learned a lot from it and the passion of the statements really helps in understanding the diversity of perspectives and issues.

Just war is an interesting thing, because we are talking about the ethical justification for the use of force. And although I agree Professor King with much of what you say, Gandhi, in his attempt to try to understand the exceptions to non-violence, the instances in which force could be used in order to make the possibility of non-violence, the conditions of non-violence, work in some ways, I think, was dealing with just war theory: he was dealing with some of the essential characteristics that we have been talking about.

Yesterday, when I talked about cosmic war, this grand vision of warfare, that is not just war, that is not ethical justifications; it is a kind of passion for war that is non-rational as its basis, and, interestingly, I think it often comes first and then we get around to trying to justify our reasons for wanting to go to war. And in an eerie kind of way I think the Iraq case is an example of that. It seems to me that this is an example of where it fails on the criteria of just war, beginning with two of the most important principles of just war. The first is the legitimate authority; that is the authority that is legitimating the action.

Now in the case of an imminent threat to a nation, which is why the discussion of weapons of mass destruction was so important for the American people, one can see why a nation would then find its own authority to be a sufficient legitimizing agent in just war.

But in cases of human rights and large issues of international civil liberties, it seems to me that it is never the right of any single nation to make that judgment because of the clouding of self-interest that every nation has in its perception of national order. One has

to then look for an international legitimizing agent, either an international court, although unfortunately the United States has not supported the idea of an international court, or the United Nations, which would be another appropriate legitimizing agent to look at any discretion of human rights or the savage treatment of a dictator.

Perhaps the most savage dictator on the earth today would be Turkmenbashi, in the state of Turkmenistan, who has changed the names of the week to meet his own family, rules with a kind of ruthlessness that Saddam Hussein would like to enjoy. But there has not been any international pressure, certainly not from the United States, to invade Turkmenistan.

So, first there is the issue of what is the appropriate legitimizing authority, and then the issue of proportionality. Was it worth it in the case of Iraq? This is obviously a debatable issue, but the thousands of lives lost, the 3,700 innocent civilians in Iraq, the damage to America's prestige and reputation throughout the world, I think, at least in my calculation, does not meet the fundamental qualification of proportionality in just war.

(Johnson) We are running out of time, so let me be just very brief. First to Professor Hanafi: historically just war tradition came together as a mix of theory and practice, a very robust mix of theory and practice.

It was composed from inputs from the canon law and from theology, from the recovery of Roman law in the 12th and 13th centuries, but also from the experience of military life and the experience of statecraft. The resulting theory of just war, the resulting consensus on just war, was thus not a theory that was abstracted from reality, but a composite that reflected very much the reality of life and the need for military force in the context of the time.

In the modern period, this all broke apart and we had, as a result of the differentiation that modernity brought, an isolation of the particular religious element, the international law element, the military element, and so on. In the last 40 years there has been a lot of effort to pull all this back together, and among my dialogue partners in particular are people that are in the American and European militaries, people who do international law as their profession, people who are engaged in the whole activity of policy formation and statecraft. So I think you are mistaken when you suggest that somehow or other this is a theory that is abstracted from reality. The truth of the matter is that it is very, very much engaged in reality.

To one of the comments that Mark Juergensmeyer made: Mark, I am sorry to hear this from you. This is the old "Why not Tibet?" argument all over again. One does not have the obligation to do everything that one ought to do. The just war tradition has built-in concerns for whether it is likely to be successful, for whether, as

you say, it would be a proportionate activity, and any number of other restraints there. So, to suggest that one use of military force is somehow questionable because other uses of military force that might be equally justified were not undertaken is simply the wrong way to look at the matter.

(Chair) I suggest that this topic be carried over to the following session since it seems possible to discuss it there. Now, finally, Professor Tsukimoto, please.

(Tsukimoto) I teach a course or the Hebrew Bible in a private university in Tokyo. I have learned a great deal from the three speakers' lectures and other comments and discussions today.

One point common to all the ideas expressed today is that violence or warfare is not good. Even the discussion on the just war theory, the question about whether or not a just war can exist, seems to imply the idea that war is bad. The importance of peace education that Dr. King mentioned also presupposes the same idea. The structural violence that Professor Kohara mentioned is also founded on the premise that violence is bad. Then, why is violence bad, why is war bad? How to explain this has not been discussed much today.

I think, quite simply, that the underlying reason should be the preciousness of individual lives and the dignity of individuals. From this, we should ask ourselves how individuals' dignity and the preciousness of life are positioned within each of the religions, and how the religions function in this regard, not only in theological terms but in everyday terms, to touch people's hearts. I think that these are major questions that the religions must answer in the 21st century.

(Chair) Our time is up, and we have to end Session 3 now. Finally, I invite you to express our gratitude to our three speakers once again by a round of applause.

Feb. 21(Sat.)
Workshop: Session 4

Toward Peace after 9/11

Islam, Risk or Promise?

Cairo University Hassan Hanafi

I- Risk and Promise for whom?

1. A question has been already asked: "Islam, a threat or a challenge?" The same question is asked again but in a different form and may be with a different intention and purpose: Islam, risk or promise? and for whom? Risk alone is one sided, a prejudgement and a presupposition. Risk or promise is an alternative and free thinking without taking any sides.

2. The concept of Risk is an essential one in existential philosophy by Kierkegaard, Jaspers, Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel …etc. But, its usage here in "Risk, complex crisis and social futures" is a circumstantial one, linked to the 11th September 2001 and essentially to Islam, since the hijackers were Arab Muslims. On the other hand, the Oklahoma bombing of the Federal building, the bloodshed in northern Ireland, Basque region, Srilanka, Klu Klux Klan and organized crimes in USA, killing Muslim Turks in Germany, Muslim Genocide in Bosnia—Herzegovena, Kosovo and Albania and Chechnya, killing in Kashmir, Afghanistan and lately in Iraq…etc. are not done by Muslims, but are mostly against Muslims, as if Muslims were all the time the victimisers, not the victims.

3. It is better to understand the roots than to condemn the results, and to extract these roots rather than to taste the bitterness of the fruits. The 11th September incidents are the outcomes of other roots. The visible is an expression of the invisible. Secondary violence is a reaction to primary violence. Using the language of Latin America, liberating violence is a counter-balance to oppressive violence. In contemporary terminology, symbolic violence is an external volcanic eruption which expresses the internal, real and boiling depth of the frustration of the heart.

4. Everyone in the four corners of the world is remembering 11th September 2001 bombing. No one remembers the 28 of September 2000, the beginning of the Intifada in Palestine, left alone for three years. Innocent children, women and old aged killed, housed destroyed, green lands destructed, resistantce physically liquidated, cities closed, individual and peoples rights violated. Arab and Muslim governments are incapable of support, cornered between American-Zionist external pressure and internal popular pressure. Opposition political parties are weak, being future alternative powers and dominated by the logic of power. The masses a long-time under State control, are doomed to indifference. Therefore somebody has to cry, to shout, to pro-claim in the loudest voice even if it is the voice of bombing, as a sign of protest, to break the deadly silence, surmount are total conspiracy of all.

5. To understand is not to justify, to be courageous is not be condemn and to analyse is not to acquiesce. What has been attacked are the symbols of powers, the signs of modern hegemony, WTO, symbol of globalization, the Pentagon—symbol of military power and military industrial complex and the White House—symbol of new conservatism, of Zionist christianism and of arrogance, namely power without justice. All progressive intellectuals and scholars criticize the same symbols of power by their pencils in scientific journals and by respected publishers, but not everyone masters the art of writing, not everyone is well educated enough to accept differences and engage in a civilized and fruitful dialogue.

6. Linking risk to complex crisises and social futures is already contextualizing risk. It needs only to be in plural. There is notone risk but many. Complex crisises are already plural because there are many crisises in different societies and cultures which ask the question: Risk for whom? They are not simple crisises easy to solve but complex ones, sharing responsibilities, not making one's self innocent, and the other a criminal.

Linking risk to social futures gives an optimistic note for the future after circumstantializing risk in the present. Risk can be a promise once socio-political contexts can be changed in the future. Nothing in the human context is permanent forever. Everything is subject to change. Once socio-political and economic circumstances are changed risks for all sides are also minimized to the fragile human existence.

II- Risks and promises for the Self.

1. A Risk is not always negative. For an existentialist, risk is a dimension in human life no less than the need for security. Life without risk is death. Risk is a mode of creativity, and the discovery of a means of security. A risk is a sign, a warning bell in the present for a better and a more hopeful future.

A risk also is not only for the Self for self-protection and security maintenance but it also for the Other in an enter-depending world. The Self and the Other are inter-changeable. Everyone is the Self for an another. Considering the customary opposition between Islam and the West, Islam is the Self, the West is the Other. The West is also the Self and Islam is the Other.

Therefore, Risk is a double risk for the Self as well as for the Other.

2. If the Self represents the Arab and Muslim World, Islam presents a real risk for the present political regimes, oppressive inside, dependent on and allied to the USA, advocating a liberal and democratic alternative political regime. The slogan "Islam is the alternative" is a real one, it expresses a strong social dissent against the actual huge disparity between rich and poor. "Islam is the solution" is another slogan symbolizing a deep frustration from unsolved social problems such as: unemployment, mass-transportation, bureaucracy, education, housing…etc. The "application of Islamic law" is a third slogan against corruption, violations of State's laws, changing laws according to group interests, unjust laws…etc. In this case, Islam is a risk for the political regime but a promise for the people.

3. Islam may present a risk for daily life for the common people as well as for the intellectual since the major dominant trend coming out of the historical reservoir is conservatism, which appears in literalism, dogmatism, ritualism, formalism, unilateralism and bigotry. Religion is considered an end per-se not a mean to another end, the perfection of man and the integrity of society. Truth exists, per-se, not as efficiency in the world, a moral action and a perfect performance. Many modern acquisitions may be prohibited, figurative art, dancing, music, songs, television, mix education, ways of dressing and all did appear already in Taliban's domestic practices.

4. Islam may represent a risk not only to internal policies of the depending States, but also a risk to its foreign policies: Recognition of Israel before obtaining the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination, and the establishment of the Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital, dependence on USA, open-door policy, signing the GATT agreement, obeying the laws of the market imposed on less-industrialized States in the name of globalization, dropping customs protection for foreign goods, obeying the World Bank and IMF precepts for economic reforms including the fluctuation of the national currency and uplifting food subsidies …etc.

5. Islam may represent a risk to narrow nationalism which considers national interests above Arab and Muslim interests. After on Camp David agreements in 1978 and the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 the slogan was "Egypt comes first". The recuperation of Sinai was disconnected from the withdrawal from the rest of the occupied territories. After the Wadi 'Araba peace treaty between Jordan and Israel the same narrow scope slogan was repeated "Jordan comes first". After the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait in 1990 Arabism was marginalized in the name of short-sighted nationalism. After the American invasion of Iraq and the incapacity of the Arab world, peoples, institution and States, to protect one of their brothers, Arabism has been greatly tarnished. Arab and Islamic resistance in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan and Kashmir gave the hope that Islam may be the only real and the most efficient ideology for resistance.

6. Islam may represent a risk to secular ideologies of modernization after being experimented with in different regions with partial success in the beginning and almost a total failure at the end. Liberalism ruled Egypt before the revolution of 1952. Partial success were on the levels of freedom of the press, multi-party system, government accountability, high education, national struggle crystallised in the revolution of 1919 …etc. The failure was: Occupation of Suez Canal and the presence of British troupes in Eastern Delta, the Kingdom and the intervention of the palace in national politics, feudalism, elitism a high degree of Westernization in the upper class and the ruling elite, taxavasion …etc. Arab Nationalism, in Syria since 1949, in Egypt after 1952, in Iraq after 1958, in Yemen after 1964, in Libya after 1969 were lead by the free officers. Partial success were on the level of evacuation of foreign troupes, industrialization, agrarian reform, free education, public sector, food subsidies, cheap housing …etc. Failures were: Defeat of June 1967, switching 180 degree to capitalism, private sector, paid education, import, dependence on USA, recognition of Israel, corruption, depoliticization of the masses, isolationism …etc. Marxism ruled alone in Southern Yemen and in a coalition in Syria and Iraq. Successes are minimal and almost invisible. Failures are more spectacular: military conflict in southern Yemen between two Marxist fractions, inefficiency in Syria and Iraq with complete support to the B'ath regimes in both countries. Nothing was left except conservatist Islam in the Arabian Peninsula and Sudan, a simple rescue-boat, a front-escape.

III- Risks and Promises for the Other.

1. If the Other is the West, Islam may represent a risk if it is linked to terrorism and violence, a common link since 11th September 2001 especially in the mass-media and Western public opinion. It is even linked structurally to Islam as a religion and scriptures, not to circumstances. In fact such a link reduces the whole to one of its parts. Islam which is presumably behind the 11th September is the same Islam behind the glorious Culture in Spain where Muslims, Jews and Christians shared the same ideal. It was the golden age in Judaism culminating in Miamonides. It is the same Islam behind Islamic mathematical, physical and human sciences, translated in the West, becoming one of the sources of Western modern renaissance. Violence is purely accidental, circumstantial and situational, due to the sense of frustration and feeling of injustice the Muslim world is subject to. Once the circumstances change violence disappears. In Islam again, no co-ercion in religion.

Whoever kills somebody it is as if he killed the whole of mankind, and whoever helps somebody to live as if he helped the whole of mankind.

2. Muslim immigration to the West does not represent any risk to Western homogeneity when Muslims become integrated in the West not secluded in Muslim Ghettos and once the West does not relinquish its pluralism the West is proud of. Immigration to Europe from southern shore to northern one is normal according to the international division of labour. Immigration to Europe is very common, from Africa and from Asia because of European colonialism. European immigration was the main source of population in Northern and Southern America, and in Australia. Indigenous people was were either completely exterminated or put in reservations. The ideal of the American society was the melting pot which has never been attained, given the actual tension still existing between whites and blacks.

3. The expansion of Islam in the West does not represent any risk concerning cultural identity. The West is a pluralistic culture. It encompasses Judaism and Christianity. Islam after all is a part of the Judeo-Christian tradition. All three major monotheistic faiths are stemming out of Abraham. The three cultures flourished around the same Mediterranean basin. Christianity expanded from the east to the west. Greco-Roman culture expanded from north to south. Afterward Islam flourished from south to north. In modern times European culture moved from west to east. The Mediterranean culture is one block in which Islam, Christianity and Judaism are major formative elements.

4. Islam may be a promise to the West, since it presents a real challenge, not a threat, an alternative not a substitute. The Muslim World is eligible to form a second pole in this uni-polar World to have a more balanced and multi-polar World. Latin America is hit by poverty, drugs, organized crime and the spirit of Guevara is no longer there. Africa is hit by drought, desertification, poverty, foreign debts, civil wars and AIDS. The only region which is still moving, questioning, resisting, disobeying the international hegemonic order is the Muslim World. Islamic culture is still alive. It is even revitalised. Islamic resurgence if well rationalised is more a promise than a risk. Democratic experiences in Morocco, Turkey and Iran give a hopeful link in practice between Islam and Democracy. The Asian Tigers are Muslim, with new experiences in Islam and Nation Building. Islam was a source of national liberation movements in the middle of the twentieth century and the core of national resistance at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the 21st century in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, South Africa and Eastern Europe, it is something to be proud of.

5. A mutual understanding of the two historical moments for the Self and the Other minimizes the risk and maximizes the promise. Both are not living in the same historical moment. The West is living at the end of its modern times after five hundred years. It can pay the price of post-modernism, deconstructionism and writing in zero point. While the Self is still struggling for its modern times, in a moment between Martin Luther and Giordano Bruno, trying to switch from Reformation to Renaissance. It still fights to end the inquisition era and the scholastic period. It defends reason, science, progress, man, freedom, equality and social justice, the ideals of the enlightenment, left behind and even discredited by the Other. Any judgement, any dialogue and any evaluation of risk and promise has to be aware of this anachronism in historical courses of the Self and the Other.

6. Both the Self and the Other are risks, and promises for each other. In the case of equal partnership, the risks are minimized, the promises maximized. Each played the role of the master and the disciple twice. The West played the role of the master during the Greco-Roman period when the Muslims translated from the north to the south the Greek heritage considering themselves the disciples of Aristotle, the first master and al-Farabi the second, Ptolemeo the first and the Alhazen the second Ptolemeo. The second time was during modern times when translations began again from the West especially from France, Modern Greece, into Arabic to make the Enlightenment a common heritage. Islam also played the role of the master twice. The first when translations began to occur directly from Arabic to Latin or indirectly through Hebrew in Toledo for two hundred years in late scholasticism. Latin Averorism was one of the sources of modern science and philosophy in the West. The second may be now when Islam may give a new type of humanity based on justice, not power, on a universal norm, not on double standard, on humanism not on racialism. Instead of wailing: The decline of the West (Spengler), crisis of European consciousness (P. Hazard), Western civilization on trial (B. Russel), putting everything upside down (M. Scheler), the machine creating gods (Bergson), the West can have a new hope resolving to solve its moral crisis and filling the spiritual vacuum. Islam can be a new blood transfer to the West in its agony.

To conclude, there is no risk without promise, no complexity crisises without simplicity solutions, and no social futures without present changes. An even world is better than an imbalanced one. Actually the two sides of the scale are imbalanced. One side needs justice and recognition.

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The Visible and Invisible in the Israeli Palestinian Conflict

Haifa University Ilan Pappe

Introduction

This article is in essence a retrospective view on the history of peace making in Palestine and Israel, for the sake of a better understanding of what lies ahead. Its main argument is that for various reasons throughout the years, an Israeli perception of what is a solution guided the peace making, while the Palestinian reading of the situation was totally neglected and rejected.

The result so far has been a peace process that focused on what would be presented here as the visible and recent aspects of the conflict: the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the wish to reach a compromise over the fate of these areas while sidelining what for the Palestinians was the heart of the matter: the 1948 war and the refugee problem. This latter view dealt with more distant past and less visible layers of the conflict: responsibility, guilt and justice.

The way forward, from this writer's point of view, given the dismal failure of all the peace efforts hitherto is to push towards a reconciliation process that will focus on abstract issues such as fairness, justice and guilt, and one that would not be limited to compromises over borders, nature of regimes or any other materialistic aspect of a political settlement. In fact, I argue that the possible achievements in the physical issues of land and borders are useless without significant progress on the moral and legal ground.

My departure point would be that 'fairness' and 'justice' are no less important bricks in the future solution than armies and territories. This is not an attempt to present only an ethical reflection; it is much more the outcome of a functional approach to the conceptualization of a future solution. This approach gains more and more support on the ground, as the two-states solution in Palestine looses its feasibility and to a certain extent, its credibility. In the various alternatives suggested, the main concern seems to focus on moral issues, no less than around materialistic question of percentages of territory, sovereignty and security. My guess is that it would even override these practical aspects of solution.

The Historical Background

Power and knowledge go hand in hand and hence in the West one hears too often and too loud the conceptualization of 'fairness' postulated by the occupier, the winner and the victorious, in our case the Israeli side. One hears little about the other side's, the subaltern, Palestinian, point of view. This is why in the past British, UN, American and Israeli conceptualizations of 'fairness' dominated the search for peace and were based mainly on the territorial dimension of the conflict while neglecting totally the question of guilt, restitution and justice. These perceptions of 'fairness' are closely connected to questions of homeland in the realm of possession, entitlement and future control. In the second part of this article I will argue that only the inclusion in a dominant position of the Palestinian concepts of fairness can construct notions of 'homeland' conducive to the pacification of the conflict.

The Israel/Palestine conflict was an object of reconciliation, mediation and peace efforts ever since it had erupted in the late nineteen-century. The first significant efforts had been made by the British Empire during the mandatory period. At that early period one can distinguish between two stages. The first until the 1930s, in which the various British initiators of dialogue, wished to construct under British auspices, a political structure—a joint homeland—that would represent equally the small Jewish community and the Palestinian majority on the land of Palestine. The second stage, beginning in the mid 1930s, was mainly inspired by the principle of partition: dividing the territory between the two communities and the construction of two separate political structures. In the first stage one can talk about a missed opportunity around the year of 1928 when the Palestinian leadership had agreed to discuss a joint federative structure, after years of rejecting any compromise, but the Zionist leadership, which had supported until that moment such a model, opposed it when it learnt about the Palestinian consent–a typical mode of behavior that would repeat itself in 1947. Compromises, which challenged the very essence of Zionism, were accepted by the Jewish community only when it was absolutely clear that they would be totally rejected by the Palestinian side.

The joint and equally divided political structure of 1928 included restrictions on Jewish immigration and was a basis for a bi-national state. It was totally forgotten when the UN offered—inspired by Zionist and British schemes—instead, a partition plan for Palestine in 1947. This partition left an equal number of Jews and Palestinians within the future Jewish State. Therefore we can say that in a way the 1947 partition resolution offered a kaleidoscopic vision of homeland divided to one bi-national state next to a uni-national one.

As in 1928 so also in 1947 the Zionist leaders were offered a bi-national model. In 1928 they had rejected it and were let off by the British. In 1947, they succeeded in creating the impression that they, unlike the Arab side, preferred such a bi-national state next to a purely Arab state, as stipulated by the partition resolution. As the Arab and Palestinian rejection persisted, their bluff was never called.

One Israeli scholar was adamant in his conviction that the Zionist support for partition in 1947 stemmed from a clear knowledge about the general Arab rejectionist posture and the particular Palestinian refusal. A very sensible act of historical deduction, but one which is difficult to substantiate with documents. It is quite clear nonetheless that a bi-national Palestinian-Jewish state—as offered by the partition resolution of the UN no. 181—would have defeated the most basic Zionist aspirations and that the Jewish leadership of the day would have resorted to any possible means—destruction and transfer included—to make the state as purely Jewish as possible.

It is noteworthy that few days before the UN partition resolution was adopted, the Zionist leadership discussed the issue and a consensus emerged that if Palestinians would remain within the future Jewish state they would have been granted full citizenship. Three months later the military command of the Jewish community devised a plan for what we now call ethnic cleansing of the areas of the future Jewish State.

So a 'fair solution' until 1948 was a bi-national state, either on all over Palestine, or on part of it, while the other part was to belong to the indigenous population. This 'fair solution' was unacceptable at the time to the Palestinians, who regarded the Zionists as did Algerians the Pied Noir, with whom they had no wish to divide the land. But it was also totally unacceptable to the Zionist movement, the leaders of which decided to de-Arabize any part of Palestine that would be allocated to them or they that would occupy. And yet in the international collective memory, the 'fair' solution was accepted by Israel and rejected by the Arabs—a memory shaping attitudes especially in the West towards Palestinians as villains and Israelis as heroes.

And indeed the future concepts of homeland in the context of Israel and Palestine would be closely associated to the international community's input in the peace negotiations. This input in turn is influenced significantly by perceptions of right and wrong and assessments of past behaviour.

What blinded the UN at the time was the organization's curious decision to opt for a solution which was adopted by the majority of its member states, and not to seek consent between the two warring parties on the ground. The future homeland of both locals and newcomers was to be defined and brokered by outside forces, this was never in history a successful recipe.

Partition was institutionalized in November 1947 by UNSCOP. The members of this committee did not know Palestine at all, and in a relatively short period adopted a plan already offered by the Royal Peel Commission in 1937, whence it had also been endorsed by the Zionist leadership. In essence partition meant dividing the land into two states, while keeping between them an economic union and supervising them from abroad. This remained the basis for the peace efforts ever since. But already the initiators of the partition resolution recognized that not every issue in Palestine was divisible or negotiable on a 'rational' basis. The resolution offered, maybe contrary to its spirit, the internationalization of Jerusalem. The positions of both sides towards the city were born not in decision making processes but laid on layers of conscience and consciousness, that even if not fully understood by the mediators, realized that a solution to this question could not be based on the divisibility of the visible but rather should emerge out of respect for the non-divisibility of the invisible layers of the conflict.

It was the first mediator in the history of the post-mandatory conflict, Count Folke Bernadotte, who tried to penetrate into these deeper layers in the post mandatory Palestine conflict. a few days after the 1948 war erupted, on June 20, 1948, he was appointed a UN mediator. He offered two proposals to end the conflict by partitioning the land into two states. The difference between them was that in the second proposal he suggested the annexation of Arab Palestine to Transjordan. But in both proposals he stipulated the unconditional repatriation of Palestinian refugees as a precondition for peace. He was ambivalent about Jerusalem wishing it to be the Arab capital in the first proposal but preferring it international in the second. In any case, he seemed to place the refugees and Jerusalem at the center of the conflict, and to perceive these two dilemmas as indivisible problems, for which only a comprehensive and just solution would do.

Even after Bernadotte's assassination by Jewish extremists in 1948, the Palestine Conciliation Commission appointed to replace him, pursued the same policy. The three members of this commission wished to build the future solution on three tiers: the partition of the land into two states—but not according to the map of the partition resolution but in correspondence to the demographic distribution of Jews and Palestinians, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the unconditional return of the refugee to their homes. The new mediators offered the three principles as a basis for negotiations and while the Arab confrontational countries and the Palestinian leadership accepted this offer, during the UN peace conference in Lausanne Switzerland in May 1949, as had done before them the UN General Assembly in resolution 194 of December 1948, it was nonetheless buried by the intransigent David Ben Gurion and his government in summer of

that year. At first, the US administration rebuked Israel for its policy and exerted economic pressure on it, but later on, the Jewish lobby succeeded in re-orientating US policy onto pro-Israeli tracks, where it remains until today.

There was a lull in the peace efforts in the 1950s and 1960s, although into the air schema such the Anglo-American Alpha program and the Johnston Plan were thrown. These and more esoteric initiative, almost all of them American, wished to adopt a business like approach to the conflict. This meant a great belief in partition according to the security interests of Israel and its Arab neighbors, while totally sidelining the Palestinians as partners for peace. The Palestinians were cancelled as a political partner in the business—like approach. They existed only as refugees whose fate was treated within the economic aspect of the American Cold War against the Soviet Union. Their problem was to be solved within a new Marshal plan for the Middle East. This plan promised American aid to the area in order to improve the standard of living as the best means of containing Soviet encroachment. For that the refugees had to be resettled in Arab lands and serve as cheap labour for their development (and by that also distancing them from Israel's borders and consciousness).

Fortunately for the Palestinians they had the PLO, a movement which through guerilla warfare and welfare systems enabled the refugees to show enough resistance that encouraged Arab regimes to leave the refugees in their transitional camps, despite their perception as a destabilizing factor. The association of the PLO with the Soviet Union was another factor pushing the Palestinians, wherever they were, from any prospective pax Americana.

The June 1967 war and its consequences clarified, in the most striking manner, the gap lying between business like American-Israeli attitudes on the one hand and the Palestinian conceptualization of a 'fair' solution, on the other. This chasm disabled ever since 1967, any significant progress in the peace efforts. As I will presently hope to show, the quantitative and divisible approach to the conflict, at best can produce military and economic rearrangements and configurations which reflect the balance of power; at worst it perpetuates past evils and injustices. Hence the occupier, Israel, remains in its previous role, and the Palestinians, the occupied, continue to live under the same oppression. And not even a very dramatic discourse of peace, dramatized by high profile ceremonies on the White House lawn can hide this reality.

Israel had occupied a large share of Palestine already in 1948–77% percent of it; it completed Palestine's takeover in 1967. This total control of the land enabled American negotiators such as William Rogers and Henry Kissinger, and Swedes such as Gunar Yaring, to

produce and market an equation they presented as the ultimate and fair solution. Territories for peace. An equation, which was wholeheartedly endorsed by the pragmatic Israeli labour movement. It is a strange formula if you stop and think about it: on the one end of the equation you have a quantitative and measurable variable, on the other, an abstract term, not easily conceptualized or even illustrated. It was less bizarre as a working basis for bilateral peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors where indeed it operated quite well, for a while, in the case of Egypt and Jordan. And yet we should remember it produced 'cold peace' in the case of these two countries, as it did not offer a comprehensive solution to the Palestine question. And indeed what had this equation to offer to the ultimate victims of the 1948 war; whose demand for 'justice' is the main fuel kindling the conflict's fire?

Justice is not just demanded by Palestinians, it is asked for by the Arab world at large. Justice in the local regional context is a less abstract term than it sounds. Justice for Palestinians is part of the reshaping of the post-Colonialist Middle East agenda. And even if Arab regimes tend to forget it, their civil societies remind them of this particular context of the Palestine question. Peace with Israel, even in the case of Egyptians and Jordanians, is reconciliation with the last colonialist movement—even if it had been also a nationalist one–remaining on Middle Eastern soil. For those who were not direct victims of this colonialism it may be easier to reconcile, due to economic interest or in recognition of the balance of power with the Jewish state; but for its victims, not only from 1948, but victims of continuos campaign of destruction of the Palestinian people, economic interests and balance of power can only induce the few, the uncommitted, but not the devoted many. They are not only seeking rectification of past evils, they seek immunity from present and future devastation.

Thus a fair peace in the eyes of the Palestinians can only be based on the healing of past wounds and far more important the security against future desolation. Can territories assure that? Or put differently, can a future solution be based on territorial dimensions alone?

The Oslo Discourse of Fairness

The architects of the Oslo accord thought it could. They resold the merchandize of 'peace for territories'. Hollow concepts such as Israeli recognition in the PLO and 'autonomy' for the Palestinians were meant to strengthen the business like approach for a solution. The solution was perpetuation, throughout indirect military control, of the Israeli occupation. This solution was displayed with a dramatic discourse of peace.

I am not underestimating the progress made in Oslo, but one should never forget the circumstances of the

accord's birth, they tell you why it was such a colossal failure. Dramatic changes in the global and regional balance of power, and an Israeli readiness to replace the Hashemites of Jordan with the PLO as a partner for peace, opened the way to an even more complicated formula of 'territories for peace'. Territories, and everything else which is visible and quantifiable could be divided between the two sides. Thus the only non Jewish parts of post-1948 Palestine—23 percent of the land—could be re-divided between Israel and a future Palestinian autonomous entity. Within these 23 percents of Palestine, the illegal Jewish settlements could be divided into 80 percent under Israeli control and 20 percent under Palestinian authority. And so on, most of the water resources to Israel, most of Jerusalem in Israeli hands. Peace, the quid pro quo, meant a stateless Palestinian state robbed of any say in its defense, foreign or economic policies. As for the Palestinian right of return, according to the Israeli interpretation of Oslo, which is the one that counts, it should be forgotten and erased. This conceptualization of fairness was presented to the world at large in the summer of 2000 at Camp David.

For Palestinians the summit in Camp David was meant to produce the final stages in the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza strip [according to resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN security council] and prepare the ground for new negotiations over a fair settlement on the basis of UN resolution 194—the return of the refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem and a full sovereign Palestinian state. Even the US voted in favor of this resolution at the time and ever since.

The Israeli Left, in power ever since 1999, regarded the Camp David summit as a stage for dictating to the Palestinian their concept of fairness: maximizing the divisibility of the visible [evicting 90 percent of the occupied areas, 20 percent of the settlements, 50 percent of Jerusalem] while demanding the end of Palestinian reference to the invisible layers of the conflict: no right of return, no fully sovereign Palestinian state and no solution for the Palestinian minority in Israel. After Camp David fairness meant that as long as the Palestinian would not accept the Israeli dictate, the occupation, exile and discrimination would continue until the Palestinians would budge. With or without Ariel Sharon's violation of the sacredness of Haram al-Sharif the second uprising broke out in the territories and in Israel in October 2000 and it would be there with us for a very long time.

'Territories for Peace' is no longer on the peace table, ever since the outbreak of the second intifada. An uprising that spilled over into Israel itself leading the Palestinian minority there to call for the deZionization of the Jewish state, allowing West Bankers to demand the Palestiniazation of the Muslim and Christian Jerusalem, the inhabitants of Gaza to raise arms against

the continued occupation and uniting refugees around the world in their call for the implementation of their right of return. What this last intifada makes abundantly clear is that the end of occupation is a precondition for peace it is not peace itself. The Israeli peace camp, so we are told by its 'gurus' is insulted. It feels its leaders maximized the equation by offering most of the territories Israeli occupied in 1967. They demand now, like never before, a Palestinian recognition of the Zionist narrative of the 1948 war: Israel has no responsibility for the making of the refugee problem, the Palestinian minority in Israel—now twenty percent of the population—is not part of the solution to the conflict and Palestinians should recognize as for ever Jewish the settlement belt encircling Jerusalem and planted at the heart of the Palestinian cities such as Nablus and Halil (Hebron).

Thus the conceptualization of a future solution is tied to values such as fairness not less than to the eviction of territories. The post-territorial dimension of the solution are closely associated with the direct recognition by the Israelis of their role as colonizers, expellers, oppressors and occupiers.

This is a most difficult task for the Jewish society in Israel since its images itself to be the victims. This is done consciously and unconsciously by the national systems in Israel that cultivate through their discourses and conduct the fear of attributing to the Palestinians positive or even empathetic images. This particular dilemma was revealed in Israel in the early 1950s. The state system by then conveyed a very clear negative stereotyping of everything that was Arab. It was the hated Other, symbolizing everything we, the Jews, are not. This juxtaposition ran into trouble when Israel encouraged about one million Arab Jews to immigrate. There was a conscious effort to de-Arabize these Arabs immigrants: they were coached to scorn their mother tongue, reject Arab culture and make an effort to be Europeanized.

The other, complementary, side of this coin, was a systematic effort of denying acts of barbarism against the Palestinians, and attributing the ability of such human abuses only to the other side. This particular dilemma can be seen in the way Israeli historiography dealt with Jewish atrocities in the 1948 war or Jewish terrorism in the Mandatory period. Atrocities and terrorism are two modes of behavior Israeli Orientalists attribute solely to the Palestinian resistance movement. Therefore it can not be part of an analysis or description of chapters in Israel's past. One way out of this dilemma is accrediting a particular political group, preferably an extremist one, with the same attributes of the enemy, by that clarifying the mainstream moral national behavior. This is why the Israeli always admitted to the massacre in Dir Yassin, committed by the right wing Irgun, but tried to hide the many other massacres carried out by the Hagana and later on by the IDF.

Thus a fair solution requires a new Israeli approach to the issue of victimhood. As I have shown recently in an article, the Israeli TV series, Tekkuma, celebrating Israel's jubilee in 1998, was the first popular attempt to ponder the possibility that Jews were not only the ultimate victims of the twentieth century, but also victimizers. This was done by allocating space on TV to show, alongside the Zionist narrative, chapters from the Palestinian version of history. Although this was a very cautious attempt, which did not deviate too much from the Zionist narrative, it was enough to bring the wrath of all the political system on the series' editors and producers.

Until such a recognition of the victimizing role they played would become a vital and necessary station in the socialization of the Jews in Israel, no less, than the horror destinations, to which high school children in Israel are forced—and one hopes that at least some of them want by their own accord—to visit in Holocaust Europe, there is very little chance for progressing on issues such a 'fair solution' in the construction of a future homeland for both Palestinians and Jews.

For the Israeli Jews recognizing the Palestinians as victims of their own evil is deeply traumatic, for it does not only question the very foundational myths of the state of Israel and its motto of 'A state without a people for a people without a state,' but it also raises a whole panoply of ethical questions with significant implications for the future of the state. This fear on the Israeli side is the stronger of the two aversions and most destructive in the Jewish society's ability to turn a new leaf in its relationship with the Palestinians. The fear from allowing the other side to become a victim of the conflict would not have been so fierce, had this victimhood been related to natural and normal consequences of a long lasting bloody conflict. From such a perspective both sides are victims of 'the circumstances' or any other amorphous, non-committal concept which absolves human beings and particularly politicians from taking responsibility. But what is demanded by the Palestinians, in fact has become a conditio sine qua non to many of them is that Israel would recognize them as victims of its own evil. The fear is deeply rooted in the way Israelis choose to tell the story of 1948, and more importantly how the Israelis react to the way the Palestinian narrative tells the story of that year, the year of the Nakbah.

In Israel, educators, historians, novelists, cultural producers in general, have been all involved in a campaign of denial and concealment. The horrors of 1948 were hidden from the public eye and generations to come by those who committed them. Only in the end of 2000, did one brave journalist in Haaretz, a voice in the wilderness, cry out in an article: how could you lie to us for so many years? Very few ask this question now and even fewer are willing to answer it.

The historians and educators in particular are the main villains in this case. They all in one way or another helped to construct and preserve a national narrative that eliminates the collective Palestinian memory. This elimination is no less violent than expulsion and destruction, it is the main constitutive element in the construction of collective Jewish identity in the state of Israel. It is manifested in the tales told by child minders on Independence day and Passover, in the curriculum and text books in elementary and high schools, in the ceremonies of freshmen and the graduation of officers in the army, it is broadcast in the printed and electronic media as well as in the speeches and discourse of the politicians, in the way artists, novelists and poets subject their works to the national narrative, and in the research produced by academics in the universities about the Israeli reality in the past and the present.

This act of symbolic violence and thought control had been intensified ever since October 2000. It is particularly evident now in the educational system and the media, but mostly evident in the Israeli academia-a state of affairs which requires non partisan scholars here and elsewhere in the USA to rethink what they can and should do in their relationship with an academia that support oppression, occupation and discrimination.

This self control guards even peace makers in Israel from not opening the Pandora box of 1948 and the whole question of victimhood. This can be seen in the particular posture adopted by the 'Peace Now' movement in Israel. For its members, peace and reconciliation are translated to the need of mutual recognition between the two national narratives, in a way that would eliminate clashing. The way to do it is to make divisible everything that is visible: land, resources, blame and history into a pre-1967 when we, the Jews, were Right and Just and a post-1967 when You, the Palestinians, were Right and Just.

Viewed from this perspective, victimhood in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can also be divided into those two historical periods. The same righteous approach of the Israeli peace camp applies to the early, more distant chapter in the history of the conflict as one in which the Jews were the victims, namely the pre-1967 era and the recent chapter, i.e., after 1967 in which the Palestinians were victims. The peridoization is very important since the earlier period is considered to be the more crucial one and thus being Just then, in the formative period of the conflict, justifies the existence of Zionism and the whole Jewish project in Palestine, as it doubts the wisdom and morality of Palestinian actions in that period. It obliterates out of any discussion the ethnic cleansing carried out by the Jews in 1948: the destruction of 400 Palestinian villages and neighborhoods, the expulsion of 700,000 Palestinians and the massacre of several thousand Palestinians.

From this perspective, Israel deviated from the moral and just road after being forced to occupy the West Bank and the Gaza strip. But this misbehavior does not cast any doubt on its very essence and justification.

But the peace and mutual recognition entails bridging over the invisible, hence the indivisible, layers of history, guilt and injustice. Blame can not be divided, not if peace and reconciliation mean respect for the Other's narrative. The Palestinian narrative is that of suffering, reconstructed on the basis of oral history—a continued exilic existence, and re-discovered historical narratives—read backwards through the prism of contemporary hardships. In that narrative, Zionism or Israel, are the absolute evil, the arch-villain as well as the ultimate victimizer. How can this image be divided in the business like approach to peace, preached by American and Israeli peacemakers?

It can not of course. When peace is discussed in this context one should appeal to ways in which communities of suffering, world wide, reconcile with their victimizers. The narrative of suffering is an interpretative construct describing a collective evil in the past, employed for the political needs of a given community in the present, in order to improve its conditions in the future. This is the tool employed by the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, the native Americans, the African Americans, the Muslims in Bosnia, and by the African majority in South Africa.

In order to avoid a reductionist view of the narrative of suffering, I will add that in the case of the Palestinians especially, as well as other communities which continue to live the aftereffects of the original action which lead to this narrative, such a concept has also a redemptive value- for the communities themselves. However, the way this narrative is manipulated by cultural production and political actors for political ends is another issue.

This narrative is reproduced with the help of educational and media systems, a commemorative infrastructure of museums and ceremonies and it is preserved by employing an adequate discourse. It can serve a community in conflict; it is more difficult as means for reconciliation. In the case of the Palestinians this takes form especially in crowding the calendar with significant days that have to be commemorated: days such the Balfour Declaration, the Declaration of Independence, the End of the Mandate, the Partition Resolution and the day of the Fatah's foundation. It is admittedly less a case of collective museums as the Palestinians continue to lack such a basic infrastructure in the absence of a terra firma on which to establish some commemorative rituals. For example the mass graveyard of the Sabra and Chatila massacres has been used as a massive garbage dump for the past nineteen years. Every year it is cleared up in September, but usually takes activists from outside the camp to generate some memorial

event before it disintegrates into a dump again. In one community at least, of the Palestinian activists of the PLO residing in Tunis between 1983 and 1993, the living room in private homes had a corner in which a kind of a Museum representing a narrative and a discourse of national identity could be found.

While Palestinians live the memory of the Nakbah, the Israelis deny it out of fear. This Israeli fear plays a crucial role in the violence exercised daily in the Israeli struggle against the Palestinian narrative, the memory and the assumption of victimhood. Victimizing the other and negating its right for the position of a victim are intertwined processes of the same violence. Those who had expelled Palestinians in 1948 deny the ethnic cleansing that took place. And so the self-declaration of being a victim is accompanied by the fear of losing the position of the Jew as the ultimate victim in modern history to the other, the ultimate victim of Israel and Zionism.

How can we deal with this fear, a subject that has to be encountered if the hypothesis of this article is accepted, that without such confrontation there very little hope for a different kind of coexistence or for the construction of a post-conflict reality. Let me suggest, briefly, two possible very different ways of approaching this complex question of reconciliation.

Post Conflictual Possibilities

The first and most difficult one is legal. The very idea of considering the 1948 case in the realm of law and justice is an anathema to most Jews in Israel and hence outside pressure would be needed here.

If it is possible to bring onto the stage of international tribunals Israel's conduct in 1948 and ever since it may deliver a message even to the peace camp in Israel that reconciliation entails recognition of war crimes and collective atrocities. This can not be done from within as any reference in the Israeli press to expulsion, massacre or destruction in 1948 is usually denied and attributed to self-hate and service to the enemy in time of war. This reaction encompasses the academia, the media, the educational system as well the political circles. The reaction shows what a powerful disincentive the current power structure is. It reveals how deep is the fear that members of Israeli society would be implicated in actions, the likes of which have been condemned by the entire world, including prominent members of the Israeli Jewish society.

Tribunals like this, even if they are staged public events, can teach us in advance about the mechanism of future settlement—for instance how does one quantify the suffering. One of best means of approaching this quantification of suffering was offered by the Israelis and Germans in their preparation agreement. An agreement that included pensions calculated according to inflation across the years, estimation of real estates and

other aspects of individual loss. A different set of agreements was that concluded about translating to money, in forms of grants to the state of Israel, of the collective loss. Salman Abu Sitta has begun such thinking in some of his works giving us an idea on the real value of assets lost in the Nakbah.

A 'softer' approach is to offer non-retributive paradigms of justice. Howard Zher in his book, Changing Lenses talks strongly against the pro-punishment judicial system. One of the questions Zher raises is relevant to our discussion of the means by which Jews in Israel could overcome their fear of facing the past. He asks, should justice focus on establishing guilt or should it focus on identifying needs and obligations? In other words can it serve as a re-regulator of life where life was once disrupted? Justice cannot be made to inflict suffering on victimizers, let alone their descendents, but to cease suffering from continuing.

Such a non-retributive panel was offered by the truth committee of Bishop Desmond Tutu in South Africa. The power underlying the Truth Commission lies both in its disinclination to inflict heavy penalties, and in its insistence on discussing future relationships between different communities in South Africa. It ensures that victims do not transform too easily into victimizers themselves.

Another legal approach is offered by the American psychologist Joan Fumia who focuses her work on the transformation of attitudes in conflictual situations. She bases her work on the relationships, which develop between offenders and victims in the American legal system, based on a recently introduced new procedure which offers victim-offender mediation. This method involves a face to face meeting between offender and victim. The most important part of the procedure is the readiness of the offender to accept responsibility for the crime. Thus, the deed itself is not the foci of the process, but its consequences. The search in this method is after restorative justice which is defined as a question of what can the offender do to ease the loss and suffering of the victim. It is not a substitute for the criminal proceedings, or in the case of Palestine, it cannot be an alternative to actual compensation or repatriation, but a supplement to any final solution. Fumia claimed that in South Africa this model was successfully implemented.

Israeli responsibility for the Nakbah, if it were to be discussed, which at the present stage is unlikely, as part of the attempt to reach a permanent settlement for the conflict, would obviously not reach the international court, as did the cases of Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia. Or at least, this is what one can assess given the way the Nakbah is perceived by governments in the USA and Europe. These political actors have so far accepted the Israeli peace camp perspective on the conflict, as elaborated above. However, the civil societies in

America and in Europe as well as governments in Africa and Asia have different views on this, and the situation may change (the move to prosecute Ariel Sharon in a Belgian court, is one such example). But as long as this balance of power remains as it is now, one doubts the possibility of establishing a truth commission a la South Africa. But the demands of the 1948 Palestinian victims would remain in a very dominant position on the peace agenda, whether or not this procedure is followed.

This outcry would continue to face the offenders. The fear of the offender would have to be taken into account in order that the settlement of the conflict can move from the division of the visible to the restoration of the invisible.

The second approach is educational and requires a dialectical recognition of both communities as communities of suffering. For this a very natural process of negating the other should be overcome first. The destruction of the collective memory of the Other, through the construction of one's own, is a central element in the formation of national identities. Violence, direct as well as symbolic, plays a crucial part in the way collective memories are produced, reproduced, disseminated and consumed within concrete historical power relations, interests and conceptual possibilities and limitations. In the case of Palestine and Israel, control of the collective memory is part of the internal and external violence and counter violence each of the rival collectives applies to secure its existence. That is, the way the two sides to the conflict construct their collective identity is a dialectical process whose impelling force is the total negation of the Other. Within this dialectics each side sees itself as a sole victim while totally negating the victimization of the Other. The violence used in order to conquer the centers of power relations and dynamics aims at positioning more 'effectively' one's own narrative, interests, values, symbols, goals and criteria while at the same time securing those of the Other are marginalized, excluded or destroyed. The incommensurability has the upper hand and dialogue has no chance of finding a starting point. Collective self-constitution, negation of the legitimacy of the Other's otherness, victimizing the Other and refusing to acknowledge the Other's suffering becomes inseparably bound up with each other. The self-proclaimed victimhood, the refusal to acknowledge the evil inflicted on the Other and the insistence on being sole victim are fused into the kind of practice which reflects the position of the Other. In the case of Israeli/Palestinian coexistence, the struggle over the control of the memory of victimization is a matter of life and death, and suffering and death, as actuality and as memory, are philosophical, political and existential issues.

It will not be easy to overcome such a powerful dialectical process in the case of Israel and Palestine,

not least because of the point I was making in this article that of the disparity in blame, injustice and victimizing between the two sides. The way to go about it is by treating the history of the conflict as a chain of victimization. The violence that bred the national awakening of the Jews and their search for a homeland in Palestine did not justify past or present evils inflicted by the movement or later the state of Israel on the Palestinians. And while Zionism may not be a historical case of pure colonialism, it can still be defined as a Colonialist movement and therefore the Palestinian violence and counter-violence cannot be judged in the same way as Zionist violence against Palestine should be assessed. In this sense, no injustice was inflicted by the Palestinian on the Israelis, as no injustice was inflicted by the Algerians on the French colonialists though there certainly was violence. But there was a European injustice inflicted upon the Jews that can be recognized as a first link in the chain of victimization.

In the reformulation of collective memory currently under way in South Africa, the Africans are not diminishing the catastrophes that propelled white settlers to come to South Africa. While reintroducing the crimes of Apartheid into the collective memory, the dialogue here creates space for the traumas that led whites to leave Europe in search of another 'homeland.' Similarly, one cannot equate injustice and Palestinian resistance to Jewish expulsion and ethnic cleansing.

The demands from the Palestinians lie elsewhere in this approach. The need to avoid dwarfing or eliminating the role of the Holocaust in the Jewish national identity and collective memory on the one hand, and the end of instrumentalizing the Nakbah in a way that obstructs the chances for peaceful dialogue.

The demand not to instrumentalize both catastrophes' memories is of course directed to both sides. Such a demand can not be accepted unless the political structure of the future solution, is a-national or bi-national. Only in such political formation one can hope for non-ethnocentric, polyphonic reconstructions of the past that can produce in their turn more reflective and humanistic attitudes towards the suffering of both sides.

The starting point is overcoming nationalism and ethnocentrism. Without this no Palestinian-Israeli dialogue on historiographical, moral and philosophical levels is possible. Critical Theory and postmodern elaboration of the historical constitution of the subject, knowledge, identity, memory together with empirical studies should impel this deconstruction and reformulation of the hegemonic Palestinian and Israeli narratives. The enemy here is not so much the hegemonic interpretation as it is the position of exclusivity demanded by one side or the other and by the denial of the Other's narrative. The demand for exclusivity in the case of the Holocaust is understandably a very touchy issue. The recognition of universality of the Holocaust's memory

and its expropriation from the hand of Zionism, does not and should not diminish its uniqueness in the history of mankind. This uniqueness, however, is manifested inter alia also in the Nakbah and the Palestinian suffering. Such an attitude contains new political possibilities currently overshadowed by both sides' one-dimensionality.

But those who go down this road will encounter many obstacles. Adopting a critical 'humanist' or 'universal' approach, which does not simply dismiss humanism, they will find themselves set apart from the accepted intellectual, cultural and emotional levels within the history of 'their' societies and may be pushed into internal exile. On such marginal spots can these people still be considered as 'Palestinians' or 'Israelis'? This is but one question to be answered within this future dialogue.

Indeed how will Israeli Jews challenging the Zionization of the Holocaust memory fare and how could Palestinians challenge openly the national instrumentalization of the Nakbah in direct clash with mainstream Palestinian conception of the Nakbah memory.

In the 1990s, on both sides hopeful signs for the beginning of such a dialogue appeared. The 'new historians' in Israel challenged the foundational myth of the Jewish State while on the Palestinian side, self-criticism emerged about the tendency to minimize the Holocaust memory and its universal implications. Edward Said and Azmi Bishara, and few others deconstructed the way Arab and Palestinian literature dwarfed, ignored and at times denied the Holocaust memory as a constitutive element in the Jewish collective memory.

This is how Edward Said has put it:

'What Israel does to the Palestinians it does against a background, not only of the long-standing Western tutelage over Palestine and Arabs... but also against a background of an equally long-standing and equally unfaltering anti-Semitism that in this century produced the Holocaust of the European Jews. . We cannot fail to connect the horrific history of anti-Semitic massacres to the establishment of Israel; nor can we fail to understand the depth, the extent and the overpowering legacy of its suffering and despair that informed the postwar Zionist movement. But it is no less appropriate for Europeans and Americans today, who support Israel because of the wrong committed against the Jews to realize that support for Israel has included, and still includes, support for the exile and dispossession of the Palestinian people.'

The universalization of the Holocaust memory, the deconstruction of this memory's manipulation by Zionism and the state of Israel and the end of Holocaust denial and underrating on the Palestinian side can lead to the mutual sympathy Said talks about. However, it may need more than this to convince the Israelis to rec-

ognize their role as victimizers. The self-image of victim is deeply rooted in the collective conduct of the political elite in Israel from the very early years of the state. It is seen as the source for moral international and world Jewish support for the state, even when this image of the righteous Israel on the one hand and the David and Goliath myth on the other became quite ridiculous after the 1967 war, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the Intifada. And yet the fear is there of loosing the position of the victim, next to the fear of facing the unpleasant past and its consequences, not far away from the fear nourished by the political system, substantiated by Arab hostility, of being physically eliminated as a community.

Conclusions

The nuclear arsenal, the gigantic military complex, the security service octopuses, have all proved themselves useless in the face of the two Intifadas or the guerrilla war in South Lebanon. They are useless as means of facing an ever frustrated and radical million Palestinian citizens of Israel, or a local initiative by refugees unable to contain their dismay in the face of an opportunist Palestinian authority or a crumbling PLO. None of the weapons the real or imaginary fear produced can face the victim and his or her wrath. More and more victims are added daily to the Palestinian community of suffering, in the occupied territories and in Israel itself. The end of victimization and the recognition of the role of Israel as victimizer are the only useful means of reconciliation.

So a post-conflictual homeland can not be constructed on the basis of a division of the shared imagined homeland in the most unfair balance thinkable: 78 percent a Jewish state and 22 percent of a Palestinian protectorate of a kind. It is even less thinkable as a solution, when the offer on the international agenda is dividing even the 22 percent with a further partition. A fair solution can not be a solution which allocates to Israel exclusive say in security, foreign and economic matters. The future solution can not include a Jewish state in which Palestinians are second rate citizens, and it can not be a perpetuation of an occupation, even if it is described with new terminology.

But above all, a future constructed homeland can not survive as a physical and political entity, when an estimated four million Palestinian refugees and their right of return are erased from its agenda. A future homeland, from which the symbolic and actual violence is reduced or even extracted, is one in which the past evil of transfer is rectified by repatriation of those who had been expelled. This principle should be discussed as a practical solution taking into account demography, economy, cultural inclinations and above all fears.

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Can America Overcome American Fundamentalism?

Director, Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Monotheistic Religions   Koichi Mori

I am grateful that Prof. Hanafi and Prof. Pappe have taken up two topics that are extremely important in the contemplation of peace in the post-9/11 world. One topic concerned the question of how the Islamic world should be viewed. Prof. Pappe touched on the Palestinian issue. I myself am a specialist in American religious history; I study America through religion. So today I would like to talk about America.

Some of our colleagues here at this meeting are from the United States. In the morning session, it was clear that our American colleagues have different views on the Iraqi war. So I would like to speak, with your indulgence, as a Japanese scholar of American studies.

It is obvious, I think, that the US, with its overwhelming military power and military technology, holds the key to war and peace in the post-9/11 world. Our thoughts on world security and peace should start from this reality. In the discussions that we have had so far, it has been pointed out that the US represents a secular civilization. Yet, America has another face, an extremely religious face, as can be seen in President Bush's remarks. Compared to the other industrialized Western countries, it can be said that the US is exceptionally religious.

It is my sense that America's-post 9/11 foreign policies leading to the Iraqi war are based on fear: fear that

the United States may again be attacked on its own land by terrorists. Preventing a second terrorist attack is the motive at the heart of all the actions taken by the US. One may ask, then, if terrorism can be eradicated by American attacks on Iraq. The answer, of course, is no. One may also ask if terrorists, by attacking US territory, can change the US or force American troops to withdraw from Iraq. The answer again is no. Yet we know that America must change, as we must accept the idea that peace is relative and in the future we will probably have to be content with peace more relative than today. I think we must recognize that it is only the US that can finally change the US. But in this talk I would like to discuss what could be done to help America change.

First of all, let us consider 9/11 and the subsequent war in Iraq. To put it very simplistically, I think that these events represent a clash between two forms of Fundamentalism; that is, Islamic Fundamentalism and American Fundamentalism. I am fully aware of the enormous risks in using the term "Fundamentalism" and yet, even with this awareness, I still dare use it. I use it in this talk, though, not in its original theological sense, but in the general sense, in the way journalists use it.

First, we have to ask ourselves what kind of people fundamentalists are. Fundamentalists maintain that they know the Truth; they resort to political and violent means to realize their version of Truth. Fundamentalists also believe that they can eliminate those who do not accept their Truth. They think that their Truth is self-evident and easy to achieve. In this sense, we can call fundamentalists ""people who can't wait." In this line of thinking, we can say that Bin Laden and George Bush are perhaps fundamentalists of similar types. Of course, America is a nation of great diversity, and President Bush does not represent all Americans. However, at the same time, we should not forget that this is a presidential election year in the US and that in the choosing of a president, the fundamentalist side of America often gains enormous power.

Since immediately after 9/11, President Bush has continually stated that an attack on the US is an attack on freedom and civilization. His notion of civilization as discernible in this statement is particularly important in understanding his Fundamentalism. So I would like to first analyze his notion of civilization, which I think is an evolutionist view of civilization. To clarify what I mean by an evolutionist view of civilization, I would like to talk about two events which helped to shape this view: the World's Parliament of Religions, which was held about one hundred years ago, in 1893, during the World Exposition in Chicago; and the Spanish-American War, which occurred five years later in 1898.

The World Exposition in Chicago was held to commemorate the 400th anniversary of Columbus's arrival on American shores in 1492 and was also called the

World's Columbian Exposition. In 1890, America surpassed Great Britain in steel production and became the world's foremost industrial power. Thus, the Chicago Expo was also a platform for showing the whole world America's industrial prowess, national power and founding principles. The founding principles of the US can be summarized as republicanism and Christianity. Republicanism, in turn, refers to the concepts of freedom and democracy that we hear Bush repeating.

I would like to show you some photographs taken at the Expo. This is the pond situated at the center of the Expo site. Here is a statue. It is not a Statue of Liberty, but the Statue of the Republic. The next photo shows a fountain installation called Columbus's Fountain on the other side of the pond. This represents the ship the Santa Maria which carried Columbus to America. Of course, it does not resemble the actual ship at all. Seated on it is Columbus. Perhaps you can tell from this photo that it is a Roman battleship. In fact, on the Expo site, there were many constructions and statues representing ideals and images related to the ancient republics of Greece, Rome and Venice. In other words, these statues and constructions were intended to proclaim that the American civilization had descended from historical republicanism; that is, that historically there were great republics and now it was America that had inherited the mantle of republican civilization.

During the Chicago Expo, international conferences were held covering twenty different fields. Of them, the World's Parliament of Religions, the first interfaith conference in modern history, was the focus of great public attention. This photo shows a scene from that Parliament. It was held for seventeen days. Its closing ceremony, in a hall that built to hold 3,000 people was packed with 7,000 people, and free admission tickets were scalped at a premium of $3.00-$4.00 (worth considerably more in those days than today). It was a closely watched, incredibly popular conference on religions.

The World's Parliament of Religions was presided over by Dr. John Barrows, a pastor at the First Presbyterian Church in Chicago. Thanks to his compilation of a thick, two-volume report on this event with numerous photographs, we know what took place. The Parliament gathered together representatives of ten religions from around the world, except Islam. The sultan was opposed to participating in this meeting, so there were no representatives from Islamic countries, although Muslims residing in the US and India attended the meeting.

The Japanese delegation comprised of ten members including two interpreters. Two of them were associated with Doshisha: one was Hiromichi Kozaki, the president of Doshisha, and the other was Nobuta Kishimoto, a graduate of Doshisha and who was then a student of religion at Harvard.

Studying the two-volume report, we can see that a common understanding of civilization and religion existed among the American participants. This common understanding was founded on what Prof. Kohara mentioned in the morning session, social Darwinism, a concept typified by the British philosopher, Herbert Spencer. Social Darwinists maintain that just as organism evolves, so do civilizations and that the leader of modern civilizations, and thus the one at the forefront of evolution, is the Anglo-Saxon civilization represented by the US, which is represented by republicanism and Christianity. Such was the understanding of civilization shared by the American participants at the World's Parliament of Religions.

Then, were they fundamentalists? No. To begin with, no fundamentalists took part in the World's Parliament; they refused to attend. Then, were the American participants capable of perceiving religions and civilizations in relative terms? No. They had just enough tolerance to listen to statements by representatives of other religions, but they never doubted the overwhelming superiority of Anglo-Saxon civilization and Christianity. They believed that the other religions in the world would eventually be brought into the Christian fold.

I would like to quote a statement made by Bishop Charles Grafton of the American Episcopal Church at the Parliament as I think that it summarizes the true sentiment of the American participants. Bishop Grafton said, "Civilization, which is making the whole world one, is preparing the way for the reunion of all the world's religions in their true center- Jesus Christ." [1]

This American view of civilization was harshly criticized by participants from Asia. In particular, they criticized the way Western missionaries were working in Asian countries, with their discriminatory and evolutionist views of civilization and religion.

Among the Asian participants making these criticisms, Kinza Hirai from Japan attracted the most attention. In Japan, this man seems to have fallen into oblivion so I would like to briefly introduce him. He was born in Kyoto in 1859, studied foreign languages, and was hired as an official translator for the government. But he was dismissed six months later because, despite his position, he criticized the other country's delegation while he was working in governmental negotiations concerning unfair treaty amendments. In 1885, he opened a private school named Oriental Hall near the intersection of Muromachi and Oike Streets, south of the Old Imperial Palace in Kyoto. I think this was done with Doshisha as a sort of reference since Doshisha had opened north of the Old Imperial Palace ten years earlier. Famous graduates of the Oriental Hall include Masaharu Anezaki, who later pioneered religious studies in Japan together with Nobuta Kishimoto. In 1891, Hirai became a Buddhist priest of the Rinzai Zen sect

and went to the United States in the following year. The year Hirai arrived in America, 1892, can be viewed as the inaugural year of the transmission of Buddhism from Japan to America. But, at the World's Parliament of Religions in 1893, Hirai was not representing the Buddhist community, but Japanese scholars of Theosophy. In his later years, he joined the Christian Unitarian movement. I think we can say that Hirai, who underwent such transitions, was a unique spiritual pilgrim.

On the third day of the Parliament in Chicago, Hirai delivered a speech entitled "The Real Position of Japan toward Christianity." Like other Asian speakers, Hirai criticized the views of civilization and religion held by Christian missionaries working in Japan, but his approach was different from that of other Asian speakers. Hirai expressed his respect for Christianity and the American founding principles and went on to point out the great gap between the American principles and reality. Let me quote him:

But I know this is not the morality of the civilized West, and I have the firm belief in the highest humanity and noblest generosity of the Occidental nations toward us. Especially as to the American nation, I know their sympathy and integrity. I know their sympathy by their emancipation of the colored people from slavery. I know their integrity by the patriotic spirit which established the independence of the United States of America. And I feel sure that the circumstances which made the American people declare independence are in some sense comparable to the present state of my country. I cannot restrain my thrilling emotion and sympathetic tears whenever I read in the Declaration of Independence. [2]

Hirai then goes on, after quoting eighteen lines from the Declaration of Independence, to say:

If any religion urges the injustice of humanity, I will oppose it, as I ever have opposed it, with my blood and soul. I am the severest critic of Christianity. At the same time, I have the deepest respect for the Gospel. I pronounce that your aim is the realization of the religious union not nominally, but practically. We, the forty million souls of Japan, standing firmly and persistently upon the basis of international justice, await still further manifestations as the morality of Christianity. [3]

When Hirai finished his speech, the audience gave a standing ovation, each of the attendants waving his handkerchief and crying "Shame, shame!!" joining Hirai in criticizing the missionaries in Japan. The following day, the headlines of the front page of the

Chicago Tribune read: "Cry from Orient. Japanese Priest Startles the Religious Congress." **4** The voices raised at the Parliament, moved by Hirai's speech against the self-righteous American perception of civilization, however, did nothing to change later American views or foreign policies, as is well illustrated by the Spanish-American War, which occurred in 1898, five years after the Parliament.

President McKinley, recalling the time that he was tormented by the question of whether his country should abandon the Monroe Doctrine and send troops to the Philippines, said,

I walked the floor of the White House night after night until mid-night; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way. I don't know how it was, but it came." **5**

Then, McKinley explains three possible solutions and dismisses them one by one and continues,

There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, … And then I went to bed and went to sleep, and slept soundly… **6**

This view of civilization held by President McKinley is evolutionist, exactly identical to Bush's version. We can replace the words Philippines and Filipinos by Iraq and the Iraqis. Of course, Bush has never said he would "evangelize the Iraqis"; he has used the term "democratize Iraq." Still, he has spoken of occupying Iraq to help educate, uplift, civilize, and democratize the Iraqis. Now, returning to Hirai's criticism against Americans, I think that his remarks succeeded, even for a short while, in moving Americans' hearts, because his words, which included a quotation from the Declaration of Independence, were in solid accordance with American principles. I would like to emulate Hirai here and criticize the American notion of civilization from the standpoint of American ideals.

Up to now, America has made enormous efforts to ensure the peaceful coexistence of different races and religions within its borders. Compared to some other countries, America has been successful in this. Outside America, however, we can hardly say that Americans have succeeded in attaining peaceful coexistence between different civilizations and religions. The obstacle has been American Fundamentalism. It is only the US that can change this aspect of the US. But how can America overcome its Fundamentalism?

Since the colonial days before the American Revolution, there have been a variety of religious communities in America. Although most Americans were Christians in those days, they belonged to different denominations. No coexistence of different denominations would have been possible if any one of them had proclaimed that only its understanding of Christianity was absolutely correct. The coexistence of different religions and different denominations has been maintained in the US, thanks to the First Amendment of the Constitution. The First Amendment of 1791 is the first proclamation in a constitution in human history that stipulates the separation of Church and State. It says, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

Prohibition of the establishment of a state religion means that the government will confer no special treatment on a particular religion. It means the state will hold no position in regard to the alleged correctness or inferiority of a particular religion. I think that the principle behind this refusal to designate a state religion can be extended to cover the refusal to justify a particular nation-state or national principle, or a particular religion or religious principle, over another. I believe that the principle and spirit of the First Amendment can be effectively applied to the endeavor for a peaceful coexistence of different religions and civilizations in the world. The principle and spirit of the First Amendment can be a declaration against Fundamentalism.

Unfortunately, however, the present position of President Bush and the United States makes us wonder if all of America is steered into an American type of Fundamentalism. Refusing to put any single principle, any single religion or religious principle in the place of a state religion is the same as refusing to institute any particular set of so-called "global standards." This is one possible approach to achieving peace and coexistence among the diverse civilizations and religions in the world. In closing, I would emphasize that this approach is one that resonates perfectly with the founding principles of the United States.

1 *John Henry Barrows, The World Parliament of Religions: the Columbian Exposition of 1893, Vol. 1, The Parliament Publishing Company, 1893, p. 25.*

2 *Ibid., pp. 449-450.*

3 *Ibid., p. 450.*

4 *The Chicago Tribune, 14 September, 1893, See Richard Hughes Seager, "The World's Parliament of Religions, Chicago, Illinois 1893: America's Religious Coming of Age," Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1987, p. 139.*

5 *James F. Rusling, "Interview with President McKinley,"*

The Christian Advocate, LXXVIII (January 22, 1903), p. 137. See Smylie John Edwin, "Protestant Clergymen and America's World Role, 1865-1900: A Study of Christianity, Nationality, and International Relations," Th. D. dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1959, p. 506.

6 *Ibid.*

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Comment·Discussion
-Session 4-

Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro's Foundation
Dr. Sheikh Salah al-Deen Kuftaro

As Salaamu Alaykum, Peace be upon you.

Thank you for your comments, Dr. Hanafi, Dr. Pappe and Professor Mori. I am sure that we would all agree that what these lecturers have told us will serve as a meaningful step toward world peace in our time. They have discussed many topics. I would also like to join the discussion and add my point of view.

First of all, I would like to focus on the issue brought up by Dr. Hanafi, "Is Islam a threat or a religion that brings happiness?" His lecture was very important in that he presented two totally different definitions of Islam: a threat and something that brings happiness. Since the word "threat" has a negative connotation, I would like to suggest changing it with the more appropriate word "Islam," which is commonly used by Muslims. Islam is a religion from Heaven, a lifestyle started by Adam, the first prophet of *Allāh*, and the other prophets who followed him and completed by Muhammad, the last prophet of Islam. Islam brings mercy to the entire world. Therefore, there is no negative connotation such as the taking of risks or threat. There are minority groups, however, who do not follow Islam. Those who sometimes pose a danger are not following Islamic teachings. The danger they pose is, as Dr. Hanafi has explained, unique to these minorities, who are responding to pressures from inside and outside and to the current situation they find themselves in.

If we want to find an answer to the inquiry, "Is Islam a threat or a religion that brings happiness?" with a sincere desire to seek the substance of Islam, we should transcend the idea of belonging to one side or the other. Rather, we have to focus on the Qur'an, the Islamic teachings, and the Sunnah, the deeds of Prophet Muhammad (may *Allāh*'s blessings and peace be upon him) and follow in the way that the actual teachings of Islam lead. This is the only way that we can reach the answer. I believe that Dr. Hanafi's lecture was a meaningful and wonderful attempt within the framework of sociopolitics to lead us to an answer to the question of whether Islam is a threat or a religion that brings happiness.

Second, I would like to pick up on the lecture by Dr. Ilan Pappe, who discussed tangible and intangible, and internal and external issues in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. We cannot reach peace without discussing this topic, especially since the 9/11 attacks. Dr. Pappe raised various Palestinian issues caused by the cessation of Palestine's severance, as a nation, from modern world history.

There have been many problems that have forced Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims to go through difficult times. To our delight, these problems are now being addressed by the Israelis, who understand the problems better than anybody else. This topic is based on three subtopics: recognition, discussion, and acceptance, which is where we believe solutions lie.

Dr. Mori's presentation on "Can America overcome American Fundamentalism?" and the current situation is closely connected to the post September 11 atmosphere. The United States is the strongest country in the world. Therefore without the recognition Dr. Mori presented, American fundamentalism will exert a tremendous influence on the world. Linking the theory of social evolution and American fundamentalism will help us understand the unilateral standard that the US is forcing the world to comply with. The US has utilized that standard only for itself instead of applying it as something to be used in common throughout the world or to a majority of the people, leading us to feel that this theme is important in our efforts to realize a well-balanced international order of priority. In any case, the opinions and theories of Dr. Mori and his study on comparisons within the history of the US serve as a fundamental study of events following the 9/11 attacks, and triggering the raising of voices necessary for addressing current issues.

In regard to Dr. Mori's study, it would be meaningful to use the concept of "a slaughterer and a sacrificial sheep" which Dr. Pappe discussed. The United States, which became a sacrifice (a victim) of the 9/11 attacks, has in turn become a butcher (a perpetrator) in Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries. Who in the world knows which country will become the next target of the US?

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that all these discussions are of great help in studying issues concerning peace after the 9/11 incidents. The three different topics discussed by the three scholars were all significantly important. I hope that all these discussions will be carried even further by the researchers and scholars participating in this session. Thank you for your attention.

University of California, Santa Barbara
Mark Juergensmeyer

Again, I would like to thank the organizers of this conference and all of the presenters in what has been a very rich and interesting couple of days. Of course with such a diversity of perspectives and opinions, there have been moments when we would all like to interject and to correct and to amend comments of the presenters, but I think it has been a mark of our own toleration and our own ability to want to learn that we have been open, as open as we have been.

One of the great insights of Gandhi is that there is a measure of truth in every other person. And I know there are times when, and maybe my presentations have strained that credulity, but I think that even in my position you will have to accept there must be some measure of truth, something worth taking a look at, something worth taking seriously.

I think the presentations this afternoon have been a good representation of what we have been doing throughout the two days: looking at traditions the way Professor Hanafi has done and seeing the way in which every great tradition is an extraordinarily rich resource that can ennoble, but it can also be exploited or abused by some. We have to be careful in understanding when we are characterizing a tradition that we are not characterizing it falsely by the way in which it is abused, rather than the way in which it has been ennobling to so much of the world's population.

Professor Pappe has reminded us that every conflict has a tradition, that there is much to be learned through memory and the importance of the reconciliation process of Bishop Tutu in South Africa has suggested of not forgetting, but not also being able to live through the terrible moments of the past in order to move on into the future.

And Professor Mori has, in fact, looked towards that future and asked if Americans can heal themselves in his rather, some of us Americans might feel harsh critique of America's current position, at least the position of some of our leaders. And although I hate to see my President being compared with Bin Laden, I understand the point: that there can be an absolutism of any position about which we can be concerned.

But what struck me most I think about Professor Mori's presentation were the slides and the pictures of the great Parliament of Religion in 1893. What it suggested to me was how tenuous and time-bound and limited is our perception of the future. Because that, after all, is supposed to be the point of this panel: to look towards peace after 9/11, or maybe more correctly we can say look towards peace after February 21st, 2004. Because we are always reconceiving the future as we try to understand the past.

There is something very poignant about these earnest assertions of the future that Professor Mori reminded us of in 1893, over 110 years ago, that somehow the world was going to become a certain way: more Christian, more democratic. When I was a graduate student, all my teachers, of the best political scientists, were imagining a world united through a new international interaction of secular nationalisms; that increasingly, the world was moving toward the secular state.

Much of the 20th century was animated by a vision of world communism. Half of the globe was led by leaders who imagined that they were moving the world into a new generation of new triumph of the laboring class in a new kind of classless society. Of course with 1990 and the Berlin Wall, that image came tumbling down.

So we live all around us with the wreckage of visions of the future. Even today I wonder whether in my own nation's concern with asserting its military power around the world we have neglected its declining economic advantage vis-a-vis other epicenters of power. Like the British in the 20th century it will be so concerned with the illusion of power, that it fails to notice that its economic power has been slipping away, replaced perhaps by China, perhaps by who knows.

But it is striking to me that in our current election the Democratic candidates have found that even though they first were very critical of President Bush on international issues, which is my greatest concern, it is the issues of the economy, and, particularly, the issue of the shift in the era of globalization of jobs away from America, a solution for which I am not sure they really have an answer. But nonetheless they have touched on a concern that I think is a part of a perilous future of America in a global age.

The point I am making is that we are moving into a new world in the 21st century. It is an era of globalization. I am not sure it is going to be an era of America as

the superpower, as the only hegemonic state. I think not just militarily, but certainly economically, there are other epicenters of power that are going to be challenging that assertion. And it is not clear yet exactly what this is going to mean for the diversity of the world's peoples. But I think that in this troubling period, and to my mind these instances of religious violence to which we have been witness in these last 10 or 15 years are examples of what is almost like a shift in geological time, in these tectonic plates as they grind together.

Here in Japan we are at the edge of the rim of fire where the tectonic plates grind together and at times magma spews up and volcanoes erupt and there is fire because there is shifting deep below the earth. I think in some way that there is some shifting in the tectonic plates of history, and these flashes of fire and religious violence are examples of a shifting that we are not exactly sure where it is going to be headed. But in that process I think, the kind of reconciliation of Bishop Tutu and the process that Professor Pappe has reminded us of is going to be extremely important. We are only going to be able to surmount a sense of humiliation with a sense of humility, of being able to say collectively that we do not know where the world is going to be in 10 or 15 years ago (from now).

But we do have some sense of its past, and we know that all of us have some things to regret, that all of us have some things to, in a very bitter way, remember, so that we can reassert a common respect and a common tolerance and begin to build structures of justice on a global scale. Because only when these systems of systemized accountability, perhaps of the United Nations or in a large vision of economic interaction will be able to be created will people then feel an honest sense of fairness, an honest sense of locations for all peoples and all cultures.

Faculty of Law, Doshisha University
Koji Murata

Thank you. Since I am studying international politics, I would like to talk about the issue from this point of view. The keywords are peace, order and the United States.

First, about peace. While defining the meaning of peace is far beyond my intellectual capability, however we may define it, there seems to be no doubt that peace contains the idea of order and stability. Although the achievement of order and stability does not guarantee peace, I do not believe that peace can be established without order and stability. A few years ago, Sir Michael Howard, an English historian, published an interesting essay "The Invention of Peace," in which he said that peace includes order and stability and that even under orderly and stable conditions, there are peo-

ple who are not satisfied with the order and stability that are maintained. Among them include those who protest against the current situation in an extreme, violent manner. This indicates that peace always contains the seeds of conflicts and wars. Peace, of course, does not always turn into war.

As was pointed out, fairness is another important concept. How fair the order is may control the level and scale of dissatisfaction. The relationship between peace and war seems to resemble that between humans and disease. Even a man with a very healthy body cannot live his whole life without suffering from any illness and we will all eventually die. Of course, our efforts to stay healthy can prevent us from contracting illness easily or, at least minimize the severity if we do fall ill. Similarly, we can lower risk of conflicts or minimize the scale of a conflict. It is difficult to imagine, however, that we can live in a peaceful global society without any conflict forever.

Now, about order. As many people have pointed out, there is a tremendous concentration of power in the U.S. However, even with the greatest power in the world, the order the US unilaterally imposes on other nations will cause dissatisfaction in many people and will not last long. It is also true that any order that fails to satisfy the US would not be formed at all. How to combine these two harmoniously is the issue we have to work on. The tremendous concentration of power in the US has given rise to a unipolar structure. Some may regard this as US unipolar dominance, which I think is wrong. If the US dominates the world, regardless of whether the world is happier or not, the world will be more stable. Many problems occurred because the US has failed to dominate the world. Conversely, our current international society is too complex for one nation to dominate. There is also an expression "unipolar regime," which I do not think appropriate because a regime must one acknowledged by international society. The US unipolar structure has provoked a backlash in many places. I therefore regard this situation as a unipolar structure, situated between a unipolar dominance and a unipolar regime.

I was very impressed by Dr. Mori's lecture. I generally agree with his conclusion that the US is the only country that can change the U.S. I understand that he overemphasized some points in order to clarify what he was trying to convey. Along the lines of what as Dr. Juergensmeyer pointed out, I also hesitate to regard both Bush and Bin Laden as fundamentalists. Even if Bush were a fundamentalist, he is a fundamentalist bound by public opinion and elections. We should not overlook the fact that the Bush administration is both fundamentalist and surprisingly more pragmatic than had been thought. While it is true that fundamentalist power has become stronger in the US, as Dr. Mori has said, many other points of view also exist in that country. If the US is fundamentalist and President Bush is a

fundamentalist, this fundamentalist president would be an extremely powerful president supported by a fundamentalist society. The truth is, however, that this president must deal with many complaints from those opposed to fundamentalism within the nation.

Francis Fukuyama said immediately after the Cold War that history, in the sense of universal conflicts of ideology, had ended. In the US however, conflicts between fundamentalists and those who oppose them and various other conflicts of ideology have continued. Ironically, that history has not ended within the U.S. This, however, may serve as a driving force behind the strength of the US.

Since time is limited, I would like to talk about the US before concluding my presentation. In analyzing the American issues, I think it appropriate to categorize them into three groups. As I stated at the onset, the first category is the structure of the international politics, where the US holds a tremendous concentration of power; second is US national politics, and third, issues unique to the current Bush administration. We have to analyze the issues according to these three categories.

The US holds a tremendous concentration of power. When one nation has as much power as that which the US possesses, that nation, even if it were not the US and even if it were not the Bush administration, would become very arrogant and selfish. Does this idea run counter to an understanding of human nature? If Japan had as much power as the US currently is, or if China were as strong as the US, would Japan and China be any more modest than the US is? In short, this is a problem caused by the international political structure.

At the same time, we also have to consider the influence exerted by the emergence of the religious right, a change of generation and a change in ethnic composition. In addition, there are issues pertinent to the personal beliefs of President Bush or beliefs of members of the administration. These three must be separately assessed. Issues unique to the Bush administration may change greatly. The term of the current President will be one more year. Even if he is reelected, his administration will end in five years. The variability is very high. How will changes within US society affect US diplomacy and behavior? There are many possibilities. The fact that the US maintains enormous power in international politics will not change greatly in the foreseeable future, even allowing for some changes.

In discussing the US, after dividing issues into ones with a high degree of changeability and others with a lower degree, we have to have, in a sense, a feeling of resignation toward the US and hope for the possibility of change in a well-balanced way. If we fail to do so, a sense of resignation alone will allow us to merely follow along, while too much hope will result in ideological discussion.

In conclusion, while there are many criticisms

against the current Bush administration and American society itself, it would be a great mistake if those who are criticizing the foreign policy of the Bush administration, which sees the world in terms of good and evil, raise their voices so high that they themselves eventually fall into the good and evil trap. This is a problem facing the Bush diplomacy and international society and, at the same time, a mistake that has been repeatedly made throughout history: as people criticize their adversary more and more, they themselves tend to end up following the same course as those that they are criticizing. We now have to acknowledge this mistake as strongly as ever.

Thank you.

Deputy Chief of Policy Planning and
Research Committee, the Democratic Party of Japan
Yuka Uchida

While my job description says that I am a member of the Democratic Party of Japan, I would like to make it clear that anything I say here today is only my personal opinion.

After having listened to the presentations given by the three lecturers and the session in the morning, as well as the comments by Dr. Murata, I have concluded that fairness is a key issue, just as Dr. Murata has also mentioned. There are many kinds of criteria for a just war. Even if we standardize the criteria for just war, taking into consideration the differences between religions, cultural areas and countries, there still remain differences in views among people living in those different regions and countries. You can tell this from the comments given today by the lecturers who come from different religious backgrounds. A just war for some people, even though it may meet a standard criteria, may not be a just war for others. We therefore have to establish a common understanding of fairness among the international community, including the three major monotheistic religions, and this is the challenge facing the world today.

In dealing with this issue, I have found the activities of Pope John Paul II, head of the Catholic Church, very interesting and I have been watching what he is doing. In the spring of 2000, or maybe 1999, he visited Jerusalem, where he showed his commitment to reconciliation with other religions by sharing a table with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, a rabbi, and leaders of two other monotheistic religions. In addition, before and after the visit, he issued statements of apology for past sins committed in the name of the church, including the treatment of Jews. He has also been engaged in various other activities seeking reconciliation with people of other faiths.

In the matter of the war on Iraq, for example, the

Pope met with Tariq Aziz, formerly an influential leader in Saddam Hussein's regime, a few months before the war, although I have no idea how meaningful that visit was. The Pope consistently repeated his comments on the need to avoid war and to seek a peaceful resolution at various places, both before and after the war.

In the his annual message on World Peace Day this year, the Pope talked about terrorism based on his understanding that terrorism has recently become a dangerous threat to world peace and stability. As I think his message is appropriate as well for this symposium today, I would like to quote an excerpt from it:

The scourge of terrorism has become more virulent in recent years and has produced brutal massacres which have in turn put even greater obstacles in the way of dialogue and negotiation, increasing tensions and aggravating problems, especially in the Middle East. Even so, if it is to be won, the fight against terrorism cannot be limited solely to repressive and punitive operations. It is essential that the use of force, even when necessary, be accompanied by a courageous and lucid analysis of the reasons behind terrorist attacks. The fight against terrorism must be conducted also on the political and educational levels: on the one hand, by eliminating the underlying causes of situations of injustice which frequently drive people to more desperate and violent acts; and on the other hand, by insisting on an education inspired by respect for human life in every situation: the unity of the human race is a more powerful reality than any contingent divisions separating individuals and people.

This was the annual message for the World Day of Peace this year. What I want to emphasize is the part "the use of force, even when necessary," because this concept includes the possibility of a just war. This indicates that both the Pope and Roman Catholic Church admit that there is such a thing as a just war.

On the other hand, while he defined terrorism as unacceptable in the beginning of his message using the expression "the unacceptable means of terrorism," (which I did not quote), he also said that "a courageous analysis of the reasons behind terrorist attacks" is needed. It should be noted that he especially emphasized in his message for World Peace Day that although terrorism is not acceptable, we must understand the reasons behind terrorist attacks in order to establish peace and stability in the world in future.

He also emphasized the necessity for a renewal of the international legal order. I understood from his message that the legal order he mentioned is not an order based on any specific religious values but one commonly accepted by the international community; a unified legal order supported by a profound respect for and

deep understanding of the values of other religions and legal systems.

So, we have these efforts, messages and appeals from the Pope. At the same time, there is a tendency to use statements made by leaders of Christian churches in the US and those by leaders in the Islamic world as a political tool to advocate an administration or system. I have a feeling that this tendency has become increasingly significant especially in this rapidly changing period. What we have to consider here is, as today's symposium has made it clear, whether or not we can actually achieve the separation of state and religion in our current global society. Under Christianity, I believe, that separation was established in the US, but this seems to be going backward recently. I would like to ask Drs. Hanafi and Pappe if they can achieve this separation under Islam and Judaism or at least if there is the possibility. In Islam, which I have studied a little, the religion itself is a part of life and the Sharia law serves as the code of life. As long as the Islamic world is isolated from the world, such a system will work. As the world is becoming more globalized, however, as I mentioned at the beginning, some effort to achieve the separation of state and religion should be made in order to establish a norm that integrates all religions and values. You cannot apply the Sharia to the entire world. In this context, I would like to hear your comments on whether the separation of state and religion can be achieved under Islam and Judaism.

Thank you for your attention to my comments.

Discussion

(Chair) We have approximately one hour for a discussion. If you don't mind, Dr. Hanafi and Dr. Pappe, could you start by giving us your responses to Ms. Uchida's questions?

(Hanafi) I think there is a difference: you have asked a Western question to a non-Western culture. The separation, it is not called religion and state, but religious authority and political authority. This is the right question in the Western culture; that means church and state.

This is an absolute issue. As you said, Islam and Judaism are both lifestyles. It is a universal code of ethics for the individual, for the community, and for international relations. Then I do not think that the question is relevant.

Because as a Muslim I have to be honest with myself against hypocrisy and doubletalk, I have to be just with others without exploitation and monopoly, and in international relations self-recognition without any transgression of others. Is this politics or religion? It is

ethics. Then there is a universal code of ethics which is behind Islam and Judaism. Many of the Islamic rituals are coming out of Judaism. You have a concept of Islamic law as the penal code. But the penal code is a very minor thing in Islamic law. Islamic law is based on a society without exploitation, it is based on the rights of the poor and the wealth of the rich; but it is not a criminal code.

Because the penal code implies human duties, we cannot implement human duties without giving mankind their human rights. I have the right from the public treasure for education, for medical care, for housing, for employment. And after this if I misuse Islamic law then the penal code can be applied; but we cannot just minimize and reduce Islamic law to the penal code.

(Chair) Well, in an extremely simplified way, I believe, you cannot separate them. Islamic law is not limited to the penal code or criminal law. Do you have any comment on that?

(Pappe) I think as Professor Juergensmeyer has reminded us, we cannot answer these questions; can things be done? All we can say is: had it succeeded or had it not succeeded until this morning?

So the answer is that until this morning the attempt to separate, in Israel, religion from state was a total failure. Does it mean that tomorrow will be a more successful day? Given the level of our politicians, probably different from here, I do not think there is much chance that something better will come out. But I think it is important to explain that in the context, at least of Palestine, secularization does not carry with it much promise, either. A lot of hatred and hostility is produced also by secular movements on both sides. There is a lot of affinity and willingness to compromise on several religious movements on both sides.

So I do not think secularization is really an issue, and I think it belongs to the modernization theories that I think Professor Mori was referring to, which are really outdated anymore. We do not need a process of modernization; we do not need a process of secularization. In the particular case of Israel, we need a process of de-Zionization. De-Zionize Israel and you create a secular democratic state, is the only way towards a solution. That does not mean when you talk about the secular state that we secularize the society. It only means that we do not give any religion or any ethnic group a dominant position within that small piece of land that seems to attract too much attention in the last 100 years.

(Chair) The issue has become very complicated. As Dr. Mori said, the problem would be solved if the concept, effective in the US, could be applied here.

However, it is not that easy. One reason for this is, as has been repeated many times, that the separation of state and religion may not be necessary where the approach taken by South Africa's Bishop Tutu can be applied. Although I wanted to make the question easier, the issue has become rather complicated. Does anyone have any opinions on the comments? How about you, Dr. Mori?

(Mori) The separation of state and religion in the US is quite different from that in France and Japan. This is what I wanted to say.

The American concept is, I believe, wise for places in which people of different religions have to live together while respecting each other's beliefs. The amendment to the Constitution, Article 1, addresses two things: one is the establishment of religion, and the other is the free exercise of religion. As shown in this amendment, this concept is wise for those of different religions who have to live together while respecting each other's beliefs. I believe that this is necessary as well as effective in addressing international issues.

(Chair) Mr. Tahara, please go ahead.

(Tahara) I have questions for Dr. Hanafi and Dr. Pappe. I have been deeply impressed by your lectures. Since we do not have much time, I will make my questions short and to the point.

Dr. Hanafi, in understanding violent acts and Islam in the current world, I think it is a very important point that hope within may be seen as risk from the outside and that violent acts in general have two sides: one is liberation from suppression and the other is that violence itself is the suppression.

As one of the lecturers has commented, socialism carried the idea of liberation in the 20th century. Although Lenin predicted in The State and Revolution that the state would dissolve after revolution, what was left behind was a state of revolution, in other words, nothing but suppression and it eventually collapsed. This kind of process may be observed in, for example, the Middle East, or the Arab World. In Algeria, where the military government forcibly rejected the results of a general election, Muslims mounted a campaign to protest the rejection. Some of them massacred civilians, which they justified by the concept of *takfir*, the charge of unbelief, changing a liberation campaign against the military government into oppression.

My question is as follows: hope can be transformed to risk, and measures taken in the name of liberation can be transformed to oppression. This has often occurred in history. In an oppressed world, I can understand that Islam exists as one concept for liberation, but is there any guarantee that this idea will not be trans-

formed into a device of oppression in the future? Or, what do you think would be ways to avoid such transformation? This is my first question.

My second question is to Dr. Pappe. I have an acquaintance through my job with an Israeli peace activist, Uri Avnery, the leader of Gush Shalom. While you and he are in different positions, I was very impressed that you mentioned the self-responsibility of Israel, just as Avnery does. Gush Shalom activities are extremely limited at present. I also remember that when I met settlers in Hebron, or al-Khalil in Arabic, they emphasized that Israel without the West Bank (the west bank of the Jordan River), where al-Khalil is, would be like a radio lacking a part and therefore could not function as a state. For this reason, the West Bank must belong to Israel. Then there are people like Zeev Jabotinsky, and Ariel Sharon, the current Prime Minister of Israel, or other people who hold the idea of Great Israel, a religious belief. I wonder about the extent to which they can grasp your words. Or, I assume that, at the same time, they may have established a peace process in the form of quantification, away from any religious significance, because they do not understand your words. I would appreciate it if you could give me your opinion on this issue.

(Hanafi) Well, once you have a state of oppression, internal or external, and there are no legal means of protest, the only thing left, is really violence. Let me give you an example. In the Arab and the Muslim world, in some political regimes where Islamic movements are legally existing and expressing itself: in Morocco, in Jordan in Yemen, in Kuwait and in Lebanon, they will never practice violence because they have the legal means, their forums, their programs, their newspapers, their magazines, their political parties to express their grievances and accepting the Parliamentary system.

But in other countries where there is a monopoly of power: Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and so on, where to go? They feel that they are oppressed.

All secular political parties have the right to exist: the Marxists, the nationalists, the liberals. But what about the Islamic movements and so on? They go underground; they go outside to Afghanistan, to Chechnya, to Bosnia, Herzegovina, Albania and so on to fight the cause of justice. Then we made them commit violence, because we did not permit them to express themselves freely and to enter a dialogue with the other political ideologies, to have a common blueprint, a common agenda for social reform.

The case of Algeria is very spectacular. Once Algeria decided to go for a democracy and the Islamic movements won 70% of the municipal votes, a coup d'etat of the army came. Then who is against democra-

cy? Not the Islamists; they accepted the Parliamentary system. It is the military regime.

Islam is an ideology of liberation. That is why Islam came out of the Arabian Peninsula. There was a Roman oppression of North Africa and some Persian oppression, and then people have hailed the newcomers because Islam, the very slogan of Islam is "no coercion in religion."

You can believe whatever you want. Even when the Muslims came to Egypt, they left Egypt for the Egyptians. When they went to Persia they left Persia for the Persians. They adopted the local system, the administrative system, the military system and all that Islam wants is to let everyone believe as he wants and in a certain kind of a confederation based on non-aggression.

When Islam came to America, the blacks, the Nation of Islam, the black Muslims, they found in Islam a liberation movement which is not based on color, on apartheid. They may have reacted because of the American system, for the black Muslims. I taught in USA, and they told me "please, Professor, do not tell the black Muslims in America that God is not black," that the Devil is not white, that Mohammed and Moses and Abraham and Jacob and Isaac are not blacks. Because Islam for them is a liberation theology from the white oppressive society. And later on, two, three, or four decades they began to know that God has no color, that the professors do not know exactly what is the devil's color. We do not know. Then here really Islam is a functional ideology for liberation.

I think we have to make a distinction between Islam per se and the contextual Islam. The Muslim world feels that he is really marginalized, that everyone is speaking of violence and no one is speaking of Grenada, Seville and Cordova and the Golden Age of Islam which was really behind also the Western modern times and so on. Then here we have to rewrite our historiography. We have to rewrite history in a more just way and even way. Otherwise, once you feel that Islam is stereotyped images in the Western mass media after Orientalism, and you are struggling in order to correct your image, then to caricaturize the adversary: this is the beginning of shooting at him.

(Pappe) I will try to be brief; I see the red lights flickering and they create a sense of urgency and some alarm. I will try to be brief, and actually what the question demands is a brief history of the Zionist project in 30 minutes.

I think that there were three major objectives for the Zionist project. One was the takeover of Palestine through two means: geographic, acquiring as much of the land as possible, and demographic having as few Arabs as possible on that land. It started in 1882; the project continues. Given the present American position,

given the present balance of power, I am afraid the project can be successful. Eventually Israel will have 100% of Palestine and depopulate the entire population of Palestine. This is a possibility. It is definitely a strategy.

The second objective is to create a safe haven for the Jews who were persecuted in Europe, not for the Jews who lived in the Arab world, because they were not persecuted. In fact only in 1948, the Jewish leadership decided to bring over Jews from Arab countries, because of the Holocaust. But definitely the leaders of the Zionist movement had no wish to have Arab Jews among them in their ideal of having a European republic in the midst of the Middle East.

Is Israel a safe haven for the Jews today? I doubt it. Many more Jews have been killed in Israel after the Second World War than in any other place in the world. And the prediction, and I am probably wrong, and I hope I am wrong, that many more Jews are going to be killed in Israel in the next decade than in any other place in the world.

The third objective was to create a new culture, a secular culture. This is a successful project. My parents came from Germany; I speak fluent Hebrew. This is the success of Zionism. I am not sure my views are considered as a success for the Zionist project, but definitely my culture is a success for the Zionist project. And my parents were saved by the Zionist project. And yet the price was horrible, and the Palestinians continue to pay this price. How many Israelis realize that this trio, this triangle of objectives is something which cannot go on forever? Very few have any ethical or moral reservations about the project, but they are growing in numbers.

More have understanding because of functional reasons that the Zionist project cannot continue as it does. It will take another decade, it may take another two decades, it will take more bloodshed, it may take a new American position; but eventually I do not really think that the sensible people and the Jews are sensible people who live in Israel can really believe for too long that the Zionist project is a valid project anymore in its present form and given its history and its trajectory.

(Chair) In response to Mr. Tahara's question, the answer would be that there is no other way but to keep going without any change, but if so, there would be more blood shed.

Now, could you start, Abu Samra? And Syamsuddin, Ina and Kuribayashi, in order.

(Abu Samra) I am Muhammed Abu Samra from Palestine-Israel, a country whose realities have just been described by Professor Ilan Pappe. To be more precise I would say that I am a second-class Palestinian

citizen of Israel. As a Palestinian, I would find it only natural to talk about the oppressive realities of my people. But I have to admit that actually I have nothing substantial to add to what has been said by Ilan. So I will seize this three minute opportunity to say something about my academic field of interest—the critical study of Islam.

I find it necessary to comment on the way that Islam was presented in this workshop. The lectures about Islam were interesting and challenging. They presented a voice of equality, justice, tolerance and peace. Such a voice is needed in our present day cultural, social and political realities. But we have to know that this is not the only voice. As in other religions, in Islam there are other voices too–those of persecution, inequality and discrimination. The emphasis that we have heard during the past two days on the positive aspects of Islam, that ignores the negative or oppressive ones, makes the presentations somewhat apologetic. Unfortunately, they may feed a widely circulated misconception in Muslim and non-Muslim societies that Islam and religious criticism are contradictions in terms. So, I find it necessary, in this context, to make it clear that religious criticism is not an exclusively Western notion or practice. In modern, and, for sure, in classical Islam there is a very rich tradition of religious criticism.

As in other religious traditions, I want to emphasize that in Islam there are liberating theologies and teachings that exist side by side with oppressive ones. Both of them are Islamic. It is important to acknowledge this–both of them are Islamic. To attribute the oppressive practices that prevail in Muslim and Arab societies to foreign origins alone is inaccurate, to say the least. They are not always imported, as was argued, from outside cultures or religions. This is not true. We have them rooted deeply in our own religious traditions, in our theologies and in our sacred texts as well. The argument that they are un-Islamic cannot be considered a serious one neither by Muslims nor by non-Muslims who know these texts and are aware of these practices too. Islam is not a secret that is accessible to Muslims only. It has been studied and examined widely by non-Muslims. They are well acquainted with its oppressive aspects.

As Muslims, I think, and many others before me have argued that, we should not be shy to expose the oppressive aspects of our religious traditions. We know that they are not exclusively Islamic. They are equally characteristic of other religions. Second, only by exposing and studying them critically there is a chance to overcome them. Without such an exposition and criticism, these oppressive aspects of Islam will continue to feed the hearts and minds of many, many Muslims. Believe me, we Muslims, no other people, are the main victims.

So, I want to say it again, the way Islam was presented here as a perfect, peace loving religion doesn't tell

the whole story. To deny discrimination, inequality, persecution of free thought as un-Islamic is not a scholarly way of introducing Islam in an academic conference. I am sorry to say that. Muslims and non-Muslims know that no religion is perfect. Islam and its sacred scripture for sure are not an exception. Only God is perfect, at least for those who believe.

This morning Professor Ursula King talked about contradictions in the Bible. As a Muslim, I can say that the Qur'an is a perfect book of contradictions. As a product of oral culture, systematic thinking and consistency are not necessary, nor are they theologically required, characteristics of the Qur'an. This fact is well acknowledged by some contemporary critical Arab thinkers. They consider, for example, the doctrine of *naskh* (that one verse can abrogate another) as a later religious development or invention in Islamic tradition in order to harmonize the diversities and contradictions of the Qur'an.

To conclude my brief comment, I would say there is no need for this apologetic approach. There is no reason for embarrassment that we might be airing what some would consider our dirty laundry. Every religion, society has its own dirty laundry. As Arabs and Muslims we have to confront the fact that in our religious traditions and in our social realities we have a lot of dirty laundry. Ignoring or hiding dirty laundry is not a healthy thing. In order to get it clean we have no choice but to hang it in public, even here in this conference, in Kyoto Japan.

Thank you.

(Chair) Things seem to have become more complex. Nothing may be perfect. May we have your comments, Syamsuddin, please?

(Syamsuddin) A friend of mine, Professor Zein, is also wanting to speak, so maybe if it is possible after me.

One of the important points of the enlightening presentations of the speakers today is the attempt to put the problem in its position and also suggest some kind of conflict resolution such as through the 3A Formula. I would like to add the fourth A: that is Appreciation.

Also the criticisms approach as suggested by Professor Koichi Mori, I think not only for the American but for all, though this equation because of the seemingly contradictory category you put between the two fundamentalisms. One put in the category of religious fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism, but the other in the category of national, American fundamentalism; because in my opinion in the two fundamentalisms, really the word "fundamentalism" is also problematic in Islamic theological thought. Many do not agree with that term, because fundamentalism for the Muslims has a positive connotation, leaning to the

very fundamentals of religion, the "usuli'un", the "usul", the "usul-al-din", maybe extremisms. So this I think what we are seeing now that the clash is not between religions, but is between the extremisms within religions.

So not only the Americans, but I think we need further clarification. We in Indonesia, for example, are concerned about the emergence of the Judeo-Christian coalition that has close links to the Bush administration.

So really the negative sides of religious communities are there; it is not peculiar to specific religions like Islam. What it reminds me of is the question of how should we see the reality, the ongoing process, especially after September 11th attack and then the war on terror by the United States to other countries. Is it really the clash between the two fundamentalisms or this is the reaction against globalization or globalism, and also the reaction against Americanism.

If we can narrow it not only to the West, not to the West in general but to the Americanisms, and more precisely against the foreign policy of the United States government to certain countries like Muslim countries in order to solve the problem of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict for example, that many Muslims in part of the Muslim world perceive that there is injustice, unfairness, and double standards performed from the side of the United States.

So maybe we can take into consideration what Professor Juergensmeyer has suggested if I understood it well, that let us see the problem, the ongoing process in the world is the natural process of the volcanic eruption: the dialectical interaction between many things in human civilization. And the most important thing, it is our question, I think the purpose of our seminar and workshop is to find the role that religion should play.

So we can take into consideration the suggestion again from Professor Juergensmeyer yesterday about the need now for translators of religious teachings and religious texts. Because I do not agree that the texts, the revelations are not perfect. I think it is God's revelation because it is coming from the most perfect being, that is God. I think the revelation, especially to the Muslims, is that the Koran is perfect. But our understanding, our interpretation to that Holy Script, that revelation is not perfect. So what we need now is translators of these Holy Scriptures in order to encourage the peaceful dimension of religious teachings, and therefore once again as suggested since yesterday, there is a need for a grand coalition of the moderating and mediating force within religious communities. Thank you.

(Ina) I am Ina, an editorial writer for the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Japan Economic News), in charge of diplomacy and security.

I have a question for Dr. Mori and some comments

on his presentation. His lecture was very thought-provoking. I may share the same awareness with the person who just asked a question, but if we compare Bin Laden and Bush, the fundamentalism of Bin Laden is probably a religious concept, and I do not remember if Dr. Mori has explicitly mentioned that. As for Bush, Dr. Mori used the term "fundamentalism" as it is widely used by the media. As the person who just made a comment also said, comparing two different things from totally different fields, such as the taste of wine and whiskey or wine and chocolate for example, will only lead to meaningless discussion.

However, I can understand very well what Dr. Mori meant by the word "fundamentalism." I believe he used the word in a sense that implies a certain dogmatism on the part of the U.S. This is, I believe, nationalism, as it can be observed in any country. The United States is a man made state, and therefore Americans avoid using the word nationalism. Some political scientists, however, use the term "civic nationalism." We may need to use the word fundamentalism to make the subject more attractive in discussion. I have a feeling, however, that the use of the word could lead the discussion to a wrong direction. My question here is why should we use the word fundamentalism instead of nationalism. Thank you.

(Mori) I have devoted myself for many years to studying fundamentalism in the US and have written research papers on what is called Christian religious fundamentalism. With this background, I fully understand what fundamentalism means in the US and in the fields of religion and theology. The reason why I dared to use the word fundamentalism in comparing Bin Laden and Bush is because I wanted to indicate that there might be similarities between them in terms of political and religious phenomena. As you have pointed out, I may, in some cases, use the word nationalism. In the US, however, in justifying nationalism and talking about it, they use religious expressions, such as civil religion or the "religion of invisible borders." In this sense, I think the way Bush thinks and behaves can be regarded as one of the ways of fundamentalism.

(Chair) Kuribayashi, please.

(Kuribayashi) While all the three lectures were very interesting, I would like to focus on Dr. Pappe's lecture here. My question is, from Dr. Pappe's point of view, what American citizens should do.

Through today's session, I have renewed my impression that the US will continue to be very influential in Palestinian issues. Dr. Mori's lecture and Dr. Murata's response in particular, have really brought home to me the fact that the US is playing an outstanding role in the

global community in terms of politics and the military and that we cannot discuss Palestinian peace issues without involving the U.S. Since I am a Christian, I cannot be indifferent to the fact that American evangelists, fundamentalists and Christian Zionists have strongly been supporting Sharon's right-wing administration in Israel. Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority and Pat Robertson of the Christian Coalition have been providing financial support to Israeli settlers. They have approved Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and in addition, have been repeatedly made one-sided political statements to the effect that "there are no Palestinian issues. Israeli territory exists." They may have their own theological motivation behind their activities, which I will not go into here. But, in order to pave the way toward Palestinian peace, what and how should American citizens think?

Although I placed great expectations on Mr. Dean, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, he lost the other day. He may have failed to take religious issues seriously in the election, which resulted in his losing in the early stages of the Iowa primary. As a result, he announced his withdrawal from the race. Replacing Dean, Senator Kerry has taken the lead. He is not a member of the religious right but a Catholic. He too, however, openly praises Israel as the only democratic state in the Middle East. Under this condition, whoever is elected as the next president, the incumbent President Bush or Senator Kerry, it does not seem that the US policy in the Middle East will deviate greatly from the pro-Israel framework. This is a very discouraging prospect, but even under these circumstances, what should American citizens themselves do? In terms of public togetherness, from a Palestinian viewpoint, is there any clue, Dr. Pappe?

(Pappe) Thank you for the question. What should the US do? I know what it should do, I am not sure how to make it do it. I think basically I would expect the Americans to stop being a dishonest broker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It is high time that the American policy would return to what it used to be in the Middle East after the end of the First World War, where institutes like the American University of Cairo and the American University of Beirut hosted the best of Arab intellectualism, where American Institutes in Palestine expressed support for Palestinian self-determination, where American consuls in Jerusalem, the beginning of the 20th century, sympathized with the indigenous population of Palestine and not only with the Jewish immigrants. So I think there is a call for the Americans to return to policies that had already been in place 100 years ago.

Secondly, I would say that if America insists on continuing to be the international policeman, it cannot go on vetoing every United Nations decision on Israel and

implementing every United Nations decision on Iraq.

Thirdly, I agree that probably the various candidates in the forthcoming election are not likely to change drastically or fundamentally American policy. But there are two points that we have to remember. One is that there is an American civil society. And I am touring America lately and the American civil society conveys a very different message from the triangle that controls Capitol Hill in the context of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. The triangle is the neo-cons, the Christian Zionists, and AIPAC. Away from the Capitol Hill, NGOs and individuals are expressing different ideas of what the conflict is all about and how it should be solved.

The second point is that if indeed this is not exactly a uni-polar system, there are the Europeans, there is Japan, there are other nations in the world, there is the United Nations. And if they are asked to share in the rebuilding of Iraq, they have the right to demand to take a share in the rebuilding of Palestine and Israel.

(Chair) Thank you. As I mentioned before, will you start, Zein?

(Zein) First of all, let me say this: this session is a very refreshing session, and the most important part of it is that the partial critique which was given by Professor Pappe. The things that he said were said by the Arabs, but nobody will give a damn to them because they were said by Arabs. But now since they are said by an Israeli citizen, these things are really very meaningful, and I hope these things that he said could be shared by some Israelis so we can have a better world and a better relationship. And I think Israel, the most important part of it, if it could succeed in becoming part of the Arab world and have a very positive role in the Arab world that would be a good thing, and that certainly will foster good peace in the area.

I think also Professor Mori, his critique, which is a partial critique of American fundamentalism, the thing which makes it meaningful to me, as somebody who has been victimized by the American aggression is that this is being said by a friend of America. Japan is a friend of America, is an ally. So when your friend criticizes you, you would take that criticism seriously.

That also leads me to our friend over there, I am not jumping Professor Hanafi, but I think I agree with most of the things that the said. But that would make me jumping to the other one. Here we have Brother Abu Samra; his critique is not completely destitute of wisdom. But I just wanted to say this, that in Islam we do make a distinction between the sacred texts and the oppressive interpretations of that sacred text.

Throughout the history there were very oppressive interpretations of the sacred texts. But these oppressive

interpretations of the sacred text cannot be taken as a genuine understanding of the text. Now, we Muslims, I guess developed this through history, that we have the most perfect and complete text because this is the final message of God. And we are making this claim, and I think the claim does have some sort of truth in it, and most Muslims I guess will take that claim seriously. But here I think what was meant by Brother Abu Samra, I am not putting things in his mouth, but I think he was very much disturbed by the interpretations of the text. If not, I guess some Muslims are going to jump into his throat and say something else.

But I think since this conference was a process of healing and a process of reconciliation, we have come across. I am not saying, well we do not have to criticize the Islamic tradition. I am not saying that. The Islamic tradition was open to criticism since its inception; what I am saying is that the spirit of this workshop was very much into a process of healing and reconciliation and let us leave it there. Thank you.

(Chair) Thank you. Dr. Kuftaro, thank you for waiting. And then, Dr. Shionohe.

(Kuftaro) I agree with what Dr. Zein has said. And I emphasize that Islam is not a religion of persecution. Islam is a religion of mercy, a religion of love and a religion connecting people. A short tale may give us a wider perspective on Islam, an Islam that brings mercy not only to the followers of Islam but also to all mankind.

Under the reign of Umar bin Al-Khattab, the second Caliph of Islam, the governor general of Egypt after liberation was Amr bin Al-Aas. When his son lost in a race against a Coptic Christian, he took a stick and hit the Christian. The Christian later traveled from Egypt to Al Medina, where he complained to the Caliph about Governor General. Amr bin Al-Aas and his son were summoned to the presence of the Caliph, who ordered the Christian to hit the governor general of Egypt on the head with a stick. The Caliph asked the governor general, "Men were born free at birth. When did you make them slaves?"

As Dr. Zein said, there are verses and interpretations of the Qur'an. Many Asianists have made mistakes in interpreting these verses. If we wish to judge Islam, we, both Muslims and non-Muslims, first have to study Islam as a religious and social phenomenon based on general rules.

As we mentioned yesterday, when *Allāh*, the Lord of the entire world, set the objective of prophets, the Islamic prophet said, "I merely sent you as a mercy to the universe." When he slaughtered an animal as a sacrifice, the prophet asked, "Have you given this meat to the Jews living next door?" Islam is a religion of

mercy, just as Christianity and Judaism are. He who created the religion would never make any mistakes or persecute, because he is the Lord of the entire world, the most merciful. Thank you for your attention.

(Shionohe) My name is Shionohe and I am from Japan.

I have a question for Dr. Hanafi. The message that violent acts sometimes result in liberation may be somewhat associated with *jihād* in the Koran. It is true in a way that violence results in liberation, but as a result of *jihād,* what have been the situations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine in the 21st century? Resisting violence has hardly achieved anything. Although Dr. Hanafi said that violent acts under a situation of no legal security would turn into liberation, and that violence must be used in that situation, Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine, where violence was used, have ended up in their current situation.

The result of the use of violence can be seen in these three countries. These three examples serve as a negative example in the current Arab situation. When violence is not used, such as in Saudi Arabia in 1988, diplomatic efforts were successful in making King Hussein of Jordan give up the West Bank. With such diplomatic efforts, the establishment of a Palestinian state was progressing. Nonetheless, in 1990, when Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat came out not in support of the liberation of Palestine, which is his state's objective, but of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, all kinds of achievements made through public diplomacy became deadlocked. When considering these two examples, did violence turn into liberation? As evidence for it, did the articles and verses in the Koran, which impress many Muslims, work effectively in the end? To me, the public diplomacy process by Saudi Arabia in gradually establishing Palestine's international position seems to be more effective. Dr. Hanafi, I would like to ask your opinion on this point.

(Hanafi) I was exposing a huge literature in Latin America written by liberation theologians making a distinction between oppressive violence represented by the big companies of USA and United States, and sometimes in coalition with the church, and liberating violence, the peasants and the workers who are trying to liberate themselves from the internal oppression as well as from the external oppression.

Then I hear I am speaking as a social scientist; I am not deducing my ideas from the text. I am not speaking of Islam; I am speaking of what the political sociology is trying to discover concerning violence and counter-violence. I am not advocating that violence is a way to liberate. But once there is a deadlock, once there is an obstacle to liberate yourself by peaceful means, see the case of the Palestinians: they went to Madrid, they went

to Oslo, and to Wye River, and they are imploring the Israelis to come to peace.

See the Arab initiative: complete peace with Israel, complete recognition of Israel, with open borders, with economic relations, diplomatic representations, provided the withdrawal from the occupied territories and returning back to the 5th of June 1967. And Israel is rejecting. Then again what to do if you have a historical deadlock? Then in this case there is no way except resistance according to the United Nations Charter: self-defense as a legitimate right for any oppressed and occupied people.

Finally, when in the second Camp David they tried to have peace and they were almost done, They were discussing streets and houses and so on. And then everything collapsed because they were doing it as merchants, meter per meter as Ilan said, not as a qualitative view, not as a world view that really we have to fight for mutual recognition and that this land can have two peoples, two cultures, and even many as we did in Grenada, Seville and Cordoba.

Finally, I am not taking examples from the Koran or from the Bible or from the New Testament because you can read it as you want. You can be very selective; you can choose verses which you like, and leave verses which you do not like, which is not very academic. Human understandings and human interests have all the time legalized themselves by textual analysis and so on.

But much better is really factual analysis. That means the analysis of causes and the roots of violence in order that we can change reality, to uproot violence in order to make a camouflage by a peaceful call and reality stays the same.

(Abu Samra) I want to respond to some of the questions that were raised about my previous comment. Regarding the Qur'an, my answer to professor Ibrahim Zein and others is yes. I meant that it cannot be perfect. If we examine some of its social roles, its attitude to the status of women and non-Muslims, its restrictions on freedom of thought, religion and belief, or its conception of Islam's exclusiveness, they cannot be considered, from a modern perspective, perfect ones. They cannot be accepted or applied in our modern realities. We have to acknowledge this fact and deal with it critically. So in this sense the Qur'an is not perfect. Second, following a long Islamic theological tradition, I understand perfection as an exclusive attribute to God. God's creatures including the Qur'an are not entitled to such a divine attribute. The idea of the Qur'an's perfection is a result of classical theologies in the post-Qur'anic contexts. These traditions need to be examined critically in order to know the origins of the dominant theological conception of the Qur'an. Actually, this has already been done by several contemporary Arab and Muslim thinkers.

This reexamination should be part of a whole critical approach to sacred texts and religious traditions. Again, this is needed in order to be able to meet our present day needs and interests- not those of any other community.

Thank you.

(Chair) Well, now, let me give an opportunity to those who have not spoken. Mr.Al Roshd, where are you from and would you state your name please?

(Al Roshd) Syria, but Moscow State University.

(Chair) Thank you.

(Al Roshd) I am a Syrian, but I am studying at Moscow State University.

The text of the Qur'an includes some paragraphs that especially focus on war and peace. We have to pay attention to an important subject in Qur'an studies, which is indicated in *"An-na suif"* (what makes things unnecessary) and *"Al-mann sūf"* (what has been made unnecessary) of the Holy Qur'an. In the Holy Qur'an there is a verse "Make ready for them all you can of armed force and tethered horses" and other verses. There are some verses calling for peace as well.

In a part dealing with *"An-na suif"* and *"Al-mann sūf"* of the Holy Qur'an, the following message is stated:

In cases where there are more than one verse dealing with the same subject, the verses given earlier become unnecessary or *"Al-mann sūf"* and only the latest verse becomes effective, meaning it will be *"An-na suif"*. According to the verse thus revealed, in other words, according to the study concerning verses shown earlier and later, the latest Qur'an verse calls for peace, coexistence and friendly relationship among all religions and all humankind. Here there is no option.

It is not possible for us to choose some verses for peace or some other verses for war. The verses on war were made unnecessary or became *"Al-mann sūf"* by the one calling for peace. We have to pay careful attention to this.

Thank you.

(Chair) In conclusion, Dr. Hanafi has something to say, providing some answers.

(Hanafi) Yes, indeed, there is a whole logic and jurisprudence of how to solve apparent contradictions in the Koran, as well as in the Old Testament and the New Testament. Jesus Christ said I did not come to give peace but to give a sword, and in the same time he

is saying love thy neighbor. Then ambiguity of languages can be solved by the general and the particular, the metaphoric and the literal; a whole linguistic logic, a whole historical chronology of the texts and all that will solve contradictions.

Any absolutist claim has to collide with any other absolutist claim, then the President of America as well as Osama Bin Laden both have absolutist claims. That is why it is against dialogue, against mutual understanding. For instance, if you would like to know what Islam is, Islam is a free choice between being a good Jew or a good Christian. Let me translate one Koranic verse: if you would like to punish, punish according to the law of the talon: eye for eye, tooth for tooth. This is the Ten Commandments. But if you would like to forgive is also good; this is the teaching of Christ. Islam is to be a good Jew or to be a good Christian. This is the real Muslim. Without anything new, since we are speaking of monotheistic faiths, that means, indeed, it is a final note maybe concerning the essence of Abrahamic religion: tolerance, universal code of ethics, mutual recognition, and conviviality.

(Chair) Thank you very much.

Over the last two days, we have discussed monotheism. Since I am not a specialist and there were many subjects for me grasp, I do not think I can sum up the session. It was however a very valuable opportunity for me to join this session made up of twenty-three participants from twelve different countries outside Japan, and to be able to listen to lectures and participate in discussions with people that I rarely have to chance to meet at ordinary academic conferences. This is, I believe, where the significance of the CISMOR project lies. Even those who believe in the same religion have different interpretations and associations, or to go even farther, the differences may vary as much as each human being differs. Religions fundamentally call for peace. How we humans interpret them seems to cause various problems.

Dr. Mori quoted, at the end of his lecture, the amendment to the US Constitution, Article 1, to show the actual situation in the US where people of many different religions enjoy a peaceful coexistence. He added that if this situation can be realized in other countries throughout the world, peaceful coexistence could be possible, which I hope will not become a threat, but a promise. This issue cannot be resolved quickly. If resolved, this CISMOR project would be completed today. We have four more years. I personally hope the issues raised today will not be solved so soon.

Here's my personal opinion. The fact that *jihād*, holy war, just war and peace, and terrorism can be interpreted in such diversified ways does reflect the complexity of the issues. I believe that the first thing we have to do

is to recognize the complexity so that people with different religious backgrounds can understand each other. In this context, while we may not be able to address the issues without taking religions into consideration, we may be able to move closer to peaceful coexistence if we can establish a common system within the international community.

Some may like it and others may not, but my hope is as follows: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan happens to be here in Japan today and will meet with Foreign Minister Kawaguchi and Prime Minister Koizumi. Some maintain that since the assessed share of its contribution to the UN exceeds 20%, Japan should obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. However, I expect, as Dr. Mori said at the beginning of today's session and Dr. Hanafi said yesterday, that Japan, while maintaining neutrality and without taking any side, will play a mediating role in a fair manner.

After this two-day session, I am sure you must be tired. In closing, I hope this opportunity will help us broaden our understanding and lead to promoting better projects. This should not be the end but the commencement of our dialogue. Let me apologize for any inconvenience I might have caused as a moderator. Thank you for your cooperation.

In closing the workshop, Dr. Mori is going to say a few words.

(Mori) This two-day symposium and workshop is coming to an end. Since this international workshop is the first international meeting organized by CISMOR, our lack of experience may have caused you some inconvenience, for which I apologize. I am not going to list all the names, but I want to thank all those who made presentations and those who participated in the discussions. I also want to express my appreciation to all the staff members of CISMOR who made the preparations for this international workshop, as well as to staff of Congress who engaged in various negotiations for this program as an agent, and to staff of the Westin Miyako who have provided a comfortable environment for the last two days. Thank you very much.

As this was our first international workshop, we would like to have your candid opinions on how we can further develop this opportunity. Some of you may have negative comments from different viewpoints. Please e-mail me or the office of CISMOR. We are not organize any international workshop next year. In 2006, should we organize a workshop in the same way as this year or in a smaller group? Or, should we hold it not for two days but for a longer period? Based on your opinions and suggestions, we hope to improve our workshop. To have become acquainted with all of you will remain our precious treasure, and we hope to make full use of it.

Thank you for your cooperation.

∗ Comment by Ko Nakata, Director of CISMOR, on the statement by Abu Samra:

An Israeli student, a self-proclaimed Muslim sent from Israel, said that the Qur'an is not perfect. This is an idea contrary to the consensus of Islamic studies and was not an appropriate topic to discuss in this session with only a limited time. This was also not a meeting of specialists of Qur'anic studies. Posting his comment, which is contrary to the consensus of Islamic studies and no more than blasphemy against Islam, will damage the academic credibility of CISMOR and moreover, will indicate an approval of the blasphemy against Islam. Therefore, I believe that his comment must be deleted. This opinion, the opinion of the only specialist in Islamic studies in the editorial board of CISMOR, has not been accepted, and his comments have been left on record. For whatever consequences will occur in association with this matter in the future, I will take no responsibility either in this world or at the last judgment.

(Abu Samra)∗

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